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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Old 14th Feb 2015, 11:24
  #3221 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 1999
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Avoid stalling your swept wing jet aircraft

Risk avoidance will minimise the number of PPRuNe threads like this one. The multiple factors that conspire to place a crew in risky situations need to be considered by all pilots. By the look of the number of accidents like this one, not all of us spend some quiet time at home thinking about the various scenarios and the choices that might be available to minimise risk.
It is OK to consider and practice in the sim for recovery procedures under difficult circumstances, but wouldn't it be heaps better to recognise the risk? Finally it is up to the captain, but the F/O is not in a comfortable position as the risk escalates. Some captains will have their own reasons why staying at F390 in increasing moderate turbulance is acceptable in an A320. A lower time F/O might accept an insufficient reason, like ATC clearance, reduced endurance, possibility of diversion or increased turbulence at lower levels.
I see no indication on these pages that companies are pressing ahead with avoidance training. Rather there seems to be so much discussion on recovery.

Last edited by autoflight; 16th Feb 2015 at 20:12.
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Old 14th Feb 2015, 21:27
  #3222 (permalink)  
 
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Xcitation
I take your point re testing in a very controlled manner, however when a real and unexpected stall occurs on the line, those involved have moved very far away from the contrlled environment of testing.
In the Bournemouth incident both crew were pushing full forward on the control column, but were unable to prevent the pitch increasing to arround 45 degrees. My point being that large control input is likely to be very necessary in order to be able to reduce aofa.
Your example proves how far removed real life can be from testing. No one flying on the line wants to go near the stall, but if they do it will be at the most inconvenient momoment and completely unexpected. Having a clear understanding of what to do is vital. Avoidance is the first step then recovery the second.
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Old 15th Feb 2015, 13:15
  #3223 (permalink)  
 
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I see no indication on these pages that companies are pressing ahead with avoidance training. Rather there seems to be so much discussion on recovery.
I must caution you here: Discussion on PPRuNe bears no resemblance to what companies are pressing ahead with.

Professional pilots are fascinated by other's mistakes (and so they should be) because that's how they learn not to repeat them. The reason threads like these go for hundreds of pages is that professional pilots see a colleague suffer a disaster and they want to know why.

In the impatience of awaiting the final report, they suggest solutions, but most of these solutions come from their creative thinking, not from research of what "those in charge of policy/training/manufacture" are actually doing about it. It's really annoying because those who are actually involved in improving policy/training/manufacture don't jump on PPRuNe every day with an update. Don't they understand the frustration this causes?

However, in direct answer to your question, "avoidance training" is not really something that can be taught in a simulator, or via newsletters/memos, or via flight manuals. This is learned on the line with experience. The only way to learn the best way to fly around thunderstorms is to spend years flying around them under the guidance of someone who has flown around more of them than you have.

Ideally, you fly in the RHS (or in some airlines as a relief pilot/cruise F/O) for many years and learn the avoidance strategies by being exposed to them over many years, with on-the-job guidance and advice from a more experienced pilot in the LHS.

Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to always pan out this way these days. For example, cadetships leading to rapid command promotion in rapidly expanding LCCs, by definition, jump this stage.

The old adage: you start with a full bag of luck and an empty bag of experience. Try to fill the bag of experience before your bag of luck runs out.

But that does not appear to be a factor in this particular accident - the F/O was inexperienced but mature, and the Captain was very experienced. We still don't know why Air Asia pitched up, stalled and stayed stalled. (If indeed that is what happened, we don't know yet.)

The investigators say they know why, but they aren't telling. Again, very frustrating.

In the case of Air France, experience/training was possibly very much a factor, as unfortunately the only chap capable of even recognising the problem (stall) was asleep. The situation may have been unavoidable, the recovery procedure was possibly known to the crew, but they failed to recognise the problem (experience? training?) so did not implement the recovery.
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Old 15th Feb 2015, 13:46
  #3224 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by autoflight View Post
Risk avoidance will minimise the number of PPRuNe threads like this one. The multiple factors that conspire to place a crew in risky situations need to be considerered by all pilots. By the look of the number of accidents like this one, not all of us spend some quiet time at home thinking about the various scenarios and the choices that might be available to minimise risk.
It is OK to consider and practice in the sim for recovery procedures under difficult circumstances, but wouldn't it be heaps better to recognise the risk? Finally it is up to ther captain, but the F/O is not in a comfortable position as the risk escalates. Some captains will have their own reasons why staying at F390 in increasing moderate turbulance is acceptable in an A320. A lower time F/O might accept an insufficient reason, like ATC clearance, reduced endurance, possibility of diversion or increased turbulence at lower levels.
I see no indication on these pages that companies are pressing ahead with avoidance training. Rather there seems to be so much discussion on recovery.
On the contrary, it is companies that have only been doing avoidance training that has led to the current state.

