Runway excursion by DL MD-80
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sorry, it is info from our training department.
especially worisome though is evacuation without coordination with pilots in the case of under wing mounted engines.
in other words, the guys who pay me say don' t let pax jump out on their own.
especially worisome though is evacuation without coordination with pilots in the case of under wing mounted engines.
in other words, the guys who pay me say don' t let pax jump out on their own.
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Agree completely. But we were getting no instructions other than, "please return to your seats we are not at the gate" which was a little odd. And, the way we hit, we had no way of knowing whether or not the pilots were conscious. We were waiting for guidance and didn't get any for a few minutes. Once the smell of smoke started working the way through the plane, it only heightened concerns. To this day, I still don't know whether either of the pilots issued a command or statement. There certainly was no, "this is the pilot, ...."
The gentleman on the opposite side of the plane to me opened his exit door and was subsequently told to shut it, (as they were spraying down the plane.) The front left exit door popped open upon landing on its own.
Bottom line, at some point you have to start thinking about options--and one of mine was to open my exit row and.....exit. But that would have only happened if things had gotten significantly worse and we still weren't getting guidance.
The gentleman on the opposite side of the plane to me opened his exit door and was subsequently told to shut it, (as they were spraying down the plane.) The front left exit door popped open upon landing on its own.
Bottom line, at some point you have to start thinking about options--and one of mine was to open my exit row and.....exit. But that would have only happened if things had gotten significantly worse and we still weren't getting guidance.
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to those involved with the lga southwest deal. did you report the lack of leadership to the ntsb?
The captain should make the decisions based upon all available facts. Sometimes the captain does not get all the information, or gets it wrong.
but for the average passenger, just jumping out of a plane on the runway or taxiway (we don't make our airports with tarmac here) is pretty dumb.
BUT if you do have special information like: can't stay in my seat with my seatbelt fastened because my seat has fallen through the bottom of the plane, do call it to the captain's attention.
The captain should make the decisions based upon all available facts. Sometimes the captain does not get all the information, or gets it wrong.
but for the average passenger, just jumping out of a plane on the runway or taxiway (we don't make our airports with tarmac here) is pretty dumb.
BUT if you do have special information like: can't stay in my seat with my seatbelt fastened because my seat has fallen through the bottom of the plane, do call it to the captain's attention.
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Using your example above, should I climb back into the cabin (from the hold, where I've fallen), or just yell from where I am?
I can understand the reluctance by the captain to call an evacuation, but how much more info did the captain need in the example a few posts back?
Denial
The flight crew in an incident or accident have a human tendency to believe things are not as bad as they really are.
If they are able to taxi, the assumption is: It can't be that bad -- lets work through the SOPs.
It seems in the delayed evacuation cases mentioned that the SOPs have left out monitoring the cabin for smoke
If they are able to taxi, the assumption is: It can't be that bad -- lets work through the SOPs.
It seems in the delayed evacuation cases mentioned that the SOPs have left out monitoring the cabin for smoke
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Historic cases: Pilot's erroneous mental-model
From slot above:
In other threads there are records of the INVESTIGATOR-err, due to the investigators' mistaken mental-model [false narrative, erroneous hypothesis, patriotic-protectionism]. And most recently at USA's CSB:In various cases of smoke-fire (on ground and inflight), the pilots' mistaken mental-model (from the misleading smoke-stream) took pilots to the WRONG CHECKLIST (Electrical Fire _v_ Cargo Smoke).
Since this thread is about a mishap at LGA, & other comments about that earlier B737 Nose Landing Gear failure at LGA:
There were two cases during the summer of 1964, where the mishap-pilots' misperceived a MLG separation (mistakenly as a tire-failure, or nothing-at-all).
