Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[xcitation]

Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate

Originally Posted by SafetyPee

Many posts focus on stick and rudder skills (fly) overlooking the preceding need to understand the situation – 90% of human thought involves understanding; when and where are the skills of understanding taught.
Some recent views of awareness suggest that we should be teaching the identification of situations where SOPs should not be followed (how to identify them), opposed to always follow SOPs.

TY safetypee for one of the best posts I have read in a long time. This identifies the root issue. All of these pilots knew how to fly, however they failed to understand their situation, their awareness was behind what their a/c was doing. This caused them to apply the wrong/opposite solution to their situation. Being aware of what the other pilots inputs to flight controls is a part situational awareness!

For this reason I suggest a modification of the flying maxim:

Situate, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate

(where situate means situational awareness).

In my first flying lesson around 12 yrs old I vividly recall trying to move the stick and finding it stuck, then looking at my instructor and seeing he had limited the sticks travel. Ever since then I always communicate who has control without exception. This is not a side stick vs shared control column issue. It is about knowing your plane and having strict discipline. Current flying practice has been honed in blood over the decades, are we to learn from the lessons of others or blaze our own trail?

[Bergerie1]

xcitation,
I believe you are correct. When things go horribly wrong you first have to diagnose the problem, then you have to recover the situation and/or carry out the correct procedure. It is not unlike the pilot shutting down the wrong engine. He misperceives the situation, therefore misdiagnoses the problem and then carries out a perfectly correct action on the wrong engine. Finally, when under extreme stress the human being has great difficulty in changing his perception - he tends to cling to his original view.
Thus, in an unexpected stall (which may or may not have all the characteristics of what I called in a previous post a 'normal stall') the startle factor causes confusion and a consequential misperception. the pilot fails to realise he is in a stall and carries out the wrong procedure - he pulls back when he should have pushed forward to unstall the wing.
And in all the mayhem that is going on around him he cannot bring himself to change his mind.

[deadheader]

unfathomable, unthinkable or unspeakable?

It appears that some very important questions are either being politicised or deliberately ignored so I'd like to ask if anyone is willing to simply apply robust airmanship without prejudice or agenda to any of the following?

***

The commonalities between aspects of this accident and AF447 raise some questions which, however obvious, ridiculous or otherwise they may appear, simply cannot be dismissed IMHO:


1. Was the PF of either accident aware they were operating the aircraft in a degraded FBW condition (e.g. alternate law)?

2. With what degree of certainty can we know the answer to question 1, above?

3. Did anyone in the flight deck verbalise or otherwise communicate the change from normal to alternate law, regardless of the obvious cues/indicators etc?

4. Given the PF's action of moving the sidestick fully aft [in both accidents] is arguably more rational in Normal law, how can we be certain that all bus drivers are proficient and/or confident operating in degraded FBW conditions, in all phases of flight, irrespective of the answer to question 1, above?

5. Assuming each PF commanded a stall unintentionally, and maintained the stalled condition unintentionally, is there a possibility, however remote one may wish that to be, that operating in a degraded FBW condition is one layer of complexity too many when faced with the deteriorating situation each found himself in (i.e. swiftly decreasing altitude with nose up attitude, unreliable or decreasing airspeed, stall warnings etc), especially considering the same action of full aft sidestick does not have entirely the same effect in each law?


***

We have to assume that neither PF intended to mush into the drink from cruise and are therefore faced with a reality in which two pilots applied full aft sidestick in the belief that doing so would command a climb/arrest his rapid descent/recover the situation. The only logical explanation for such an action is that the PF either:


A> was unaware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition

B> was aware he was operating in a degraded FBW condition but did not understand that applying full aft would not have the same effect as doing so in Normal law

C> was unaware he was applying full aft sidestick or was gripped by fear/other human factor


I can think of no other logical explanations for applying full aft sidestick and therefore, as we have 2 instances of this occurring, I believe we are able to derive some conclusions and make some recommendations in order to help prevent further recurrence. Explanations A> and B> above can be mitigated by:


I> Removing any element of doubt about which FBW condition/law one is operating in at any given time

II> Removing any element of doubt about what the correct course of action is during an upset in the law/FBW condition one is operating in at the time

III> Training crews to operate the aircraft in all FBW conditions/laws in all phases of flight


I'll leave mitigating C> above for the interesting 'human factors' discussion ongoing on these and other pages, but the point is that action can be taken, in numerous/varied guises, to address some of the concerns arising from some of the similarities between this and the AF accident.


And even if one takes the view all of this is too simplistic, or not necessarily relevant, there is little harm in doing all possible to ensure one more PF doesn't hold full aft sidestick all the way to his, his colleagues and his passengers' premature doom.

IMHO.

[ChrisJ800]

There have been several incidents of Airbus A330's degrading to alternate law and the crews successfully riding through the procedures and ECAMS. In 2009 alone a Northwest 330 and 2 Jetstar A330's had unreliable airspeed incidents in severe weather in the Asia region that degraded to alternate law. Crews in each case got through the 5 minutes or so of uncertainties without major pitch changes. And a couple of Qantas 330's suffered ADIRU faults causing uncontrolled pitching, resolved by experienced and trained crew. If you pull full up in most aircraft (canards excepted?) you will stall, Airbus being the exception when in Normal law.

