United Airlines warning letter to Pilots about safety
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United Airlines warning letter to Pilots about safety
wondering why this story isn't being followed on pprune. someone else might post the story, reported in the USA on major networks.
It's what SMS and flight data monitoring is all about - very likely they saw these events in their data and they did something about it. It's a superb response. Having done this work for a long time now, I know that no carrier can reasonably believe that some of this doesn't apply to them. There are no such things as "skygods", (but there may be some pilots that believe in their own propaganda...).
When the cost is so enormous, UAL's actions come under the heading of "Lesson's for free" for all flight crews and not just UAL's.
When the cost is so enormous, UAL's actions come under the heading of "Lesson's for free" for all flight crews and not just UAL's.
I'm at a loss what I should do with this action. Obviously it sells good when brought into the light of the public. Was that part of the plan, was it the plan or was it what is written down, a wake up call from the top to the bottom?
Next question is, shouldn't unsafe happenings, incident and accident reports be available to all the crews all over the industry and be part of a mandatory regualar briefing through the training and supervising departments? Shouldn't those departments make sure, that each crew member has been informed in reasonable time about those flight safety items to prevent such happenings in the future operations?
If I take this letter honest, do I have to conclude that such a system does not even exist about such happenings within an airline for their own happenings or does not work sufficiently or is not taken serious enough, that it has to be supplemented by some top notch guy to make his point clear via public adress?
Next question is, shouldn't unsafe happenings, incident and accident reports be available to all the crews all over the industry and be part of a mandatory regualar briefing through the training and supervising departments? Shouldn't those departments make sure, that each crew member has been informed in reasonable time about those flight safety items to prevent such happenings in the future operations?
If I take this letter honest, do I have to conclude that such a system does not even exist about such happenings within an airline for their own happenings or does not work sufficiently or is not taken serious enough, that it has to be supplemented by some top notch guy to make his point clear via public adress?
Good for UA. What they're doing looks sensible and all airlines should follow, provided that what they do is not simply to publicise mistakes or actions that are "not in compliance" followed by downgrading or "re-training" the pilots involved, but to analyse why the incidents occurred and show how procedures or mind-sets can be changed so that others can avoid similar mistakes. Most of us, except of course the "sky-gods" (and their counterparts, the "ground-gods"?) will admit that we make mistakes sometimes and want to understand how we can avert them.
The UA memo mentions "the recent CFIT accident in Birmingham [in which] the approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact." I suppose they mean the UPS crash in 2013? (at Birmingham, Alabama, not Birmingham, England.) In that case the NTSB said that the crew continued an unstabilized approach ... failed to monitor the altitude ... failed to properly configure the FMC ... FO's failure to make required call-outs ... captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer ... and [yes, yes] flight crew fatigue.* Did that approach really appear normal to the pilots?
* Caveat: This is from the NTSB's press release, I haven't read its actual report.
The UA memo mentions "the recent CFIT accident in Birmingham [in which] the approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact." I suppose they mean the UPS crash in 2013? (at Birmingham, Alabama, not Birmingham, England.) In that case the NTSB said that the crew continued an unstabilized approach ... failed to monitor the altitude ... failed to properly configure the FMC ... FO's failure to make required call-outs ... captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer ... and [yes, yes] flight crew fatigue.* Did that approach really appear normal to the pilots?
* Caveat: This is from the NTSB's press release, I haven't read its actual report.
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Here is the full memo:
Date: January 9, 2015
SAFETY ALERT: Significant safety concerns
Recent events in our operation have dictated that we communicate with all of you immediately. Over the past few weeks, our airline has experienced what we would categorize as major safety events and near-misses.
In Flight Operations we have seen two events in close proximity to terrain (one resulting in a GPWS pull-up maneuver), an Undesired Aircraft State on departure and a low fuel state on arrival after a deviation from a Sabre Flight Plan routing.
The common thread with all of these is that they are preventable. We must ask ourselves, “Do we have our priorities in line every time we put on our uniforms and strap into the airplane?” While the airline industry always seems to be in a state of flux, the one constant for all of us is that we are professional aviators with the common goal of flying our passengers and crew from point A to point B SAFELY.
Another common thread to some of these events is a lack of attention to disciplined Crew Resource Management. Every time we enter the cockpit with the intention of performing our pilot duties, we evaluate risk. Every pilot must be willing to speak up if safety is in question. In the same vein, every pilot must also accept the input of their fellow crewmembers on the flight deck. In most cases, one of the pilots recognizes an unsafe situation. In some cases, a pilot’s input is ignored. This is unacceptable.
The recent CFIT accident in Birmingham involving another carrier underscores how quickly things can unravel. The approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact. Let’s not for a moment think something like that could not happen at United.