Northeast Airlines 715 / 5Jun64 DC-6B, N8221H, approach to LGA Rwy31 impacted dike prior to threshold; Rt MLG separated. . . . CAB's AAR pg-3:
And two months later:
TWA91 / 26Aug64 B707-331C N787TW, Capt Hogan, landing Kansas City downtown, MKC, Both MLG sheared off by impact with Dike…. This case was reviewed regularly during recurrent training for decades after:
[UMKC archives, Box 157 (index on p36), Folder, Incident – August 26, 1964 (1), and (2), Kansas City, MO –- FLT 91 Capt. Hogan.]
... flight crew in an incident or accident have a human tendency to believe things are not as bad . . . the assumption is: It can't be that bad -- lets work through . . .
Since this thread is about a mishap at LGA, & other comments about that earlier B737 Nose Landing Gear failure at LGA:
There were two cases during the summer of 1964, where the mishap-pilots' misperceived a MLG separation (mistakenly as a tire-failure, or nothing-at-all).
Northeast Airlines 715 / 5Jun64 DC-6B, N8221H, approach to LGA Rwy31 impacted dike prior to threshold; Rt MLG separated. . . . CAB's AAR pg-3:
As the aircraft passed over the water retaining dike located ahead of the runway threshold a "thump" was heard or felt by the crew. With regard to this occurrence, the captain stated,
" . . . there was no change of any sort other than the thump, either the sound or the feeling -- I believe it was feeling probably more than sound . . . I was aware that the aircraft had struck something. I was quite surprised, and the first officer made the statement that,
" . . . there was no change of any sort other than the thump, either the sound or the feeling -- I believe it was feeling probably more than sound . . . I was aware that the aircraft had struck something. I was quite surprised, and the first officer made the statement that,
'I think we might have blown a tire'
. . . after we were in what I was considering the landing, and I thought the gear was still with us . . . "
TWA91 / 26Aug64 B707-331C N787TW, Capt Hogan, landing Kansas City downtown, MKC, Both MLG sheared off by impact with Dike…. This case was reviewed regularly during recurrent training for decades after:
those mishap-pilots attempted to taxi their B707, not realizing that their airliner was belly-on-the-concrete.
Various instructors would recite the old story: The pilots didn’t begin to recognize the real problem until passengers had exited, then around to the cockpit side-window … No AAR(an “incident”). No details about the post accident misperceptions (unaware MLG had separated).[UMKC archives, Box 157 (index on p36), Folder, Incident – August 26, 1964 (1), and (2), Kansas City, MO –- FLT 91 Capt. Hogan.]
Last edited by IGh; 22nd Mar 2015 at 02:47.
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Excessive reverse thrust
NTSB Issues Third Update on the Delta Flight 1086 Accident at LaGuardia
NTSB Issues Third Update on the Delta Flight 1086 Accident at LaGuardia
4/2/2015
As part of its ongoing investigation into the March 5, 2015 accident at LaGuardia Airport where Delta Air Lines flight 1086 veered off the runway shortly after touching down, the NTSB today released its third investigative update.
At about 11:02 a.m., the Boeing MD-88, flying from Atlanta, GA to New York, NY, exited the left side of runway 13, struck a perimeter fence with its left wing, and came to rest with its nose on an embankment. There were 127 passengers on the aircraft, including two infants carried on adults’ laps, as well as five crewmembers. Twenty-three passengers suffered minor injuries.
The NTSB has formed two additional investigative groups that will investigate Airport Operations and Survival Factors. Existing groups include Operations and Human Performance, Airplane Performance, Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, and Maintenance Records.
The Airport Operations group will document the snow-clearing plan in place at LaGuardia Airport and document snow clearing operations the day of the accident. Thus far, the group was provided information indicating that runway 13 was cleared approximately 20-25 minutes prior to the accident.
The Survival Factors group will document the cabin safety aspects of the accident, and the emergency evacuation of the accident airplane.
Other updates include:
• The Airworthiness group has completed its initial examination of the accident airplane. Several components have been removed from the accident airplane for further examination and testing. At this point, no pre-impact anomalies have been noted in the airplane structure, spoilers, thrust reversers, or braking system.
