Turkish A330 incident, Kathmandu
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Oh, and Capt Blogs. Do you now understand that the orbits of the GPS satellites are fixed?
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The real safety and vulnerability issues here???
The real issue here is the unnecessarily and inappropriately high DA(H). Properly designed RNP procedures with correctly applied Baro VNAV VEBs are typically good enough technically to support DA(H)s down to about 250' HAT or even somewhat below. So any unnecessarily high DA(H) situation leads to potential risk of visually mishandling the trajectory below DA(H), ...just as with the KSFO B777, KBHM A300, or recent Libreville B747-8 hard landing for that matter. So while these RNP approaches provide vastly better vertical guidance to about 200' HAT than any other VOR, VOR/DME, NDB, LOC, or BCRS approach, ....we still eventually also need the benefit of GBAS/GLS, to provide the accuracy, integrity, and availability to support use of LAND3/AIII modes all the way through flare and rollout for these kinds of marginal visibility situations. GLS/GBAS is both entirely possible and economically practical at places like VNKT, to augment and complete these already better RNP approaches than any other alternative.
Both the terms "Precision and Non-Precision" are long obsolete as a practical matter, and were even dropped from use in references like FAA AC120-28D and AC120-29A. The FAA/JAA/Industry AWO HWG even tried to once move ICAO and ANSPs toward simply designating approaches as 2D or 3D, recognizing that any and all approaches need to be flown "precisely". Further, RNP is vastly more precise than even ILS for much of the total track mile distance of the arrival procedure, until typically very close to the runway, and for ALL of the MAP. hence it is instead ILS that, for locations like VNKT, would more appropriately be considered as "Non-Precision".
WAAS and EGNOS are SBAS. WAAS IS NOT CONSIDERED to be GBAS, period, even though it uses a few ground reference stations to derive the space broadcast corrections.
Only GLS (and JPALS and Portabas and equivalent) are considered as GBAS.
None of these RNP procedures should need to be considered as AR any more by authorities globally, beyond simple applying criteria like FAR121.445 compliance. RNP and GLS, as well as use of LAND2/LAND3 are now basic elements of safe routine operation of any modern transport jet. Instead, it is ADF/NDB, VOR, LOC, BCRS, PAR, and "Circles" that perhaps now ought to be considered and treated as "AR".
Both the terms "Precision and Non-Precision" are long obsolete as a practical matter, and were even dropped from use in references like FAA AC120-28D and AC120-29A. The FAA/JAA/Industry AWO HWG even tried to once move ICAO and ANSPs toward simply designating approaches as 2D or 3D, recognizing that any and all approaches need to be flown "precisely". Further, RNP is vastly more precise than even ILS for much of the total track mile distance of the arrival procedure, until typically very close to the runway, and for ALL of the MAP. hence it is instead ILS that, for locations like VNKT, would more appropriately be considered as "Non-Precision".
WAAS and EGNOS are SBAS. WAAS IS NOT CONSIDERED to be GBAS, period, even though it uses a few ground reference stations to derive the space broadcast corrections.
Only GLS (and JPALS and Portabas and equivalent) are considered as GBAS.
None of these RNP procedures should need to be considered as AR any more by authorities globally, beyond simple applying criteria like FAR121.445 compliance. RNP and GLS, as well as use of LAND2/LAND3 are now basic elements of safe routine operation of any modern transport jet. Instead, it is ADF/NDB, VOR, LOC, BCRS, PAR, and "Circles" that perhaps now ought to be considered and treated as "AR".
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Tom Imrich
So any unnecessarily high DA(H) situation leads to potential risk of visually mishandling the trajectory below DA(H), ...just as with the KSFO B777, KBHM A300, or recent Libreville B747-8 hard landing for that matter.
With the current debate regarding experience and inexperience of Air Transport category pilots what are you advocating here...........that's a rhetorical questions - don't answer.
