Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Registration characters
No one has mentioned it yet, but it appears that the various in situ photos included both left and right side registration numbers. Comparison of all in situ regis# photos to date suggest there are differences between letters re bends/folds. The raising of the tail section also shows that many clues as to shape and event sequence observable underwater will be lost when raised, with the raised debris having been further deformed and then flattened during recovery into more of an origami puzzle.
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RE LOCATION OF FDR/CVR
CVR and FDR were originally in that part of the plane
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I'm surprised that the CVR/DFDR is exposed to the elements outside the pressure bulkhead like that (temperate extremes, hydraulic fluid, moisture, etc). Of course, I'm talking about the electronics external to the fireproof section.
Is this common for Airbus?
Is this common for Airbus?
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The water is reportedly only about 100 feet / 30 metres deep.
The currents are reportedly only up to about 6 knots.
If one assumed that the aircraft pancaked, or even broke up attempting to ditch, you would expect that the remainder of the aircraft, particularly all the concentrated mass components, ie, the dense and heavy bits, like engines, apu, mlgs, nlg, and if they separated from their mounting trays, the cvr, fdr etc, and the other larger major components like ths, outboard wing panels, and centre section, would be, indeed must be, immediately proximate, regardless of currents.
So far, that does not seem to be the case.
There is no evidence, at this stage, of any other major component wreckage, anywhere, let alone anywhere near the location of the tail.
It has been reported that a suspected pinger is over a mile away.
The reported condition of the recovered bodys (at this stage less than one third) suggests relatively low "g" conditions.
The leaked mode "s" data showed high rod at much below cruise level.
Taken together therefore, these observations suggest strongly to me, the high probability of an in flight breakup, not a whole aircraft experiencing surface induced structural disruption.
My viewing of the recovered upper empenage and fin, and lower rudder, suggests to me, that the ths, and it's mounting structure (including apu mounting structure and apu) most likely separated from the upper empenage by downward bending with pitch down torsion.
If that is the case, it would have taken tremendous downward ths loading of the support structure to do that, which suggests to me, probable breakup during pull-up, attempting recovery from a significantly pitch down attitude, at high speed (high dynamic pressure), probably at a relatively low altitude, ie, between FL200 - FL100.
Under such conditions, if the ths separated first, with the aircraft otherwise still "whole at that instant", the remainder of the aircraft would immediately, and violently, "tumble in the pitch down direction", with high angular velocity. The weakened empenage would "immediately" tear off, and the remaining fuselage aft of the wing, and the fuselage forward of the wing, would then both rapidly separate from the wingbox, probably before the pitch axis had even passed through the vertical. In the same timeframe, the pylons would fail, the engines would separate, and the outboard wing sections would fail in downward bending and torsion overload, and separate, probably at or just outboard of the pylons.
The schredded wreckage would then descend.
If that be the case, the greater the altitude of the breakup, the greater the dimensions of the resulting debris field.
The foreward section of the fuselage, and the remaing aft section of the fuselage, may have remained relatively intact, and may still contain most of the occupants.
The currents are reportedly only up to about 6 knots.
If one assumed that the aircraft pancaked, or even broke up attempting to ditch, you would expect that the remainder of the aircraft, particularly all the concentrated mass components, ie, the dense and heavy bits, like engines, apu, mlgs, nlg, and if they separated from their mounting trays, the cvr, fdr etc, and the other larger major components like ths, outboard wing panels, and centre section, would be, indeed must be, immediately proximate, regardless of currents.
So far, that does not seem to be the case.
There is no evidence, at this stage, of any other major component wreckage, anywhere, let alone anywhere near the location of the tail.
It has been reported that a suspected pinger is over a mile away.
The reported condition of the recovered bodys (at this stage less than one third) suggests relatively low "g" conditions.
The leaked mode "s" data showed high rod at much below cruise level.
Taken together therefore, these observations suggest strongly to me, the high probability of an in flight breakup, not a whole aircraft experiencing surface induced structural disruption.
My viewing of the recovered upper empenage and fin, and lower rudder, suggests to me, that the ths, and it's mounting structure (including apu mounting structure and apu) most likely separated from the upper empenage by downward bending with pitch down torsion.
If that is the case, it would have taken tremendous downward ths loading of the support structure to do that, which suggests to me, probable breakup during pull-up, attempting recovery from a significantly pitch down attitude, at high speed (high dynamic pressure), probably at a relatively low altitude, ie, between FL200 - FL100.