We are currently seeing a lot of movement in the pilot group, such as retirements, seat movements and new hires, that -- while welcome -- introduces significant risk to the operation. While no one ever shows up to work with the goal of intentionally making a mistake, we are human and mistakes happen. What we can control is how we conduct ourselves on each and every flight. If you have ever used the term “Standard Brief” before departure, you have not complied with an SOP. If you have ever exceeded Stabilized Approach Criteria intentionally and not executed a go-around, you are not in compliance.
We know this is a brutally honest message and the tendency may be to rationalize why compliance is not occurring in some areas. Bottom line: United is at a critical juncture in its history and we as aviators must adhere to the policies and procedures outlined in the Flight Manuals, FOM, WOM and ALPA Code of Ethics. Reviewing, understanding, and complying with the guidance in company manuals is imperative to returning ourselves, our fellow crewmembers and passengers to their families safely. This is our top priority and greatest responsibility, and we appreciate in advance your continued commitment and cooperation.
Fly safe.
Howard Attarian, Sr. Vice President Flight Operations
Michael Quiello, Vice President Corporate Safety
Date: January 9, 2015
SAFETY ALERT: Significant safety concerns
Recent events in our operation have dictated that we communicate with all of you immediately. Over the past few weeks, our airline has experienced what we would categorize as major safety events and near-misses.
In Flight Operations we have seen two events in close proximity to terrain (one resulting in a GPWS pull-up maneuver), an Undesired Aircraft State on departure and a low fuel state on arrival after a deviation from a Sabre Flight Plan routing.
The common thread with all of these is that they are preventable. We must ask ourselves, “Do we have our priorities in line every time we put on our uniforms and strap into the airplane?” While the airline industry always seems to be in a state of flux, the one constant for all of us is that we are professional aviators with the common goal of flying our passengers and crew from point A to point B SAFELY.
Another common thread to some of these events is a lack of attention to disciplined Crew Resource Management. Every time we enter the cockpit with the intention of performing our pilot duties, we evaluate risk. Every pilot must be willing to speak up if safety is in question. In the same vein, every pilot must also accept the input of their fellow crewmembers on the flight deck. In most cases, one of the pilots recognizes an unsafe situation. In some cases, a pilot’s input is ignored. This is unacceptable.
The recent CFIT accident in Birmingham involving another carrier underscores how quickly things can unravel. The approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact. Let’s not for a moment think something like that could not happen at United.
We are currently seeing a lot of movement in the pilot group, such as retirements, seat movements and new hires, that -- while welcome -- introduces significant risk to the operation. While no one ever shows up to work with the goal of intentionally making a mistake, we are human and mistakes happen. What we can control is how we conduct ourselves on each and every flight. If you have ever used the term “Standard Brief” before departure, you have not complied with an SOP. If you have ever exceeded Stabilized Approach Criteria intentionally and not executed a go-around, you are not in compliance.
We know this is a brutally honest message and the tendency may be to rationalize why compliance is not occurring in some areas. Bottom line: United is at a critical juncture in its history and we as aviators must adhere to the policies and procedures outlined in the Flight Manuals, FOM, WOM and ALPA Code of Ethics. Reviewing, understanding, and complying with the guidance in company manuals is imperative to returning ourselves, our fellow crewmembers and passengers to their families safely. This is our top priority and greatest responsibility, and we appreciate in advance your continued commitment and cooperation.
Fly safe.
Howard Attarian, Sr. Vice President Flight Operations
Michael Quiello, Vice President Corporate Safety
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OldLurker:
Exactly. UAL glossed over the multiple errors of commission and omission during that UPS crash approaching Runway 18 at KBHM.
The UA memo mentions "the recent CFIT accident in Birmingham [in which] the approach and landing appeared normal to the pilots until right before impact." I suppose they mean the UPS crash in 2013? (at Birmingham, Alabama, not Birmingham, England.) In that case the NTSB said that the crew continued an unstabilized approach ... failed to monitor the altitude ... failed to properly configure the FMC ... FO's failure to make required call-outs ... captain's decision to change the approach strategy without communicating his change to the first officer ... and [yes, yes] flight crew fatigue.* Did that approach really appear normal to the pilots?
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well, to me, this means:
someone had a very high rate of descent on approach and a gpws alert, in other words a very unstablized approach.
it also sounds like someone took off with the flaps improperly set.
and IF SOMEONE WAS SMART AT A MAJOR TV NETWORK THEY WOULD FILE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST and get the straight dope.
