Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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ACAS guide Eurocontrol
Just for clarification, from the above online doc:
RAs at the maximum altitude
"Even at the maximum certified flight level, aircraft should have the ability to climb, albeit maybe at less than 1500 ft/min., for a short period of time. If unable to achieve the required climb rate, pilots should apply the best possible rate and must never manoeuvre opposite to a RA."
RAs at the maximum altitude
"Even at the maximum certified flight level, aircraft should have the ability to climb, albeit maybe at less than 1500 ft/min., for a short period of time. If unable to achieve the required climb rate, pilots should apply the best possible rate and must never manoeuvre opposite to a RA."
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That's interesting. I'm not sure how the whole programming thing works for max RA climb altitude. Perhaps our company maintenance put in that max altitude. If it is something that comes from the manufacturer based on them knowing which aircraft type the system it will be installed in, it was way off.
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So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.
The A320 plane in question had the rudder limiter problems for several days if not weeks prior to the incident. Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option! They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.
The Captain had flown the aircraft previously where the problem cropped up and was logged. On the ground previously, the Captain had seen the ground maintenance engineer " magically " restored normal operations with the resetting of circuit breakers on the panel at the back his seat. Those were circuit breakers, not the overhead reset breakers.
So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.
The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.
The plane in unusual upset attitudes became unrecoverable by the time the skipper could get back to the seat.
This is being handled gingerly because the Air Asia maintenance practice come into question, Indonesia Aviation Maintenance oversight come into question, crew logging of squawks come into question, missing maintenance log pages AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.
At the behest of Airbus, the other cheapie A320 operators have kept their silence...all big money and to prevent investigators into digging into past maintenance practices. 'Nuff said. Copy this down. I won't come back to answer any puerile questions.
The A320 plane in question had the rudder limiter problems for several days if not weeks prior to the incident. Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option! They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.
The Captain had flown the aircraft previously where the problem cropped up and was logged. On the ground previously, the Captain had seen the ground maintenance engineer " magically " restored normal operations with the resetting of circuit breakers on the panel at the back his seat. Those were circuit breakers, not the overhead reset breakers.
So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.
The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.
The plane in unusual upset attitudes became unrecoverable by the time the skipper could get back to the seat.
This is being handled gingerly because the Air Asia maintenance practice come into question, Indonesia Aviation Maintenance oversight come into question, crew logging of squawks come into question, missing maintenance log pages AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.
At the behest of Airbus, the other cheapie A320 operators have kept their silence...all big money and to prevent investigators into digging into past maintenance practices. 'Nuff said. Copy this down. I won't come back to answer any puerile questions.
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Ali Sadikin
Sounds like a bit of inside information.
The official report is due in August according to the last statements by the authorities on the subject.
All the weather tap dancing in the last video presentation was true as far as it went, but probably not relevant to the accident.
So we can perhaps conclude that not only are pilots not getting enough stick time, but the maintainers (engineers in Brit-speak) are losing their troubleshooting skills with the modern aircraft. If a box change doesn't fix the problem, many don't know what to do next.
Sounds like a bit of inside information.
The official report is due in August according to the last statements by the authorities on the subject.
All the weather tap dancing in the last video presentation was true as far as it went, but probably not relevant to the accident.
So we can perhaps conclude that not only are pilots not getting enough stick time, but the maintainers (engineers in Brit-speak) are losing their troubleshooting skills with the modern aircraft. If a box change doesn't fix the problem, many don't know what to do next.
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So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.
Sat Jan 31, 2015 6:53am EST
AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources
SINGAPORE/JAKARTA/PARIS | By Siva Govindasamy, Kanupriya Kapoor and Tim Hepher
The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unusual procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.
Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have not ruled out any cause and stress it is too early to draw firm conclusions.
The Airbus A320 jet plunged into the Java Sea while en route from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore on Dec. 28, killing all 162 people on board.
People familiar with the matter said earlier this week that investigators were examining maintenance records of one of the automated systems, the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to any outage.
One person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device days earlier. There was no independent confirmation of this.
After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.
People familiar with the matter said it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane...
AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources
SINGAPORE/JAKARTA/PARIS | By Siva Govindasamy, Kanupriya Kapoor and Tim Hepher
The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unusual procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.
Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have not ruled out any cause and stress it is too early to draw firm conclusions.
The Airbus A320 jet plunged into the Java Sea while en route from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore on Dec. 28, killing all 162 people on board.
