TransAsia in the water?
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Surely the only reason the engine instrument readings were similar when the #1 PL had been retarded was because the miss identification had already occurred and the serviceable (#1) engine had been shut down?
EDIT: Can't get img hosting to work, look at approx. time 53:20
With the exception of Np, all the other readings would have been similar at this point in time - possibly adding to confusion?
Last edited by TheInquisitor; 7th Feb 2015 at 22:17.
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: London
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Engine Failure!"
I flew with a UK airline out of LHR for many years (B737 and A320). The EFTO (Engine Failure on TakeOff) was practised several times on every 6-monthly sim check. The engine failure was naturally, usually at V1 or very shortly thereafter.
The training was that NH would call out "Engine Failure!" and nothing more. The crucial decision of 'which' engine was left until later. Meanwhile, the PF would simply (!) fly the plane until a safe point when both pilots could analyse the problem and carefully decide which engine had failed. Then the shutdown procedure would take place, monitored by both pilots. This system hugely reduced the chance of an early and incorrect decision on which engine had failed, but both pilots were 'in the loop', being aware of the problem.
It was literally a "sit-on-your-hands-and-fly-the-plane" scenario until it was safe to analyse the problem. The old adage "Fly – navigate – and communicate" was always the priority in our airline.
The training was that NH would call out "Engine Failure!" and nothing more. The crucial decision of 'which' engine was left until later. Meanwhile, the PF would simply (!) fly the plane until a safe point when both pilots could analyse the problem and carefully decide which engine had failed. Then the shutdown procedure would take place, monitored by both pilots. This system hugely reduced the chance of an early and incorrect decision on which engine had failed, but both pilots were 'in the loop', being aware of the problem.
It was literally a "sit-on-your-hands-and-fly-the-plane" scenario until it was safe to analyse the problem. The old adage "Fly – navigate – and communicate" was always the priority in our airline.
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: England
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Why are people talking about P2F?
The flight crew had 12,000 hours between them, and the chap in the jump seat had 16,000 hours.
There's 28,000 hours of flying on that flight deck, yet some people are talking about 'how it's a disgrace that 200 hour pilots are getting jobs.'
Any opportunity for some of you.
The flight crew had 12,000 hours between them, and the chap in the jump seat had 16,000 hours.
There's 28,000 hours of flying on that flight deck, yet some people are talking about 'how it's a disgrace that 200 hour pilots are getting jobs.'
Any opportunity for some of you.
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: Norden
Posts: 138
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A "Flame Out" warning without a flame out.
Uptrim condition but no higher torque.
Auto Feather without a reason.
EEC and MFC in a mode nobody has seen before.
Stop blaming the crew
Uptrim condition but no higher torque.
Auto Feather without a reason.
EEC and MFC in a mode nobody has seen before.
Stop blaming the crew
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A "Flame Out" warning without a flame out.
Uptrim condition but no higher torque.
Auto Feather without a reason.
EEC and MFC in a mode nobody has seen before.
Stop blaming the crew
Uptrim condition but no higher torque.
Auto Feather without a reason.
EEC and MFC in a mode nobody has seen before.
Stop blaming the crew
But all things do not appear to be equal here.
It is also worth noting that a good 45 seconds or so elapses between the first sign of trouble and the #1 being slotted. Somebody who's in a hurry to slot an engine doesn't take 45 seconds over it...
There seems to be a queue building up of people desperate to blame the crew first, and question any potential technical issues later (or not at all). Do they all work for Airbus, perchance?
Join Date: Dec 2013
Location: Paso Robles
Posts: 261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We do actually know quite a bit at this point. You can also read what (real) ATR/other pilots say about the information we have so far - it isn't very flattering to those pilots. Assuming of course we are missing some BIG factor that would excuse the crew, so far none is on the horizon. CAA action to shut down the ATR operations at this airline and retrain pilots speaks for itself.
Last edited by porterhouse; 7th Feb 2015 at 22:50.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not necessarily true, porterhouse.
Unusually, with video and FDR available in such short order, we know a lot of the 'What'.
What we don't really know much of yet is the 'Why'.
Unusually, with video and FDR available in such short order, we know a lot of the 'What'.
