TransAsia in the water?
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Interested in anyone operating the same type or engine type that can add to the discussion on types of failures that can give misleading indications . Could a certain engine part fail and give indications that eng is still producing some power when in fact it's not ? Or eng surge give ind that eng may have failed but actually still operating ?
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Originally Posted by Robkilo
Those endlessly pontificating about "aviate first" and harping on about best glide speed seem to be blithely ignoring the fact that all this was all happening over a densely built-up city.
BTW I used to fly the old versions of the ATR42 and 72 and they flew fine on one - without all the bells and whistles of the -600...
Lower power lever - increasing power
I have just noticed that the improvements in #2 engine parameters are co-incident with a reduced power lever angle. Could this be the result of some engine control system malfunction on #2?
From posted FDR trace.
@olasec - post presently #242
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8856151
54:30 (about 5s before end of recording)
From posted FDR trace.
@olasec - post presently #242
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8856151
#2 in quote box
#2 PLA reduced from 85 degrees to 45 degrees
#2 All engine indications start showing increasing power delivery
. . Master warning flameout OFF, Beta, NP, Fuel flow, TQ, NL, NH
#2 All engine indications start showing increasing power delivery
. . Master warning flameout OFF, Beta, NP, Fuel flow, TQ, NL, NH
Last edited by jimjim1; 8th Feb 2015 at 05:14. Reason: added link to FDR
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interesting... i thought aviation had moved on a bit from this??
sure the crew made one error, but then just about everyone here has, we have all at one stage in our career sat, taking a few deep breaths thinking i really shouldn't have done that, but we got away with it.
Some of you may not realize that with two engines out the crew were down to battery power (they had no APU) once a relight is attempted the PF's only screen can auto change its mode an engine start page, leaving you gliding with a IESI and no reference bugs while you try and get your PFD back.
Do many of you practice gliding on an IESI, trying to avoid buildings without any reference speeds? i guess you have all memorized the best glide speed for all configurations and weights??
A really good point earlier on about about the engine partially shutting down and auto feathering, that may have been a causal factor??? along with training etc.
These guys didn't set out to crash this plane, they for all we know were highly respected pilots who made an error, true it was a bad one, i don't see any point in vilifying them, and being pious from my arm chair. I would rather learn from their unfortunate mistake.
sure the crew made one error, but then just about everyone here has, we have all at one stage in our career sat, taking a few deep breaths thinking i really shouldn't have done that, but we got away with it.
Some of you may not realize that with two engines out the crew were down to battery power (they had no APU) once a relight is attempted the PF's only screen can auto change its mode an engine start page, leaving you gliding with a IESI and no reference bugs while you try and get your PFD back.
Do many of you practice gliding on an IESI, trying to avoid buildings without any reference speeds? i guess you have all memorized the best glide speed for all configurations and weights??
A really good point earlier on about about the engine partially shutting down and auto feathering, that may have been a causal factor??? along with training etc.
These guys didn't set out to crash this plane, they for all we know were highly respected pilots who made an error, true it was a bad one, i don't see any point in vilifying them, and being pious from my arm chair. I would rather learn from their unfortunate mistake.
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interesting... i thought aviation had moved on a bit from this??
sure the crew made one error, but then just about everyone here has, we have all at one stage in our career sat, taking a few deep breaths thinking i really shouldn't have done that, but we got away with it.
Some of you may not realize that with two engines out the crew were down to battery power (they had no APU) once a relight is attempted the PF's only screen can auto change its mode an engine start page, leaving you gliding with a IESI and no reference bugs while you try and get your PFD back.
Do many of you practice gliding on an IESI, trying to avoid buildings without any reference speeds? i guess you have all memorized the best glide speed for all configurations and weights??
A really good point earlier on about about the engine partially shutting down and auto feathering, that may have been a causal factor??? along with training etc.
