Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Old 9th Feb 2015, 19:54
  #3141 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 59
Posts: 5,239
Originally Posted by caulfield View Post
And I can tell you that on joining 80% of these airlines, nobody really cared about my flying skills or airmanship (bar the V1cut and required LPC items). What they all cared about was ... did I know and follow the SOP's, cross my T's and dot my I's, and keep the automation in and watch the good ship.
This fits into the current legal environment nicely. That is what has a lot of management concerned: liability.
I rarely if ever saw sim time devoted to ex LPC items. And many instructors would reposition the sim in a perfunctory manner until the box was ticked. No expansion, no discussion, no focus on airmanship. Just whats the next box to tick.
This make regulators happy, seeing all of those boxes ticked. Training costs time and money. Box ticking is more "time efficient." (Please note the sarcasm dripping from my keyboard ... )
In one airline I was supposed to follow like a monkey a set pat of intra flight deck comms when the ramp agent arrived. I said to the line instructor, I can get the load sheet, extract the data, enter it into the FMC with the other guy cross-checking and we can do it safely without a procedure like a monkey. This is where the airlines focus is now. Procedure.
ISO 9000 has arrived on the Flight Deck.

Don't feel bad. This isn't only a problem in the airline industry.
They dont want the crew thinking for themselves or flying the plane all by their lonesome. And its enforced from top down with FDM. This is where we're going wrong.
Because people are hard to lead and manage.
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 9th Feb 2015, 21:32
  #3142 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Schiphol
Posts: 303
@ wes wall - cockpit crew

Status that I keep says ...

Both Captain and F/O were seated.
Early rumours that Capt was out of his seat were rejected early on by officials.
Rumours persisted.
No foundation of rumours known to me.

On Friday both pilots were located in the damaged cockpit. Both strapped in. And one of the pilots was recovered. His uniform had 3 stripes. But formal identification is referred to the DVI team.

Recovery of the second pilot, most likely the captain, is planned. Progress unknown.
A0283 is offline  
Old 9th Feb 2015, 21:41
  #3143 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Western Pacific
Posts: 708
Perfect summary caulfield & Lonewolf_50 adds to it nicely! The accountants & marketing types have got their hands firmly on the airline industry & they are going to force it into their mold, no matter what!
Oakape is offline  
Old 9th Feb 2015, 21:57
  #3144 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2010
Location: Ontario, Canada
Posts: 2
Alternate Law PFD

Note the HUGE red X's on the display in Alternate Law PFD


Flight Control Laws | Alternate Law - Description
Nimbus4 is offline  
Old 9th Feb 2015, 23:30
  #3145 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Kemi,Finland
Age: 64
Posts: 68
Caulfield

Not much to add,even today. thanks for writing.
Naali is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 00:28
  #3146 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2014
Location: NY
Posts: 7
Experience with Alternate Law

Can any Airbus guys say how often they have to fly in Alternate Law? Is it a regular occurence or something you just experience in training?
scard08 is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 04:58
  #3147 (permalink)  
Pegase Driver
 
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 68
Posts: 2,501
caulfield

Superb post Caulfield, totally agree .
Same in our Profession, the most important part of Safety management today is satisfying audits and regulators questionnaires. If all the boxes are ticked, management opens the Champagne bottles and congratulate themselves how good they are.
But unfortunately I do not think "Good airmanship" " is one of the boxes.
ATC Watcher is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 06:16
  #3148 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 2,045
Can any Airbus guys say how often they have to fly in Alternate Law? Is it a regular occurence or something you just experience in training?
6K+hrs A340/320 - never.