* Anyone flying manually outside the immediate landing or takeoff gets snitched by FOQA and told to desist: the automatics are better than you are and this avoids the risk of something going wrong.
* If this (alert/instrument fail/behavior) happens then memorize this list of precise instructions and follow them. Get the PNF to read through and check that you have done them and nothing else.
* Sit in this reasonable simulation with critical unrealities every month and improve your by rote response to specific (alert/instrument fail/behavior)

These are all risk avoidance by the aircraft operators. To some extent one can understand their point. However, when the real LOC happens it is nothing like the SOPs/FCOM say and usually multiple things happen at once. Unlike the simulator there is negative and positive g, manuals, drinks, grit, EFBs flying everywhere about your head - you cannot even read the instruments and the ones that you have trusted for thousands and thousands of hours are not working. The training to reduce risk may have gone through the motions but the visceral reactions to unexpected g, airstream noises, perhaps even shouts screams and bangs from the passenger cabin. This sudden and extreme stress puts you right at the wrong end of the 'inverted U' ( Yerkes?Dodson law - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ) and leads to cognitive/attentional tunneling usually onto an incorrect area. The training in other words has not prepared the crews for what things could get like. But its difficult and expensive and 'how many of our aircraft will have that problem?' So it is not done. This is unfortunate because as people have said here if you actually _have_ experienced negative g, and recovering from an incipient spin _multiple_ times _and_ been scared a few times then you are likely to perform better. The psychologists call this 'stress inoculation', you are put in the situation and shown how to get out of it. Then when it occurs you are not pushed into cognitive decline by the stress and arousal levels.

The current system is built around avoiding nasty problems around the edges of the flight envelope and training people not to go there. The training is done in comfortable shirt sleeve environments without any physical stresses at all. The training and systems have no doubt increased safety but they have had the unfortunate side effect that when an aircraft is in a sudden upset there is a very much higher chance that the crew will not recover the situation. The very risk avoidance approach has increased the risk of crew poor performance with attentional tunneling due to stress and automation surprise at the very time that they become the sole people capable of recovering the situation.

So now take a many thousand hour fighter pilot and put that pilot in a shiny airliner with two underwing engines and go through all the risk averse training ticking all the boxes. That will NOT include stall or spin recoveries "don't even go there!". Then a few thousand hours into flying the airliner go from bumpy but normal flight in early daylight IMC to all the bells alerts cavalry charges and whistles 2 g zoom climb all inside 20 seconds followed (speculation alert) by a port engine compressor stall as the aircraft approaches apogee with full power on starboard - and the edge of the stall turns into a fast rotation into a flat spin driven by the 'good engine'. Hind brain training kicks in and what were the by rote procedures in the fighter aircraft - and they are implemented. However, the procedures for a fighter with roll/yaw diversion due to a weight concentrated in the fuselage is not quite the same as for a twin jet airliner with a dead engine but that is the practiced response and nobody bothered to erase that response with what to do in _this_ aircraft because we "don't even go there!"

So cautious stay out of trouble training needs to be looked at very carefully. As does the reality of what 'trouble' feels like. If crews felt that once - they may be 'inoculated' against the cognitive stress of its occurrence when it happens.
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Old 15th Feb 2015, 15:09
  #3225 (permalink)  
 
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Loud & Very Clear

Ian W's post below says it all.


"On the contrary, it is companies that have only been doing avoidance training that has led to the current state.

