Runway excursion by DL MD-80
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Baggage and Evacuation
In view of all the discussion on bags and evacuation I went through a few of the Youtube recordings of the various airlines safety briefings. Delta did not appear to say anything about baggage and evacuation; the latest United video had the no baggage on evacuation as a ticker running on a bus destination board 
; a South West rapper gave one brief --- these safety briefings seem to have been handed over to marketing people to be entertainment / advertising rather than be a safety brief that may save people's lives. All seem to have 'safety is our number one priority' then proceed to show that it is not.
Perhaps it is time to tell airlines that briefing SLF particularly the SLF that need to be told how to do up a lap belt may mean making things a little more formal.
; a South West rapper gave one brief --- these safety briefings seem to have been handed over to marketing people to be entertainment / advertising rather than be a safety brief that may save people's lives. All seem to have 'safety is our number one priority' then proceed to show that it is not. Perhaps it is time to tell airlines that briefing SLF particularly the SLF that need to be told how to do up a lap belt may mean making things a little more formal.
Ian W...
Passengers' almost complete absence of situational awareness goes along with wearing flip-flops, T-shirts & shorts when departing for sun destinations from northern airports in mid-winter. I'm not sure what the survival time in -28C weather even with no windchill factor is but an evacuation isn't going to be very comfortable in light shirts with palm trees on them, and flip-flops don't give a lot of protection against sharp metal edges or rough ground just in case things go pear-shaped.
Why ruin the fun?, marketing reasonably says...what are the chances? Well, it works okay until it doesn't. It takes so little effort to take some of the responsibility for one's own safety aboard an aircraft.
Perhaps it is time to tell airlines that briefing SLF particularly the SLF that need to be told how to do up a lap belt may mean making things a little more formal.
Why ruin the fun?, marketing reasonably says...what are the chances? Well, it works okay until it doesn't. It takes so little effort to take some of the responsibility for one's own safety aboard an aircraft.
I am surprised that there has not been any comment on post #126 which suggests that the industry is complacent, not taking overruns very seriously.
Are we complacent, more willing to discuss baggage than an accident? What more can operators do to minimise the risks when landing on contaminated runways.
Does anyone have details of the prelanding distance calculations which the crew should have referenced; or do they use dispatch data?
What are the recommended crosswind values for various levels of contamination – MD80?
Although the runway is shorter than normal, non-contaminated landing distances should be well within the distance available without using reverse (Ops Requirement). Credit for reverse might only be considered when operating on contaminated runway with special provisions – EU Operations; what is the US case, what provisions?
What was the air temp, dew point difference? (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/1428/20120...tedRunways.pdf Appx 1)
Are we complacent, more willing to discuss baggage than an accident? What more can operators do to minimise the risks when landing on contaminated runways.
Does anyone have details of the prelanding distance calculations which the crew should have referenced; or do they use dispatch data?
What are the recommended crosswind values for various levels of contamination – MD80?
Although the runway is shorter than normal, non-contaminated landing distances should be well within the distance available without using reverse (Ops Requirement). Credit for reverse might only be considered when operating on contaminated runway with special provisions – EU Operations; what is the US case, what provisions?
What was the air temp, dew point difference? (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/1428/20120...tedRunways.pdf Appx 1)
safetypee, the baggage diversion was a b-session while we wait. I think most have been waiting for some data to see what the actual problem was - whether associated with the braking system itself, the initial absence of spoiler deployment/subsequent deployment by the F/O, and perhaps why JBI (or CRFI) or whatever it is called now, wasn't available to the crew because braking action reports in such conditions are contextual and may not apply to one's own airplane.
I believe once airborne the actual landing distance required is the calculation that is done and as you know those in-flight Advisory performance charts provide numbers for braking action, WAT conditions, wind, reversers etc.
And this was an excursion off the side and not off the end, so something other than runway distance required/availabe was at work perhaps?
I believe once airborne the actual landing distance required is the calculation that is done and as you know those in-flight Advisory performance charts provide numbers for braking action, WAT conditions, wind, reversers etc.
And this was an excursion off the side and not off the end, so something other than runway distance required/availabe was at work perhaps?
