Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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If the Captain had specifically instructed his F/O
" Please WATCH YOUR INSTRUMENTS..I am going to try to get the system working."
This might have been enough.
( Others may say " Leave the systems alone..." I cannot comment.)
LT
" Please WATCH YOUR INSTRUMENTS..I am going to try to get the system working."
This might have been enough.
( Others may say " Leave the systems alone..." I cannot comment.)
LT
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Experience and licence needed for my York flying as mentioned above :
CPL+ I/R , 450 hours total. My Captains required me to remain within 50 ft of cruising level and 1 or 2 degrees of course (C)
I noted my actual Instrument flying times in my log book, as suggested by a former R.F.C. pilot, who said it might be interesting some day !
L.T.
CPL+ I/R , 450 hours total. My Captains required me to remain within 50 ft of cruising level and 1 or 2 degrees of course (C)
I noted my actual Instrument flying times in my log book, as suggested by a former R.F.C. pilot, who said it might be interesting some day !
L.T.
Last edited by Linktrained; 8th Dec 2015 at 00:34. Reason: bits
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It does seem outrageous that professional pilots would ignore a stall warning (thinking as a mere private pilot, drilled on stalls), but.... if the rudder on my Cessna suddenly kicked and threw the plane into a yaw and bank, maybe I'd be startled too. Airbus needs to make some changes. Why not degrade to a "Safe Mode", where the aircraft maintains wings level, thrust and AOA set to a known good level? Professional pilots said that is the fallback, simple enough to automate that. How about instead of "Stall Stall" it says "Stall, push nose down NOW!", like the ground prox warning "Pull up!". It costs nothing to do that. On the sticks, add a friggin' vibrator. Dirt cheap, easy mod. If the other pilot is moving the stick, you NEED TO KNOW NOW. The senior pilot can then tell the other pilot "My Aircraft", Sully style, and know if the other pilot is respecting that. In the case of Allah Akbar, he can punch that sucker out. These problems are very rare, but the consequences are severe. I would imagine that most pros NEVER encounter a stall warning in an AirBus, NOR have a situation where the other pilot is flailing away with the side stick, but if it does happen it's a crisis. The software has to take that into account.
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I am absolutely with Centaurus on this one!
Along time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, we were being instructed in UA recovery in the sim by a chap of Asian extraction. The syllabus/checklist recall was the [then] new Boeing UA recovery program.
The input of the instructor was that the only way the recovery should be done by we inexperienced pilots was to do so on the autopilot. This was totally against the Boeing requirements [and for that matter, our employers!!]
My problem with this is that if the autopilot fails and causes an upset, you don't have an autopilot on which to recover [or would you trust the "other" one??] Thus, skip some years to sitting in the RHS over Europe, red light on the INS and the aircraft takes off in an upward left hand turn from FL330. Quick disconnect, recover and engage the other autopilot.
Back to Centaurus' argument; teach it right in the first place and it will stick, backed up by practice.
Indeed, when instructing the same sequence, I would complete the syllabus, then if we had time [mostly], do the same exercise, but freeze the pilot's PFD attitude in a non-representative position and get the guys to recover on the standby. Without exception, they all thanked me for the additional input.
G'day
PS The "Bahrain Bomber" was the forerunner of this stuff and not really repeated until FBW machines came along.
Along time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, we were being instructed in UA recovery in the sim by a chap of Asian extraction. The syllabus/checklist recall was the [then] new Boeing UA recovery program.
The input of the instructor was that the only way the recovery should be done by we inexperienced pilots was to do so on the autopilot. This was totally against the Boeing requirements [and for that matter, our employers!!]
My problem with this is that if the autopilot fails and causes an upset, you don't have an autopilot on which to recover [or would you trust the "other" one??] Thus, skip some years to sitting in the RHS over Europe, red light on the INS and the aircraft takes off in an upward left hand turn from FL330. Quick disconnect, recover and engage the other autopilot.
Back to Centaurus' argument; teach it right in the first place and it will stick, backed up by practice.
