Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Feathers McGraw: "if the captain was busy sliding/falling around..... (the FO) may well have been looking back over his shoulder and thinking "Oh crap!"
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It wasn't just inappropriate stall recovery. It appears that neither PF recognized they were in a stall even with the stall warnings blaring. That screams for change and not just training or SOP.
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@G-CPTN
I remember reading an article on AW&ST about USAF IPs training Portuguese crews on low level, "high"-g maneuvers on C130s.
During high workload/stress flight regimes, the IPs noticed that the trainees weren't responding to "Push" commands, despite being fluent in English. Eventually, they realized that "Push" sounds almost the same as "Puxe," which is Portuguese for "Pull." So, the IPs switched to "Unload" instead and solved the problem.
During high workload/stress flight regimes, the IPs noticed that the trainees weren't responding to "Push" commands, despite being fluent in English. Eventually, they realized that "Push" sounds almost the same as "Puxe," which is Portuguese for "Pull." So, the IPs switched to "Unload" instead and solved the problem.
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The NTSB, etc., have been trying to get AOA indicators available to airline pilots for DECADES. But so far the regulators and industry remain opposed to the idea.
AoA information of all three AoA vanes is actually available on the bus, however only via the CDU and in numeric values, not something one would do in a dynamic situation like that. And i guess displaying the difference between where the aircraft is going versus where it is pointing, although readily available via a simple "bird on", is beyond the reduced mental capability of the pilots during an event like that.
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As customer option blah blah blah. Is passenger safety optional?
NTSB recommendation to the FAA, 1996, after the AA965 crash near Cali, Colombia:
Nearly 20 years later we still don't have AOA indicators on the vast, vast majority of transport-category aircraft. Why is that?
FAA's response to NTSB on this recommendation, dated October 2000:
NTSB recommendation to the FAA, 1996, after the AA965 crash near Cali, Colombia:
Require that all transport-category aircraft present pilots with angle-of-attack information in a visual format, and that all air carriers train their pilots to use the information to obtain maximum possible airplane climb performance (Class 11, Priority Action) (A-96-94)
FAA's response to NTSB on this recommendation, dated October 2000:
THE FAA HAS REEXAMINED ITS POSITION REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DISPLAY OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INFORMATION TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM CLIMB PERFORMANCE AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE REQUREMENT TO INSTALL ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INFORMATION IN ALL TRANSPORT-CATEGORY AIRCRAFT IS NOT WARRANTED BECAUSE OF THE DECISION TO MANDATE TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS)
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ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees
Less than a minute after AP disconnect, at 38000 ft.
Nobody could save that plane using the primary controls only (stick rudder and thrust)
(hint: abnormal attitude law)
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I return to the language question.
If the Captain thought he had told the P2 to push down, then he would therefore not say 'I have control' because he thought he was pushing in the same direction as the P2. Likewise the P2 would also think, thanks to his interpreting the "pull down" command as "pull" (which he was instructed to do later), that the Captain was either not touching the controls or trying to move the stick in the same direction as himself.
The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.
If the Captain thought he had told the P2 to push down, then he would therefore not say 'I have control' because he thought he was pushing in the same direction as the P2. Likewise the P2 would also think, thanks to his interpreting the "pull down" command as "pull" (which he was instructed to do later), that the Captain was either not touching the controls or trying to move the stick in the same direction as himself.
The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.
The captain's problem was in trying to take control without telling the FO to hand over control.
The three words "I have control" might well have saved this aircraft.
I am sorry to put it so bluntly but this crash would NOT have happened had the Captain not tried a 'smart fix' of the ECAM by pulling the CB's. Let's not forget that this EXACT procedure is expressly and clearly forbidden in the aircraft flight manuals.
This was the origin of the event, the poor manipulative skills of the crew were only exposed by this fool hardy action. The ECAM wasn't even serious! Could have written it up and left the reset to the Engineer, yes it had been faulted on numerous occasions but as the Captain if you have a problem with this then don't accept the aircraft!
This is up there with the crew who crashed the aircraft into the Everglades whilst trying to replace a landing gear light bulb, a minor tech problem that has been poorly managed which has led to total hull loss.
The question of the crews inability to recover the aircraft is an industry wide problem, in our attempts to remove the human element from incidents we have created a generation of pilots who are now causing crashes due to piss poor manipulative skills e.g. Air France, Air Asia, Asiana .........
