Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[IcePack]

Funny (not) Airbus in normal law is not supposed to be stallable. (Well according to check airmen, who wouldn't believe Mother Nature is a bit quicker than mere computers) So if it somehow ended up in alternate law "again" methinks Airbus need to re-evaluate their design.
Again speculation is futile, but I'm sure other crews would also have been caught out so I believe respect to the crew is called for as they were just doing their job, using their peers skill set that was/is deemed adequit.
RIP

[mcdunav]

Update: The SAR mission will continue into the night using floodlights provided weather improves. Divers to be used tomorrow.

@Xeque
Agreed. But most of the incidents can lead to damage and loss of lives. All I am saying is we shouldn't call it a bad day for aviation. Everything seems compounded by the loss of qz8501.

[training wheels]

I know it's way too early to be speculating what happened, but if the aircraft is reasonably well intact on the bottom of the sea floor, then an inflight break-up due to weather is most unlikely.

However, the possibility of a double engine flameout due to heavy and intense rain from TS cells in the area at the time, can not be ruled out, as a possible cause.

Such an occurrence has happened before in Indonesian airspace to a Garuda 737-300 flight from Lombok to Jogjakarta which suffered a double engine flameout after passing Surabaya flying in intense thunderstorm conditions. The crew glided the aircraft down from cruising level, whilst trying to relight the engines, but were unsuccessful and they ended up ditching the aircraft in the Solo river. Surprisingly, all aboard survived, except one flight attendant who slipped and fell during the emergency evacuation and later drowned.

This incident was discussed on PPrune some years ago here, for those interested. http://www.pprune.org/questions/2203...g-details.html

[island_airphoto]

If I were to be gliding in from FL360 or so, I think I would have time to mention it to ATC .
ELTs can beep away underwater, but they work just as well as your cellphone does at the bottom of the pool. Ever wonder why it takes a huge and very powerful radio on a very low frequency to talk to a submarine? Normal radio frequencies do not penetrate water

[mcdunav]

@training wheels
engine flame-out can also be caused by high ice water content weather which is generally associated with convective weather, something which is believed to be present. High ice water content may not show up on properly on a weather radar and is more likely the reason than rain in the TS as rain can be detected by the wxr. water particles are five times more reflective than ice particles.

http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/d...ort_4-2011.pdf

[TWT]

The ELT, why is the ELT not bleeping?

ELT's don't work underwater.They only work if they're on the surface.Attenuation of water too great for RF at UHF 406Mhz

[Hasherucf]

The ELT, why is the ELT not bleeping? That's my question/concern if the a/c is in tact and in relatively shallow waters.

The ELT is probably actuated but the water attenuates the signal. Also from crash experience with light aircraft crashes the ELT antennas often get damaged. Remember the ELT uses 406mhz

This article explains the problem of attenuation underwater very well.

http://users.tpg.com.au/ldbutler/Und...munication.pdf

Of course this is why the CVR or FDR will have an Underwater locator beacon attached which should make finding the wreckage straight forward. That operates at a low frequency of 37khz .

Also it takes about 60 seconds for the ELT to activate once the switch or Gswitch is activated. So it could have been submerged in that time.

Maybe they should look at making the signal activate instantly on G switch activation.

[DrPhillipa]

As I see it the search, and identification of the crash remains for QZ8501 has been conducted professionally and well within the normal time frame for any crash in any remote place, land or sea.

We have a thread for MH370 issues, this crash has absolutely nothing to do with that incident and it's resolution had nothing to do with intelligent ELTs, burst data transmissions or whatever. Things might have gone marginally quicker if the airline had paid for EICAS but why are people discussing satellites when the AC was in VHF range? Please take this stuff to the MH370 thread - or start, or use, a suitable generalised technical thread.

Possibly links to AF447 are perhaps understandable, if premature, but bad mouthing Airbus might have more to do with the 787s problems than this crash or 447.

One thing occurs to me though is whether 14,000 hours flying oldish fighter planes is likely to make one a better or worse pilot for fly by wire 'busses. Maybe we should be giving the seats to proficient gamers instead.

[goeasy]

Any/everyone can forget any possible live transmission of CVR data or video. The industry will never accept it, as its denies the rights of privacy to the crew.

FDR data however is a distinct possibility, although I belive the airlines will never pay for it! And we all know the airlines control the regulators.... Not v.v.

[Superpilot]

Yes, sorry, brainfart, I was of course thinking about the locator beacon associated with the recorders.

[slats11]

And how does the device snug in its little box tell the difference between the transponder being off in a parked aircraft or the transponder losing power during level flight or after a gentle ditching.

Assuming the device was a GPS combined with a transmitter, than I guess it can determine if the aircraft is parked or flying.