No one has mentioned that United and Continental merger may have ruffled some feathers in terms of seniority integration. IF anyone knows the method they finally used, maybe they can post it. But as many of you know, Continental used Scabs at one time. ( United used mgmt pilots to just fly a 747 round and round the pattern at ORD to make things look normal at one mid 80's strike)
I can also imagine that if seniority allowed United pilots to fly Continental MD80s there might be some less familiarity with this type .
I saw tom foreman on CNN try to explain a standard go around and he made it sound like a death defying catastrophic maneuver and Erin Burnett, the host like a dear caught in the headlights. It was awful. You can look it up on their website.
While it is important to reaffirm the CRM concept (which was needed at United many years ago, they coined the term I think), I think the tricks of commuter airlines have been brought to the big lines all in the name of money and it ain't pretty
HERE is a link to the CNN piece, I really ask the pilots here to comment on the piece.http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/politi...ing/index.html
someone had a very high rate of descent on approach and a gpws alert, in other words a very unstablized approach.
it also sounds like someone took off with the flaps improperly set.
and IF SOMEONE WAS SMART AT A MAJOR TV NETWORK THEY WOULD FILE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST and get the straight dope.
No one has mentioned that United and Continental merger may have ruffled some feathers in terms of seniority integration. IF anyone knows the method they finally used, maybe they can post it. But as many of you know, Continental used Scabs at one time. ( United used mgmt pilots to just fly a 747 round and round the pattern at ORD to make things look normal at one mid 80's strike)
I can also imagine that if seniority allowed United pilots to fly Continental MD80s there might be some less familiarity with this type .
I saw tom foreman on CNN try to explain a standard go around and he made it sound like a death defying catastrophic maneuver and Erin Burnett, the host like a dear caught in the headlights. It was awful. You can look it up on their website.
While it is important to reaffirm the CRM concept (which was needed at United many years ago, they coined the term I think), I think the tricks of commuter airlines have been brought to the big lines all in the name of money and it ain't pretty
HERE is a link to the CNN piece, I really ask the pilots here to comment on the piece.http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/politi...ing/index.html
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skyhallfallguy said:
File a FOIA with whom? FOIA is an "open government" law - and nothing whatsoever to do with private industry. Are you suggesting the media submit FOIA requests to the airlines?
and IF SOMEONE WAS SMART AT A MAJOR TV NETWORK THEY WOULD FILE A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST and get the straight dope.
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Retired F4;
Re your middle paragraph, yes we should be able to learn from others' errors, incidents and accidents.
So here in EASA controlled Britain, we still await the Accident Report on the HULL LOSS ACCIDENT, suffered by Ryr at Fiumicino, too many years ago, due multiple birdstrike and the May 2013 ACCIDENT to the cowling shedding Airbus out of Heathrow.
But answer came there none.
Maybe I'll get to read them before shuffling off this mortal coil due to excess inhalation of Organo-Phosphate vapours? Or a wayward bus will get me as my reactions get even slower?
Re your middle paragraph, yes we should be able to learn from others' errors, incidents and accidents.
So here in EASA controlled Britain, we still await the Accident Report on the HULL LOSS ACCIDENT, suffered by Ryr at Fiumicino, too many years ago, due multiple birdstrike and the May 2013 ACCIDENT to the cowling shedding Airbus out of Heathrow.
But answer came there none.
Maybe I'll get to read them before shuffling off this mortal coil due to excess inhalation of Organo-Phosphate vapours? Or a wayward bus will get me as my reactions get even slower?
@ oldlurker - well, let's just say the Birmingham approach looked normal enough to the pilots that they did not do anything to question it, correct it, or initiate a go-around.
As to the UA memo - I agree with its prime message. No flight is ever "just another day in the office." And it is dangerous, in and of itself, to slip into that mind-set.
That includes management, of course. Pay, rest, training, and "on-time" pressures also need to reflect the fact that it isn't just another job. If you invest for "just good enough, most of the time" - that's what you'll get.
As to the UA memo - I agree with its prime message. No flight is ever "just another day in the office." And it is dangerous, in and of itself, to slip into that mind-set.
That includes management, of course. Pay, rest, training, and "on-time" pressures also need to reflect the fact that it isn't just another job. If you invest for "just good enough, most of the time" - that's what you'll get.
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This sums it up:
Inspector:
The airlines have spent the last 20+ years breaking the pilot unions and demoralizing the pilots, cutting anything good out of the career to save money or demoralize. They have also cut any training or safety expenses they could get away with. The result is a demoralized workforce, doing a job that requires extreme dedication and motivation. I've been involved in military and airline aviation for nearly 50 years, I spend a lot of time with pilots professionally and casually, and I've never been as concerned about their capabilities in the cockpit. I'm not alone, I'm hearing this from the older pilots almost constantly now.