• The Operations group has found that four airplanes landed on runway 13 between the conclusion of snow-clearing operations at about 10:40 local time and the accident flight. It also determined that the airplane that landed three minutes before the accident flight was another Delta MD-88 airplane. The group has interviewed or obtained statements from all four flight crews. The group reviewed the Delta MD-88 pilot operational materials and found guidance to limit reverse engine pressure ratios (EPR) to 1.3 on contaminated runways.
• The Airplane Performance group continues to examine data from the FDR, ATC radar, weather, and ground scar information to determine the timeline of aircraft motion, pilot control inputs and forces acting on the airplane. Based on a preliminary readout and examination of the FDR data from the Flight Data Recorder group and preliminary calculations from the Airplane Performance group:
NTSB Issues Third Update on the Delta Flight 1086 Accident at LaGuardia
4/2/2015
As part of its ongoing investigation into the March 5, 2015 accident at LaGuardia Airport where Delta Air Lines flight 1086 veered off the runway shortly after touching down, the NTSB today released its third investigative update.
At about 11:02 a.m., the Boeing MD-88, flying from Atlanta, GA to New York, NY, exited the left side of runway 13, struck a perimeter fence with its left wing, and came to rest with its nose on an embankment. There were 127 passengers on the aircraft, including two infants carried on adults’ laps, as well as five crewmembers. Twenty-three passengers suffered minor injuries.
The NTSB has formed two additional investigative groups that will investigate Airport Operations and Survival Factors. Existing groups include Operations and Human Performance, Airplane Performance, Flight Data Recorder, Cockpit Voice Recorder, and Maintenance Records.
The Airport Operations group will document the snow-clearing plan in place at LaGuardia Airport and document snow clearing operations the day of the accident. Thus far, the group was provided information indicating that runway 13 was cleared approximately 20-25 minutes prior to the accident.
The Survival Factors group will document the cabin safety aspects of the accident, and the emergency evacuation of the accident airplane.
Other updates include:
• The Airworthiness group has completed its initial examination of the accident airplane. Several components have been removed from the accident airplane for further examination and testing. At this point, no pre-impact anomalies have been noted in the airplane structure, spoilers, thrust reversers, or braking system.
• The Operations group has found that four airplanes landed on runway 13 between the conclusion of snow-clearing operations at about 10:40 local time and the accident flight. It also determined that the airplane that landed three minutes before the accident flight was another Delta MD-88 airplane. The group has interviewed or obtained statements from all four flight crews. The group reviewed the Delta MD-88 pilot operational materials and found guidance to limit reverse engine pressure ratios (EPR) to 1.3 on contaminated runways.
• The Airplane Performance group continues to examine data from the FDR, ATC radar, weather, and ground scar information to determine the timeline of aircraft motion, pilot control inputs and forces acting on the airplane. Based on a preliminary readout and examination of the FDR data from the Flight Data Recorder group and preliminary calculations from the Airplane Performance group:
o The airplane was aligned with the runway centerline during the approach to the runway.
o The autopilot was engaged until the airplane was about 230 feet above the ground.
o The airspeed during the final approach was about 140 knots.
o The main landing gear touched down close to the runway centerline, at a speed of about 133 knots.
o Two seconds after main gear touchdown both thrust reversers were deployed and engines began advancing in power.
o The spoilers were fully deployed within 2.5 seconds after main gear touchdown.
o The nose gear touched down and brake pressure began to rise in a manner consistent with autobrake application 2.8 seconds after the main gear touchdown.
o About six seconds after main gear touchdown, the airplane’s heading began to diverge to the left. At this point, both the left and right engine EPR were about 1.9 with the reversers still deployed.
o The engines reached peak recorded reverse thrust of 2.07 EPR on the left, and 1.91 EPR on the right, between six and seven seconds after touchdown. Engine thrust decreased after this point.
o The thrust reversers were stowed nine seconds after main gear touchdown when the engines were both at about 1.6 EPR.
o The airplane departed the left side of the runway approximately 14 seconds after main gear touchdown.