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Reuters reports:
Flight crew cite brake problem in Delta NYC accident: NTSB
A brake problem may have caused a Delta Air Lines Inc jet to skid off a runway at New York's LaGuardia Airport last week, according to testimony from the flight's crew, federal safety investigators said Monday.
The auto brakes were set to "max," but the crew "did not sense any wheel brake deceleration" before the plane crashed into a fence, the National Transportation Safety Board said in a statement. It added that the brake switch was found in the "max" position during the investigation.
"The captain reported that he was unable to prevent the airplane from drifting left," the agency said, confirming earlier media reports. The Boeing Co MD-88 aircraft stopped just feet from the icy waters of Flushing Bay, its left wing and other parts damaged but no passengers seriously injured.
"Investigators with the Airworthiness group will continue to examine and test the antiskid, autobrake and thrust reverser systems today," it added.
Another MD-88 aircraft operated by Delta landed on the same runway 3 minutes prior to the plane that crashed, the crew of which described the braking action on the runway as "good," the agency said.
Still, the National Transportation Safety Board said it is examining the weather conditions at the time of the accident.
A brake problem may have caused a Delta Air Lines Inc jet to skid off a runway at New York's LaGuardia Airport last week, according to testimony from the flight's crew, federal safety investigators said Monday.
The auto brakes were set to "max," but the crew "did not sense any wheel brake deceleration" before the plane crashed into a fence, the National Transportation Safety Board said in a statement. It added that the brake switch was found in the "max" position during the investigation.
"The captain reported that he was unable to prevent the airplane from drifting left," the agency said, confirming earlier media reports. The Boeing Co MD-88 aircraft stopped just feet from the icy waters of Flushing Bay, its left wing and other parts damaged but no passengers seriously injured.
"Investigators with the Airworthiness group will continue to examine and test the antiskid, autobrake and thrust reverser systems today," it added.
Another MD-88 aircraft operated by Delta landed on the same runway 3 minutes prior to the plane that crashed, the crew of which described the braking action on the runway as "good," the agency said.
Still, the National Transportation Safety Board said it is examining the weather conditions at the time of the accident.
PJ, you are seeking ‘runway braking action’; aren’t we all.
One of the issues in discussion (including reverse) involves the differences between Europe and the US.
Europe openly recognises that operations on contaminated runways involve increased risk and thus if these operations are to be conducted regularly some additional mitigation is required. If reverse is to be included then consider ‘what if’ it fails – perhaps less margin in speed, touchdown point being allowed, more GA minded.
The US apparently accepts contaminated operations as routine, or a necessity due to other limitations in the ATC / runway infrastructure. The chosen margin over ‘actual’ landing performance might only be the minimum 15%, which has been discussed elsewhere; ‘actual+15%’ might only be a better representation of what is actually achievable in routine operations, with everything working; thus in reality there is no margin.
Yes a runway excursion vice overrun, but there is a hint of complacency with thoughts of EAMS; these are to mitigate aspects of a landing which should have already have been allowed for, not an aspect of routine operations – “we don’t need more than 15% because of EMAS”. Of course EMAS has no value once off the pavement.
Did the airport calculate and broadcast braking action as per TALPA … a US inspired system.
If the pictures at #37 are representative of the runway condition – snow, slush, depth greater 1/8in, then the best braking action from TALPA would be ‘Medium’ or more likely ‘Medium Poor’. Then add to that the dew point which identifies increased risk.
Braking action also defines crosswind aspects, thus the reported wind might have been acceptable for ‘Good’, but it could be less so in ‘Medium Poor’ – even less margin for a rear engine aircraft; what mitigations would be considered for these ‘routine’ variations in wind measurment and reporting.
A key item in TALPA is that a PIREP cannot upgrade the braking action, thus a call of ‘Good’ is irrelevant as the preceding reports of "medium, worse at the end ... later said poor" remain unless there is a runway inspection. Are PIREPS considered that way, are all preceding PIREPS passed on to crews – not necessary if TALPA is used.
One of the issues in discussion (including reverse) involves the differences between Europe and the US.