These guys didn't set out to crash this plane, they for all we know were highly respected pilots who made an error, true it was a bad one, i don't see any point in vilifying them, and being pious from my arm chair. I would rather learn from their unfortunate mistake.
sure the crew made one error, but then just about everyone here has, we have all at one stage in our career sat, taking a few deep breaths thinking i really shouldn't have done that, but we got away with it.
Some of you may not realize that with two engines out the crew were down to battery power (they had no APU) once a relight is attempted the PF's only screen can auto change its mode an engine start page, leaving you gliding with a IESI and no reference bugs while you try and get your PFD back.
Do many of you practice gliding on an IESI, trying to avoid buildings without any reference speeds? i guess you have all memorized the best glide speed for all configurations and weights??
A really good point earlier on about about the engine partially shutting down and auto feathering, that may have been a causal factor??? along with training etc.
These guys didn't set out to crash this plane, they for all we know were highly respected pilots who made an error, true it was a bad one, i don't see any point in vilifying them, and being pious from my arm chair. I would rather learn from their unfortunate mistake.
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Just joined so someone may have covered this, then sorry.
The first event is the left engine bleed going closed coincident with left Objective torque increase, followed by the right prop starting to change pitch and prpm followed by the right engine Master warning then the right engine parameters start to wind down.
Have flown several TP but not familiar with the ATR so maybe an ATR type can explain that?
And another thing, I thought we had got over ATC giving you frequency changes while your ass is on fire
The first event is the left engine bleed going closed coincident with left Objective torque increase, followed by the right prop starting to change pitch and prpm followed by the right engine Master warning then the right engine parameters start to wind down.
Have flown several TP but not familiar with the ATR so maybe an ATR type can explain that?
And another thing, I thought we had got over ATC giving you frequency changes while your ass is on fire
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ATR stall recovery
Last ATR I trained on 500 series demanded to extend flaps 15 if flaps retracted(as might have been at that altitude or in transition)..and select MCT Torque.With power available questionalble.The extension of Flaps with no available power and little obstacle free altitude beow the 1300ft they were at had them sandwiched in a sorry state.The last provounced nose drop might have been the entry into a deep stall as punctuated by the Stick pusher...quite like soon after the second stall warning.(more likely a Stick Pusher warn)..unless there was a pusher inhibit due to loss of electrics supplying the Stick Push(On Captain's side only supplied by DC Bus1 and monitored by MFC2A/B and MFC1A/B I suspect DC Bus 1 was off after shutting down the engine #1)...it was not a recoverable position to be in...because the engine that was producing power was shut down and couldn't relight.That is the reason May day call was made early..they saw how futile their position was and the best was just to alett the emergency response to locate them in good time.
Last edited by Trackdiamond; 8th Feb 2015 at 10:56.
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A 'stall warning' is NOT a stall... it is designed to go off a margin above the stall, the clue is in the name - else it would be called a 'stall INDICATOR'.
In the absence of any accurate IAS / alpha data, I would like to know exactly how all the armchair TREs here have determined that the aircraft was 'stalled all the way down', besides making wild assumptions from several grainy videos.
I see no evidence the ac was stalled all the way down - in fact, quite the opposite. The (ground?)speeds provided through ADS-B captured by FR24, the descent rate, the fact they had enough directional control to 'aviate' to an area of their choosing, the fact that the stall warner was intermittent, NOT continuous.... plenty of evidence to suggest they may not have been stalled. That they were close to the stall appears to be in no doubt.
Stop jumping to conclusions.
In the absence of any accurate IAS / alpha data, I would like to know exactly how all the armchair TREs here have determined that the aircraft was 'stalled all the way down', besides making wild assumptions from several grainy videos.
I see no evidence the ac was stalled all the way down - in fact, quite the opposite. The (ground?)speeds provided through ADS-B captured by FR24, the descent rate, the fact they had enough directional control to 'aviate' to an area of their choosing, the fact that the stall warner was intermittent, NOT continuous.... plenty of evidence to suggest they may not have been stalled. That they were close to the stall appears to be in no doubt.
