Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

[NigelOnDraft]

The evidence against the F/O looks overwhelming but based on a single memory card as far as I understand.

I think there are 3 sources to date:

1. CVR
2. ATC: Mode C/S and Comms (or lack of)
3. ADS-B e.g. FR24

The last is somewhat "independent" in that it recorded in real time certain data - the most significant of which I would think are:

1. Selected Altitude would down to ~100'
2. Once past transition, I believe IAS is maintained accurately at just under 350KIAS (Max) - I am sure some maths will show whether or not M was consistent above Transition?

I would think if a "shootdown" or structural failure was responsible, the ADS-B data would be very different? Whilst we have heard little re the ATC Data, I suspect that would be as the ADS-B.

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft

Please consider the following scenario

1. Buzzer goes off, Capt & FA in cockpit.
2. Capt assess the person requesting entry is a security hazard and wishes to deny them entry
3. FA decides the person outside the door is to be permitted entry.

and now please answer:

1. Under the "policy", whose decision is final?
2. In practical terms, should they disagree, whose decision is the one that can be made to apply?

I do not know whether the airlines with the policy have specified the above, my employer did not have the policy so I cannot help. But were I to operate as Captain under the policy, I would wish to ensure the policy made the answers (and others) clear to all.

I believe life has moved on since last week, and risks that were not apparent prior to last week are now known world wide. IMO this policy adds clear new risks, now the "2 in cockpit" rule is so widely known and practiced.

Nigel, a nice straw man - however I think in this case even the slowest flight attendant might be influenced by the high rate descent, the proximity of the mountains through the cockpit window and the screams of the pax.

From a more psychological point of view, the action of the FO was a lot easier to take when 'alone' in his own little world and the people behind were just noises in his head. Having a person in the cockpit changes that psychological state as he would have been actively taking that person's life which is a little more difficult.

[montague]

shotgun licences / HGV licences

I do HGV medicals and those ask for history of mental illness / suicidal ideation etc - usually they are my own patients so I tend to know their history. You can of course go to another doctor who may not know,
Re the shotgun licence until recently it has been "let us know if you think there is a problem" now it is "please send us a health report" ..... lovely battles underway as to what they mean by a "health report" . Patient has to pay for these BTW

[gasbag1]

"I have too much work and I am not able to do my job properly,"

"Interesting to me because it dovetails into one theory, which is that he was not up to the job, partially because of his inexperience. I think it is worthwhile to note that he would not have been in the cockpit of an American A 320 because he would be not meet the basic experience level to qualify in America. I hope its OK to make that observation, because I think its important."

Indeed I have wondered the same thought. Given the experience required to be hired in North America by an airline who operates the A-320 or B 737, the new hire would have flown with at least one or more previous airlines or commercial operations. During that earlier period any dangerous tendencies would have been noticed.

[turker339]

Don't forget to look at the situation from the other side of the fence. I know a F/O that lost his father, got into a depression (no suicidal tendencies though) and did the correct thing by going to an AME instead of going to a GP without declaring his profession. He lost his license and is now, having recovered fully, fighting to get it back. Shame this little ordeal will probably further cement his chances of getting back in the FD.

[Denti]

Indeed I have wondered the same thought. Given the experience required to be hired in North America by an airline who operates the A-320 or B 737, the new hire would have flown with at least one or more previous airlines or commercial operations. During that earlier period any dangerous tendencies would have been noticed.

Apparently not, remember the Fedex screwup and the Jetblue nutcase.

Anyway, the industry is different in europe to north america. In europe there have always been cadets entering directly into airliner flight decks. And airlines have run their own schools since WWII, therefore there is a lot of experience with training from the ground up.

Interestingly enough, every winter those cadets do fly in north america as well, in 737s too, not to mention those lucky cadets that make it into long haul early on and fly over there with their widebodies.

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by topoftheloop

There are some incorrect technical statements, obviously the author is not an aviation specialist.

He seems also to have a problem with the English language, being under the impression that "accusation" and "evidence" are synonymous.

[marie paire]

Slats 11

Maybe screening at airports is now good enough the bomb proof doors are no longer necessary. 9/11 was a game changer, weakly armed hijackers probably can't get control of a plane again, and there have been several incidents thwarted by passengers. So maybe we need to revisit the issue of cockpit security.

I agree. But it will never happen. The US would rather see 100 full loaded planes go down than one hit the White House.

[Rushed Approach]

It is the prosecutor's job to launch an accusation if he thinks there is some data making this possible ! It is a lawyer's job to argue that this data isn't convincing. A trial will decide. Saying such a process is ridiculous seems to me... rather strange (I wouldn't like to say ridiculous, because I suppose things are working differently in other countries ; please do not fall in this US tendency saying that "if you don't do things like we do, it means you haven't still found the right way").

It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.

[Cantiflas]

Min. of two on flight deck.

If I had a pound or dollar for every mention of "knee-jerk" in this context I'd be much better-off.I truly believe that this reaction is not so.The argument has been most probably finely balanced and this event was the tipping-point in Europe.
When the .38/45 and mega-Joule-proof doors came in,it fell to the lot of some of us to come up with a satisfactory procedure.The reason some airlines went for a minimum of two might have been the same as mine:I could not accept the idea of one pilot,on their own,behind something notionally impenetrable.I was coming from the standpoint of overall safety for all on board by having another pair of hands and eyes available-no algorithms,no statistics.Cabin crew are well trained and resourcful.

[Rushed Approach]

You display no clue about French legal process, yet choose to be critical of it.

The question of a "crime" or not is not relevant. I explained earlier that when a life has been lost, the "Procureur" for the relevant district opens an "instruction" I explained this in an earlier post ( Iwould quote the post number, but because of deletions, the number keeps changing)

Here 150 lives were lost.