What we don't really know much of yet is the 'Why'.
Join Date: Dec 2013
Location: Paso Robles
Posts: 261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not necessarily true, porterhouse.
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Philippines
Posts: 460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There's 28,000 hours on that flight deck.
28,000 hours and it seems they learned nothing.
Communicate (Mayday); Navigate (Between the buildings); and Aviate (Into the sea).
All seems back to front to me?!
28,000 hours and it seems they learned nothing.
Communicate (Mayday); Navigate (Between the buildings); and Aviate (Into the sea).
All seems back to front to me?!
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: at my computer
Posts: 250
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Google has a good try.
10: 41: 14.6 GE 235 flight record start
10:51 : 12.7 Matsuyama tower issued takeoff clearance
10:52 : 33.8 Matsuyama request GE 235 Contact Taipei tower near field station
10:52 : 38.3 main warning sound
10:52 : 43.0 One engine crew referred to recover
10:53 : 00.4 crew procedures referred to engine flameout
10:53 : 06.4 One engine crew referred to recover
10:53 : 07.7 crew mentioned confirm II engine flameout
10:53 : 09.9 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 10.8 )
10:53 : 12.6 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 18.8 )
10:53 : One engine has 19.6 members mentioned feathered and off the oil
10:53 : 21.4 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 23.3 )
10:53 : 25.7 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 27.3 )
10:53 : 34.9 crew to contact the tower Matsuyama mayday mayday call
engine flameout
10:53 : 55.9 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 59.7 )
10:54 : 06.1 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 10.1 )
10:54 : 09.2 crew began to call again to drive
10:54 : 12.4 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 21.6 )
10:54 : 23.2 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 33.9 )
10:54 : 34.4 main warning sound
10:54 : 34.8 unknown sound
10:54 : 36.6 recorder stops recording
10:51 : 12.7 Matsuyama tower issued takeoff clearance
10:52 : 33.8 Matsuyama request GE 235 Contact Taipei tower near field station
10:52 : 38.3 main warning sound
10:52 : 43.0 One engine crew referred to recover
10:53 : 00.4 crew procedures referred to engine flameout
10:53 : 06.4 One engine crew referred to recover
10:53 : 07.7 crew mentioned confirm II engine flameout
10:53 : 09.9 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 10.8 )
10:53 : 12.6 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 18.8 )
10:53 : One engine has 19.6 members mentioned feathered and off the oil
10:53 : 21.4 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 23.3 )
10:53 : 25.7 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 27.3 )
10:53 : 34.9 crew to contact the tower Matsuyama mayday mayday call
engine flameout
10:53 : 55.9 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 53: 59.7 )
10:54 : 06.1 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 10.1 )
10:54 : 09.2 crew began to call again to drive
10:54 : 12.4 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 21.6 )
10:54 : 23.2 stall warning sounds ( 10 : 54: 33.9 )
10:54 : 34.4 main warning sound
10:54 : 34.8 unknown sound
10:54 : 36.6 recorder stops recording
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: <60 minutes
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ahem, could I point out, in the most gentle and coy way possible, to a large number of turbofan only posters here, that 'fanstop' and 'negative feather' are polar opposites when considering the need to "literally sit on your hands" or "have a mental cup of tea" and fly the aeroplane before any drills are actioned. Having endured both in the simulator many times, the former is an inconvenience, the latter can really ruin your best shirt.
One powerplant producing rated torque while the other misbehaving 3 to 4m diameter propellor generates as much drag as a small planet needs TIMELY action by the crew, perhaps similar in tempo and priority to upset recovery. This is an unwelcome and uncomfortable characteristic of high powered modern turboprops, and having swapped between jets and props more than once, demands considerable respect.
For all the other 'professionals' pre-judging culpability here, consider one day it might be a relative or friend of yours reading pprune in your unforeseen absence
. Not nice at all.
One powerplant producing rated torque while the other misbehaving 3 to 4m diameter propellor generates as much drag as a small planet needs TIMELY action by the crew, perhaps similar in tempo and priority to upset recovery. This is an unwelcome and uncomfortable characteristic of high powered modern turboprops, and having swapped between jets and props more than once, demands considerable respect.