Europe openly recognises that operations on contaminated runways involve increased risk and thus if these operations are to be conducted regularly some additional mitigation is required. If reverse is to be included then consider ‘what if’ it fails – perhaps less margin in speed, touchdown point being allowed, more GA minded.
The US apparently accepts contaminated operations as routine, or a necessity due to other limitations in the ATC / runway infrastructure. The chosen margin over ‘actual’ landing performance might only be the minimum 15%, which has been discussed elsewhere; ‘actual+15%’ might only be a better representation of what is actually achievable in routine operations, with everything working; thus in reality there is no margin.
Yes a runway excursion vice overrun, but there is a hint of complacency with thoughts of EAMS; these are to mitigate aspects of a landing which should have already have been allowed for, not an aspect of routine operations – “we don’t need more than 15% because of EMAS”. Of course EMAS has no value once off the pavement.
Did the airport calculate and broadcast braking action as per TALPA … a US inspired system.
If the pictures at #37 are representative of the runway condition – snow, slush, depth greater 1/8in, then the best braking action from TALPA would be ‘Medium’ or more likely ‘Medium Poor’. Then add to that the dew point which identifies increased risk.
Braking action also defines crosswind aspects, thus the reported wind might have been acceptable for ‘Good’, but it could be less so in ‘Medium Poor’ – even less margin for a rear engine aircraft; what mitigations would be considered for these ‘routine’ variations in wind measurment and reporting.
A key item in TALPA is that a PIREP cannot upgrade the braking action, thus a call of ‘Good’ is irrelevant as the preceding reports of "medium, worse at the end ... later said poor" remain unless there is a runway inspection. Are PIREPS considered that way, are all preceding PIREPS passed on to crews – not necessary if TALPA is used.
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Safetypee and PJ
Unfortunately, the aircraft ahead that had good braking action may have produced the poor braking action that the following aircraft experiences by blowing liquid with deicer off the surface and letting fresh snow fall on the water freezing in the wake of the landing aircraft's reverse thrust. Two minutes later there is a skating rink nicely prepped for the next aircraft.
If a lot of the automatics are predicated by WOW and wheel spin up, then the question has to be asked - what if they don't spin up?
Unfortunately, the aircraft ahead that had good braking action may have produced the poor braking action that the following aircraft experiences by blowing liquid with deicer off the surface and letting fresh snow fall on the water freezing in the wake of the landing aircraft's reverse thrust. Two minutes later there is a skating rink nicely prepped for the next aircraft.
If a lot of the automatics are predicated by WOW and wheel spin up, then the question has to be asked - what if they don't spin up?
Rotate on this!
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Passengers' almost complete absence of situational awareness goes along with wearing flip-flops, T-shirts & shorts when departing for sun destinations from northern airports in mid-winter
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If a lot of the automatics are predicated by WOW and wheel spin up, then the
question has to be asked - what if they don't spin up?
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Baggage Evacuation & Emergency Instructions
Unfortunately I've been on two different commercial crashes, so I do have a little different perspective on evacuation proceedings.
The first was SWA Flight 2294 back in 2009 when a football sized hole in the plane blew open in the top of the airplane. Fortunately, when we landed there was no need for an emergency evacuation and they advised us to grab our luggage. However, as I was sitting in an Exit Row, it was surprising the amount of additional information they provided as we were preparing to land. I've flown for over 25 years on business and had never heard some of those--important--instructions.
The 2nd was SWA Flight 345 2 years ago at LGA. In this case, we had no warning until we hit and skidded to a stop. It was shortly after the Asiana crash so it was fresh in our memories. As I was sitting in an exit row, I was waiting for crew instructions--none came. If you watch the in-plane flight Youtube clip, you will hear me ask, (as calmly as possible to not cause concern,) "do you want us to open the exit doors?" I asked it twice, no reply until we were told to take our seats.
As passengers, when you receive no guidance and you start to smell smoke, it was terribly upsetting. However, although great concern by all, I did not sense any real panic. We simply wanted to get off the plane, it took several minutes before they provided any instructions other than to sit down. At that point, individuals started to pick up their briefcases, computer bags or purses. I did not see anyone trying to get a rolling bag or anything of any size.
