Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
Originally Posted by pulse1
As a PPL
You push and hold the button to instantly disconnect inputs from the other pilot. When you can confirm that the other pilot is not making any more inputs (shout "I have control", ask to see his hands, hit him with the newspaper etc), then you let go of the button.
So much quicker and easier than trying to separate cross-connected columns and yokes in similar circumstances...
Capn Bloggs,
Misunderstanding the system perchance?
We have some 7 stone female captains. I'd rather have a disconnect in 0.5 seconds with a push of a small button rather than a mighty struggle from a small person trying to mechanically disconnect the linkage.
Misunderstanding the system perchance?
We have some 7 stone female captains. I'd rather have a disconnect in 0.5 seconds with a push of a small button rather than a mighty struggle from a small person trying to mechanically disconnect the linkage.
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With both FACs disabled all PFD characteristic speeds, protections except manoeuvre, both APs, ATHR are lost, in this situation the FDs would also be lost. In both AF and QZ the initial knee jerk reaction of the PF in pitch destabilised the plane and during recovery the resultant high rate of descent seems to have clouded their situational assessment of stalled condition as they did not seem to have noticed the high attitude because if the stick was pushed forward it was quickly brought back. I tend to think this may be due to the subconscious fear factor or reaction to extreme anxiety. In airbus FBW there is never a need to suddenly act on the pitch as the flight path is stable even in alternate law and also thrust would be locked at present level. There is only need to level or maintain wings level. It needs to be emphasized that no changes to pitch and thrust should be made untill careful assessment of the situation done.
HPP,
Good training is what enables you to still function when in extreme danger. I suspect, as others have said, the main issue is the training one.
Good training is what enables you to still function when in extreme danger. I suspect, as others have said, the main issue is the training one.
100%Please,
From the report:
From the report:
If a flight crewmember falls on a sidestick, or a mechanical failure leads to a jammed stick (there is no associate ECAM caution), the "failed" sidestick order is added to the "non-failed" sidestick order.
In this case, the other not affected flight crewmember must press the sidestick takeover pushbutton for at least 40s, in order to deactivate the "failed" sidestick.
In this case, the other not affected flight crewmember must press the sidestick takeover pushbutton for at least 40s, in order to deactivate the "failed" sidestick.
Capn Bloggs,
The takeover is instant, and continues while the button is pressed. After 40 seconds, the takeover is latched, until the other pilot presses his button.
The report, in many respects, is dreadful. Don't expect to learn how an Airbus works from this skewed piece of literature.
How about a bit of FCOM?
The takeover is instant, and continues while the button is pressed. After 40 seconds, the takeover is latched, until the other pilot presses his button.
The report, in many respects, is dreadful. Don't expect to learn how an Airbus works from this skewed piece of literature.
How about a bit of FCOM?
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Cognitive dissonance
... I simply do not believe you that the captain ...
Even very experienced professionals, who have no reason whatsoever to do something wrong, and certainly had no intent, have been involved in accidents that before hand where deemed 'unbelievable'. Part of how and why this happens fits under the label of cognitive dissonance. One clear and 'easy to show (low speed and 2D)' example that I have often used was a collision between a US Navy vessel and a Canadian Coast Guard vessel. These vessels were sailing on a separated parallel, safe, opposite 0/180 course. But in the end one vessel literally started 'chasing' the other that desparately tried to escape. In the end one the chaser hit the other port-aft with both vessels on almost the same course 135/135. Could you 'believe' the same thing happening on an airport apron?
An associated challenge (part of the overall challenge) for designers and testpilots is to decide which 'believable' and 'unbelievable' scenario's are tested against a possible design. I posted the example of a discussion between pilots and engineers about the access and location of CB panels. Believe has no place in such discussions. What you can use are scenario's and probabilities. And have these probabilities supported by as many facts as possible.
What we do not get in this case, with this low (CVR amongst others) content final report, is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ... Answer to these questions would change quite a few posts and their implied conclusions. What this report clearly fails to deliver is as many known (CVR) facts as possible. And thereby fails to fully contribute to the improvement of safety.
Originally Posted by A0283
is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ..
unworry, keep on worrying; bud leon also.
You don’t need experts to ask the right question, which if identified might help us understand that which is clouded by hindsight.
Consider the assumption “If they knew they were in a stall …”; there is little or no CVR information which would confirm that the crew knew that they were in a stall, and their actions were as required to return to wings level and the datum altitude by following the FD (#3722 Check Airman).