The investigation is ongoing and any future updates will be issued as events warrant. For the latest, follow the investigation on Twitter at @NTSB or on our website at ntsb.gov.
o The autopilot was engaged until the airplane was about 230 feet above the ground.
o The airspeed during the final approach was about 140 knots.
o The main landing gear touched down close to the runway centerline, at a speed of about 133 knots.
o Two seconds after main gear touchdown both thrust reversers were deployed and engines began advancing in power.
o The spoilers were fully deployed within 2.5 seconds after main gear touchdown.
o The nose gear touched down and brake pressure began to rise in a manner consistent with autobrake application 2.8 seconds after the main gear touchdown.
o About six seconds after main gear touchdown, the airplane’s heading began to diverge to the left. At this point, both the left and right engine EPR were about 1.9 with the reversers still deployed.
o The engines reached peak recorded reverse thrust of 2.07 EPR on the left, and 1.91 EPR on the right, between six and seven seconds after touchdown. Engine thrust decreased after this point.
o The thrust reversers were stowed nine seconds after main gear touchdown when the engines were both at about 1.6 EPR.
o The airplane departed the left side of the runway approximately 14 seconds after main gear touchdown.
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Dear ZEFFY
thanks for posting!
The MD80 series should have its nose wheel on the ground PRIOR to selecting thrust reverse.
Overboosting on thrust reverse and, LEFT engine putting out more power than Right, which would pull the plane to the LEFT, which is what happened. Though the timing might be slightly off. Rereading this shows the heading change at six seconds with the assymetric reverse at six to seven seconds, but close.
This may also give credence to the rudder blanking at high thrust reverse.
THINGS they should have done.
Delayed thrust reverse until nosewheel on ground and directional control established
Select thrust reverse at 1.3 epr instead of 1.9 to 2.07.
Sounds like a big OOOOPS in the front end of the plane.
thanks for posting!
The MD80 series should have its nose wheel on the ground PRIOR to selecting thrust reverse.
Overboosting on thrust reverse and, LEFT engine putting out more power than Right, which would pull the plane to the LEFT, which is what happened. Though the timing might be slightly off. Rereading this shows the heading change at six seconds with the assymetric reverse at six to seven seconds, but close.
This may also give credence to the rudder blanking at high thrust reverse.
THINGS they should have done.
Delayed thrust reverse until nosewheel on ground and directional control established
Select thrust reverse at 1.3 epr instead of 1.9 to 2.07.
Sounds like a big OOOOPS in the front end of the plane.
Last edited by skyhighfallguy; 3rd Apr 2015 at 00:49.
The plane didn't begin to verge left until 3 seconds after the nose wheel came down.
The EPR difference was relatively insignificant. The runway had to be much slicker than reported.
The EPR difference was relatively insignificant. The runway had to be much slicker than reported.
skyhighfallguy
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737er
i think it is significant
and rudder blanking happens above 1.3 epr.
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no worries friend
I think all transport pilots know that directional control on landing may even trump early and aggressive use of thrust reverse.
better to go off the end at 40 knots than the side at 100 knots eh?
I think all transport pilots know that directional control on landing may even trump early and aggressive use of thrust reverse.
better to go off the end at 40 knots than the side at 100 knots eh?
Well correct and true for the jets I have flown with the caveat that it takes a darn slick runway to get a high speed loss of directional control going based on reverse thrust application. But yes, if that occurs you decrease reverse thrust to regain controllability.
For example, an MEL'd TR would be allowable for many jets with a wet runway braking action good report. Also, you can honk in a full helping of reverse on a single engine landing and have zero directional control issues with wet-good runway on evey jet I've flown. ( but I've not flown the mad dog)
I think what we are talking about here is both. I think the rudder blockage issue sounds like its a serious factor on the MD and that runway was slipppery as snot, probably more than the breaking action report provided.