Under such conditions, if the ths separated first, with the aircraft otherwise still "whole at that instant", the remainder of the aircraft would immediately, and violently, "tumble in the pitch down direction", with high angular velocity. The weakened empenage would "immediately" tear off, and the remaining fuselage aft of the wing, and the fuselage forward of the wing, would then both rapidly separate from the wingbox, probably before the pitch axis had even passed through the vertical. In the same timeframe, the pylons would fail, the engines would separate, and the outboard wing sections would fail in downward bending and torsion overload, and separate, probably at or just outboard of the pylons.
The schredded wreckage would then descend.
If that be the case, the greater the altitude of the breakup, the greater the dimensions of the resulting debris field.
The foreward section of the fuselage, and the remaing aft section of the fuselage, may have remained relatively intact, and may still contain most of the occupants.
But it was not 'the industry' that paid those extended recovery costs. 'The industry' was getting a free ride on the taxpayers of the location of the crash. In the same way that MH370 searches are being largely funded by Australian taxpayers.
Perhaps if 'the industry' or rather the airline and the manufacturer were billed for the costs of the recovery process, we would see a significant jump in the eagerness to get DFDR/CVR that could be rapidly recovered, as the cost to the Airline would be unsupportable. Attempts to insure against these recovery costs would result in the insurers demanding a better DFDR/CVR location system - or no insurance.
Perhaps if 'the industry' or rather the airline and the manufacturer were billed for the costs of the recovery process, we would see a significant jump in the eagerness to get DFDR/CVR that could be rapidly recovered, as the cost to the Airline would be unsupportable. Attempts to insure against these recovery costs would result in the insurers demanding a better DFDR/CVR location system - or no insurance.
Just who decides the level of recovery and investigation and for what reason?
The answer is the public decides, that's why the funding should come from the pubic sector.
If it was the industry alone, their needs only need to satisfy the regulator along the lines of continued airworthiness of their part of the product, be it design/manufacture, operation or maintenence.
The major barrier has always been the inability or unwillingness of the public to pay for questions to be answered. If it was left to some portions of the public, nothing would be done and only speculation would result.
It's really neither black nor white, but only a gentlemens handshake in the end as to who pays.
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It looks like a belly flop. The horizontal stabilizer hit the sea surface, then under the impact force the tail is torn apart like a banana peeling.
See in imagine below: half of the pressure bulkhead is compressed, the accordion skin aft of LHS door, buckled structure at the bottom of leading edge of the vertical stabilizer
http://abload.de/image.php?img=2628x2471219u9b.jpg
See in imagine below: half of the pressure bulkhead is compressed, the accordion skin aft of LHS door, buckled structure at the bottom of leading edge of the vertical stabilizer
http://abload.de/image.php?img=2628x2471219u9b.jpg
Last edited by _Phoenix; 11th Jan 2015 at 00:52. Reason: link corrected
I would suggest that the ULBs requirements are:
Detection Range At least 25 nautical miles in open ocean
Battery Life At least 6 months, possibly by reducing number of pulses and using smart transponder that does not go into regular short location signals until it receives a search request sonar signal
Encoded Location Signals The signals from the ULBs should be encoded with airframe ID, their position (last GPS position of the aircraft) and their depth in the water.
These requirements appear to be asking too much and all that is being offered is a slightly longer life battery.
Well then you will need a unit that's about 4 times as large to give more power output and longivity. But 25NM range: dream on unless you're talking of equipment capable of transmitting to submarines which is massive i.e Rugby.
Detection Range At least 25 nautical miles in open ocean
Battery Life At least 6 months, possibly by reducing number of pulses and using smart transponder that does not go into regular short location signals until it receives a search request sonar signal
Encoded Location Signals The signals from the ULBs should be encoded with airframe ID, their position (last GPS position of the aircraft) and their depth in the water.
These requirements appear to be asking too much and all that is being offered is a slightly longer life battery.
Well then you will need a unit that's about 4 times as large to give more power output and longivity. But 25NM range: dream on unless you're talking of equipment capable of transmitting to submarines which is massive i.e Rugby.
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Bulkhead
RE Phoenix pic...thanks for the higher res. Previous searcher comments were of impact as left wing low. But pic shows greatest impact force to left of center (looking aft) on the bulkhead meaning right wing low. Large impact on tail bottom (and probably fwd of that as well) with the bulkhead shearing bottom skin in tension seems suggested. Still nothing that clearly disallows pre-impact airframe failure.
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RE PRESSURE BULKHEAD PHOTO
10th Jan 2015, 14:43 #1704 (permalink)
ventus45
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http://www.mediafire.com/view/grguqy...e-Bulkhead.png
ventus45
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http://www.mediafire.com/view/grguqy...e-Bulkhead.png
In either case, it does look like a major downword force on the empenage/tail bending the whole mess upwords **perhaps* due to a nose high position at impact.