Being a pilot requires you to PILOT the aeroplane. If you do not possess or maintain the skills, at least for the last 600' to point it at your aim point, to do so, you should seriously consider your future.
What is precision and non-precision whether 2d or 3D are all mute points. The real issues in this incident are these:
1. Company dispatching policy when weather is forecast and known to be below minimums at the destination at the scheduled time of arrival (if a nil divert policy was in place).
2. Adherence to company fuel policy and minimum divert fuel policy.
3. Airmanship by not allowing yourself nil safe alternative options.
4. Lack of Technical and Procedural knowledge regarding the requirements for the approach to be flown - centre line guidance is required to conduct an Autoland legally
5. Adherence to Company SOP's - Company visibility minimums for this approach at this destination.
These are the issues that require redressing.
The technical aspects of designing approaches, whether PANS-OPS or TURPS, at the pilot level, are adequately dealt with in Jeppesen VOL 1.
The AOM/FCOM of the aircraft details in the limitations section the requirements and equipment serviceability/redundancy needed to conduct the approach - whether ILS (glideslope max/min angle for an Autoland as an example) if CAT I/II/IIIa/IIIb, VOR, NDB, RNAV/GNSS or APV - IAW Company OPS SPEC.
The Company Training/Standards Manuel will have the necessary training and recurrency requirements for conducting its day to day operations which also include LVO OPS using the different approaches/NAV AIDS, again IAW with Company OPS SPEC.
This information is all in the books and is expected that the pilot to be at least aware of and know where to reference the information in the books - The books concerned are required to be on the aircraft.
Last edited by FO Cokebottle; 1st Apr 2015 at 14:06. Reason: grammer and spelling
If that is the accident flight, that video puts to bed any question of the visibility at touchdown! 
2:28 shows the left side 300m fixed distance marking clearly visible from the window. The centreline of the aircraft must have been very close to the left edge of the runway.
2:28 shows the left side 300m fixed distance marking clearly visible from the window. The centreline of the aircraft must have been very close to the left edge of the runway.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 3rd Apr 2015 at 01:25.
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Much more complicated than "just follow SOP"
@ Cokebottle. Yes, better following SOP, the FCOM, and FCTM (and common sense) certainly helps. But we've been having jet transport hull losses in similar circumstances, by very experienced pilots trying to do the right thing for the circumstances encountered, since the dawn of the jet age, and before, ...in fact back to the 1930s, with the advent of the first radio nav aids. Accidents like this are now completely unnecessary, as much as an accident due to an R2800 blown jug or shedding an R3350 or Allison 501 prop blade are no longer necessary. That landing would have been entirely routine, with fully using RNP combined with GLS, and use of the autoflight modes already installed and long available to that flight crew. So this failure is a failure of the entire system, ...from authorities, to ANSPs, to airports, to the operator not insisting on cost effective options and solutions when making aircraft purchases, and it is not just for the flight crew to take 100% of the blame. Let's not go another decade now, unnecessarily costing jets and risking crew and passenger lives, with accidents like this one, and CYHZ. There is now a much better way, for equivalent or less cost.
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JanetFlight:
You beat me to it.
Just viewed the link to the video and was going to post it here.
Yes indeed - pretty well puts it into the slumber party category.
Tom Imrich:
The GNSS Landing System does not provide for centre line guidance - only the "Back Course" of the ILS or MLS can provide such guidance for an autoland.
What you are praising is LPV. Please read the direct copy and paste from Wikapidia....
"Localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) are the highest precision GPS (WAAS enabled) aviation instrument approach procedures currently available without specialized aircrew training requirements, such as required navigation performance (RNP). Landing minima are usually similar to those in an instrument landing system (ILS), that is, a decision height of 200 feet (61 m) and visibility of 1/2 mile.[1] Although precise and accurate, it is still considered a Non-Precision approach. According to the Instrument PTS, you may use a GPS approach down to LPV minimums to substitute a precision approach."
There is NIL centre line guidence for an auto land with a GPS based navigation system. The Pilot's either did not know this fact or had no other option due to poor decision making.