For example, an MEL'd TR would be allowable for many jets with a wet runway braking action good report. Also, you can honk in a full helping of reverse on a single engine landing and have zero directional control issues with wet-good runway on evey jet I've flown. ( but I've not flown the mad dog)
I think what we are talking about here is both. I think the rudder blockage issue sounds like its a serious factor on the MD and that runway was slipppery as snot, probably more than the breaking action report provided.
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The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable causes of this accident were the flight crew’s failure to discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area and the crew’s failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown.
Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2) continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio (EPR) after landing.
http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-re.../A01_49_70.pdf
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Recommendation from a 1980 test flight accident:
Incorporate the following information into the DC-9-80 training manuals
and training programs under the flight control and landing sections:
When thrust reversers (located just forward of the vertical stabilizer) are used during landing rollout, the exhaust gases from the engines are deflected by the thrust reverser buckets in such a manner that the free-stream airflow over the vertical stabilizer and rudder is blocked, reducing the
effectiveness of these surfaces. At a nominal airspeed of 100 KIAS, the reduction in rudder effectiveness with increasing symmetric reverse thrust levels is shown below.
Engine Thrust Setting Max Rudder Effectiveness available(%)
Forward Idle 100
Reverse Idle 65
1.3 EPR (Reverse) 25
1.6 EPR (Reverse) minimal
Rudder effectiveness also decreases with decreasing airspeed. On a dry runway, directional control is easily maintained by differential antiskid braking and nosewheel steering.
However, under adverse conditions such as a slippery runway with rain, snow, or ice, when crosswinds reduce the braking effectiveness of the gear on the upwind wing, or when a high speed landing is made with both hydraulics systems out (i.e., flaps/slats retracted, ground spoilers, rudder hydraulic boost, nosewheel steering all rendered inoperative, and brake
antiskid systems limited by hydraulic accumulator pressure), the vertical stabilizer and rudder will be the primary source of directional stability and control during the high speed portion of the landing rollout. Under these conditions, it is important to make allowance for the adverse effects of reverse thrust on the effectiveness of the vertical stabilizer and rudder.
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...0-06-19-US.pdf
Incorporate the following information into the DC-9-80 training manuals
and training programs under the flight control and landing sections:
When thrust reversers (located just forward of the vertical stabilizer) are used during landing rollout, the exhaust gases from the engines are deflected by the thrust reverser buckets in such a manner that the free-stream airflow over the vertical stabilizer and rudder is blocked, reducing the
effectiveness of these surfaces. At a nominal airspeed of 100 KIAS, the reduction in rudder effectiveness with increasing symmetric reverse thrust levels is shown below.
Engine Thrust Setting Max Rudder Effectiveness available(%)
Forward Idle 100
Reverse Idle 65
1.3 EPR (Reverse) 25
1.6 EPR (Reverse) minimal
Rudder effectiveness also decreases with decreasing airspeed. On a dry runway, directional control is easily maintained by differential antiskid braking and nosewheel steering.
However, under adverse conditions such as a slippery runway with rain, snow, or ice, when crosswinds reduce the braking effectiveness of the gear on the upwind wing, or when a high speed landing is made with both hydraulics systems out (i.e., flaps/slats retracted, ground spoilers, rudder hydraulic boost, nosewheel steering all rendered inoperative, and brake
antiskid systems limited by hydraulic accumulator pressure), the vertical stabilizer and rudder will be the primary source of directional stability and control during the high speed portion of the landing rollout. Under these conditions, it is important to make allowance for the adverse effects of reverse thrust on the effectiveness of the vertical stabilizer and rudder.
http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports...0-06-19-US.pdf
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2.07 L reverse and 1.97 R reverse would explain leaving the runway with rudder blanking at high reverse thrust and minimal nose wheel steering with full right rudder.
Reducing left reverse thrust when drift started to the left would have straightened the horse out using the stopping the horse with reins technique.
Reducing left reverse thrust when drift started to the left would have straightened the horse out using the stopping the horse with reins technique.