The Procureur (please note the different vocabulary; "Procureur" is not the same thing as "prosecutor"), is obliged to open a case and be open with the public and with all concerned parties.

The Procureur is not investigating the technical aspects; BEA do that. They brief him, and he applies his required public duty to what follows.

He does not have "gut feelings" and as such they are neither subjective nor not so.

Just to be clear, because you seem not to have grasped it. When a death has occurred, the Procureur opens a case. It does not ergo facto mean that there is a suspicion of a crime having been committed.

The, in due course, BEA investigations and reports become part of the "instruction"

Got it now?

Thanks for the patronising reply.

In which case he doesn't need to pass subjective judgments as to what is "likely" to have happened does he? Thought not. Got it?

[mercurydancer]

You cannot treat anyone until a diagnosis is made, or at least symptom control or empirical treatment. Its quite possible to attend a clinic or hospital for investigations and not be treated. I understand that in this instance, there is an attendance at a clinic for an eye problem.

It is not unusual for someone to present with a physical set of symptoms which either consciously or unconsciously cause the person to go to a doctor.

Conscious or deliberate attendance? Perhaps the person wanted to speak to a doctor but his employment would put him in some kind of jeopardy if he reported mental difficulties. Best go to the doctor with en eye problem?

[rh200]

The fact that this guy has put a whole plane into a mountain suggests that there is much more than depression at play here.

Exactly right, it seems to be along the same lines as those wanting to go out in some sort of twisted glory logic that they will know my name. I would suggest it gets group in the mass shootings type of thing.

There are possible reasons for this phenomena but this thread is not the place to discuss.

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by Rushed Approach

It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.

I actually doubt that very much, do you seriously think that if you deliberately caused the death of 149 people in UK, and the evidence is plain on the CVR that you did it and you are still flying happily with the airline that the AAIB would not pass that evidence to the police? Of course they would pass all the evidence to the police or they would be criminally liable themselves.
There is a huge difference between an accident due to human error and a deliberate crash.

[montague]

You cannot treat anyone until a diagnosis is made, or at least symptom control or empirical treatment. Its quite possible to attend a clinic or hospital for investigations and not be treated. I understand that in this instance, there is an attendance at a clinic for an eye problem.

It is not unusual for someone to present with a physical set of symptoms which either consciously or unconsciously cause the person to go to a doctor.

Conscious or deliberate attendance? Perhaps the person wanted to speak to a doctor but his employment would put him in some kind of jeopardy if he reported mental difficulties. Best go to the doctor with en eye problem?

Classic is the diabetics in the UK - plenty of type 2 DM HGV drivers who are fine so long as they are aware of the potential problems of one or two of the drugs. However some Type 2's end up up on insulin and that is a no no for the HGV licence - hence some reluctance to attend for monitoring of the condition.

[Cows getting bigger]

I'm a little bemused by the regular references to US cockpits and the strength of their 1500hr rule. That rule isn't exactly something that has been kicking around for too long and, if the jungle drums are to be believed, was implemented as a (knee jerk) reaction to the Colgan crash.

Sooooo, I'm not sure the example is mature enough to be quoted as why things are better over the western side of the Atlantic.

[Alain67]

@Rushed Approach

It's ridiculous (to me being UK based) because the whole point about aircraft investigations is that witness testimony is protected from being passed on to law enforcement agencies in the UK - i.e. aviation safety is placed above criminal proceedings. Clearly it's different in France. The reason for this is simple - if you screw up and are going to be prosecuted for it, then you are going to cover it up if there is a danger you will be locked up, hence every pilot would stay silent in any investigation in case they might be accused of a "crime".

So yes the French system does indeed appear to be different, but not for the better as far as flight safety is concerned some would argue.

Ok, systems are different. Yours (UK) might also have problems IMHO :
take the case of a serious medical error, or suppose an innocent is put in jail, do you think that in order to improve the efficiency of these jobs in the future, one should also stay silent ? We all tend to ask truth about faults made by others, and aren't very prompt to tell it when the problem is on our side.

[BOING]

CGB

Requirements change with time and demand but at my airline selection interview, about 30 years ago, ALL of the applicants had 4-jet time (some of 'em 8 jets ). This was far above the airlines published basic requirements but I guess that if you pay the wages you get to select the employees.

[Rushed Approach]

I would point out that we do not know that IF a pilot was in the cabin he ever entered the emergency code. As far as I know, it is not possible for the airline to disable the emergency code option (the FCOM doesn't indicate so), so the assertion by the quoted individual from Germanwings does not make sense in saying that this option was not available. If a pilot was out of the flight deck, he and the rest of the crew could have forgotten the code (or have been told a different one to that which was programmed) which might explain why it was never entered.

I suspect the Germanwings aircraft did not have a physical "deadbolt" fitted, so that's another red herring.

Bilt mentions a GPWS "Sink Rate" warning on the CVR supposedly shortly after a pilot left the flight deck, yet this is an approach/go-around mode that you would not expect to be triggered at all in the scenarios discussed on here thus far.

[Rushed Approach]

I actually doubt that very much, do you seriously think that if you deliberately caused the death of 149 people in UK, and the evidence is plain on the CVR that you did it and you are still flying happily with the airline that the AAIB would not pass that evidence to the police? Of course they would pass all the evidence to the police or they would be criminally liable themselves. There is a huge difference between an accident due to human error and a deliberate crash

The point that you seem to be having extreme difficulty in grasping, is that what is "deliberate" cannot be determined until a proper investigation has concluded. Therefore if you want the best flight safety system, the quid pro quo is that you must assume those involved are innocent until proven guilty.

Otherwise you compromise the whole reporting system.