There was nothing routine about this landing.
You beat me to it.
Just viewed the link to the video and was going to post it here.
Yes indeed - pretty well puts it into the slumber party category.
Tom Imrich:
That landing would have been entirely routine, with fully using RNP combined with GLS, and use of the auto flight modes already installed and long available to that flight crew.
What you are praising is LPV. Please read the direct copy and paste from Wikapidia....
"Localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) are the highest precision GPS (WAAS enabled) aviation instrument approach procedures currently available without specialized aircrew training requirements, such as required navigation performance (RNP). Landing minima are usually similar to those in an instrument landing system (ILS), that is, a decision height of 200 feet (61 m) and visibility of 1/2 mile.[1] Although precise and accurate, it is still considered a Non-Precision approach. According to the Instrument PTS, you may use a GPS approach down to LPV minimums to substitute a precision approach."
There is NIL centre line guidence for an auto land with a GPS based navigation system. The Pilot's either did not know this fact or had no other option due to poor decision making.
There was nothing routine about this landing.
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Cabin baggage
Interesting towards the end of the video part 3, that the cabin crew are seen standing around with their cabin baggage on the runway - not only did the passengers take it with them down the slides, so did the crew !
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FO Cokebottle's completely incorrect GLS/GBAS assertion
@ Cokebottle. Your assertion reference RNP and GLS/GBAS, that "GLS does not provide rollout guidance", is completely false and incorrect. GLS provides outstanding rollout guidance, over the full runway, from and for ANY approach direction, including for any runway that would be applicable at VNKT. It (GBAS) also as well provides an extremely accurate positioning signal to assist in providing very low RNP values for missed approach (e.g., RNP.003) for the initial missed approach segment, until the path returns to using some higher but still adequate RNP level (e.g., RNP .1) as needed. Further, Wikipedia is not the appropriate place to be finding key modern aviation criteria. Instead, try sources like AC120-28D Table 4.5.1-1, and similar provisions. LPV and SBAS remain an obsolete, virtually useless waste of money, in this kind of global air-transport environment, needing RNP paths to a short FAS, able to benefit from LAND3/AIII (or Airbus equivalent) AFDS modes.
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I enjoyed the lax attitude from passengers and crew alike.
"Oh, we actually landed in one piece! Great, now get your things and go out. What, the stairs don't work? That's OK, we're used to the slides, just let me get my Big Bag of Precious Things here... Cabin Crew, you don't forget your suitcases this time! It was a helluva lot of work to retrieve them last time something happened!"
Found it hilarious. Sure, I know the dangers about runway excursions, overruns, landing short etc. But this seemed like a planeload of people that went there, done that, bought the tshirt already.
"Oh, we actually landed in one piece! Great, now get your things and go out. What, the stairs don't work? That's OK, we're used to the slides, just let me get my Big Bag of Precious Things here... Cabin Crew, you don't forget your suitcases this time! It was a helluva lot of work to retrieve them last time something happened!"
Found it hilarious. Sure, I know the dangers about runway excursions, overruns, landing short etc. But this seemed like a planeload of people that went there, done that, bought the tshirt already.
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I would agree with that.
But, I strongly disagree with Tom about the merits of LPV. LPV has made possible CAT I precision minimums for well over 1,000 U.S. light airplane airports that previously had lousy instrument approaches (IFPs) or no IFPs at all.
OTOH, the bar for RNP AR is set so high by the FAA only the airlines and high end business jets can enter that "club." For business aviation even those who have qualified RNP AR airframes, the price of qualifying and maintaining the equipment, crews, and avionics is simply not worth the price or effort to many of those operators.
RNP AR feathering to GLS may be wonderful in 20 or 30 years.
But, I strongly disagree with Tom about the merits of LPV. LPV has made possible CAT I precision minimums for well over 1,000 U.S. light airplane airports that previously had lousy instrument approaches (IFPs) or no IFPs at all.