[IcePack]

This may not go down too well & I expect the post to be removed:

Back in the day I was once told:

You can teach a monkey to fly:

BUT a very big BUT

Only 5% of the population could actually be trained to be a Pilot. (This means that only a small number of people have the ability to assimilate information whilst under stress & such things as coping with responsibility etc etc)

Again a BUT

Only 2 to 3% will actually make it & become a PILOT. (Sorry for shouting)

Maybe aviation is now starting to see the results of every tom dick & harry getting their flying licences. (Monkeys)

Trouble is that with the lack of available training aids (Sims for upper Air Work) the Monkeys can not be trained, so you have to rely on pilots which now appear to be very few & far between. (Would the likes of Chuck Yager "lost" the aeroplane )


IMHO Airbus particularly tried to design an aeroplane for the monkeys but have obviously failed in that respect.

[CONF iture]

THS

Is it the third time in 7 years an Airbus ends up stalled in the water with full trim up ... ?
THS grah ... anyone ?

[mm43]

Originally Posted by CONF iture

Is it the third time in 7 years an Airbus ends up stalled in the water with full trim up ... ?

Yes, and its the third time that a SS has been held full back and the Trim Wheel has been calmly spinning with no-one realizing the implications; the aircraft is no longer in Normal Law.

[_Phoenix]

SS has been held back because of the overspeed mindset, also the overspeed is accompanied with buffet and awful aerodynamic noise. The FO PFD was not recorded in the FDR. The only reasonable explanation is an amazing speed shown on FO side. FO relaxed SS at the same time with selection of CAPT 3. That`s not a coincidence...
What would you do, in the second part of this video?
https://youtu.be/MbiVuPWX5K8

[vilas]

What are the situations in the air where you require full back stick or yoke? I can't visualize any other than EGPWS activation which is basically a lower level phenomenon unless you were flying over the Himalayas or Alps. Even at lower levels in a non protected aircraft it can cause structural damage. I am not sure this basic information is understood in that manner. A pilot doing that in any aircraft at cruising levels will stall the aircraft. In speed stable aircraft it may not auto trim but if the stick is held back disregarding the stall warning will the aircraft unstall itself without the yoke being released? In airbus FBW which is flight path stable once the stick is held out of neutral it is g demand reverting to AOA demand at lower end with the trim following it up unless the stick is neutralised. In both AF and QZ the pilot pulling and holding full back stick is extremely bizarre handling of the aircraft at those Flight levels. Any full application of flight control at cruise will end up in disaster. Full rudder will cause separation of tail, full bank can roll you on your back a 747 has done that.

[Volume]

1. Was the PF of either accident aware they were operating the aircraft in a degraded FBW condition (e.g. alternate law)?

The question probably is, was the PF fully aware what it means to fly a FBW aircraft in degraded condition?
Was he aware, which FBW functions were still operative (e.g. Autotrim, Stall Warning) and which were not (e.g. artificial roll damping, Stall Protection).
Are humans designed to fly half-automatic? I feel fine to program and monitor automatics fly the aircraft, I feel fine to hand fly. But I find it strange to share the job between the automatics and me. I find it strange if a system is still able to warn, but no longer to protect me.

[cats_five]

Originally Posted by latetonite

All what if's, regulations, circuit breakers left on the side, how about a glance at the artificial horizon?

I keep wondering about the VSI...

[gums]

For those not familiar with the FBW systems, once outta neutral you are commanding a "change"

So as Vila points out for the 'bus, pulling back on the stick in NORMAL you have a blend of AoA and gee when slow, but mainly gee when not slow. This means you can increase pitch to steep angles with only a slight amount of back stick as you are not commanding elevator position - the computer is!. In DIRECT, you do command position, but in either of the ALTERNATE laws you do not.

We discovered this aspect of FBW in the Viper after the first deep stalls. Just a tiny amount of back stick kept increasing pitch and we got too slow too quicky for the AoA protection to take effect. AF447 did the same thing but at a much lower pitch attitude, and the elevator/THS had little to no command authority for getting the nose down, although some sim tests showed it was possible using manual THS trim and nose down command.

[PT6Driver]

Deadheader and others,

Q1 and 2
We will never ever know what they knew for certain. However the post by safetypee an xcitation are excellent possible answers, they knew not where they were.

All these pilots and I can include colgan in this reacted in a way they thought was correct.
None of them realised the situation they were in and reacted using gut instinct.

No amount of legidlation or "protection" can protect against this.

Air france thought overspeed.
Colgen thought .... well we don't know but he fought to maintain height overriding stike push etc.
This one? Well we cannot know, and there is no cvr transcription worth a damn to analyse.

I was always tought

FIRST SIT ON HANDS

[Ian W]

Volume and Deadheader
I was thinking along the same lines but with a rather different direction.

