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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Old 8th Dec 2015, 09:04
  #3681 (permalink)  
ZFT
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while more pilot training will cost money in the short term.
Is it more training or better and more relevant training?
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 10:00
  #3682 (permalink)  
 
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Many people are advocating that the answer to this issue is simply more training so that “pilots can fly planes”. While more and better training is obviously a good thing and will improve the situation, training is not the magic cure for everything. Training can fail just like a pitot tube. Smart intelligent people can make mistakes. A better result will be obtained from multiple improvements of the many aspects that could help the pilot perform his important tasks.

More training is easy to implement because it reinforces the idea that the pilot is 100% responsible and takes the responsibility off the operator and manufacturer.
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 10:28
  #3683 (permalink)  
 
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I'd like an AOA presentation on/beside the speed scale.
After all, it is available in the BUSS
(Back-up Speed Scale)
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 11:12
  #3684 (permalink)  
 
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Let me throw one more ingredient into the melting pot here.

In the olden days when pilots did their basic training all the aircraft were aerobatic and spinnable and the instructors were almost exclusively war time and used to doing aeros etc.

Fast forward a few decades and spinning was eliminated from the PPL course and I believe it has minimal requirement in CPL training. At a CFIs conference I attended last year one member was berating the fact the instructors applying for jobs had only ever done a couple of spins in their entire careers.

What difference does this make to the airline product? There is no doubt in my mind that being trained in spinning and basic aeros etc create a much more robust pilot. (I speak as one who was civil trained). When spinning was in the PPL syllabus as an instructor if the student finished the spinning exercise thinking "whatever happens I am not going to let the a/c get into that situation" they had learned a good lesson.

I agree that training isn't everything but we have to face the fact that we seem to have a new generation of pilots now who seem unable to recognise an unusual attitude and/or recover from more than 30 degrees of bank and or an approaching stall.
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 12:35
  #3685 (permalink)  
 
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Is it more training or better and more relevant training?
I think better training inevitably means more training.

We can talk about the pros & cons of automation and side sticks vs control columns until the cows come home. But the one thing above all which can't be ignored, is that reading the CVR 'transcripts' of both AF447 and QZ8501, both PFs' responses to the upset can be summed up as "Oh my god, what has happened!?!- I'm trying to fix it but nothing's working as I expect it to!! -I don't really understand what's going on!!!", with the PNF seemingly even further behind the plane than the PF.

With respect to the two dead crews, what frightens me most is, did they perform any better in the situation, than would an untrained member of the public, whose automatic response would be panic, followed by, 'we're going down, I must pull the stick back to make it go up again???'

If this is the case, then it is without doubt a training issue, and matters of automation are minor concerns in comparison.
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 12:59
  #3686 (permalink)  
 
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Not a member of the blame the flight crew camp here...

I still believe, without the control inputs of the other pilot confusing the flight control computers, any of the four pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 was fully capable of recovering the aircraft from the upset.

How many more of these accidents is it going to take before this flawed man/machine interface is exposed for what it is?
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 13:14
  #3687 (permalink)  
 
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Back to the basic training & CPL course discussion. Not only was there more basic flying, certainly spins & stalls; there were stalls in turns, incipient spin recovery; there were minor aeros and spins off the tops of loops; some were intended an others not. The unexpected ones were better training in fact. You learnt SA and not to be afraid when the blue side was below you and the horizon was AWOL. Spins under the hood were even more fun. Indeed that was with highly qualified QFI's, not hour builders who had just been spat out be the same school and who were searching for a 'proper' job.
Oh, and I forgot, a CPL course was 250hrs, not the mickey mouse 148hrs of today where the concentration is on MCC, CRM, AFDS and SOP's. Think what could be done with 50 hours extra. Let the dog of the lead and let the guys have some fun, perhaps even scare themselves a bit; but either way they will learn the envelop edges are much further away than they thought; of both the a/c and themselves.
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 13:45
  #3688 (permalink)  
 
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Wannabee,

Control inputs do not confuse the flight control computers. The Bus flies just like any other aeroplane. Adjust pitch and roll as required to achieve what you need. If you want to take over, say "taking over" and press and hold the button, just like you are taught to. It ain't rocket science. But you need to recognise what is happening, and know how to fix it. Doesn't matter if it's a bus or a Boeing, A bad pilot will bend it.
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Old 8th Dec 2015, 14:52
  #3689 (permalink)  
 
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Ranger One, et al; many posts reflect hindsight bias, particular when attempting to rethink ‘what’ happened, and then concluding ‘why’, choose an inappropriate response – cause and effect are not reversible in complex accidents.