This was the origin of the event, the poor manipulative skills of the crew were only exposed by this fool hardy action. The ECAM wasn't even serious! Could have written it up and left the reset to the Engineer, yes it had been faulted on numerous occasions but as the Captain if you have a problem with this then don't accept the aircraft!
This is up there with the crew who crashed the aircraft into the Everglades whilst trying to replace a landing gear light bulb, a minor tech problem that has been poorly managed which has led to total hull loss.
The question of the crews inability to recover the aircraft is an industry wide problem, in our attempts to remove the human element from incidents we have created a generation of pilots who are now causing crashes due to piss poor manipulative skills e.g. Air France, Air Asia, Asiana .........
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What is it about the Abnormal Attitude Law that "dooms" the airplane at FL380, and prevents recovery if the correct response to the stall is achieved?
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Cross cockpit comms
One thing that puzzles me is why the CAPT did not take control assertively. He is 100% responsible for a/c. Did he feel FO was more situationally aware? Perhaps another similarity with AF447 is CAPT being out of his seat at the time of zoom climb by FO .
Contrast this Air Asia incident / AF447 incident with the very public Hudson incident (quote from flight 1549 NTSB report):
Note CAPT disables FO SS inputs after verbally taking control. This is pro-active action taking control immediately and without waiting for any dual input warning messages.
Contrast this Air Asia incident / AF447 incident with the very public Hudson incident (quote from flight 1549 NTSB report):
HOT-1 my aircraft.
15:27:24
HOT-2 your aircraft.
15:27:24.4
FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:25
CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine
igniters begins]
15:27:26.5
FWC priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs
when the sidestick priority button is activated
on the Captain's sidestick]
15:27:24
HOT-2 your aircraft.
15:27:24.4
FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:25
CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine
igniters begins]
15:27:26.5
FWC priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs
when the sidestick priority button is activated
on the Captain's sidestick]
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What is it about the Abnormal Attitude Law that "dooms" the airplane at FL380
See Airbus 319-320-321 FCTM or in this final report at page 78:
Pitch alternate with load factor protection (without auto-trim)
With THS at maximum nose-up position, the correct recovery action on primary controls only, is not sufficient:
Only half a speed-brake
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ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees
Simply, they were doomed there.
...
if the correct response to the stall is achieved?
Simply, they were doomed there.
...
if the correct response to the stall is achieved?
It is very questionable whether there were any "correct responses" in that situation. I also tend to believe that this was it, once they got there.
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On the airbus, stall warning is only encountered in alternate law, i.e. when the systems are already degraded by multiple failures. So stall warning is always preceded by other, unrelated, warnings calling for ECAM actions, and causing an unusual and stressful environment in which aural warnings tend to be ignored.
Sufficiently violent windshear has triggered the stall warning in the past on A320 series but the difference is that the aircraft is already applying full down elevator input as it occurs and will recover from the stall itself.
48° AoA is massive. Many test pilots have never been there. No modern Jet transport has ever been there in a controlled and monitored environment, so absolutely no data is available.
It is very questionable whether there were any "correct responses" in that situation. I also tend to believe that this was it, once they got there.
It is very questionable whether there were any "correct responses" in that situation. I also tend to believe that this was it, once they got there.
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An overlay display could show both sidestick inputs.
Such a purely informational display would not require any programming mods to the existing active controls setup, but would still allow pilots to deconflict their inputs.
Edmund
Such a purely informational display would not require any programming mods to the existing active controls setup, but would still allow pilots to deconflict their inputs.
Edmund
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Macro CRM
A number of excellent posts here today. Thanks. Real pleasure reading them.
Having been involved in, and following, discussions like these for many years now, it is clear to me that on some points we have to break an industry deadlock in order to get safety yet another notch up. The low hanging fruit has already been properly picked.
Let’s take 2 important points. I hope you will not find them ‘philosophical’, as they are literally deadly serious. You will see them back in errors and incidents and accidents,even when their direct relationship to ‘visible’ events is not immediately clear (not only in operations but for example also in program management,engineering and manufacturing).
The first point concerns national and company cultures. French and US cultures are different (French culture differs from other European cultures too by the way). As a consequence of that, each will deliver products and solutions that have some inherent weaknesses. Sometimes you see this inside the industry – when you move work from one country to another for example they pop up sooner or later.Sometimes you see them in incidents and accidents.
n For example (mods - not judging, just illustrating – you can say similar things about other manufacturers) - Boeing has and will have some manufacturing issues for example that you will not quickly see in Airbusses.
n For example (mods – again, not judging, just illustrating) - Airbus has some design choices and issues for example that you will not quickly see in a Boeing. In some cases Boeing has followed the Airbus choices (delayed by X years) but made different design implementation decisions. In one case I am constantly checking if Boeing cultural manufacturing issues will come out of that by the way (hope it will be in incidents rather than accidents).