Stop jumping to conclusions.
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The inquisitor
That is correct my friend. The Stick shake comes on at 1.10Vs and Stick Push at 1.05 if recall correctly.Till the last drop near the road light poles..it looked they were flying the plane deliberately..even if close to the stall envelope.
There is no evidence of gross pilot's incompetence. Only limited data has been released and certainly nothing anywhere near sufficient to fully understand what happened to an experienced crew
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51L, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33L. At 10:52:38L at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43L the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00L the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06L the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12L a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18L. At 10:53:19L the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34L the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34L a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
The holes have aligned resulting in this tragedy, but what is frustrating is that there were signs of this happening years ago.
Time to change checking philosophies?
It appears that the Captain was the least experienced crew member.
Was P2 a command failure and if not what was he doing in the RHS?
Having grown up with the chop test mentality the majority of my greatest errors were during line checks.
Partly due to the character of some of those check pilots...but also having someone breathing down your neck watching and writing everything they see.
Is it not about time that we place more emphasis and time on simulator training and install video cameras in all flight decks where the pertinent portions of flights can be analysed on the ground?
I worked for three legacy carriers...in two we had a few checkers who were incompetent bullies...The most extreme were removed with union pressure.
There were also three different mentalities to those who were marginal.
One made everyone into captains.
One sacked command failures.
One put them into a comparatively safe environment.
Whether this has any relevance to the accident I haven't a clue but three pilot isn't a normal operation nor is a FO with more experience than P1.
Was P2 a command failure and if not what was he doing in the RHS?
Having grown up with the chop test mentality the majority of my greatest errors were during line checks.
Partly due to the character of some of those check pilots...but also having someone breathing down your neck watching and writing everything they see.
Is it not about time that we place more emphasis and time on simulator training and install video cameras in all flight decks where the pertinent portions of flights can be analysed on the ground?
I worked for three legacy carriers...in two we had a few checkers who were incompetent bullies...The most extreme were removed with union pressure.
There were also three different mentalities to those who were marginal.
One made everyone into captains.
One sacked command failures.
One put them into a comparatively safe environment.
Whether this has any relevance to the accident I haven't a clue but three pilot isn't a normal operation nor is a FO with more experience than P1.
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KABOY, assuming it was fundamental operator error, you and others are wrongly equating a fundamental error with incompetence.
It suggests you and others so quick to hang the crew have no background in incident investigation, causality, or safety science.
If all of the people adopting the disposition of hanging judge think the situation is so simple and so obvious, that should actually suggest to you there may well be other factors at play.
It suggests you and others so quick to hang the crew have no background in incident investigation, causality, or safety science.
If all of the people adopting the disposition of hanging judge think the situation is so simple and so obvious, that should actually suggest to you there may well be other factors at play.
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Yes: at Kegworth
A precedent: Crew shut down working engine when other had failed- emergency diversion to East Midlands Airport, UK, landed short on motorway embankment.
Last edited by Mahonda; 8th Feb 2015 at 10:41. Reason: clarification
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VmLB 0
I think at around 18.5t weight. Flaps zero that it was ...the best drift down speed would have been around 135kts..With the left prop feathered and right prop not..am not sureif this speed would have produced an ideal result.It looked like they were descending at a normal approach vertical speed but a flatter attitude based on the video from below and from thelater video from varandah on top of that building. VmHB (flaps 35 approach speed) might have been closer to 104kts
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True there bud leon, 
we learn a lot because Air Safety Investigators (I am one) don't apportion blame or liability but we still have a parallel culture that isn't satisfied unless 'heads roll' which is totally counterproductive.
we learn a lot because Air Safety Investigators (I am one) don't apportion blame or liability but we still have a parallel culture that isn't satisfied unless 'heads roll' which is totally counterproductive.