Indeed, when instructing the same sequence, I would complete the syllabus, then if we had time [mostly], do the same exercise, but freeze the pilot's PFD attitude in a non-representative position and get the guys to recover on the standby. Without exception, they all thanked me for the additional input.
G'day
PS The "Bahrain Bomber" was the forerunner of this stuff and not really repeated until FBW machines came along.
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I've said it before and I make no apology for saying it again; one issue DID cause this accident. Two qualified and experienced ATPLs managed to stall a basically-serviceable modern aircraft into the drink from FL380.
That should NOT be possible. That should NEVER EVER happen. You can argue AoA indicators and control laws and sidesticks until you're blue in the face; what it needed was pilots who could fly the <expletive deleted> plane! If you lose sight of that, you've lost sight of the damned *profession*.
That should NOT be possible. That should NEVER EVER happen. You can argue AoA indicators and control laws and sidesticks until you're blue in the face; what it needed was pilots who could fly the <expletive deleted> plane! If you lose sight of that, you've lost sight of the damned *profession*.
The more aircraft, or really any machine, are automated, with added layers upon layers of protection systems, the more removed from actually operating it safely, the pilot will become. They'll be thinking to themselves: "I won't have to xxx, because it will do it, or it will provide a warning". Well.... Maybe it won't.
I had to check myself out in a turboprop aircraft, and then undertake stall testing in it - and it does not incorporate any stall warning system in it's type design. I approached with caution, and managed just fine.
Less automation, and more training! The crews don't need to be stalling Airbusses around the sky to get the idea, send them in a DA-42 or similar for the stall practice. Oh, they can't safely take up a DA-42 on their own? There's another problem then!
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quote Vilas :
"If the pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 knew the pitch, bank and thrust autopilot uses at those levels they wouldn't have done what they did"
You are absolute right Vilas
Knowing required PITCH + POWER SETTING at high altitude is essential !
And that is for all commercial aircraft.
I have made it a habit, when reaching a new FL at cruise, to look at pitch + power
If things start to seriously bad at high altitude = as PF stick to the memorized PITCH + POWER, and then start to solve the problem(s)
If you are an Airbus pilot, I highly recommend reading the book : "Understanding AF447". It contains so much valuable information, and will probably leave you sleepless for some nights, thinking about how fast things can go fatally wrong. As this accident is proof of.
"If the pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 knew the pitch, bank and thrust autopilot uses at those levels they wouldn't have done what they did"
You are absolute right Vilas
Knowing required PITCH + POWER SETTING at high altitude is essential !
And that is for all commercial aircraft.
I have made it a habit, when reaching a new FL at cruise, to look at pitch + power
If things start to seriously bad at high altitude = as PF stick to the memorized PITCH + POWER, and then start to solve the problem(s)
If you are an Airbus pilot, I highly recommend reading the book : "Understanding AF447". It contains so much valuable information, and will probably leave you sleepless for some nights, thinking about how fast things can go fatally wrong. As this accident is proof of.
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However these incidents which allegedly have a significant component of pilot error will only support the trend to increased automation.
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Many people are advocating that the answer to this issue is simply more training so that “pilots can fly planes”. While more and better training is obviously a good thing and will improve the situation, training is not the magic cure for everything. Training can fail just like a pitot tube. Smart intelligent people can make mistakes. A better result will be obtained from multiple improvements of the many aspects that could help the pilot perform his important tasks.
More training is easy to implement because it reinforces the idea that the pilot is 100% responsible and takes the responsibility off the operator and manufacturer.
More training is easy to implement because it reinforces the idea that the pilot is 100% responsible and takes the responsibility off the operator and manufacturer.
Let me throw one more ingredient into the melting pot here.
In the olden days when pilots did their basic training all the aircraft were aerobatic and spinnable and the instructors were almost exclusively war time and used to doing aeros etc.