OTOH, the bar for RNP AR is set so high by the FAA only the airlines and high end business jets can enter that "club." For business aviation even those who have qualified RNP AR airframes, the price of qualifying and maintaining the equipment, crews, and avionics is simply not worth the price or effort to many of those operators.
RNP AR feathering to GLS may be wonderful in 20 or 30 years.
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Aterpster partially correct !!!
Aterpster, I agree that LPV was once a useful idea, back in the 50s and 60s, and maybe continuing into the 70s. But we had the chance to make the change in the 90s to go directly to (vastly superior) RNP, and bypass the entire generation of SBAS driven angular-straight-in criteria and systems. Sadly authorities didn't capitalize on the opportunity. Now we have a global mess, just as predicted. But I do agree that LPV is (temporarily) less bad than VOR, NDB, LOC, BCRS and even 2D RNAV, .... but that could easily and instantly change with simple revision of authority criteria. It is an authority issue, that primarily fouled this all up, and it is now up to the industry to help fix it. RNP can be simple, easy, and done by anybody down to LSAs. It isn't rocket science. It is only being made unnecessarily complex by authorities lacking vision, experience, and technical knowledge to implement the right criteria. Remember back to the days when basic TJ minima were 300 and 3/4, and only "expert pilots" could fly Cat I minima!!! That was all baloney, fixed by any modern AFDS, so that now any basic instrument pilot flying a C172 can do it, as well as any air-carrier airplane delivered out of the box. The exact same possibility could now be true for RNP. It is vastly safer, simpler, easier, better, more capable for efficient airspace use, and could even be less costly than any other alternative. The same goes for GBAS/GLS which is already vastly better (and safer) than the Wilcox ILSs we first approved for Cat III use back at KIAD, KDEN, KATL and KSFO, as well as the AN-GRN27s we used at the 31 other sites nationally with publication of AC120-28B on Dec 1st 1977.
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My reply to Tom Imrich...now known as 7478ti
1. Wikipedia was used as it provided the simplest and shortest definition, in layman's terms, to explain the aspects of what was being discussed. Remember KISS.
2. GLS/GBAS - Yes point conceded if the airport has the suitable equipment to provide the GBAS portion of the marriage. However, the procedure approach flown was a RNAV(RNP) not a GLS/GBAS
Your specific reference AC120-28D also states:
In this case the RNAV(RNP) VIS MINIMA is 900M for CAT C Aircraft. I have been led to believe that the Company MINIMA for this approach is 1500M.
Hence my point regarding the decision making processes in this "actual" accident.
I understand the debate for more automation vs pilot experience requirements - However, I stand on the latter side of the arguement. I have witnessed the actions of those who fly by the ADFS when it stops doing what they wanted it to do - KSFO RWY 28 QUIET BRIDGE as a specific and perfect example.
In the end, I am just a line driver that follows Company Procedures (including being familiar with Jeppesen VOL 1) to allow me to keep working and earn a pay cheque. Not doing so will get you terminated. Anything more out on the line is akin to going down a "Rabbit Hole".
1. Wikipedia was used as it provided the simplest and shortest definition, in layman's terms, to explain the aspects of what was being discussed. Remember KISS.
2. GLS/GBAS - Yes point conceded if the airport has the suitable equipment to provide the GBAS portion of the marriage. However, the procedure approach flown was a RNAV(RNP) not a GLS/GBAS
Your specific reference AC120-28D also states:
AC 120-28D
07/13/99
Page
48
1. Operations Specification.
Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with, and properly
able to apply, operations specifications applicable to Category III landing or low visibility takeoff.
2. Normal and Non-normal Procedures.
Pilots should be familiar with appropriate normal and
non-normal procedures including crew duties, monitoring assignments, transfer of control during normal operations using a "monitored approach," appropriate automatic or crew initiated call-outs to be used, proper use of standard instrument approach procedures, special instrument approach procedures, applicable minima for normal configurations or for alternate or failure configurations and reversion to higher minima in the event of failures.