Pavlov ringing a bell and his dogs salivated as a conditioned reaction. For some pilots a lot of flying is conditioned reaction when there is a sudden workload increase with failures and alarms - it is the conditioned reaction that will win as the tunnel vision increases and the hearing fades to nothing.

In both AFR 447 and this flight the PF relatively inexperienced was suddenly dropped into alternate law. The roll becomes really squirelly and both PF fought to get wings level (tunnel vision) but their conditioned reaction from all their flying on the aircraft was that to go up pull back and the aircraft will go up. This is of course not the case in Alternate law. Pull hard back and the aircraft will stall.
So what cues are there to a PF with tunnel vision fighting for wings level that the aircraft is now in Alternate law and requires different handling. Almost none.
I would suggest not a stick shaker but perhaps some kind of 'stiffener' so the stick is less easy to move a haptic clue that you are now in Alternate Law respect the stick as there are less protections. This could also reduce PIO by slowing the rate of movement (less mayonnaise more thought).
Of course there will be those who had and have no problem with dropping into Alternate Law but there will always be some out at the end of the probability tail that don't notice and revert to type expecting protections that are no longer there. There will also be those that are perfect in the Sim but lose it in the real aircraft.
So a brake on the sidestick making it a little more difficult to move might be sufficient to remind them that they are in Alternate.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Ian W,

Your implication is that they didn't know that they were in Alternate Law, and that if they knew then they wouldn't have zoom climbed.

May I suggest that even in Normal Law, it's a really bad idea to fly into protections anyway? And that therefore your suggestion is targeting the wrong area?

What pilots need is adequate training such that when bad stuff happens they don't start madly flailing with the controls, but they engage in a discipline which promotes diagnosis and then considered actions.

Adequate training will not happen until we can break away from the cycle of greedy airlines looking to sap the last penny from the operation, customers who will choose one airline over another to save a penny, and regulators who simply want a quick V1 cut, circuit, NPA to G/A and S/E landing.

Ironically, with the advent of safer, more "protected", complex aircraft - never has there been more need to ramp up the training. Old boys in crap aircraft were exposed to situations like this every day. Newbies now "fly" FBW+A/P from ILS to ILS day in, day out.

[FlightDetent]

IW: Sorry, I need to ask in hope of understanding your point. Are you aware of the differences in pitch control between normal and alternate law of 320?

100pp: "Old boys in crap aircraft were exposed to situations like this every day" 35+ degrees AOA with ,75 mach at FL350 under heavy leans/vetigo? Really?

[wiggy]

Personally I think 100pp has got a bit of a point.

I wouldn't claim to be that much of a man but even a callow youth such as myself remembers hand flying a heavy in the cruise at high level (even if you were not doing it for the heck of it it was part of our cruise trimming procedure on the 747) and a lot of the "old boys" I knew hand flew the 747 from just before top of drop all the way through to the landing when circumstances permitted, something that these days would ring alarm bells in the office and a telephone call when you got home.

I'm not saying doing the above is a panacea to all handling ills but it sure as heck sharpened up the scan and above all reminded you how gentle you had to be and how small some of your margins could be at high level. Above all you sure as hell knew that applying full back yolk at high level was never appropriate and was never going to end well.

Oh carp, does that mean I'm an "old boy..".........

[HundredPercentPlease]

I exaggerate slightly.

My first transport aircraft had no autopilot, so hand flying in the cruise was second nature. The 737 has left me with no autopilot in some pretty odd attitudes, and we hand flew it a lot because we were better than the rough old autopilot fitted.

This aircraft did NOT give them 35 degrees AoA. It simply rolled to the left as a result of rudder deflection. Nothing else. It was the PF who did nothing for 9 seconds and then yanked in the back stick which caused a pitch of +9 (while rolling it right).

[vilas]

Ian W and deadheader
Simply emphasizing on the pilots that at higher levels applying full back stick is bizarre, irrational and suicidal and never to be done in any law is good enough. There are enough indications on the PFD to indicate change in flight control law for anyone who cares to look. Applying back stick and not checking attitude is simply poor instrument flying technique. It is as bad as SFO accident where visual approach was flown without ever looking at speed. In all these accidents there were professional deficiencies in pilots who were at controls and those were exposed, that's it. As I said before all one has to do is to routinely notice the bank, pitch and thrust the automation uses at higher levels and when you loose the automation just do the same yourself.

[RAT 5]

As I said before all one has to do is to routinely notice the bank, pitch and thrust the automation uses at higher levels and when you loose the automation just do the same yourself.

100%: oh that todays training emphasised such basics and allowed pilots to practice, attain & maintain these basic skills. It really is KISS, but there are too many higher influences that are acting against this basic principle. Those of us at the sharp end of TQ training, and those at the sharp end of Line Training are screaming for changes, but deaf ears abound. In many other instances on here there has been the cry that "until a smoking hole occurs nothing will happen". In recent years there have been too many smoking holes caused by serviceable a/c. What has been the reaction? Sadly too little. It is not yet too late. Who is holding their breath?