* Anyone flying manually outside the immediate landing or takeoff gets snitched by FOQA and told to desist: the automatics are better than you are and this avoids the risk of something going wrong.
* If this (alert/instrument fail/behavior) happens then memorize this list of precise instructions and follow them. Get the PNF to read through and check that you have done them and nothing else.
* Sit in this reasonable simulation with critical unrealities every month and improve your by rote response to specific (alert/instrument fail/behavior)

These are all risk avoidance by the aircraft operators. To some extent one can understand their point. However, when the real LOC happens it is nothing like the SOPs/FCOM say and usually multiple things happen at once. Unlike the simulator there is negative and positive g, manuals, drinks, grit, EFBs flying everywhere about your head - you cannot even read the instruments and the ones that you have trusted for thousands and thousands of hours are not working. The training to reduce risk may have gone through the motions but the visceral reactions to unexpected g, airstream noises, perhaps even shouts screams and bangs from the passenger cabin. This sudden and extreme stress puts you right at the wrong end of the 'inverted U' ( Yerkes?Dodson law - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ) and leads to cognitive/attentional tunneling usually onto an incorrect area. The training in other words has not prepared the crews for what things could get like. But its difficult and expensive and 'how many of our aircraft will have that problem?' So it is not done. This is unfortunate because as people have said here if you actually _have_ experienced negative g, and recovering from an incipient spin _multiple_ times _and_ been scared a few times then you are likely to perform better. The psychologists call this 'stress inoculation', you are put in the situation and shown how to get out of it. Then when it occurs you are not pushed into cognitive decline by the stress and arousal levels.

The current system is built around avoiding nasty problems around the edges of the flight envelope and training people not to go there. The training is done in comfortable shirt sleeve environments without any physical stresses at all. The training and systems have no doubt increased safety but they have had the unfortunate side effect that when an aircraft is in a sudden upset there is a very much higher chance that the crew will not recover the situation. The very risk avoidance approach has increased the risk of crew poor performance with attentional tunneling due to stress and automation surprise at the very time that they become the sole people capable of recovering the situation.

So now take a many thousand hour fighter pilot and put that pilot in a shiny airliner with two underwing engines and go through all the risk averse training ticking all the boxes. That will NOT include stall or spin recoveries "don't even go there!". Then a few thousand hours into flying the airliner go from bumpy but normal flight in early daylight IMC to all the bells alerts cavalry charges and whistles 2 g zoom climb all inside 20 seconds followed (speculation alert) by a port engine compressor stall as the aircraft approaches apogee with full power on starboard - and the edge of the stall turns into a fast rotation into a flat spin driven by the 'good engine'. Hind brain training kicks in and what were the by rote procedures in the fighter aircraft - and they are implemented. However, the procedures for a fighter with roll/yaw diversion due to a weight concentrated in the fuselage is not quite the same as for a twin jet airliner with a dead engine but that is the practiced response and nobody bothered to erase that response with what to do in _this_ aircraft because we "don't even go there!"

So cautious stay out of trouble training needs to be looked at very carefully. As does the reality of what 'trouble' feels like. If crews felt that once - they may be 'inoculated' against the cognitive stress of its occurrence when it happens."
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Last edited by formationdriver; 16th Feb 2015 at 16:30. Reason: spelling
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Old 15th Feb 2015, 15:36
  #3226 (permalink)  
 
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"The current system is built around avoiding nasty problems around the edges of the flight envelope and training people not to go there."

Even that gives the current strategy too much credit. It is in fact just about reducing costs and making money. For money-men pilots are an inconvenience to be eliminated as quickly as possible.

Pilots used to be almost worshipped ! The captain of the skies. It was an honour to meet one or visit the cockpit and see those stripes on the shoulder.

Travelling to Asia used to be a once in a lifetime thing, a strange world with strange food and exotic culture. Now busloads go and sit in concrete boxes and etc...

For those in the industry, like in all industries in this age, one must be quite sly to get the best out of it. You must know the money-agenda of the corporations ... no matter what their PR people say in public.

They demand that you robotise your flying behaviour to keep your job ... and yet you may meet a situation where only your skill wits and knowledge is going to save your backside.

If I was a pilot I would certainly be plugging into the simulator all the serious air incidents that affect the models I fly, and going over them until I know exactly what to do to get the best outcome. Without necessarily telling the company what I am doing.

It is interesting if these pilots tried to switch off the computers. It may indicate that they were trying to avert AF447 but hadn't studied the case well enough.

It's one thing talking about life-saving manoeuvres on the internet, but unless you have disciplined yourself to practice them over and over and over again until you are certain, absolutely certain what and why and how ... if you haven't, then if the time comes you will either sit like a rabbit in headlights ... or make a mess of it.
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Old 15th Feb 2015, 18:42
  #3227 (permalink)  
 
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They demand that you robotise your flying behaviour to keep your job ... and yet you may meet a situation where only your skill wits and knowledge is going to save your backside.
rideforever, that is so true - one of the best statements I've seen on PPRuNe for quite a while - thanks!
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 19:54
  #3228 (permalink)  
 
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UPRT Needed

As Ian W stated in his previous reply (excellent insight!), we really have a problem with getting all commercial pilots to train for unexpected upsets to react instinctively - not with primitive brain (which seems to be pull, pull, pull!!).

