TransAsia in the water?
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Well, that's good to know!
No real need for a crash investigation, eh? A day or two looking at the CVR and the FDR and "Bob's your uncle."
Calm down, guys. Let's wait for the official report before we make up our minds about the cause of the accident, particularly since most accidents are taken to be the result of multiple causes. You know, that "accident chain" we are trained to think about as professional aviators.
Calm down, guys. Let's wait for the official report before we make up our minds about the cause of the accident, particularly since most accidents are taken to be the result of multiple causes. You know, that "accident chain" we are trained to think about as professional aviators.
@Lost in Saigon:
(as reference to post #580)
For me, using a ruler for exact reference, it seems like #1 uptrim came first. TQ1, Objective TQ1, FF1, ITT1 increases first and without torque on #2 falling at all.
If i did understand it right, uptrim and autofeather triggers by tourqe on "failing engine" falling below 18%. This do not seem to be the case, TQ2 even increases a little bit and it looks as it did it about when feathering started.
ATPCS faulty ?
(as reference to post #580)
For me, using a ruler for exact reference, it seems like #1 uptrim came first. TQ1, Objective TQ1, FF1, ITT1 increases first and without torque on #2 falling at all.
If i did understand it right, uptrim and autofeather triggers by tourqe on "failing engine" falling below 18%. This do not seem to be the case, TQ2 even increases a little bit and it looks as it did it about when feathering started.
ATPCS faulty ?
Last edited by AAKEE; 11th Feb 2015 at 15:33. Reason: added post reference
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I agree, upon close examination the exact timeline data does look suspicious. But, even if the ATPCS was initially faulty, all the readings were showing a failed engine well before the good engine was shut down.
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You are reading it wrong. That's not the gear up or down indication. It's the sensor in the gear, showing that the weight of the aircraft transitioned to the wings.
If you think about it, that's really important at least fractionally BEFORE climbing away, right?
If you think about it, that's really important at least fractionally BEFORE climbing away, right?
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DFDR presented on a single page
Does the DFDR readout of engine paramaters and other data, as presented in this thread earlier, occur in this order on a single page?
Perhaps through copy and paste, the data has lost precise timing and relationship.
Also, the use of VHF1 radio occurs at the beginning of these events. Coincidence?
Perhaps through copy and paste, the data has lost precise timing and relationship.
Also, the use of VHF1 radio occurs at the beginning of these events. Coincidence?
Last edited by jack11111; 11th Feb 2015 at 22:10. Reason: Grammer, added observation.
The fact that the Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration has ordered the pilots to undergo proficiency tests tells me they probably know exactly what happened and why.
And apparently 20% of them failed even the oral test.
And apparently 20% of them failed even the oral test.
I would be more interested to see a pilot's performance in the simulator and/or the aircraft.
Don't get me wrong I'm not saying pilot's shouldn't be able to field relevant oral questions but there is a difference between "espoused theory" (what you say you would do in a given situation) and "theory in use" (what you actually do).
Whilst you would expect all pilots to know items such as Memory/Recall items etc this reaction seems like a "trapping" exercise rather than remedial/refresher training. Sort of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted.
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Summary of pages 1 to 31!
Just read page 1 to 31 - lots of great deductions. I thought i'd summarize what I've read (from an aero engineer perspective)
1. FDR trace matches ATCPS system activating to retard eng #2 to idle + feather, eng#1 bleed off etc.
2. the FDR doesn't seem to indicate any prior reason for the ATCPS to activate (specifically no oil pressure drop or TQ drop).
3. The #2 engine maintains healthy operating parameters (al biet at idle) throughout, and shows a quick acceleration immediately prior to impact (ITT, NH, NP, FF all going up) - nothing to suggest engine has actually failed - at least not completely.
4. There have be previous incidents of erroneous ATR72 ATCPS activation.
initial cause faulty ATCPS?
5. There seems to be conflicting CVR transcripts so we can't really trust any - but at least one translation clearly states the pilots correctly identify eng#2 fail early in the piece.
6. FDR shows PL#1 retarded in stages and shutoff
7. FDR shows PL#2 set to 100% (whoever is moving the levers is moving the wrong ones - that much is clear!)
8. CVR then seems to suggest confusion in cockpit as to why eng#1 is feathered and shut-off - supporting the idea the pilots DID correctly identified end#2 as the failed engine.
9. Crew then attempt restart of #1 (~20s before impact) (again, they think the #1 is the good engine). Eng#1 responds to start but it's too late.