Seriously however, I do take your point. This needs to be thought through very carefully. As you say, simply adding a new device without thinking through all the issues will lead to unintended consequences.

But many people think we need to do better. Given all the double and triple redundancy on aircraft today, it seems very odd that geolocation remains so primitive and so fallible.

Given current technology, is it acceptable that an aircraft disappears when out of range of secondary radar (AF447), or gets into trouble and disappears off radar when it descends below the horizon (Air Asia) or disappears after a transponder is turned off (MH370)? Is any of this acceptable?

[highflyer40]

why would the searchers even mention the fact that the ELT is broadcasting, since they have already found the aircraft!?

in this day and age everyone thinks they are entitled to every minuscule detail, and there is a massive cover up/incompetence if it isn't given to them.

[KBPsen]

I think you are barking up the wrong tree, Slats11. AF447 "disappeared" because it ended up in the Atlantic ocean. It was found 6 miles from it's last known position. Similarly, MH370's probable track is also known.

In both cases the real issue is the limited availability and capability of deep water search and locator technology.

[slats11]

No one knew AF447 had crashed until many hours had elapsed. It is true that a last known position was established, and the wreckage was eventually found close to the last known position. But I doubt many people think it is optimal that it crashed around 0200 and ATC started asking questions at 0400.

There are many possible tracks for MH370. These generate an impossibly large search area. Some reasonable assumptions have been made, which mean the search area is reduced to merely "enormous."

We don't have the option of rapidly improving inderwater search capability.

We do have the option to track aircraft should we so desire. Or the option to not bother.

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by slats11
Then there is MH370. The cost of the search thus far is massive. The human cost to the relatives of not knowing what happened is incalculable. Against this, so what if it is a 1 in a million event. And that is before you consider the possibility that real time tracking (if unable to be turned off) may have prevented MH370 in the first place.

Originally Posted by cee cee

If the device cannot be turned off, what if it malfunctions and catches on fire, or shorts out the main power bus, taking out all the other equipment?

If it can be turned off, then what is the point? If MH370 was caused by malicious agent(s), the only reason inmarsat tracking worked was because it was a new thing that has not been done before. If anyone wants to vanish an aircraft now, you can be sure that they will pull the breaker to the sat comms.

Please can we get off this hamster wheel?

Aircraft leave the factory with adequate tracking/position reporting capability. Widebodies all have FANS 1/A which provides for ADS-C, CPDLC and ACARS messaging. ADS-C links could have been set up to Air France from AF447 but they were not by human decision as the Senegal system did not have ADS-C. (ADS-C can be active to up to 5 ground agencies). So all that was available were ACARS reports which are through a message switch with no prioritization so the reports can come in at random times. It was a human decision not to provide tracking information the aircraft itself had tracking capability with ADS-C.

All narrow bodies leave the factory with ADS-B. MH370 had the capability to be tracked using ADS-C and ADS-B and it was also in (albeit poor) secondary radar cover. ADS-C and SATCOM were turned off by human decision at the airline. It had Rolls Royce engine tracking capability but this was turned off by human decision at the airline. It had Boeing continual health monitoring capability but this was turned off by human decision at the airline. MH370 had ADS-B and secondary radar transponder - but these transponders were apparently turned off by someone in the cockpit who was unaware of the INMARSAT handshake to a SATCOM on standby.

8501 had ADS-B and was using it along with SSR, both these appear to have worked adequately to identify the likely crash site. It is arguable whether a SATCOM, ADS-C capability should be fitted to such relatively short water crossings as this one and the Gulf of Mexico. But as we have seen the wreckage is where it was expected from the last known ADS-B position report - so there is no real benefit from ADS-C.

In short. there is no need for clever devices, new avionics, gizmos from Radio Shack... ALL aircraft have tracking capability. All that is needed is regulation that mandates aircraft operators use the tracking capability that is already on the aircraft.

Guess what - mandates are already in place for use of ADS-C, ADS-B and SSR.
Indeed expect these mandates to require retrofit to all the older airframes within the next 5 years.

Tracking exists, it works, aircraft can be tracked with an accuracy of a runway width if necessary anywhere in the world.

So please stop trying to propose more expensive** hardware be fitted aircraft to replicate what is already completely adequate tracking capability.

/rant



** Yes it may be available for $5 from Radio Shack and on every smart phone on the planet. But if you want to put it in an aircraft it is expensive as it has to be certified as not interfering with anything else on the aircraft. Multiply its cost by at least 1000 possibly 10000 if it is radiating radio signals and linked to the aircraft power or <gasp> has a rechargeable battery.

[island_airphoto]

2 very different issues:
1 - ATC "losing" airplanes
2 - Crew stealing airplanes

#2 can only be dealt with by a device no one can turn off. I suspect most of us do not want anything that can't be turned off on an airplane.