A simple Google search "loss of control LOC airliner accidents" turned up an interesting article:

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...0100030600.pdf

that systematically looks at over 100 Loss of Control accidents (they are even listed in the Appendix). We have a serious problem and only radical training can deal with it. When we had Controlled Flight into Terrain as the most serious accident cause, the airline industry spent large sums to deal with it in adding the Enhanced Ground Prox system. Unless we design and incorporate a FlyByWIre Upset Recovery System, we must spend the sums to train our pilots to focus on Push-Power-Roll sequences that will save the aircraft. That same Google search pointed to a company that is already providing the type of upset training that is required -
Upset Recovery Instruction, Aerobatics Flying, Spin/Stall Flight Training - take a look!

Last edited by whitav8r; 16th Feb 2015 at 19:57. Reason: typos
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 20:48
  #3229 (permalink)  
 
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Hope they know what they are teaching. Aerobatic aircraft techniques will have the tail separating from a big jet.
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 21:08
  #3230 (permalink)  
 
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IcePack

I dont think aerobatics a large passenger aircraft would be in the syllabus somehow.

I would think they try and teach the recognition and the best way to recover from usual attitudes, by putting the least amount of G on any aircraft.
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 21:59
  #3231 (permalink)  
 
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Hope so, but the way some talk on this thread the mind boggles.
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 23:06
  #3232 (permalink)  
 
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@rideforever

Even that gives the current strategy too much credit. It is in fact just about reducing costs and making money. For money-men pilots are an inconvenience to be eliminated as quickly as possible.

Pilots used to be almost worshipped ! The captain of the skies. It was an honour to meet one or visit the cockpit and see those stripes on the shoulder.
And yet... Flying now is indisputably safer than when pilots were 'worshipped'. Would you like a few more deaths from avoidable accidents just so the self loading freight down the back could be reminded just how much respect they need to show the pilot? Maybe the odd manufactured 'emergency' to remind them how grateful they should be to the gods of the skies? Yep, turn off the automatics and lets get back to it being a man's game, where there are no old bold pilots but by God the passengers went down screaming the captain's name out of respect rather than terror when he screwed up and killed them all.

When deciding that is the case, perhaps you should also ask the surgeon the next time you go into hospital if he wouldn't relive the glory days by operating on you half cut with a fag in his mouth and without using any modern machines. After all, medical personnel also used to be gods - back in the days when many more people died on operating tables.

Taking the train was much more adventurous back in the day as well of course, before automatic train protection systems and all that bloody technology came in to stop every boy dreaming of being a train driver. OK, so a few people died, but hey the driver was having more fun and that's what's important right? Turn off the TPWS and lets have the oil lamps and semaphores back.

I'm afraid it's happened to every industry. It's called maturing. The first few people are pioneers, who succeed on luck as much judgement. That doesn't last, and eventually professional standards take hold, and the old guard moan that it was more fun when the odd ****up (even if fatal) was a risk it was acceptable to take. Plus ca change. The only difference is that pilots got the god-complex bug even more than most.

Travelling to Asia used to be a once in a lifetime thing, a strange world with strange food and exotic culture. Now busloads go and sit in concrete boxes and etc...
And you see that as a bad thing do you? All those bloody peasants, being allowed to travel! Don't they know aviation is only for the elite, for heavens' sake?!
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Old 16th Feb 2015, 23:53
  #3233 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Slfandproud
Flying now is indisputably safer than when pilots were 'worshipped'.
We do have a chip on our shoulder, don't we? The main reason that flying safety has increased is because of things like TCAS, EGPWS and FMS based approaches. It's got almost nothing to do with the lessening of the macho heros. In fact, you're very lucky flying was as safe as it was in the old days; only because of the skill of the pilots. Now that the beancounters, aided and abetted by the regulatory authorities, have diminished pilot's flying skills by reducing/eliminating SIM practice time to compensate for reducing on-the-line hand flying, we are seeing a rise in the number of LOC accidents. So how about giving the pilot/doctor-bashing a break?

pointed to a company that is already providing the type of upset training that is required -
This could easily be achieved in our current Sims. There just needs to be the will.
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 00:06
  #3234 (permalink)  
 