With hindsight it’s easy to assume that the crew were aware of the stall warning, low airspeed, etc, but we humans only hear and see what we wish too, or what we are capable of in situations of high mental workload.
Looking for similarities in other accidents (we can always find what we look for) compare this with AF447 or even Colgan; did those crews understand the situation. Their control inputs were not necessarily rushed, but consistent with the situation that they perceived – doing what they always do.
You don’t need experts to ask the right question, which if identified might help us understand that which is clouded by hindsight.
Consider the assumption “If they knew they were in a stall …”; there is little or no CVR information which would confirm that the crew knew that they were in a stall, and their actions were as required to return to wings level and the datum altitude by following the FD (#3722 Check Airman).
With hindsight it’s easy to assume that the crew were aware of the stall warning, low airspeed, etc, but we humans only hear and see what we wish too, or what we are capable of in situations of high mental workload.
Looking for similarities in other accidents (we can always find what we look for) compare this with AF447 or even Colgan; did those crews understand the situation. Their control inputs were not necessarily rushed, but consistent with the situation that they perceived – doing what they always do.
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2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back"."
Errrr... isn't that the exact opposite of what is required...?!
Dean
Errrr... isn't that the exact opposite of what is required...?!
Dean
Our crews use the Airbus FCOM Stall procedure. Taking that procedure, our own policy manual, basic airmanship, etc., I can't honestly say we'd not have the same outcome. Many other carriers I suspect would be in the same position
There is nothing to indicate to the non flying pilot that the PF's response is incorrect. The assumption would in fact be that the PF's response is correct. Add to that the fact that recovery from a High Altitude Stall isn't quick. You'll lose a good few thousand feet easily. That further delays any action from the non flying pilot.
After a STALL warning, a verbal call of PFs stick position/action should be mandatory. The incorrect response would immediately be picked up by the non flying pilot and the correction could be made.
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Facts ... detailed facts
@Capt Bloggs
From my personal viewpoint (I respect yours) this is only a fraction of the information that is required before we can draw any conclusions. Did he leave his seat, why, when, how long, why did he return, in what condition (bank to 50 degrees...did he crawl back, did he bump his head), was he indeed consciously moving the stick (you imply that he was clear headed, and would still know what he was doing, ... ), or was he slumped over his stick, there is so much that this report does not deliver, so we just dont know.
I think the discussions show how important these issues are on order to understand what happened here. But we need far more information in far more detail before we are able to support any conclusion. A proper synchronisation of very detailed CVR bits and FDR data is necessary to say the least.
So they lost control, but exactly how and why ...
Originally Posted by A0283 - is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ...
Capt Blogss: He was back in his seat for long enough to oppose the FO's stick inputs... for over 3 minutes prior to hitting the water.
I think the discussions show how important these issues are on order to understand what happened here. But we need far more information in far more detail before we are able to support any conclusion. A proper synchronisation of very detailed CVR bits and FDR data is necessary to say the least.
So they lost control, but exactly how and why ...
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A0283;
Regarding the KNKT report and an incomplete CVR record, we might take some hope that those who are studying the human factors aspects of this accident, trying to understand what energizes an instinctive, opposite reaction against all training and who may be able see into the problem in order to effect change, have the full CVR recordings plus other data. Let us hope for at least this, as the problem is the present Gordian Knot of commercial aviation.
Regarding the KNKT report and an incomplete CVR record, we might take some hope that those who are studying the human factors aspects of this accident, trying to understand what energizes an instinctive, opposite reaction against all training and who may be able see into the problem in order to effect change, have the full CVR recordings plus other data. Let us hope for at least this, as the problem is the present Gordian Knot of commercial aviation.
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The London TIMES today reports :
" DEAF TO THE WORLD
Scientists have discovered why we go deaf when absorbed in a visual task. Researchers asked ten adults to play a game, while brief sounds were played. They found that players brains tended to register a lower signal when they were concentrating harder, " Journal of Neuroscience " reported.
Nilli Lavie, Professor of Neuroscience at Univercity College, London, said : "Unintentional deafness is a common experience in everyday life, and now we know why." "
I hope that this helps.
LT
" DEAF TO THE WORLD
Scientists have discovered why we go deaf when absorbed in a visual task. Researchers asked ten adults to play a game, while brief sounds were played. They found that players brains tended to register a lower signal when they were concentrating harder, " Journal of Neuroscience " reported.