I'm a big man and went out the back slide which was elevated more than normal due to the nose of the plane tilting on the ground. My computer bag, clasped firmly in my arms on my chest, caused no problem.
I've read the criticism by others about this "selfish" act and how they would run someone over. No-you wouldn't. You might be surprised at how disciplined people can be even when scared to death. (That said, had we seen flames I don't think anyone would have grabbed anything, just get out. I was sitting beside the exit door on the raised wing, if it had gotten urgent, I was prepared to throw the door out and jump to the ground. Survival is more important than a rolled ankle.)
The first was SWA Flight 2294 back in 2009 when a football sized hole in the plane blew open in the top of the airplane. Fortunately, when we landed there was no need for an emergency evacuation and they advised us to grab our luggage. However, as I was sitting in an Exit Row, it was surprising the amount of additional information they provided as we were preparing to land. I've flown for over 25 years on business and had never heard some of those--important--instructions.
The 2nd was SWA Flight 345 2 years ago at LGA. In this case, we had no warning until we hit and skidded to a stop. It was shortly after the Asiana crash so it was fresh in our memories. As I was sitting in an exit row, I was waiting for crew instructions--none came. If you watch the in-plane flight Youtube clip, you will hear me ask, (as calmly as possible to not cause concern,) "do you want us to open the exit doors?" I asked it twice, no reply until we were told to take our seats.
As passengers, when you receive no guidance and you start to smell smoke, it was terribly upsetting. However, although great concern by all, I did not sense any real panic. We simply wanted to get off the plane, it took several minutes before they provided any instructions other than to sit down. At that point, individuals started to pick up their briefcases, computer bags or purses. I did not see anyone trying to get a rolling bag or anything of any size.
I'm a big man and went out the back slide which was elevated more than normal due to the nose of the plane tilting on the ground. My computer bag, clasped firmly in my arms on my chest, caused no problem.
I've read the criticism by others about this "selfish" act and how they would run someone over. No-you wouldn't. You might be surprised at how disciplined people can be even when scared to death. (That said, had we seen flames I don't think anyone would have grabbed anything, just get out. I was sitting beside the exit door on the raised wing, if it had gotten urgent, I was prepared to throw the door out and jump to the ground. Survival is more important than a rolled ankle.)
Crashman, please don't spoil the groupthink of "airline professionals."
You'll upset someone.
You'll upset someone.
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Baggage Evacuation & Emergency Instructions
CrashMan II
First hand and first class account of reality, rather than the pompous "commander control" which has prevailed from the procedure Jonnies on this thread.
I have only experienced one Bolko helicopter crash landing and one "bomb emergency" landing/evacuation in a BAC 1-11, and I would agree with your observations.
The pilot of the helicopter and the crew of the 1-11 were not the best source of reliable information to make an exit decision. Passengers can see risk unfold and act accordingly.
First hand and first class account of reality, rather than the pompous "commander control" which has prevailed from the procedure Jonnies on this thread.
I have only experienced one Bolko helicopter crash landing and one "bomb emergency" landing/evacuation in a BAC 1-11, and I would agree with your observations.
The pilot of the helicopter and the crew of the 1-11 were not the best source of reliable information to make an exit decision. Passengers can see risk unfold and act accordingly.
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we have a word or phrase for passengers deciding to evacuate on their own.
uncommanded evacuation, or passenger initiated evacuation.
RARELY, is it the right thing to do. AND it can lead to more injuries than you might imagine.
I DO HOPE we can get back to the cause of the excursion. And analysis of the report issued by the NTSB on march 9.
uncommanded evacuation, or passenger initiated evacuation.
RARELY, is it the right thing to do. AND it can lead to more injuries than you might imagine.
I DO HOPE we can get back to the cause of the excursion. And analysis of the report issued by the NTSB on march 9.
