Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France
Exactly Steve.
I'm wondering also why AvHerald is so keen about 4u9525.... I mean the owner of that site went to Berlin to visit the press conference. Can't remember any other case where he did that.
And it wasn't about fumes....
I'm wondering also why AvHerald is so keen about 4u9525.... I mean the owner of that site went to Berlin to visit the press conference. Can't remember any other case where he did that.
And it wasn't about fumes....
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Simon attended the BEA press conference for the final report on AF447, for example. And he didn't make the trip to Berlin just to hear Gόnter Lubitz talk, but he was in town for a few days anyway - at least that's what he says (4th paragraph in the avherald article).
I can understand that the part about the possibly defective door keypad got his attention, and that he asked BEA for more information about it:
And I find their response kind of disappointing:
But then again, maybe he shouldn't have submitted a whole catalog of no less than 25 questions about all kinds of weird topics brought up at the press conference, including gems like "Is the BEA aware that there are 4 different versions of the CVR transcript?" 
I can understand that the part about the possibly defective door keypad got his attention, and that he asked BEA for more information about it:
Originally Posted by avherald
6) Has the BEA received information about an occurrence on D-AIPX a few days prior to the crash, that a flight crew managed to lock themselves out of the cockpit while still on the ground and needed maintenance to get back into the cockpit?
7) Did the BEA investigate this occurrence, or did the BFU investigate this occurrence? Is it possible to receive that investigation report?
8) Is it correct, that this occurrence was caused by the failure of the digit x (Editorial note: actual key removed for publication) on the keypad?
9) Is the BEA in possession of the relevant tech log entries and is this occurrence included in this tech log? Was the keypad replaced, or was the defect deferred by maintenance?
7) Did the BEA investigate this occurrence, or did the BFU investigate this occurrence? Is it possible to receive that investigation report?
8) Is it correct, that this occurrence was caused by the failure of the digit x (Editorial note: actual key removed for publication) on the keypad?
9) Is the BEA in possession of the relevant tech log entries and is this occurrence included in this tech log? Was the keypad replaced, or was the defect deferred by maintenance?
Originally Posted by BEA
I am well aware that the recent press conference has renew the interest in this event but as far as the BEA is concerned, we have published the final report and have nothing else to add or to comment.
Why AVH is keen on the story he has answered more than clearly. Like many of us the Herald staff seem to find that there are a lot of unanswered questions which need addressing, some of them quite pressing ones such as the keypad issue and generally the conduct of that investigation. That is reason enough to keep looking at it.
This is a pilot's father trying do defend the family or similar in formation flight with some "investigative" journalist with some non proven suspicions. So far okay but nothing to bring forward the topic itself. Shouldn't we wait for actual news to come up? Apologies but I don't care that much about the FO family's PR.
The BEA knew from the start that, because of the particular circumstances of the crash, every word they published would be subject to intense scrutiny and, on the whole, the investigation report reflects that (including a detailed discussion of the CDLS as applicable to the airframe in question)..
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Runs in the family ?
Mental illness ?
Lack of understanding of what goes on and accepting it.
As father, as son we say in Norway.
A total lack of understanding how things work, and how to behave.
This
Andreas is a mass murderer and a traitor to his country and his profession.
3 independent investigations say so.
Andreas was a rotten egg, and his Father knew he was a Coo Coo.
His inaction and his sons action has made a mess.
He could have stopped him, he did not.
He should not attack others, for telling the truth.
Lack of understanding of what goes on and accepting it.
As father, as son we say in Norway.
A total lack of understanding how things work, and how to behave.
This
Andreas is a mass murderer and a traitor to his country and his profession.3 independent investigations say so.
Andreas was a rotten egg, and his Father knew he was a Coo Coo.
His inaction and his sons action has made a mess.
He could have stopped him, he did not.
He should not attack others, for telling the truth.
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The father is victim too.
He lost his son, and his son went from the perfect son (young pilot from the national airline) to a mass murderer.
He (the father) feel probably guilty about his son's actions, but he has nothing to do with it. And all Germany hates him now, and his wife (the mother) ass well, And all the Lubitz Family.
So, as a father, you can :
1- commit suicide (alone please)
2- deny the truth
3- go insane
He chose the second option...
I feel sorry for him
He lost his son, and his son went from the perfect son (young pilot from the national airline) to a mass murderer.
He (the father) feel probably guilty about his son's actions, but he has nothing to do with it. And all Germany hates him now, and his wife (the mother) ass well, And all the Lubitz Family.
So, as a father, you can :
1- commit suicide (alone please)
2- deny the truth
3- go insane
He chose the second option...
I feel sorry for him
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He could have stopped him, he did not.
Lots of people have - and muddle through with - severe psychiatric problems. It's far from true to say that their nearest and dearest always know what's going on, or how unwell they are.
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We all have problems, and we all hide things.
But you have to be blind as a father is you in this case did not see that your son had big problems and needed serious help and restrictions.
If Your son drops out due to depressions it is Your duty to help him. If not there is something wrong with You.
I think Lubnitz Sr just proved to all that he was not a good and passionate father. He could have helped his son get proper treatment and job on the ground. That is what good Dads do!
And , no, I am not privy to any information You dont have.
But my field of interest happens to be Human Performance in Aviation, or the lack of it.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.
But you have to be blind as a father is you in this case did not see that your son had big problems and needed serious help and restrictions.
If Your son drops out due to depressions it is Your duty to help him. If not there is something wrong with You.
I think Lubnitz Sr just proved to all that he was not a good and passionate father. He could have helped his son get proper treatment and job on the ground. That is what good Dads do!
And , no, I am not privy to any information You dont have.
But my field of interest happens to be Human Performance in Aviation, or the lack of it.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.
BluSdUp
Lubitz father is denying a depression of his son.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaJOTaPK0sc&t=5488s
Lubitz father is denying a depression of his son.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaJOTaPK0sc&t=5488s
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But my field of interest happens to be Human Performance in Aviation, or the lack of it.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.
This person should never have been near an aircraft , never mind flying one!
Some knew this but chose to turn the blind eye, that is a crime.
His father must have known or should have.
Now, there are clearly several types of depression (and related illnesses). Certainly some stories about Lubitz suggest that his illness was unusual and should have raised red flags if they are true as reported. However speaking more generally, people who kill themselves often do surprise friends and family. Also, the brighter you are, the more unwell you can get whilst still seemingly holding things together. And even if families know about a person's low mood, it's not uncommon for it to seemingly improve shortly before they decide to kill themselves - presumably due to the newfound sense of purpose.
And , no, I am not privy to any information You dont have.
Last edited by abgd; 14th Apr 2017 at 16:29.
On the previous flight, the following facts can be noted:
ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
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At around 1:33 in that youtube video, Tim Van Beveren, is saying that he believes Lubitz was dialling down the Altitude in the FCU on way to Barcelona, to see the optimal descent point / profile, this was regarding what happen on the previous sector to BCN.
Really clutching at straws these people.
These people are in serious denial regarding what happen.
Really clutching at straws these people.
These people are in serious denial regarding what happen.
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at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captains return to the cockpit;
at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captains return to the cockpit;
at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
If the descent was initiated to FL 350 and 100 feet selected "in the window" the a/c would continue as commanded towards FL350, but, if the "window" height was increased, as suggested, to 49000 feet, on a Boeing, the A/P would have discontinued the "v-nav" descent and reverted to "Alt Hold". Surely the same would have occurred on an Airbus!
Over to you bus drivers...
Only half a speed-brake
Mode reversion, yes - but to SEL V/S of the moment when the ALT selector goes through the currently passing level / altitude.