Very rare on the line, of course practiced in the Sim.

if cruising at max altitude and you receive a tcas alert to "climb", don't do anything; the other aircraft will get tcas alerts to descend at a higher rate
I trust your advice not to climb is not serious How do you know the other aircraft even has TCAS? If you are Max Alt, and TCAS says climb, then FOLLOW IT
NigelOnDraft is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 06:23
  #3149 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: equatorial side of the Polar Jet
Posts: 194
Caulfield

Well posted old boy! We need more retrospecive thinking in this industry to correct matters.Its not just about speedy i-pad googly minds in the cockpit.We need Airmen who can THINK and DECIDE like AVIATORS.That means a liberal latitude rather than robotic SOP and punching buttons like a Digital DJ. Unfortunately when "Airmanship" criterion appears I the tick box..it is judged not objectively but more subjective assessment o how the TRE sees your operation dominated by CRM mandates.There is also the worrying trend that modern trained young pilots just because have CRM lessons in their syllabus seem to think they have a monopoly of expertise in the field and their misinterpretation of Assertiveness versus Aggressiveness might lead to undermining the authority of the Pilot In Charge.The AF Airbus 340 landing accident at Toronto amongst others bring to mind.Experience vs knowledge...two similar but quite different positions in the cockpit.At the end of the day when in dire straits..it is correct judgement that will count.And that comes on naturally..with years of hard earned experience.
Trackdiamond is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 08:15
  #3150 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: UK
Age: 56
Posts: 48
Originally Posted by Trackdiamond View Post
..it is correct judgement that will count.And that comes on naturally..with years of hard earned experience.
I've been quite surprised to see a number of posts along these lines recently, basically criticising CRM for empowering whipper-snappers to challenge wise old greybeards. I thought that Tenerife (and numerous accidents before and since) had demonstrated that "years of hard earned experience" do not necessarily equate to correct judgement in any given situation, and that a far greater risk is the FO cowered into silence by the higher status of their more experienced captain? It might be irritating to have your judgement regularly queried by a relative novice, but haven't we all (in whatever field) had the experience at one time or another of being challenged and thinking "damn, the kid's right"?
HeavyMetallist is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 10:38
  #3151 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Florida and wherever my laptop is
Posts: 1,200
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50 View Post
This fits into the current legal environment nicely. That is what has a lot of management concerned: liability. This make regulators happy, seeing all of those boxes ticked. Training costs time and money. Box ticking is more "time efficient." (Please note the sarcasm dripping from my keyboard ... )
ISO 9000 has arrived on the Flight Deck.

Don't feel bad. This isn't only a problem in the airline industry.
Because people are hard to lead and manage.
At one stage in my 'career' I qualified as an ISO-9000 auditor. One of the things that was expressed to me during the training was that procedures were not required for everything, only where it was really essential the procedures were not varied. Or to put it another way one of the more experienced QA instructors said:

"You go to audit some companies and they have several tables all covered with procedure manuals 2 or 3 deep. You go into others and they hand you a single slim folder. You know immediately which company actually follows their procedures."

I think that this has application in the aviation world. Less by rote procedures and more capable personnel will make a better more professional airline which in the long term will be safer and more profitable.

Unfortunately, that message has not percolated through to 'management' and tickboxes and inhibition of original thought are seen as the way to do it. That inevitably leads to the:

'if there isn't a procedure for it - you are not allowed to do it'; and,

'I have learned all the procedures in the manual and the boxes have all been ticked, so I don't need to know anything else.'
Ian W is online now  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 11:38
  #3152 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Schiphol
Posts: 303
Investigative approach taken by the KNKT/NTSC ?

What I would like to understand is the huge difference between how the AirAsia and the latest TransAsia accidents are treated by the respective national authorities (both acting under ICAO Rules).

In the AirAsia case the (investigation) authorities have published few preliminary facts (radar, FDR and CVR data). But have published some short ‘final opinion’ conclusions( {we know what happened} “ we have the ‘key‘ “ – and – “it was not a suicide”).
In the TransAsia case the (investigation) authorities have already published many preliminary facts (radar, FDR and CVR data). And have published a ‘preliminary factual’ conclusion (one engine out and the second good one shut down too).

From a professional personal point of view you learn much much more from getting the preliminary facts yourself, struggle with them to find probable cause and contributing factors, and then compare these when preliminary, interim and final reports are published. The main learning moments being where the professional official report either confirms or rejects your professional personal conclusions.

From that professional viewpoint you can only be very very happy with the approach taken by the Taiwanese ASC. And at the same time negatively surprised by the approach taken by the Indonesian KNKT/NTSC.