Nilli Lavie, Professor of Neuroscience at Univercity College, London, said : "Unintentional deafness is a common experience in everyday life, and now we know why." "
I hope that this helps.
LT
Last edited by Linktrained; 9th Dec 2015 at 15:38. Reason: Typo
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An Example :
Potential Chief Pilot for a new airline ( LHS)
My Fleet Manager (RHS)
" Engine Fire No 1 " Just before V1
Potential Chief Pilot ( LHS ) took no action...
After a few seconds ,
Fleet Captain closed Throttles and a/c stopped, safely.
( The Potential C/P was sent home. )
LT
Potential Chief Pilot for a new airline ( LHS)
My Fleet Manager (RHS)
" Engine Fire No 1 " Just before V1
Potential Chief Pilot ( LHS ) took no action...
After a few seconds ,
Fleet Captain closed Throttles and a/c stopped, safely.
( The Potential C/P was sent home. )
LT
LT,
We have know this for a long time. That is why a tactile cue is needed for a stall warning.
We have know this for a long time. That is why a tactile cue is needed for a stall warning.
Bergerie1,
Along with your comment about training, I am inclined to agree that a sidestick shaker (wired in parallel with the STALL STALL warning) can only provide an improvement to these scenarios.
If there is a phenomenon causing blind-fear-pull-up, then maybe this is the slap round the chops that might save the day.
Recent A320 deliveries have come with a new sidestick design (with a cheaper feel to it - no inertia damping, just springs) so I am sure another re-design can't be impossible. Maybe an exchange program with retrofit?
Along with your comment about training, I am inclined to agree that a sidestick shaker (wired in parallel with the STALL STALL warning) can only provide an improvement to these scenarios.
If there is a phenomenon causing blind-fear-pull-up, then maybe this is the slap round the chops that might save the day.
Recent A320 deliveries have come with a new sidestick design (with a cheaper feel to it - no inertia damping, just springs) so I am sure another re-design can't be impossible. Maybe an exchange program with retrofit?
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Errors in cpies of the same device
Then reading the report I an struck again by the fault in identical systems without any known important diversification in either design or in manufacturing. Hence the root should be classified as a Common Cause Error.
The PF pulling on the stick seems to be a common reaction to a surprising Stall alarm. Compare with the pulling in AF447. Somewhere I read after the turboprop crash that this pulling surprisingly occurred in 80 % of tested pilots.
The PF pulling on the stick seems to be a common reaction to a surprising Stall alarm. Compare with the pulling in AF447. Somewhere I read after the turboprop crash that this pulling surprisingly occurred in 80 % of tested pilots.
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Again: Concerned SLF here.
Are (some of) you really sure that the side stick lack of tactile feedback is the true problem? Or is that just something that is easy to blame because it is different from Boeings? From what I have been told, fighter jets have side sticks and they don't fall from the sky like bricks after a pilot induced upset due to some poor bastard clinging on to the stick for dear life.
Is there perhaps something else going on? Something we need to understand in a whole another way? Something we might not see yet?
Another comment: I too read the report and found it very confusing. There is no mention at all about Capt actions (Was he really out of the chair? If yes: for how long? Where are the CBs that he had to pull situated? Did they sound stressed out?) but a loooooong detailed story about... well, I actually skipped a lot since it was just copy-paste from the manual.
I had expected at least some mentions about the CRM and decision making capabilities, some comments about situational awareness, analysis of ergonomics et. al. Nothing of that kind. Which is very weird.
Are (some of) you really sure that the side stick lack of tactile feedback is the true problem? Or is that just something that is easy to blame because it is different from Boeings? From what I have been told, fighter jets have side sticks and they don't fall from the sky like bricks after a pilot induced upset due to some poor bastard clinging on to the stick for dear life.
Is there perhaps something else going on? Something we need to understand in a whole another way? Something we might not see yet?
Another comment: I too read the report and found it very confusing. There is no mention at all about Capt actions (Was he really out of the chair? If yes: for how long? Where are the CBs that he had to pull situated? Did they sound stressed out?) but a loooooong detailed story about... well, I actually skipped a lot since it was just copy-paste from the manual.
I had expected at least some mentions about the CRM and decision making capabilities, some comments about situational awareness, analysis of ergonomics et. al. Nothing of that kind. Which is very weird.