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I'm afraid it's happened to every industry. It's called maturing. The first few people are pioneers, who succeed on luck as much judgement. That doesn't last, and eventually professional standards take hold, and the old guard moan that it was more fun when the odd ****up (even if fatal) was a risk it was acceptable to take.
If modern professional standards equates to monitoring automatics until such a time when the automatics give up, leaving two out-of-the-loop beating hearts to question what is wrong and fix it before landfall ... I prefer the sky gods, thank you.
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 06:09
  #3235 (permalink)  
 
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I was disappointed back in AF447 that an A330 was not flown through the initial zoom and stall profile, perhaps with spin chute.

The data could have been provided to the sim manufacturers so the crews would have an opportunity to explore high altitude stalls and recovery with valid data. This crew, their passengers and their families might have benefited.

There is talk that no crew should ever get near that edge of the envelope, but convective activity can put any crew in a place they never intended to be.

Until the data is available, the ITCZ crapshoot will continue.
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 08:32
  #3236 (permalink)  
 
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SLFandProud. Your analogies are superb....But you shouldn't be sidetracked by the occasional retired 'Skygod' sitting at their computer, tapping away feverishly at their keyboards about how brilliant they were in the 80's!

The problem is that ordinary pilots believe that the direction cockpit design took as technology 'enabled' enhanced safety, was to an extent the wrong one.
To remove the human input from cockpit automation, to dismiss ergonomics and human-machine interface design so comprehensively.

Things will always go wrong environmentally. It's called bad weather. It will always outfox a drone pilot or the most sophisticated automation technology. But when an Airbus has the equivalent of a 'kernel exception error' because it's probes have frozen up or it's Angle of Attack probes are jammed, it takes a pilot to know beyond the rudimentary basics of flight using only rudimentary instruments that remain. That requires training and that costs money.

This is not about ego. We all want 100% safety. It just requires making pilots more skilful to achieve that aim. Don't confuse those who moan about that lack of training as Egotistical!
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 08:58
  #3237 (permalink)  
 
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@right engine

SLFandProud. Your analogies are superb....But you shouldn't be sidetracked by the occasional retired 'Skygod' sitting at their computer, tapping away feverishly at their keyboards about how brilliant they were in the 80's!
Oh absolutely, I quite agree; the point I was trying to make is that this is a completely normal and natural evolution, and as depressing as it may be if you were once a 'sky god' there's no point tilting at that particular windmill.

It happens in /every/ industry.

Hell, the software engineers of my generation will moan that the job was more skilled when we hand rolled assembly language using nothing but a HEX editor, and that all this modern nonsense like automatic garbage collection and strict type checking means that any old Tom, Dick or Harry could write code with all the skill taken out of it.

Would you rather the automatics on your plane were being programmed by the greybeards like me who insist on using stone and chisels or with the full aid of all the modern compiler and software correctness tools available?
The problem is that ordinary pilots believe that the direction cockpit design took as technology 'enabled' enhanced safety, was to an extent the wrong one.
To remove the human input from cockpit automation, to dismiss ergonomics and human-machine interface design so comprehensively.
And that is an entirely valid argument to have. But it's not the one that @rideforever was making.
This is not about ego. We all want 100% safety. It just requires making pilots more skilful to achieve that aim. Don't confuse those who moan about that lack of training as Egotistical!
I think it's fair to say when @rideforever starts bemoaning the fact that pilots aren't worshipped any more it's hard to see it as anything other than an appeal to ego.

Look, I totally agree with your point. I learned to fly gliders long ago, stall recovery was in literally the first couple of lessons and was drummed in hard, so I find it absolutely astonishing that the pilot of AF447 could pull back on the stick all the way into the sea. But the blathering about automatics and sky gods seems to me to be to deflect the subject from inadequate training, not to highlight that that really is the problem. It's not the automatics making pilots incompetent - it may be the automatics meaning that incompetent pilots get to fly for longer before they kill themselves or their passengers, though.

As a society, we make even decide that's an acceptable tradeoff, since the overall levels of safety have absolutely increased, and since it has also resulted in the poor folk that @rideforever so derides to have access to travel that they could only have dreamed of not so long ago.