People familiar with the matter said earlier this week that investigators were examining maintenance records of one of the automated systems, the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to any outage.
One person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device days earlier. There was no independent confirmation of this.
After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.
People familiar with the matter said it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane...
AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources | Reuters
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So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.
The A320 plane in question had the rudder limiter problems for several days if not weeks prior to the incident. Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option! They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.
The Captain had flown the aircraft previously where the problem cropped up and was logged. On the ground previously, the Captain had seen the ground maintenance engineer " magically " restored normal operations with the resetting of circuit breakers on the panel at the back his seat. Those were circuit breakers, not the overhead reset breakers.
So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.
The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.
The plane in unusual upset attitudes became unrecoverable by the time the skipper could get back to the seat.
This is being handled gingerly because the Air Asia maintenance practice come into question, Indonesia Aviation Maintenance oversight come into question, crew logging of squawks come into question, missing maintenance log pages AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.
At the behest of Airbus, the other cheapie A320 operators have kept their silence...all big money and to prevent investigators into digging into past maintenance practices. 'Nuff said. Copy this down. I won't come back to answer any puerile questions.
The A320 plane in question had the rudder limiter problems for several days if not weeks prior to the incident. Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option! They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.
The Captain had flown the aircraft previously where the problem cropped up and was logged. On the ground previously, the Captain had seen the ground maintenance engineer " magically " restored normal operations with the resetting of circuit breakers on the panel at the back his seat. Those were circuit breakers, not the overhead reset breakers.
So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.
The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.
The plane in unusual upset attitudes became unrecoverable by the time the skipper could get back to the seat.
This is being handled gingerly because the Air Asia maintenance practice come into question, Indonesia Aviation Maintenance oversight come into question, crew logging of squawks come into question, missing maintenance log pages AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.
At the behest of Airbus, the other cheapie A320 operators have kept their silence...all big money and to prevent investigators into digging into past maintenance practices. 'Nuff said. Copy this down. I won't come back to answer any puerile questions.
Tiger Airways Australia good example. Pushed 10 A320 fleet in Australia hard, no time for proper maintenance. Big no no from CASA down there. Cost them a bit too.
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Ali sadakin,
The AA A300-600 crashed in the Queens broke the rudder.
The rapid pedal sharing had been taught to Learjet pilots to stop the dutch roll on their planes.
It seems that here, after the breaker pull a violent dutch roll developed without rudder loss (?) Maybe the FAC card had a repetitive bad contact and the yaw damper failed for that reason whose effect increased with rudder limiter stop.
(In any case pedal sharing is critical, but unless we have the dfdr data we are not sure that was the cause of the crash)
The AA A300-600 crashed in the Queens broke the rudder.
The rapid pedal sharing had been taught to Learjet pilots to stop the dutch roll on their planes.
It seems that here, after the breaker pull a violent dutch roll developed without rudder loss (?) Maybe the FAC card had a repetitive bad contact and the yaw damper failed for that reason whose effect increased with rudder limiter stop.
(In any case pedal sharing is critical, but unless we have the dfdr data we are not sure that was the cause of the crash)
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Sadakin
So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.
So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.
Interesting account, Sadakin. However, I would say that most aviation authorities are complicit in this game of charades.
In a previous aviation era we would put every intermittent defect in the deferred defect list, whether they were deferrable or not. So you would see things like 'rudder limiter occasionally drops out' as an ADD, and a comment 'please report further instances'. A list of pilot comments on when this problem occurred would follow, so that engineers could diagnose and trace the fault.
Then some lawyer came along and said: "that's not legal - all non-deferrable items must be cleared, even if intermittent". In legal terms this makes sense, but in aviation terms it is a calamity.
What the engineers now had to do is pretend that that fault had been fixed, when everyone knew it had not. (Hint - how do you instantly trace and rectify an intermittent fault covering a dozen complex components and 5 miles of wiring...? Which item is at fault? ) So engineers resorted to 'system reset' or 'tested found serviceable'. Sorry, 'system reset' has not fixed the problem, it has just given it to the next crew. This is the management equivalent of Pilate washing his hands - it absolves management of any responsibility for incidents and accident, but is of no use whatsoever.
Under the old system, the intermittent problem was known to everyone, because it was an open ADD, and suggestions were made to deal with it. Under the new system the problems get buried in old pages or a previous techlogs, and so the intermittent problem comes as complete surprise to the new crew. And I have seen many instances of new crew getting into difficulty with an old problem that was well known to many crews.