Instead of looking for ‘cause’, think about what could be learnt from what has already been published; consider how this might relate to other situations, other people, yourself – airmanship, professionalism.

‘Blame and train’ is not a solution. It is impossible to be sure (‘NEVER EVER’) that the required human behaviour – via training – will be applied in all situations. The surprise in many posts ‘how could the human have done this’, is no more than the same surprise which the accident crew encountered – surprise clouds our thoughts and adds mental workload, which the report considered.
If we wish to judge that more effective training is required then the focus could be on avoidance and situation awareness vice actions after the event – proactive not reactive safety.

PPRuNe is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety; everyone is entitled to an opinion, but without justification then we may not be entitled to an opinion; justification requires well-reasoned argument.
I have no strong views on what happened in this accident, but from some previous posts I will now consider where the seat is positioned during cruise – can the controls be reached and moved to the maximum deflection, and if I leave the seat to switch something, reconsider “should I be doing this”, and in addition to continually noting the pitch power values in flight, check the normal range of trim settings for each situation.

In the Cartoon below, change the Flt No as required.
“You are not entitled to your opinion. You are entitled to your informed opinion. No one is entitled to be ignorant.” Harland Ellison

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Old 8th Dec 2015, 20:56
  #3690 (permalink)  
 
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My informed opinion.

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Old 8th Dec 2015, 22:36
  #3691 (permalink)  
 
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Safetypee;

Sid Dekker also expressed it very well in his, "Field Guide to Understanding Human Error", where, in the Chapter, "They Should Have...", he wrote:

"What (you think) happened cannot explain people's behaviour", p.39.

FDMII
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 03:25
  #3692 (permalink)  
 
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Yes FDMII. I really wish some of the people who post here would better educate themselves in the field of human error before so soundly crucifying the pilots.

That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 03:53
  #3693 (permalink)  
 
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That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
One of them being an auto trim trimming all the way to make it comfortable to sustain the stall.
Where is the THS graph ... !?
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 04:11
  #3694 (permalink)  
 
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To be fair, I have never flown a jet (so am unfamiliar with Airbus systems). But, the Airbus is type certified, as all certified aircraft, to a standard which includes the requirement that the aircraft must not require unusual pilot skill and attention to safely fly. It can't be presented as terribly difficult to fly through its full range of controlled flight. That's the airplane side of the interface.

The pilot(s) of an aircraft are duty bound to meet that interface halfway, with skill and experience appropriate to the aircraft type and the operating environment. Pilots are entitled to a learning phase, per type, or at least class of aircraft, during which they cannot be expected to have mastered all about the aircraft. But, when they are assigned as Captain, they better have it worked out.

For those times when I have flown passengers, I made damn sure I had mastered the aircraft. On a few occasions, that included taking the plane solo first, to assure my familiarity before carrying a passenger. That flight would ALWAYS include a few stalls - to the break.

Understandably, airline jet pilots don't have the same privilege to take the plane for half an hour refresher, as "small" plane pilots might. But in my opinion, that should be balanced off with these pilots having easy access to smaller aircraft for their refresher flying. I read that NASA Astronaut pilots are "sent" solo flying to remain sharp - so should airline pilots.

Some airline pilots seek out recreational flying, and keep their skills sharp - good for them, they are being true to themselves, and their passengers.

If their employer requires "training", great, but that does not need to be the only occasion when pilot build/maintain their skills.
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 04:50
  #3695 (permalink)  
 