The second point is communication. I have an idea about what Airbus is going to say lateron (“when they have had time to study the report” – which is an interesting statement by itself). I also have an idea about the reactions that they will generate (rational,emotional, frustration, ...). And see some of these Airbus statements bouncing of a proverbial wall rather than being really absorbed and commented upon by some recipients. Clear and explicit examples of this bouncing can be found in the KNKT AirAsia Report which includes statements directly taken from AirAsia manuals. Statements that are counter to what Airbus has stated over many years by now. There are of course also Boeing examples. Citing one example - a famous US aerodynamics specialist called it the “NIH Syndrome”.
Both culture and communication together have been root causes of very serious issues that both Airbus and Boeing have had with major new programs over the last 15 years or so.These are not played out in accidents but in significant program delays and cost overruns. They have had and may have some issues later.
You might say that together both point to a requirement for CRM on an industry level and scale, Macro CRM.
Having been involved in, and following, discussions like these for many years now, it is clear to me that on some points we have to break an industry deadlock in order to get safety yet another notch up. The low hanging fruit has already been properly picked.
Let’s take 2 important points. I hope you will not find them ‘philosophical’, as they are literally deadly serious. You will see them back in errors and incidents and accidents,even when their direct relationship to ‘visible’ events is not immediately clear (not only in operations but for example also in program management,engineering and manufacturing).
The first point concerns national and company cultures. French and US cultures are different (French culture differs from other European cultures too by the way). As a consequence of that, each will deliver products and solutions that have some inherent weaknesses. Sometimes you see this inside the industry – when you move work from one country to another for example they pop up sooner or later.Sometimes you see them in incidents and accidents.
n For example (mods - not judging, just illustrating – you can say similar things about other manufacturers) - Boeing has and will have some manufacturing issues for example that you will not quickly see in Airbusses.
n For example (mods – again, not judging, just illustrating) - Airbus has some design choices and issues for example that you will not quickly see in a Boeing. In some cases Boeing has followed the Airbus choices (delayed by X years) but made different design implementation decisions. In one case I am constantly checking if Boeing cultural manufacturing issues will come out of that by the way (hope it will be in incidents rather than accidents).
The second point is communication. I have an idea about what Airbus is going to say lateron (“when they have had time to study the report” – which is an interesting statement by itself). I also have an idea about the reactions that they will generate (rational,emotional, frustration, ...). And see some of these Airbus statements bouncing of a proverbial wall rather than being really absorbed and commented upon by some recipients. Clear and explicit examples of this bouncing can be found in the KNKT AirAsia Report which includes statements directly taken from AirAsia manuals. Statements that are counter to what Airbus has stated over many years by now. There are of course also Boeing examples. Citing one example - a famous US aerodynamics specialist called it the “NIH Syndrome”.
Both culture and communication together have been root causes of very serious issues that both Airbus and Boeing have had with major new programs over the last 15 years or so.These are not played out in accidents but in significant program delays and cost overruns. They have had and may have some issues later.
You might say that together both point to a requirement for CRM on an industry level and scale, Macro CRM.
Last edited by A0283; 3rd Dec 2015 at 13:37.
Disclaimer - I don't fly and haven't flown the bus.
However, abnormal attitude law does seem to be a big issue in general to me. As I understand it, bus drivers only ever touch the trim wheel to set trim for takeoff.
Therefore a law that:
- (after an upset has occurred!) freezes the trim in a position that may have contributed to the initial upset
- expects pilots in an upset to recognise and comprehend this law degradation
- expects pilots to trim manually to assist recovery, despite never trimming manually in normal ops
In my opinion has serious issues. In general, the concept of being trained out of the need to trim is in my view inherently detrimental to the skills required for upset recovery.
However, abnormal attitude law does seem to be a big issue in general to me. As I understand it, bus drivers only ever touch the trim wheel to set trim for takeoff.
Therefore a law that:
- (after an upset has occurred!) freezes the trim in a position that may have contributed to the initial upset
- expects pilots in an upset to recognise and comprehend this law degradation
- expects pilots to trim manually to assist recovery, despite never trimming manually in normal ops
In my opinion has serious issues. In general, the concept of being trained out of the need to trim is in my view inherently detrimental to the skills required for upset recovery.