In one case an emergency descent was made because of a pressurisation failure, when the fault was a simple and known intermittent problem with an altimeter (work that one out...). In another case an altitude was bust and overspeed encountered because of a well-known intermittent altitude capture problem. In another case a diversion was made due to no ant-ice, when keeping the N1 at 60% would have cured the problem. And all because the crews had not been alerted to an intermittent fault. And the list goes on....
And before you all say 'well fix the damn problem then' - how many times do you test fly an empty aircraft, to check the previous day's repairs? So having filled the aircraft with pax, how do you know if the previous fix is really a fix? Declaring that any intermittent fault is 'fixed' is pretend engineering of the most deceitful kind. Unless a whole week has passed with no further occurences, you have no idea if the fix is really a fix.
So what is preferable. The old honest reporting system? Or the new, legal, but completely dishonest and potentially dangerous reporting system?
Silver
If circuit breaker resetting caused the first officer to over-react and over control, leading into an IMC unusual attitude of his own making, all the hooha about poor maintenance practices doesn't disguise the cold fact there are still airline pilots around who lack basic instrument flying ability if forced to fly manually in IMC. What an indictment on regulators and operators who are aware of this problem but continue to close their eyes to it.
This sort of accident reminds me of the tongue-in-cheek remarks attributed to a Boeing 787 test pilot, when he said Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent airline pilots. Hence all the much vaunted envelope protections.
I wouldn't be surprised Airbus test pilots quietly agree with their Boeing counterpart.
This sort of accident reminds me of the tongue-in-cheek remarks attributed to a Boeing 787 test pilot, when he said Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent airline pilots. Hence all the much vaunted envelope protections.
I wouldn't be surprised Airbus test pilots quietly agree with their Boeing counterpart.
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Centaurus,
With the circuit breaker cycling event pretty nearly fully out of the bag, I can envision a situation where the PF was looking over his shoulder at the Captain playing with the breakers and was startled to find his aircraft had leaned way over while he was looking over his shoulder. Followed by application of full right aileron. Problem being that the aircraft had switched control laws and he was in Alternate Law. (High roll rate-minimal damping). Then highly likely some back and forth roll action with his arm beginning to get tired and beginning to grab some aft stick during the roll corrections. Alternate law essentially adds up all these accidental aft stick corrections and increases pitch attitude-result a rapid climb. As the aircraft slows, the ailerons become less effective and the pilot may gain control of roll, but by then the aircraft is decelerating through stall speed and below due to the high nose attitude.
All personal speculation at this point, but there have been a number of possible clues dropped that point in approximately this direction. It would be nice to have all the details from the accident report. Not too different than the AF447 initial pull up and loss of airspeed.
I suspect that the unexpected change in roll sensitivity and damping that occurs with a sudden change into Alternate Law (A320) is catching some pilots out.
With the circuit breaker cycling event pretty nearly fully out of the bag, I can envision a situation where the PF was looking over his shoulder at the Captain playing with the breakers and was startled to find his aircraft had leaned way over while he was looking over his shoulder. Followed by application of full right aileron. Problem being that the aircraft had switched control laws and he was in Alternate Law. (High roll rate-minimal damping). Then highly likely some back and forth roll action with his arm beginning to get tired and beginning to grab some aft stick during the roll corrections. Alternate law essentially adds up all these accidental aft stick corrections and increases pitch attitude-result a rapid climb. As the aircraft slows, the ailerons become less effective and the pilot may gain control of roll, but by then the aircraft is decelerating through stall speed and below due to the high nose attitude.
All personal speculation at this point, but there have been a number of possible clues dropped that point in approximately this direction. It would be nice to have all the details from the accident report. Not too different than the AF447 initial pull up and loss of airspeed.
I suspect that the unexpected change in roll sensitivity and damping that occurs with a sudden change into Alternate Law (A320) is catching some pilots out.
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"AirAsia type of accident can happen anywhere in the world today!"
Too many similar accidents and incidents point on pilot skills and automation adiction, but personally I think that the main issue is due to huge difference between:
Normal law: "now everyone can fly the automation"
& Alternate law: "experienced captain with over 20k hours under his belt cannot recover from 38000 ft"
I mean, you cannot have grandma and superman under the same skin, anywhere in the world...
Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del
Too many similar accidents and incidents point on pilot skills and automation adiction, but personally I think that the main issue is due to huge difference between:
Normal law: "now everyone can fly the automation"
& Alternate law: "experienced captain with over 20k hours under his belt cannot recover from 38000 ft"
I mean, you cannot have grandma and superman under the same skin, anywhere in the world...
Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del
Last edited by _Phoenix; 7th Jul 2015 at 02:45.
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Some 45 Reports
A review of the FAA’s Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs), and NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) showssome 9 SDRs, and 4 ASRS reports of uncommanded rudder movements (Yaws, Kicks, Inputs, etc) in the A-300, A-319 and A-320 series before the loss of AA 587 in November 2001.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.
37 SDR Control Numbers. To read the full report, access the FAA’s Service Difficulty database and query search at FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page]-just enter SDR control number and run query.
AALA20012082, AALA20020060, AALA20030633, CA030819001, AALA200330886, AALA20040029, CA040513001, AWXA200401278, F3LA200600010, NWAA071863251, CA090421011, UALA2009061601722, UALA2009080302310, NA20090915114, UALA2010020300427, UALA2010041901293, UALA2011032101332, UALA2011072503805, USAA2011092700016, USAA2011092700015, USAA2012071800008, UALA2012072704071, USAA2012081300022, USAA2012081300019, USAA2012081000010, USAA2012121000012, USAA2013060400023, USAA2013070100015, USAA2013081600001, USAA2013082600014, YENA20140114012, USAA2014032100017, USAA2014052700039, USAA2014062000006, WX0A2014120972293, ANCF201412121, and CA150202008.
8 ASRS Report Numbers. Source; ASRS query.Link > http://akama.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSDBOnli...ard_Begin.aspx - Just enter the Report number , run query.
531245, 536451, 540100, 567765 (with 63 prior “events”), 644939, 734999, 790707, and 1158605.
Most common causes given include; FAC – 12 reports,Yaw damper – 11 reports, and Trim actuator – 4 reports.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.
37 SDR Control Numbers. To read the full report, access the FAA’s Service Difficulty database and query search at FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page]-just enter SDR control number and run query.
AALA20012082, AALA20020060, AALA20030633, CA030819001, AALA200330886, AALA20040029, CA040513001, AWXA200401278, F3LA200600010, NWAA071863251, CA090421011, UALA2009061601722, UALA2009080302310, NA20090915114, UALA2010020300427, UALA2010041901293, UALA2011032101332, UALA2011072503805, USAA2011092700016, USAA2011092700015, USAA2012071800008, UALA2012072704071, USAA2012081300022, USAA2012081300019, USAA2012081000010, USAA2012121000012, USAA2013060400023, USAA2013070100015, USAA2013081600001, USAA2013082600014, YENA20140114012, USAA2014032100017, USAA2014052700039, USAA2014062000006, WX0A2014120972293, ANCF201412121, and CA150202008.
8 ASRS Report Numbers. Source; ASRS query.Link > http://akama.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSDBOnli...ard_Begin.aspx - Just enter the Report number , run query.
531245, 536451, 540100, 567765 (with 63 prior “events”), 644939, 734999, 790707, and 1158605.
Most common causes given include; FAC – 12 reports,Yaw damper – 11 reports, and Trim actuator – 4 reports.
I REALLY SHOULDN'T BE HERE
Interesting point machinbird,
Also worth considering that most Airbus (indeed most airline) stick time occurs with the aircraft at low speeds and thus sluggish flight control response but with good damping. Very different response from an aircraft at high altitude and high speed.
Also worth considering that most Airbus (indeed most airline) stick time occurs with the aircraft at low speeds and thus sluggish flight control response but with good damping. Very different response from an aircraft at high altitude and high speed.
Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del
Phoenix, I am thinking of having about a thousand bumper stickers made with that sentiment on that.
Would you put one on your car? I think I will.
Just askin'
What was the company's policy regarding the inflight computer reset via CBs?
The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.
AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.
A review of the FAA’s Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs), and NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) showssome 9 SDRs, and 4 ASRS reports of uncommanded rudder movements (Yaws, Kicks, Inputs, etc) in the A-300, A-319 and A-320 series before the loss of AA 587 in November 2001.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.
Was there any other aeroplane of comparable size and purpose that had problems with its rudder?
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What made the aeroplane depart normal law and lose associated attitude protections?
As recall, the protections reside in the FACs, and when you pull the C/Bs, you disable the protections and drop to Alternate law.