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It seems to me that there are some issues that we are missing and that maybe need to be stressed. First of all I apologize because English is not my mother tongue, so I hope I would be forgiven for grammar errors. Now let's go back to the topic. For start let me explain my background. Ex Air Force pilot, fast jet and tanker, now professional pilot, held rating on B 737, MD 80 series and now skipper on A 320 series. So we can say I have experienced (and indeed I did) all aerobatic that could be done in a fighter, including obviously stall and spin (they were forbidden but you know...at that time you were not a real pilot if you weren't able to fly such things). I have flown the B 707 as a skipper, and I had the luck to actually experience a real stall and recovery (intentional) at FL 350 coupled with a manifacturer test pilot. Then due to autopilot failure I had the chance to hand fly the thing from Milan to Caboverde (no AP, no ATHR) on course to EZE.
Actually there is no simulator experience that can give a faint idea of what is an high altitude stall: no way. In an heavy aircraft you are close to the Baffin Corner and also remember that the inusual pitch attitude is so extreme that can be very disorienting. Sorry for all of you that fly and stall any Cessna Piper or DA, but there are very few similititudes with a heavy sweptwing jet stalling at high altitude. The recovery also is very...interesting: we lost 12000 ft and we both knew what we were doing, we both went through a very detailed briefing and we were in daylight with CAVOK. It is one of the most vivid experience of my aviator career.
I have flown the B 737 and the MD 83 series: control column better than sidestick? Maybe...I am not really sure of that because it seems to me that when things goes terribly wrong in the flight deck no control column or yoke has been able to save the day.
Now for flying manually tha Airbus: actually when we talk about flying manually we talk about flying a beautiful FBW aircraft in normal law without AP and ATHR....with autotrim and a nice sidestick and a beautiful speed trend...so there is no problem to hand fly the minibus in this conditions.Problems arises when the flight law is degrade in Alternate, but in that case there is no way we can experience manual flight in Alternate law because obviously we cannot degrade intentionally the aircraft capabilities like it happened in this accident. One must understand that in Normal Law a pilot can use the sidestick abruptly to the mechanical stops and the aircraft will always give the best capability her can. Actually a EGPWS recovery from warning is flown exactly in this way, or a severe windshear. Completely different situation in Alternate Law, where the envelope protection is degraded.
An Airbus pilot, like any other pilot, must know pitch and thrust for some situations, and must know the capabilities of the aircraft; in my opinion is required a little bit more discipline in order to understand the actual capabilites of the aircrafts in the actual flying conditions: this is addressed only with the training.
Happy landings.
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 05:06
  #3696 (permalink)  
 
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Stepturn:

To be fair, I have never flown a jet (so am unfamiliar with Airbus systems). But, the Airbus is type certified, as all certified aircraft, to a standard which includes the requirement that the aircraft must not require unusual pilot skill and attention to safely fly. It can't be presented as terribly difficult to fly through its full range of controlled flight. That's the airplane side of the interface.

The pilot(s) of an aircraft are duty bound to meet that interface halfway, with skill and experience appropriate to the aircraft type and the operating environment. Pilots are entitled to a learning phase, per type, or at least class of aircraft, during which they cannot be expected to have mastered all about the aircraft. But, when they are assigned as Captain, they better have it worked out.
You know the pilot of QF32, the A380 that had an uncontained engine failure, grounded himself for four months after that incident because he didn't think he was fit to fly, such was the impact of the incident. He also makes it very clear that the fact that there were five pilots in the cockpit on that flight was a crucial advantage. In addition to the normal crew of three, there were two additional check captains: a captain who was being trained as a check captain and a supervising check captain, who was training the check captain. While the pilot flew the plane the FO was completely consumed monitoring the ECAMs, with the other three supporting and monitoring both as necessary.

Putting aside the initial mistakes made in this incident, what was subsequently the situation was task overload, disorientation, masking of warnings and alarms, and an opaque and effectively masked primary operating device. Just as in AF477.
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 06:20
  #3697 (permalink)  
 
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Isn't the final failure in all of this the poor CRM. The PIC knew what to do but not once did he take control or announce it.

I'm also a bit puzzled as to how any Airbus pilot would know to do that - take control. As far as we know - every pilot understands stall recovery is the same for all aircraft - nose down. Why would any PIC ever take control when his basic assumption is that the PF is obviously doing the right thing to start with?

He/She would be confused as heck watching the instruments and wondering why the aircraft is not responding as it should. He'd second guess the instruments before he second guessed his co-pilot. As time passes and altitude loss increases, effective CRM erodes, giving way to stress and fear and the longer it continues the less likely the chances of recovery.

The stall procedure in an Airbus needs to include PF's verbalization of the side stick position. 2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back".
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 06:57
  #3698 (permalink)  
 
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Some airline pilots seek out recreational flying, and keep their skills sharp
Huh? I keep my skills sharp by hand flying the jet for takeoffs, approaches & landings whenever conditions and traffic permit.
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 07:34
  #3699 (permalink)  
 
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@nncO:

"2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back"."

Errrr... isn't that the exact opposite of what is required...?!

Dean
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Old 9th Dec 2015, 08:12
  #3700 (permalink)  
 
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Isn't the final failure in all of this the poor CRM.
Too much emphasis on this PC nonsense. CRM is sitting down with a problem and collaboratively fixing it using "the team". Forgetting to say a couple of appropriate words when the aeroplane is plunging waterward at 12,000fpm is not CRM.

This situation required a dictator: "push the stick full forward NOW or I'll thump ya!" or better "Give me the friggin aeroplane, I'll get us out of this mess!" or I should say "My controls!!". As Han Solo said when they realised they were in the guts of the monster, "No time to discuss, this isn't a committee!"
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