TransAsia in the water?
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Uh oh. I hope it doesn't turn out to be what it feels like it is.
Another aviation classic - shutting down wrong engine, have we seen it before?
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Cross wiring ? was mentioned after Kegworth, of course it wasn't the case there, but I remember in checks of many other Boeings (inc 757's if I remember) there were cases of cross-wiring discovered, or is my old memory playing tricks ?
Quoted from sky news:
Thomas Wang, director of the safety council, said: "Based on the data we have so far we can see that for a period of time both engines showed not thrust."
He added: "The right engine flamed out and triggered a warning in the cockpit. The left engine was shut down by command and the pilot tried to restart the engine but couldn't."
Unfortunately sounds very much like the wrong engine was identified.
Thomas Wang, director of the safety council, said: "Based on the data we have so far we can see that for a period of time both engines showed not thrust."
He added: "The right engine flamed out and triggered a warning in the cockpit. The left engine was shut down by command and the pilot tried to restart the engine but couldn't."
Unfortunately sounds very much like the wrong engine was identified.
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Cross wiring ?
(the cross-wiring discovered would have no relation to such accident)
de minimus non curat lex
What we need now is the CVR to be made available in due course to really get the complete picture.
CRM will once again come under scrutiny. It is one thing in the cold light of day to identify what went wrong; the difficult part is to understand WHY?
Just what were the mental processes which triggered this, and, with a third pair of eyes of an experienced pilot even more puzzling.
A lot to understand and learn from. Use it to educate and protect others.
CRM will once again come under scrutiny. It is one thing in the cold light of day to identify what went wrong; the difficult part is to understand WHY?
Just what were the mental processes which triggered this, and, with a third pair of eyes of an experienced pilot even more puzzling.
A lot to understand and learn from. Use it to educate and protect others.
Last edited by parkfell; 6th Feb 2015 at 09:38. Reason: Clarity for OLD CHINA
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According to investigators at a briefing in Taipei, the plane ran into trouble just 37 seconds after taking off from Taipei's Songshan airport.
Thomas Wang, director of the Aviation Safety Council, said the pilot announced a "flame-out", which can occur when the fuel supply to the engine is interrupted or when there is faulty combustion.
However, he said there was no flame-out, and the right engine had actually shifted into idle mode without the oil pressure having changed.
"The plane flashed a flame-out signal for one of the two engines at 10:53:28 when the plane climbed to an altitude of 1,200ft, triggering a warning," AFP news agency quoted Mr Wang as saying.
"Then the other [left] engine was shut down manually. The pilot tried to restart the engines but to no avail. That means that during the flight's final moments, neither engine had any thrust. We heard 'Mayday' at 10:54:35," he added.
The plane, which had been bound for Taiwan's Kinmen Island, crashed into the Keelung River just 72 seconds later.
Thomas Wang, director of the Aviation Safety Council, said the pilot announced a "flame-out", which can occur when the fuel supply to the engine is interrupted or when there is faulty combustion.
However, he said there was no flame-out, and the right engine had actually shifted into idle mode without the oil pressure having changed.
"The plane flashed a flame-out signal for one of the two engines at 10:53:28 when the plane climbed to an altitude of 1,200ft, triggering a warning," AFP news agency quoted Mr Wang as saying.
"Then the other [left] engine was shut down manually. The pilot tried to restart the engines but to no avail. That means that during the flight's final moments, neither engine had any thrust. We heard 'Mayday' at 10:54:35," he added.
The plane, which had been bound for Taiwan's Kinmen Island, crashed into the Keelung River just 72 seconds later.
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/pilots-bod...e.html#SgCxa19
Why did the RH bleed valve close at the same time as the ENG 1 master warning? Is this something the ATR does automatically?
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Priorities
Regardless of the emergency or the responses, correct or otherwise...
Someone has to fly the aircraft and keep it within the envelop. Had they not stalled although a crash was inevitable more people would have survived had a pilot maintained control of the aircraft and ditched in the river.
Someone has to fly the aircraft and keep it within the envelop. Had they not stalled although a crash was inevitable more people would have survived had a pilot maintained control of the aircraft and ditched in the river.
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Looking again at the FDR track, some things seem odd:
(FDR track) http://pbs.twimg.com/media/B9JarHTIAAAgAy3.jpg:large
#2 flameout and beta come into play. ITT, fuel flow and NP drop _but remain above #1 even when #1 is shut down._
Oil pressure, NL and NH for #2 also remain above #1 shutdown condition values.
Speculation:
False alarm on #2, #2 automatically goes into beta (and idle fuel flow - does the automatic system do this?) but is selected at full throttle - the display for #2 may show that it's good i.e. high objective tq, etc. This leads to:
#1 shut down conventionally by command but has no problems?
(FDR track) http://pbs.twimg.com/media/B9JarHTIAAAgAy3.jpg:large
#2 flameout and beta come into play. ITT, fuel flow and NP drop _but remain above #1 even when #1 is shut down._
Oil pressure, NL and NH for #2 also remain above #1 shutdown condition values.
Speculation:
False alarm on #2, #2 automatically goes into beta (and idle fuel flow - does the automatic system do this?) but is selected at full throttle - the display for #2 may show that it's good i.e. high objective tq, etc. This leads to:
#1 shut down conventionally by command but has no problems?
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maybe they were “pre-conditioned” into thinking “left engine”.
The CVR data will be invaluable to the investigation team.
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Parkfell
It's a good question, although we may never know.
I still haven't heard a valid explanation of the mental process used to fly an Asiana B777 into the ground from a CAVOK visual approach, and those guys survived to tell the tale.
Just what were the mental processes which triggered this,
I still haven't heard a valid explanation of the mental process used to fly an Asiana B777 into the ground from a CAVOK visual approach, and those guys survived to tell the tale.
Psychophysiological entity
JJ above says:
As soon as I saw the news today I feared this scenario. My comment is based only on an early assessment of probability.
Imagine the skipper's mindset at this time, 'pre-conditioned' is a good enough term and I'm sure psychologists would be very aware of the huge bias towards an engine thought to be faulty. On top of this was probably an associated frustration at the company's 'rebuf' - all this churning around in his mind as the anticipated actually happened. It takes a disciplined mind to then accept it might be the 'good' engine.
It becomes even more interesting if that rumour about the captain reporting a problem with the left engine on the previous leg is true in the sense that maybe they were “pre-conditioned” into thinking “left engine”.
As soon as I saw the news today I feared this scenario. My comment is based only on an early assessment of probability.
Imagine the skipper's mindset at this time, 'pre-conditioned' is a good enough term and I'm sure psychologists would be very aware of the huge bias towards an engine thought to be faulty. On top of this was probably an associated frustration at the company's 'rebuf' - all this churning around in his mind as the anticipated actually happened. It takes a disciplined mind to then accept it might be the 'good' engine.
IF it's true that the wrong eng was shutdown, then it's possible that the existence of a check capt was an intimidating variable. Many pilots tend to change their natural behavior under check and go somewhat into acting/posturing mode. If vulnerable to 'checkitis' they are not directly responding to the situation, but thinking "what's he thinking" about what I'm doing.