3. Weather and RVR.
Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with weather associated
with Category III and proper application of runway visual range, including its use and limitations, the determination of controlling RVR and advisory RVR, required RVR equipment, appropriate light settings for correct RVR readouts and proper determination of RVR values reported at foreign facilities.
4. Use of DA(H) or Alert Height.
Pilots should be familiar with the proper application of Decision Height or Alert Height, as applicable, including proper use and setting of radar altimeter bugs, use of the inner marker where authorized or required due to irregular underlying terrain and appropriate altimeter setting procedures for the barometric altimeter consistent with the operators practice of using either
QNH or QFE.
5. Use of Visual Reference.
Pilots should be familiar with the availability and limitations of visual
reference encountered for taxi, takeoff, and approach. Approach visual reference limitation information should at least address aircraft geometry limitations on visual reference, actions to take with loss or partial loss of visual reference, risks of inappropriate use of visual reference, and necessary visual references for continuation after Decision Height, if a Decision Height is applicable. Issues listed in section 6.2.7 above for continuation or discontinuation of an approach in deteriorating weather conditions should be comprehensively addressed.
Pilots should be familiar with procedures for an unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than the minimum visibility specified for the procedure during an approach, flare or roll out including the proper
response to a loss of visual reference or a reduction of visual reference below the specified values when using a Decision Height and prior to the time that the aircraft touches down.
The operator should provide some means of demonstrating the expected minimum visual references that occur on approach when the weather is at acceptable minimum conditions, and the expected sequence of visual queues
during an approach in which the visibility is at or above the specified landing minimums. This may be done using simulation, video presentation of simulated landings or actual landings, slides or pictures showing expected visual references, computer based reproductions of expected visual references, or other means acceptable to the FAA
07/13/99
Page
48
1. Operations Specification.
Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with, and properly
able to apply, operations specifications applicable to Category III landing or low visibility takeoff.
2. Normal and Non-normal Procedures.
Pilots should be familiar with appropriate normal and
non-normal procedures including crew duties, monitoring assignments, transfer of control during normal operations using a "monitored approach," appropriate automatic or crew initiated call-outs to be used, proper use of standard instrument approach procedures, special instrument approach procedures, applicable minima for normal configurations or for alternate or failure configurations and reversion to higher minima in the event of failures.
3. Weather and RVR.
Pilots and aircraft dispatchers should be familiar with weather associated
with Category III and proper application of runway visual range, including its use and limitations, the determination of controlling RVR and advisory RVR, required RVR equipment, appropriate light settings for correct RVR readouts and proper determination of RVR values reported at foreign facilities.
4. Use of DA(H) or Alert Height.
Pilots should be familiar with the proper application of Decision Height or Alert Height, as applicable, including proper use and setting of radar altimeter bugs, use of the inner marker where authorized or required due to irregular underlying terrain and appropriate altimeter setting procedures for the barometric altimeter consistent with the operators practice of using either
QNH or QFE.
5. Use of Visual Reference.
Pilots should be familiar with the availability and limitations of visual
reference encountered for taxi, takeoff, and approach. Approach visual reference limitation information should at least address aircraft geometry limitations on visual reference, actions to take with loss or partial loss of visual reference, risks of inappropriate use of visual reference, and necessary visual references for continuation after Decision Height, if a Decision Height is applicable. Issues listed in section 6.2.7 above for continuation or discontinuation of an approach in deteriorating weather conditions should be comprehensively addressed.
Pilots should be familiar with procedures for an unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than the minimum visibility specified for the procedure during an approach, flare or roll out including the proper
response to a loss of visual reference or a reduction of visual reference below the specified values when using a Decision Height and prior to the time that the aircraft touches down.