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@ventus45
Thanks for the excellent photo. If we're looking at the aft side of the pressure bulkhead, are we also looking at the place where the FDR/CVR should be mounted? Or is the mounting on the bottom section which seems to be missing?
http://www.mediafire.com/view/grguqy...e-Bulkhead.png
Thanks for the excellent photo. If we're looking at the aft side of the pressure bulkhead, are we also looking at the place where the FDR/CVR should be mounted? Or is the mounting on the bottom section which seems to be missing?
http://www.mediafire.com/view/grguqy...e-Bulkhead.png
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Machinbird's suggestions have merit. There are already inflatable slides in aircraft. Perhaps toughening the material in them, and adding the supplementary recording/pinger devices to them, and ensuring they break free and inflate upon impact, could be one way of adding further location-finding assistance?
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Some good perspective in this news story video.
BBC News - AirAsia QZ8501: Plane tail is lifted from the sea bed
BBC News - AirAsia QZ8501: Plane tail is lifted from the sea bed
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@NSEU
I'm surprised that the CVR/DFDR is exposed to the elements outside the pressure bulkhead like that (temperate extremes, hydraulic fluid, moisture, etc). Of course, I'm talking about the electronics external to the fireproof section.
Is this common for Airbus?
I'm surprised that the CVR/DFDR is exposed to the elements outside the pressure bulkhead like that (temperate extremes, hydraulic fluid, moisture, etc). Of course, I'm talking about the electronics external to the fireproof section.
Is this common for Airbus?
It is normal for these to be located here in many Airbus and Boeing planes;
http://asasi.org/papers/2007/The_Evo...l_Campbell.pdf
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I am amazed at how many great ideas are coming out of people who know nothing about planes.
They insist things should be different, yet they don't cough up the money, or actually design stuff. They don't make prioritization decisions like...spend billion dollars on new gadgets when it might be better to spend money on avoiding the situation in the first place.
Most planes are pretty good. Stuff happens. IF you want to prevent all accidents are you prepared to pay 4 times current ticket prices to get even half a percent safer travel?
They insist things should be different, yet they don't cough up the money, or actually design stuff. They don't make prioritization decisions like...spend billion dollars on new gadgets when it might be better to spend money on avoiding the situation in the first place.
Most planes are pretty good. Stuff happens. IF you want to prevent all accidents are you prepared to pay 4 times current ticket prices to get even half a percent safer travel?
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are you truly amazed ?
this used to be a forum for considered analysis of known facts from an industry perspective, all awaiting official data.
This changed and we have to read through hundreds of posts from ms flight-sim users and press trolls to read any relevant posts.
We signed on to prune to escape redtop mentality, yet here we have knee jerk after knee-jerk filling the pages.
Yes you can track an object to the fri**ing moon and back but it will not provide the answers which are, quite probably :
1) handing the management of flight ops to the accounts department on a plate
2) treating recruitment as a revenue source) see point 1)
3) denuding simulator sessions to the bare minimum required to stay legal, again see point 1
These apply even more so in developing aviation environments around the ITCZ. Companies for example drafting in pilots from temperate climes without a sim check / OPC, and minimal line training.
None of these apply to the airline in question here unless proven otherwise, however, flight sim users and hacks take note
This changed and we have to read through hundreds of posts from ms flight-sim users and press trolls to read any relevant posts.
We signed on to prune to escape redtop mentality, yet here we have knee jerk after knee-jerk filling the pages.
Yes you can track an object to the fri**ing moon and back but it will not provide the answers which are, quite probably :
1) handing the management of flight ops to the accounts department on a plate
2) treating recruitment as a revenue source) see point 1)
3) denuding simulator sessions to the bare minimum required to stay legal, again see point 1
These apply even more so in developing aviation environments around the ITCZ. Companies for example drafting in pilots from temperate climes without a sim check / OPC, and minimal line training.
None of these apply to the airline in question here unless proven otherwise, however, flight sim users and hacks take note
And the airline owners are ....?
Not pertinent at all to the incident cause, but does anyone know who has the other 51% of Indonesia Air Asia?
Yes, I know the early history of the company and "possible" owners but current ownership seems to be very difficult to confirm.
This in itself suggests sensitivity over majority ownership which further suggests some VERY high flyer(s) who wish to remain out of the limelight when, in fact, they should be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Tony Fernandez.
Yes, I know the early history of the company and "possible" owners but current ownership seems to be very difficult to confirm.
This in itself suggests sensitivity over majority ownership which further suggests some VERY high flyer(s) who wish to remain out of the limelight when, in fact, they should be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Tony Fernandez.