Fast forward a few decades and spinning was eliminated from the PPL course and I believe it has minimal requirement in CPL training. At a CFIs conference I attended last year one member was berating the fact the instructors applying for jobs had only ever done a couple of spins in their entire careers.
What difference does this make to the airline product? There is no doubt in my mind that being trained in spinning and basic aeros etc create a much more robust pilot. (I speak as one who was civil trained). When spinning was in the PPL syllabus as an instructor if the student finished the spinning exercise thinking "whatever happens I am not going to let the a/c get into that situation" they had learned a good lesson.
I agree that training isn't everything but we have to face the fact that we seem to have a new generation of pilots now who seem unable to recognise an unusual attitude and/or recover from more than 30 degrees of bank and or an approaching stall.
In the olden days when pilots did their basic training all the aircraft were aerobatic and spinnable and the instructors were almost exclusively war time and used to doing aeros etc.
Fast forward a few decades and spinning was eliminated from the PPL course and I believe it has minimal requirement in CPL training. At a CFIs conference I attended last year one member was berating the fact the instructors applying for jobs had only ever done a couple of spins in their entire careers.
What difference does this make to the airline product? There is no doubt in my mind that being trained in spinning and basic aeros etc create a much more robust pilot. (I speak as one who was civil trained). When spinning was in the PPL syllabus as an instructor if the student finished the spinning exercise thinking "whatever happens I am not going to let the a/c get into that situation" they had learned a good lesson.
I agree that training isn't everything but we have to face the fact that we seem to have a new generation of pilots now who seem unable to recognise an unusual attitude and/or recover from more than 30 degrees of bank and or an approaching stall.
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Is it more training or better and more relevant training?
We can talk about the pros & cons of automation and side sticks vs control columns until the cows come home. But the one thing above all which can't be ignored, is that reading the CVR 'transcripts' of both AF447 and QZ8501, both PFs' responses to the upset can be summed up as "Oh my god, what has happened!?!- I'm trying to fix it but nothing's working as I expect it to!! -I don't really understand what's going on!!!", with the PNF seemingly even further behind the plane than the PF.
With respect to the two dead crews, what frightens me most is, did they perform any better in the situation, than would an untrained member of the public, whose automatic response would be panic, followed by, 'we're going down, I must pull the stick back to make it go up again???'
If this is the case, then it is without doubt a training issue, and matters of automation are minor concerns in comparison.
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Not a member of the blame the flight crew camp here...
I still believe, without the control inputs of the other pilot confusing the flight control computers, any of the four pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 was fully capable of recovering the aircraft from the upset.
How many more of these accidents is it going to take before this flawed man/machine interface is exposed for what it is?
I still believe, without the control inputs of the other pilot confusing the flight control computers, any of the four pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 was fully capable of recovering the aircraft from the upset.
How many more of these accidents is it going to take before this flawed man/machine interface is exposed for what it is?
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Back to the basic training & CPL course discussion. Not only was there more basic flying, certainly spins & stalls; there were stalls in turns, incipient spin recovery; there were minor aeros and spins off the tops of loops; some were intended an others not. The unexpected ones were better training in fact. You learnt SA and not to be afraid when the blue side was below you and the horizon was AWOL. Spins under the hood were even more fun. Indeed that was with highly qualified QFI's, not hour builders who had just been spat out be the same school and who were searching for a 'proper' job.
Oh, and I forgot, a CPL course was 250hrs, not the mickey mouse 148hrs of today where the concentration is on MCC, CRM, AFDS and SOP's. Think what could be done with 50 hours extra. Let the dog of the lead and let the guys have some fun, perhaps even scare themselves a bit; but either way they will learn the envelop edges are much further away than they thought; of both the a/c and themselves.
Oh, and I forgot, a CPL course was 250hrs, not the mickey mouse 148hrs of today where the concentration is on MCC, CRM, AFDS and SOP's. Think what could be done with 50 hours extra. Let the dog of the lead and let the guys have some fun, perhaps even scare themselves a bit; but either way they will learn the envelop edges are much further away than they thought; of both the a/c and themselves.