The operator should provide some means of demonstrating the expected minimum visual references that occur on approach when the weather is at acceptable minimum conditions, and the expected sequence of visual queues
during an approach in which the visibility is at or above the specified landing minimums. This may be done using simulation, video presentation of simulated landings or actual landings, slides or pictures showing expected visual references, computer based reproductions of expected visual references, or other means acceptable to the FAA
Hence my point regarding the decision making processes in this "actual" accident.
I understand the debate for more automation vs pilot experience requirements - However, I stand on the latter side of the arguement. I have witnessed the actions of those who fly by the ADFS when it stops doing what they wanted it to do - KSFO RWY 28 QUIET BRIDGE as a specific and perfect example.
In the end, I am just a line driver that follows Company Procedures (including being familiar with Jeppesen VOL 1) to allow me to keep working and earn a pay cheque. Not doing so will get you terminated. Anything more out on the line is akin to going down a "Rabbit Hole".
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Beyond VNKT ???
Yes Cokebottle, those were some of the very words that I originally wrote, now decades ago...
But my point is that in an era when we can reliably land UAVs on pitching, rolling, carrier decks blind, within a foot laterally and a few feet longitudinally, with sensors now on virtually all modern production transport jets, using the computing power of about an iPad, and modes like LAND3/LAND2/AIII, using techniques like RNP and GLS/GBAS (or JPALS), ... then the hull losses at places like VNKT, KSFO, KBHM or CYHZ are completely unnecessary.
I'm advocating that we all, just like or forefathers argued in 1939 for ILS versus NDB/ADF (the experienced airline pilots and airlines supported ILS [Air-Track, YB, and NBS], versus the Air Corps that instead supported the A-1 Hegenberger system [ADF]), ... we all should now argue globally for the substantive near term full implementation of the vastly better RNP and GLS/GBAS, allowing for full use of our FMSs and AFDS modes like LAND3/AIII.
Both we, and our passengers and cargo, will then be able to confidently put these kinds of unfortunate unnecessary accidents in the past.
But my point is that in an era when we can reliably land UAVs on pitching, rolling, carrier decks blind, within a foot laterally and a few feet longitudinally, with sensors now on virtually all modern production transport jets, using the computing power of about an iPad, and modes like LAND3/LAND2/AIII, using techniques like RNP and GLS/GBAS (or JPALS), ... then the hull losses at places like VNKT, KSFO, KBHM or CYHZ are completely unnecessary.
I'm advocating that we all, just like or forefathers argued in 1939 for ILS versus NDB/ADF (the experienced airline pilots and airlines supported ILS [Air-Track, YB, and NBS], versus the Air Corps that instead supported the A-1 Hegenberger system [ADF]), ... we all should now argue globally for the substantive near term full implementation of the vastly better RNP and GLS/GBAS, allowing for full use of our FMSs and AFDS modes like LAND3/AIII.
Both we, and our passengers and cargo, will then be able to confidently put these kinds of unfortunate unnecessary accidents in the past.
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Cokebottle:
Isn't the AB330 a CAT D airplane?
Another factor is this NOTAM, which was in effect on the date of the accident:
V0071/15 - [DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] RUNWAY DISPLACED. RUNWAY 02 THRESHOLD DISPLACED 120 METERS (400 FT) UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 09 APR 20:05 2015 UNTIL 01 JUN 00:01 2015. CREATED: 09 APR 20:05 2015
In the U.S., at least, the RNP AR would have been NOTAMed OTS until the threshold is no longer displaced.
In this case the RNAV(RNP) VIS MINIMA is 900M for CAT C Aircraft. I have been led to believe that the Company MINIMA for this approach is 1500M.
Another factor is this NOTAM, which was in effect on the date of the accident:
V0071/15 - [DOD PROCEDURAL NOTAM] RUNWAY DISPLACED. RUNWAY 02 THRESHOLD DISPLACED 120 METERS (400 FT) UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 09 APR 20:05 2015 UNTIL 01 JUN 00:01 2015. CREATED: 09 APR 20:05 2015
In the U.S., at least, the RNP AR would have been NOTAMed OTS until the threshold is no longer displaced.