(As an aside, I also love the fact that because there was an Airbus involved everyone has basically assumed the entire incident is identical to AF447 and all the same arguments can be rehearsed, despite there being absolutely no evidence I've seen to support the assertion whatsoever.)
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 09:18
  #3238 (permalink)  
 
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I am a simple old world kind of person who has managed to stay alive after 10 years in the military and 30 years in civil aviation. I have had to learn to adapt to the fact that the machine knows better than the man. But does that logic follow when parts of the machine are compromised and parts are not? Indeed when parts are compromised, it is possible that the remaining parts are working against you rather than for you, but you are in such a lather that you don't or can't read the message.

Having trawled the various airbus accidents, I am convinced that there is a very serious problem with the trim control in partial degradation of systems. The Perpignon A320 accident is a classic example.

Small print advice is not something one can understand in a major upset.

Please Mr Airbus...do something about a system that will allow trim to work against a pilot in the case of partial or substantial upset.

Last edited by VR-HFX; 18th Feb 2015 at 05:38.
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 11:14
  #3239 (permalink)  
 
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A few years ago in the simulator I was required to upgrade an experienced B737 first officer from RH seat to LH seat. This was in the days when the Australian CAA licencing system has first class endorsements and second class endorsements. First class endorsements were for captains and first officers were given second class endorsements. As expected back then, the second class endorsement was not recognised outside of Australia and that meant some pilots could not get jobs overseas despite being highly experienced.

This particular pilot had no problem whatsoever operating from the LH seat. At the end of the endorsement training we had time to spare and I asked him if he would like to practice some unusual attitude recoveries in IMC. He thought about it for a moment before saying he thought UA's were a bit of a waste of time. Anyway, he reluctantly gave it a go. The simulator was set up for a un-commanded steep pitch up at 500 ft agl after take off. Airspeed loss is dramatic. This had really happened some years previously in USA and by superb handling the USA pilot had rolled sharply through 60 degrees to get the nose to drop and cleared a building by 100 feet in the recovery.

In the event, our pilot in the simulator was completely caught by surprise when it happened at 500 ft in the simulator as he expected the UA's to be done at 10,000ft. He tried forward elevator to stop the immediate speed loss but to no avail. With the nose going through 50 degrees nose up, he made no attempt to roll to the nearest horizon to get the nose to drop which would have saved the day. To my astonishment, he pulled both engines to idle and the simulator gave up the ghost and fell out of the sky.

In short and despite several thousands of copilot hours on automatic pilot on the 737, he simply didn't have a clue. Certainly he was unfamiliar with the pertinent chapter in the FCTM about UA recovery technique.

I suggested he have another attempt - this time rolling to the nearest horizon. I even offered to slip into his seat and demonstrate the recovery technique. He looked at his watch and reiterated he thought UA's were a waste of valuable simulator time and that in any case he had an appointment elsewhere. In other words he had stuffed up big time and refused to admit it.

This episode proved to me that automation dependency will continue to be the shadowy danger in the flying of jet transports. It beats me that time and again we see regulators and ops management paying lip service to manual handling skills but have yet to schedule comprehensive simulator training to mitigate autopilot dependency. One well known Middle East carrier boasted that they had added one extra hour per year of manual handling. What a laugh that was. In other words extra safety measures that involve simulator training are seen as a unnecessary cost impost.

The occasional raw data ILS to tick a regulatory box is virtually a waste of time as it does not scratch the surface in terms of manual handling. I believe we will see more future instances of loss of control in IMC as pilots are forced into more and more automation by their ops management.

So much valuable simulator time is wasted on button pushing and excessive check list reading exercises. In turn, this must only increase automation dependency. IMHO, to counteract ever-increasing automation dependency, 50 percent of all simulator training should be devoted to non-automatics handling in IMC - and that includes high altitude flying. High altitude stall recovery skills (37,000 ft) and landing configuration stall recovery skills (1000 feet AGL) are vital.

Last edited by Centaurus; 17th Feb 2015 at 11:30.
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Old 17th Feb 2015, 11:45
  #3240 (permalink)  
 
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Centaurus,




I would like to say that what you wrote is one of the most important and well articulated pieces that I have seen on this site for a while. Thank you for illustrating and sharing your insight.


Largely due to financial pressures of the industry, finding the balance between training costs and associated risk of crew experience is important of course. In the case of these airlines that have lost aircraft, the cost and pain for all involved has not been measured well.


The over reliance on automation is fact and needs to be addressed in a cost effective approach.


I have done research on this area and at times I feel safer in raw data at the 'what the' moments.




The high stall recovery techniques at FL510 are interesting.
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