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We are on a open forum and not on the NTSB website. We do speculate and give our, obviously not completely informed, reassured, doublechecked opinion. Otherwise close the forum.
If i put my bum, or the one of my wife and kids' onto a public airline seat, i expect a minimal competence of our fellow aviators in the cockpit. We are all put there to guarantee safety and to be the last resort for any failure that can happen.
I very much hope that we can all agree that an engine failure is probably (and hopefully) one of the most extensively trained failures, because of its time critical nature.
If an airliner crashes due to engine failure, we might not blame the pilots right away, however, if we read and get confirmed that the other engine than the one that lost power is shut down within seconds, then i can't believe the not blaming the jockeys.
We are in the planes for a purpose. Trying to excuse such a blatant failure takes away our legitimation to fight anything from bs automation, to single pilot cockpit and so forth. Those poor colleagues failed blatantly, whatever the initial failure and subsequent indications, warnings were. In a modern twin airliner shutting down the remaining power source is a deathwish or a screw-up.
No one can ever convince me of the opposite.
If i put my bum, or the one of my wife and kids' onto a public airline seat, i expect a minimal competence of our fellow aviators in the cockpit. We are all put there to guarantee safety and to be the last resort for any failure that can happen.
I very much hope that we can all agree that an engine failure is probably (and hopefully) one of the most extensively trained failures, because of its time critical nature.
If an airliner crashes due to engine failure, we might not blame the pilots right away, however, if we read and get confirmed that the other engine than the one that lost power is shut down within seconds, then i can't believe the not blaming the jockeys.
We are in the planes for a purpose. Trying to excuse such a blatant failure takes away our legitimation to fight anything from bs automation, to single pilot cockpit and so forth. Those poor colleagues failed blatantly, whatever the initial failure and subsequent indications, warnings were. In a modern twin airliner shutting down the remaining power source is a deathwish or a screw-up.
No one can ever convince me of the opposite.
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glofish
That is close minded thinking and at that no need to actively participate in the forum ..we are all in here to learn, with respect.Keep the suppositions and hypothesis pouring in everyone...eventually the truth shall be revealed am sure.
It suggests you and others so quick to hang the crew have no background in incident investigation, causality, or safety science.
I work in Asia.......culture has a lot to answer for.
Air Safety...... look at this operators history!!
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We weren't there in the cockpit to know what the PF was intending, or why he flew so slowly. However I would disagree that flying at a higher speed would have caused more deaths. Rather I would argue just the opposite.
A higher speed would have improved the glide angle, and so have given more clearance over the obstacles, and a greater range of landing spots in the river. A higher speed would also have given more kinetic energy for better control in the final few seconds of flight and allowed for a much gentler touch down into the water. (yes, that was their only option).
Instead it appears that the PF was trying to increase time in the air at the cost of energy and distance. Maybe he wanted more time to restart an engine. We will just have to wait for more information before we can ever know the answers to these questions.
A higher speed would have improved the glide angle, and so have given more clearance over the obstacles, and a greater range of landing spots in the river. A higher speed would also have given more kinetic energy for better control in the final few seconds of flight and allowed for a much gentler touch down into the water. (yes, that was their only option).
Instead it appears that the PF was trying to increase time in the air at the cost of energy and distance. Maybe he wanted more time to restart an engine. We will just have to wait for more information before we can ever know the answers to these questions.
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White Knight
Who cares if it's a densely packed city! A Performance 'A' category aeroplane should climb away with one out... They didn't aviate; that's why people are pontificating about it
1. that the cockpit indications were not contradictory;
2. that it was possible accurately to identify the failed engine whilst the situation was still retrievable; and
3. that the crew's actions had the effects intended.
As far as I can understand from the thread so far, including analyses made here of the FDR data, none of these assumptions have been established as fact.
I think we are likely to find that the crew was desperately trying to aviate based on their interpretation(s) of the information available to them, and was perplexed that the actions they took didn't have their intended effects.