For all the other 'professionals' pre-judging culpability here, consider one day it might be a relative or friend of yours reading pprune in your unforeseen absence
. Not nice at all.
Last edited by darkbarly; 8th Feb 2015 at 00:05. Reason: typo
N4790P
What exactly not necessarily true? Clearly CAA had enough circumstantial evidence to suspect gross pilot's incompetence and ask for pilots retraining, how many times in the past such decisive action was done so fast.
2) The Taiwanese regulator has NOT asked for retraining only checking.
The regulator had to be seen to do something for local consumption and they have reacted. (In the past this same authority has imposed sanctions such as restrictions on routes and new aircraft acquisitions).
This is somewhat strange as the majority of TNAs fleet are 72-500s which really is a very different aircraft and I doubt all their crews have had the delta course yet (or even if TNA operate a mixed fleet policy?)
Join Date: Jan 2015
Location: US
Posts: 64
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NY Times:
The pilot, Liao Chien-tsung, 42, has been widely praised for avoiding buildings in Taipei’s dense urban center as the plane, an ATR 72, plummeted. He had nearly 5,000 hours of flying time, including 3,400 on ATR 72s, and the co-pilot Liu Tse-chung, 45, had nearly 7,000 hours of flight time, including 6,500 on ATR 72s, according to Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
1) There is no evidence of gross pilot's incompetence.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: usa
Posts: 67
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Many on here are saying "hero" , others say "zero".
And lot of people are yelling "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate".
Let's work on Aviate; Regardless what happened prior, they got the stall warning five times before they impacted the Earth. They were behind the best lift/drag airspeed. Too slow. Too fast would be a loss for glide distance too. But they failed to maintain optimum airspeed. A basic flying skill.
Navigate: "They are hero's for avoiding the buildings". NOPE! Self preservation kicks in to this equation. They would have had additional options had the proper airspeed been maintained.
Communicate: Don't know, don't care where or when in the sequence that call was made. It's just a thumb switch to broadcast the fact that you have a problem and need special attention.
Whether the problem was with ambiguous instrumentation, false indications from the aircraft, improper action from the crew, whatever, it all comes down to ?
Aviate: Maintain proper airspeed.
And lot of people are yelling "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate".
Let's work on Aviate; Regardless what happened prior, they got the stall warning five times before they impacted the Earth. They were behind the best lift/drag airspeed. Too slow. Too fast would be a loss for glide distance too. But they failed to maintain optimum airspeed. A basic flying skill.
Navigate: "They are hero's for avoiding the buildings". NOPE! Self preservation kicks in to this equation. They would have had additional options had the proper airspeed been maintained.
Communicate: Don't know, don't care where or when in the sequence that call was made. It's just a thumb switch to broadcast the fact that you have a problem and need special attention.
Whether the problem was with ambiguous instrumentation, false indications from the aircraft, improper action from the crew, whatever, it all comes down to ?
Aviate: Maintain proper airspeed.
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: on the road less travelled
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Communicate: Don't know, don't care where or when in the sequence that call was made. It's just a thumb switch to broadcast the fact that you have a problem and need special attention.
This incident may well spell out the need to ensure communication between crews (think CRM) is clearly understood and precisely followed.
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: HK
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Those endlessly pontificating about "aviate first" and harping on about best glide speed seem to be blithely ignoring the fact that all this was all happening over a densely built-up city. The only unbuilt ground for miles around is steeply wooded hillside; the rivers have bridges over them. Achieving and maintaining best glide speed is pretty academic in terms of outcome here, it wouldn't have taken them anywhere better. It could arguably even have been less optimal; I think on balance I'd rather take an aircraft smashing into my house with the least energy possible if it's going to happen at all.
Incidentally, there is one patch of relatively flat ground without buildings on it, mainly comprising allotment-style gardens, and it is right on the other side of the river where they came down. It's possible they were aiming for that, rather than the river itself.
Incidentally, there is one patch of relatively flat ground without buildings on it, mainly comprising allotment-style gardens, and it is right on the other side of the river where they came down. It's possible they were aiming for that, rather than the river itself.