Wannabee,
Control inputs do not confuse the flight control computers. The Bus flies just like any other aeroplane. Adjust pitch and roll as required to achieve what you need. If you want to take over, say "taking over" and press and hold the button, just like you are taught to. It ain't rocket science. But you need to recognise what is happening, and know how to fix it. Doesn't matter if it's a bus or a Boeing, A bad pilot will bend it.
Control inputs do not confuse the flight control computers. The Bus flies just like any other aeroplane. Adjust pitch and roll as required to achieve what you need. If you want to take over, say "taking over" and press and hold the button, just like you are taught to. It ain't rocket science. But you need to recognise what is happening, and know how to fix it. Doesn't matter if it's a bus or a Boeing, A bad pilot will bend it.
Ranger One, et al; many posts reflect hindsight bias, particular when attempting to rethink ‘what’ happened, and then concluding ‘why’, choose an inappropriate response – cause and effect are not reversible in complex accidents.
Instead of looking for ‘cause’, think about what could be learnt from what has already been published; consider how this might relate to other situations, other people, yourself – airmanship, professionalism.
‘Blame and train’ is not a solution. It is impossible to be sure (‘NEVER EVER’) that the required human behaviour – via training – will be applied in all situations. The surprise in many posts ‘how could the human have done this’, is no more than the same surprise which the accident crew encountered – surprise clouds our thoughts and adds mental workload, which the report considered.
If we wish to judge that more effective training is required then the focus could be on avoidance and situation awareness vice actions after the event – proactive not reactive safety.
Pprune is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety; everyone is entitled to an opinion, but without justification then we may not be entitled to an opinion; justification requires well-reasoned argument.
I have no strong views on what happened in this accident, but from some previous posts I will now consider where the seat is positioned during cruise – can the controls be reached and moved to the maximum deflection, and if I leave the seat to switch something, reconsider “should I be doing this”, and in addition to continually noting the pitch power values in flight, check the normal range of trim settings for each situation.
In the Cartoon below, change the Flt No as required.
“You are not entitled to your opinion. You are entitled to your informed opinion. No one is entitled to be ignorant.” Harland Ellison
Instead of looking for ‘cause’, think about what could be learnt from what has already been published; consider how this might relate to other situations, other people, yourself – airmanship, professionalism.
‘Blame and train’ is not a solution. It is impossible to be sure (‘NEVER EVER’) that the required human behaviour – via training – will be applied in all situations. The surprise in many posts ‘how could the human have done this’, is no more than the same surprise which the accident crew encountered – surprise clouds our thoughts and adds mental workload, which the report considered.
If we wish to judge that more effective training is required then the focus could be on avoidance and situation awareness vice actions after the event – proactive not reactive safety.
Pprune is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety; everyone is entitled to an opinion, but without justification then we may not be entitled to an opinion; justification requires well-reasoned argument.
I have no strong views on what happened in this accident, but from some previous posts I will now consider where the seat is positioned during cruise – can the controls be reached and moved to the maximum deflection, and if I leave the seat to switch something, reconsider “should I be doing this”, and in addition to continually noting the pitch power values in flight, check the normal range of trim settings for each situation.
In the Cartoon below, change the Flt No as required.
“You are not entitled to your opinion. You are entitled to your informed opinion. No one is entitled to be ignorant.” Harland Ellison
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Safetypee;
Sid Dekker also expressed it very well in his, "Field Guide to Understanding Human Error", where, in the Chapter, "They Should Have...", he wrote:
"What (you think) happened cannot explain people's behaviour", p.39.
FDMII
Sid Dekker also expressed it very well in his, "Field Guide to Understanding Human Error", where, in the Chapter, "They Should Have...", he wrote:
"What (you think) happened cannot explain people's behaviour", p.39.
FDMII
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Yes FDMII. I really wish some of the people who post here would better educate themselves in the field of human error before so soundly crucifying the pilots.
That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
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That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
Where is the THS graph ... !?