[NigelOnDraft]

In short. there is no need for clever devices, new avionics, gizmos from Radio Shack... ALL aircraft have tracking capability. All that is needed is regulation that mandates aircraft operators use the tracking capability that is already on the aircraft.

One also needs to consider the MEL aspects of whatever is proposed?

Do the pPrune arguers for "real/live tracking" really want to spend hours grounded, or even diverting, because the system will not work/logon? The moment this gets elevated to "compulsory" this becomes a serious concern. If a satellite or 2 are lost, or find a more lucrative market for their bandwidth, are all airliner flights limited to times/areas covered by remaining capacity?

NoD

[flt001]

A professional SAR operation, dismisses any Asian SAR doubts anyone may have had.

If anything it highlights just how unusual the MH370 mystery remains.

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by Una Due Tfc

Something that's grinding my gears about the media reports I've been hearing:

"Air Asia jet crashed after being denied permission to climb to avoid weather by ATC"

ATC can only know what a pilot tells us. If the captain feels the weather ahead poses such a significant threat to his/her aircraft, he/she should have say in the first transmission "need immediate left turn 120 degrees and climb to FL380 due weather". If the ATC response was not to their satisfaction, say the magic words and do it anyway. If you are in conflict with another aircraft, it's my job to get it out of your way in those situations. You are my number 1 priority and nobody is getting in your way.

The aircraft was approaching handover to another center from what I've read. The next sector is expecting that aircraft at FL320, and is planning their separations and crosses based on that fact. It varies from place to place but normally if the climb is being initiated within 10 mins of an FIR boundary, I have to pick up the phone and get permission for a climb BEFORE giving it to the aircraft.

Also, if the aircraft is crossing an FIR boundary, it needs to meet certain conditions for silent handover, IE to be handed to the next sector e.g. 10 nm at boundary behind traffic ahead if same speed or slower, 20 nm if faster. Not to mention coming at the next sector off route. Also, in this instance, you would warn the next sector about the weather reported so they will expect subsequent aircraft off route and warn any aircraft they are sending your way. Anything that does not meet silent handover criteria must be manually co-ordinated over the phone and approved by the giving and receiving sectors.

That little rant is just to give you an idea of some of the criteria that we need to meet to give climbs or re-routes in non emergency situations, and how important it is that the magic words are used if you aren't getting what you need

I would support this 100%.

I would add that if there is an important reason for a change in your track or level then tell the controller that at the time. Even on CPDLC a free text DM could be added to a climb request. perhaps "DUE WX". If the controller knows that there is a potential reason for concern then the normal procedures can be short-circuited. In this case close to an FIR/UIR boundary instead of asking the next controller the controller could have immediately cleared the climb, then tell the downstream controller that an aircraft in the 'area of common interest' has been given a climb, apologize but the climb was allowed due weather, expect following aircraft to climb too. It happens all the time. Tell the controller about severe weather, it will affect how (s)he reacts to responses for deviation or level changes and sector transit plans may be eased out a little so there is space for you and following aircraft to make deviations.

[mseyfang]

I would support this 100%.

I would add that if there is an important reason for a change in your track or level then tell the controller that at the time. Even on CPDLC a free text DM could be added to a climb request. perhaps "DUE WX". If the controller knows that there is a potential reason for concern then the normal procedures can be short-circuited. In this case close to an FIR/UIR boundary instead of asking the next controller the controller could have immediately cleared the climb, then tell the downstream controller that an aircraft in the 'area of common interest' has been given a climb, apologize but the climb was allowed due weather, expect following aircraft to climb too. It happens all the time. Tell the controller about severe weather, it will affect how (s)he reacts to responses for deviation or level changes and sector transit plans may be eased out a little so there is space for you and following aircraft to make deviations.

This. In the end, the PIC is responsible for the aircraft and has the legal latitude to deviate from ATC instructions to the extent which, in the PIC's sole judgment, is necessary for the safety of the flight. Exercising that authority is still an issue in the West and I can imagine it being more of an issue in parts of the world where deference to authority is more strongly inculcated as part of the culture. Conversations here tend to discuss deference to authority in the context of CRM; what I'm suggesting is an issue between PIC's and ATC.

"Unable", "declaring an emergency", "PAN, PAN, PAN" should be encouraged in events where there is an issue with the possible safety of the aircraft. Better to deal with some paperwork and maybe a call to the chief pilot's office or a hearing after the fact than winding up in the morgue.

This also implies that there are cases where you may need to communicate first in order to aviate. Yes, this goes against the grain of conventional wisdom, but, once done, you have full latitude to aviate.

Bottom line: use your legal authority to the fullest extent to get your passengers (and yourself) safely on the ground and don't be reticent about it.