Relations between pilots and airline management have always been harsh, with airline CEOs stating they will give only what they are forced to give by the unions. In 1981 Congress added Section 159a to the Railway Labor Act, effectively ending the ability of airline unions to influence the airlines or the airline industry. With the unions broken, and the FAA never really policing the industry, the airlines steadily drove down compensation, benefits, conditions, rest periods, days off, and safety. Morale followed.
With the long union contracts, it has taken decades. The airlines are where they said they would be: they will pay only what they are forced to pay, and now that happens only when there are no young people willing to enter the eight+ year pipeline to the pilot profession at below minimum wage. It has been over ten years since the profession was worth the cost and sacrifices. Young people stopped coming years ago, and the "new" (~ten years new) pilots are not nearly the caliber of the ones hired before them. Some are outstanding, but as a group, they are not the best and brightest that used to claw their way to airline cockpits. The old pilots have also lost some capabilities, from the days when they flew hard and trained hard.
Airline safety has peaked, it will never be the same reliable industry pilots and other airline workers made it. The major airlines will make heaps of money, as a pilot shortage means a shortage of low-cost airlines that keep ticket prices down. There are limits to capitalism, and this industry has reached and passed one. Taking away the right to strike gave this industry too much power, which they have used with reckless abandon.
While other industries reliant on specialized workers carefully manage the supply with recruiting and training, this industry has willfully destroyed the supply, to cripple their low-cost competition. The lack of pilots has begun to impact our nation's economy, and soon we will be looking at compromising safety further to "save" the airline industry. It will be the pilots we will turn to, asking them to give more, while blaming them for every incident they couldn't prevent.
Relations between pilots and airline management have always been harsh, with airline CEOs stating they will give only what they are forced to give by the unions. In 1981 Congress added Section 159a to the Railway Labor Act, effectively ending the ability of airline unions to influence the airlines or the airline industry. With the unions broken, and the FAA never really policing the industry, the airlines steadily drove down compensation, benefits, conditions, rest periods, days off, and safety. Morale followed.
With the long union contracts, it has taken decades. The airlines are where they said they would be: they will pay only what they are forced to pay, and now that happens only when there are no young people willing to enter the eight+ year pipeline to the pilot profession at below minimum wage. It has been over ten years since the profession was worth the cost and sacrifices. Young people stopped coming years ago, and the "new" (~ten years new) pilots are not nearly the caliber of the ones hired before them. Some are outstanding, but as a group, they are not the best and brightest that used to claw their way to airline cockpits. The old pilots have also lost some capabilities, from the days when they flew hard and trained hard.
Airline safety has peaked, it will never be the same reliable industry pilots and other airline workers made it. The major airlines will make heaps of money, as a pilot shortage means a shortage of low-cost airlines that keep ticket prices down. There are limits to capitalism, and this industry has reached and passed one. Taking away the right to strike gave this industry too much power, which they have used with reckless abandon.
While other industries reliant on specialized workers carefully manage the supply with recruiting and training, this industry has willfully destroyed the supply, to cripple their low-cost competition. The lack of pilots has begun to impact our nation's economy, and soon we will be looking at compromising safety further to "save" the airline industry. It will be the pilots we will turn to, asking them to give more, while blaming them for every incident they couldn't prevent.
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Dear WILLFLYFORCHEESE:
IF a pilot screwed up and had to do a GPWS escape maneuver he might have filed a report with the FAA or NASA OR other agency and received some protection/immunity. IF it was observed by ATC visually or on RADAR other documents might be available too!
SO, you might want to check out such things. I didn ' t think another pilot would have to understand the enormous amount of paperwork filed with one govt agency or another that has to happen to run an airline.
JETJOCKEYA4: thanks for confirming what I thought. ROTTEN work ON the ERIN BURNETT CNN SHOW and TOM FOREMAN really over did it.
IF he summed up brushing your teeth, he would have shown us how we could all poke our eyes out with deadly toothbrush induced eye surgery.
IF a pilot screwed up and had to do a GPWS escape maneuver he might have filed a report with the FAA or NASA OR other agency and received some protection/immunity. IF it was observed by ATC visually or on RADAR other documents might be available too!
SO, you might want to check out such things. I didn ' t think another pilot would have to understand the enormous amount of paperwork filed with one govt agency or another that has to happen to run an airline.
JETJOCKEYA4: thanks for confirming what I thought. ROTTEN work ON the ERIN BURNETT CNN SHOW and TOM FOREMAN really over did it.
IF he summed up brushing your teeth, he would have shown us how we could all poke our eyes out with deadly toothbrush induced eye surgery.
