Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France
IMHO the father is only a victim of the PAID journo (self called expert) sitting on the far right.
https://youtu.be/RaJOTaPK0sc
https://youtu.be/RaJOTaPK0sc
Last edited by gearlever; 4th Apr 2017 at 15:12. Reason: video
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I think the BEA checked with Airbus and Germanwings about how the cockpit door for this aircraft was programmed, apparently the normal access code generates a buzzer for only 980ms and they ruled out completely that a 'clacking' noise heard during the 980ms buzzer was the switch being set to LOCK. The noise probably was Lubitz doing something at that point in the process of locking the door and preparing himself for what he was about to do.
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keypad didn't work. Btw., the reasoning offered for that specific last item is the one thing that makes the AVHerald article worth reading, more precisely the section titled "Keypad, normal and emergency entry".
But make no mistake, I have little doubt whether or not Lubitz did all this intentionally. From the BFU statement in the final report, appendix 3 (emphasis is mine):
This assessment of the capability to act combined with the factual information, that the co-pilot [...] has made enquiries concerning the function of the door system and suicides, according to documents available to BFU, resulted in the above-mentioned conclusion.
Stand to be corrected.
Last edited by gearlever; 4th Apr 2017 at 17:24. Reason: typo
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Didn't they find web searches on his tablet computer in the days leading up to the crash which included "ways to commit suicide" and "cockpit doors and their security provisions"?
This is really strange (flight to BCN)
On page 28 of the final report you can find the corresponding graph, scary.
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyd...0125.en-LR.pdf
On the previous flight, the following facts can be noted:
ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to
continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
ˆˆ at 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the aeroplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the co-pilot;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350 , selected a few seconds earlier;
ˆˆ at 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to
continue the descent to flight level FL210;
ˆˆ at 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft;
ˆˆ from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 ft most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
ˆˆ at 7 h 24 min 29, noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit;
ˆˆ at 7 h 25 min 32, the flight was transferred to the Barcelona en-route control
centre and the crew was instructed to descend to FL170;
ˆˆ at 7 h 26 min 16, the aircraft was put into a descent to its newly cleared flight level and the flight continued normally.
Due to the engaged autopilot modes, the changes in selected altitudes described above did not influence the aircraft descent flight path.
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyd...0125.en-LR.pdf
I must repeat my question as of before..
Is it true or false that BA no longer follow the two cockpit policy?
Is it true or false that BA no longer follow the two cockpit policy?
If you insist on conflating this with the elderly pax: severe credibility probs with the media reports, done to death elsewhere on Pprune.
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You can repeat your question as often as you want but no professional aviator with any sense will give you answers to questions involving security measures - being blunt there is a principle called "need to know" and in this case you don't "need to know".
Nemrytter - you're not wrong but as someone once said: "You might say that, I can't possibly comment 
Seriously though, and just to clarify matters for the sake of A320ECAM ......
For good reason most (?all) companies have a blanket prohibition (on pain of dismissal) on staff discussing security matters with e.g. non employees and others outside the organisation.
Seriously though, and just to clarify matters for the sake of A320ECAM ......
For good reason most (?all) companies have a blanket prohibition (on pain of dismissal) on staff discussing security matters with e.g. non employees and others outside the organisation.
Last edited by wiggy; 6th Apr 2017 at 06:49.
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or good reason most (?all) companies have a blanket prohibition (on pain of dismissal) on staff discussing security matters
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I cannot believe that the AVH would give the father of Lubitz time considering what Lubitz did?
The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!
The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!
the French should have sent up two F-16s
In any event as I recall it at the time reports were they were pretty quick to react but no way they could intercept in time to observe events unravelling.
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I cannot believe that the AVH would give the father of Lubitz time considering what Lubitz did?
The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!
The moment the plane lost RT, the French should have sent up two F-16s to check what was going on in the flight deck. Had they seen Lubitz alive and conscious, then that would shut Lubitz' ignorant and unapologetic father up once and for all!
The second point is unnecessary - after all, the data from the FDR is very clear what happened. The son didn't just 'play with the selected altitude' and become unconscious, he was adjusting the target speed as the aircraft descended. Had the father's claims held any truth, the son could have returned the target altitude back to a safe level, rather than repeatedly turning the target speed ever higher.
As the last movement of the speed control knob happened more than 4 minutes after the altitude was selected to 100 feet, it was clear that Lubitz knew what he was doing, the father should shut up and think of the families of the victims......
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'see, he did that on the previous flight, the a/p altitude knob was something he always played with when the other crew member was out of the cockpit'
and try to use it as proof the son never intentionally crashed the aircraft because in the previous flight, the turning to 100 feet had made no difference; unfortunately - so is the probable reasoning of Lubitz Senior - on the return flight his son became incapacitated after he had adjusted the altitude to 100 feet, hence the plane crashed.
The fact that he wasn't incapacitated enough to stop continually modifying the target airspeed over the next 4 minutes hasn't yet registered with this ill-informed and crassly insensitive father - but I can live in hope that he eventually reads this and understands how much anger he is causing families of the victims by his refusal to accept the truth.
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