10. PM was used to sitting in the left seat as PF. He was called in to fill in and sat in right seat as PM.
All crew responses make sense IF you swap the levers. i.e. PL#1 with PL#2 and CL#1 with CL#2. Did PM mix up #1 and #2 levers from an unfamiliar seat despite crew otherwise correctly identifying #2 engine/ATCPS failure? (of course it would have been better if PM did nothing at all to either lever until everything calmed down abit)
the hole in this theory is why didn't PF/PM notice unexpected response to PL reduction and correct it? (there is 45s from initial PL reduction until FSO) - my only suggestion here is distraction by stall warning which occurs ~20s after PL reduction and subsequent information overload)
11. In the final moments ATCPS is deactivated (probably since pilots initiate restart procedure for #1 eng, moving PWR management to MCT, which deactivates ATCPS). the #2 eng unfeathers and begins accelerating once again suggesting the engine is actually in not too bad shape - i.e. ATCPS failure, not engine failure. In any case it's too late.
p.s. I suggest speed management and wing drop in the final moments is a bit of a red hearing. The only real chance these guys had in this hostile environment was restore power and fly away, although it maybe fair to argue the initial speed decay leading to stall (warning) was a unnecessary distraction.
1. FDR trace matches ATCPS system activating to retard eng #2 to idle + feather, eng#1 bleed off etc.
2. the FDR doesn't seem to indicate any prior reason for the ATCPS to activate (specifically no oil pressure drop or TQ drop).
3. The #2 engine maintains healthy operating parameters (al biet at idle) throughout, and shows a quick acceleration immediately prior to impact (ITT, NH, NP, FF all going up) - nothing to suggest engine has actually failed - at least not completely.
4. There have be previous incidents of erroneous ATR72 ATCPS activation.
initial cause faulty ATCPS?
5. There seems to be conflicting CVR transcripts so we can't really trust any - but at least one translation clearly states the pilots correctly identify eng#2 fail early in the piece.
6. FDR shows PL#1 retarded in stages and shutoff
7. FDR shows PL#2 set to 100% (whoever is moving the levers is moving the wrong ones - that much is clear!)
8. CVR then seems to suggest confusion in cockpit as to why eng#1 is feathered and shut-off - supporting the idea the pilots DID correctly identified end#2 as the failed engine.
9. Crew then attempt restart of #1 (~20s before impact) (again, they think the #1 is the good engine). Eng#1 responds to start but it's too late.
10. PM was used to sitting in the left seat as PF. He was called in to fill in and sat in right seat as PM.
All crew responses make sense IF you swap the levers. i.e. PL#1 with PL#2 and CL#1 with CL#2. Did PM mix up #1 and #2 levers from an unfamiliar seat despite crew otherwise correctly identifying #2 engine/ATCPS failure? (of course it would have been better if PM did nothing at all to either lever until everything calmed down abit)
the hole in this theory is why didn't PF/PM notice unexpected response to PL reduction and correct it? (there is 45s from initial PL reduction until FSO) - my only suggestion here is distraction by stall warning which occurs ~20s after PL reduction and subsequent information overload)
11. In the final moments ATCPS is deactivated (probably since pilots initiate restart procedure for #1 eng, moving PWR management to MCT, which deactivates ATCPS). the #2 eng unfeathers and begins accelerating once again suggesting the engine is actually in not too bad shape - i.e. ATCPS failure, not engine failure. In any case it's too late.
p.s. I suggest speed management and wing drop in the final moments is a bit of a red hearing. The only real chance these guys had in this hostile environment was restore power and fly away, although it maybe fair to argue the initial speed decay leading to stall (warning) was a unnecessary distraction.
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not that I know anything about trans asia, but typically, acars is not using VHF number one.
Perhaps , when coordinated with cvr, we will find a radio call from the plane.
I read somewhere that a CVR transcript was to be released today, anything out there?
Perhaps , when coordinated with cvr, we will find a radio call from the plane.
I read somewhere that a CVR transcript was to be released today, anything out there?
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VHF1 radio operation.
My thought regarding VHF1 radio use is noise, perhaps RF spike or DC bus spike, being sensed by ATPCS triggering auto feather event. All it takes is a faulty ground or noise filter to be weak. Then its a matter of bad timing.
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CNN Reports 10 of 49 fail test
CNN is reporting that of the 49 TransAsia pilots the TCAA have tested, 10 of those have failed the oral exam and will need retraining before they are allowed back into the cockpit. The 39 who did pass will also have to undergo a simulator test session. There are also 19 other pilots who have yet to undergo the tests.
Not sure what it says about the airline when over 20% of your pilots (with an average of 6,900 hours) can't pass an oral exam but it sure can't be good.
TransAsia pilots grounded after failing flight test after crash - CNN.com
Not sure what it says about the airline when over 20% of your pilots (with an average of 6,900 hours) can't pass an oral exam but it sure can't be good.
TransAsia pilots grounded after failing flight test after crash - CNN.com
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Lurking in the back corner of the room is the fact that on every check ride they took they secured which engine? and why? as dictated by how many different countries authorities?
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It would be pretty easy to design an oral exam to yield a high failure rate if that was the objective of the exercise.
I remember a checkie asking me one time how many wheel nuts were on the main gear.
I remember a checkie asking me one time how many wheel nuts were on the main gear.
and ground staff is worse.