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Safety Messages
@IanW
I value your posts, but I think you may be wrongly blaming marketing, here. Think of the last time you sat through a "formal" safety briefing: how many pax were attending? Mostly people who could quote it all, anyway, I suspect. Now sit through a cheesy Air NZ briefing (my favourite is the Richard Simmonds aerobics one): quite a lot of people watch. It's the same principle as a workshop putting a pin-up next to the safety poster: before the people will pay attention to a warning, they have to have seen it. Some methods of attracting attention are no longer acceptable (and I understand why), but pax haven't signed on to join a disciplined service, and while we all ought to behave and co-operate, there's no requirement for formality. The warning about not taking bags should be more emphasised, I agree (Now listen up, you mo-fos, no mo-foing bags).
Perhaps it is time to tell airlines that briefing SLF particularly the SLF that need to be told how to do up a lap belt may mean making things a little more formal.
Briefing passengers before takeoff.
For US Carriers:
§121.571 Briefing passengers before takeoff. (the thinned down version)
(a) Each certificate holder operating a passenger-carrying airplane shall insure that all passengers are orally briefed by the appropriate crewmember as follows:
(1) Before each takeoff, on each of the following:
(i) Smoking.
(ii) The location of emergency exits.
(iii) The use of safety belts,
(b) Each certificate holder must carry on each passenger-carrying airplane, in convenient locations for use of each passenger, printed cards supplementing the oral briefing. Each card must contain information pertinent only to the type and model of airplane used for that flight, including—
(1) Diagrams of, and methods of operating, the emergency exits;
(2) Other instructions necessary for use of emergency equipment; and
(3) No later than June 12, 2005, for Domestic and Flag scheduled passenger-carrying flights, the sentence, “Final assembly of this airplane was completed in [INSERT NAME OF COUNTRY].”
So there is not a requirement to inform the SLF to leave everything behind. Airline X probably does not want to add it, because it might scare the pax to Airline Y. Not sure about other countries, but probably something along the same lines.
§121.571 Briefing passengers before takeoff. (the thinned down version)
(a) Each certificate holder operating a passenger-carrying airplane shall insure that all passengers are orally briefed by the appropriate crewmember as follows:
(1) Before each takeoff, on each of the following:
(i) Smoking.
(ii) The location of emergency exits.
(iii) The use of safety belts,
(b) Each certificate holder must carry on each passenger-carrying airplane, in convenient locations for use of each passenger, printed cards supplementing the oral briefing. Each card must contain information pertinent only to the type and model of airplane used for that flight, including—
(1) Diagrams of, and methods of operating, the emergency exits;
(2) Other instructions necessary for use of emergency equipment; and
(3) No later than June 12, 2005, for Domestic and Flag scheduled passenger-carrying flights, the sentence, “Final assembly of this airplane was completed in [INSERT NAME OF COUNTRY].”
So there is not a requirement to inform the SLF to leave everything behind. Airline X probably does not want to add it, because it might scare the pax to Airline Y. Not sure about other countries, but probably something along the same lines.
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Braking action may have had a part in leaving the runway with half the runway remaining because of lack of differential braking to remain straight either by not overriding max braking setting to return to normal brakes or not being able to get adequate braking on the right main gear.
Rudder blanking because of max reverse thrust on the tail mounted engines also could cause the drift left with the 10 knot left crosswind. Reducing reverse should have restored rudder effectiveness. The CVR and FDR info should explain why they didn't regain directional control.
Rudder blanking because of max reverse thrust on the tail mounted engines also could cause the drift left with the 10 knot left crosswind. Reducing reverse should have restored rudder effectiveness. The CVR and FDR info should explain why they didn't regain directional control.
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bubbers is right of course. I just exchanged E mail with a rep of the NTSB and he says nothing is scheduled in the way of a second report any time soon.
IT is vital with all contaminated runway operations to establish and maintain directional control as your first duty. It is better to run off the end of the runway (in this case to a short EMAS over run) a bit too fast, than off the side out of control.
I would like to know much more before commenting, but if you give up flying the plane with stick and rudder and just hope for the best with brakes and steering, good luck.
IT is vital with all contaminated runway operations to establish and maintain directional control as your first duty. It is better to run off the end of the runway (in this case to a short EMAS over run) a bit too fast, than off the side out of control.
I would like to know much more before commenting, but if you give up flying the plane with stick and rudder and just hope for the best with brakes and steering, good luck.