In context, the Taiwanese ‘political’ risks appeared to be much greater than the Indonesian ones. Declaring the pilot a hero ( while keeping the ‘from hero to villain pilot’ case after rolling the 747 in mind ). Possibly shutting down the good engine too (keeping the UK 737 case in mind). And the mainland Chinese passengers (keeping general politics and MH370 emotions in mind).
In the Indonesian case no-one, not a single mention on PPRuNe I think, suggested a suicide. And no-one expects an investigation team to have the ‘key’ in an early stage. There is a lot of information that can be published without having any political overtones. Publishing the MH370 take-off fuel weight for instance would also have harmed no one, on the contrary one could even say.

Is there a PPRuNe member who has an informed opinion on this. And can give us a better understanding of how the Indonesian investigation might view its own QZ8501 approach.
A0283 is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 12:53
  #3153 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 59
Posts: 5,239
Ian:
As with any quality and standards system, the "spirit of the law" versus "the letter of the law" application remains problematic.

Your points are well taken, but that doesn't mean that the concept behind the system is reflected in practice.
(See also with various misadventures in Lean ... )

There is no substitute for knowing the aircraft thoroughly and knowing the limitations / constraints of the regulatory system (be it national or international) that is put in place with the intention of establishing some order to air travel and transport.
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 16:18
  #3154 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: Clinton WA
Age: 70
Posts: 73
RE IanW's stack of manuals: I attended a local emergency planning meeting, with fire department, and city, county, and state officialdom. The city manual was 50 pages long. The mayor and I were the only ones who had read it. The manual was all about who is in charge.

I have a very pedestrian 13 ton truck, one you see hundreds of on the road. It won't start. The local motor guru who can in 35 seconds diagnose 95% of all problems of pre-1985 light duty vehicles, plus HIS diesel guru still don't know whats going on after a week and, like a more monetarily restrained version of the truck dealer, have begun throwing dollars at it in hopes something will work. Someone somewhere knows all the troubleshooting SOPs. They don't live here.

I've used simple examples here because complex examples too often become a pack of dogs chasing their tails. If there are no ongoing, systemically encouraged conversations between those who have great knowledge and those who have great experience what you get in the group mind is advancing Alzheimers, in other words, increased relational complexity. Every pilot knows (or should) that all you need to guarantee an accident is too many complexities in too short a time. Eliminating complexities is automation's promise. But the issue here is when automation increases complexity. There aren't any pilots, no matter their training, knowledge, or experience, who are not vulnerable to overwhelm. Some of the arguments that more training would solve everything seem be made by people who haven't yet had the whee squeezed out of them and now know beyond a shadow of a doubt they were saved only because of luck. I have, so I know I don't know everything. That makes me skeptical of arguments like "If you knew what I know", and "If you knew more", unless I know for a fact that that the person had a whee squeezing event where serendipitous luck and not his own abilities clearly saved his bacon.
Leightman 957 is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 16:49
  #3155 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: ampthill
Age: 70
Posts: 11
Leightman.
As one of those who advocates more stall training in the sim, I think I should reply. The point I was making was that the recovery from a fully developed stall, especially at very high altitude is quite the opposite of what is taught to airline crews, with monotonous regularity, for the avoidance of an impending stall at low level. The crew must be able to recognise when stall prevention gives way to stall recovery and this has to be instinctive and mustn't be delayed. If necessary the recovery attitude (and power) needs to be applied for a protracted period of time and with a large loss of altitude. The resulting trajectory has to be accepted even if it takes the aircraft into a CB or terrain. Until the aircraft is unstalled and flying again, nothing else matters. Just hope you've got enough airspace.
When I read details of the various reports of aircraft upsets, I always wonder if I could have coped as well as the guys who survived or any better than those who didn't.
Yes, I've also had many lucky escapes.
c.j.shrimpton is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 16:57
  #3156 (permalink)  
PJ2
 
Join Date: Mar 2003
Location: East of the sun, West of the moon
Age: 71
Posts: 2,381
Thumbs up

A very fine post, Leightman 957.
PJ2 is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 17:10
  #3157 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: AR
Age: 68
Posts: 1
ISO 9000

Ian, I don't believe that ISO quality and management systems are really too applicable to pilots, perhaps more to aircraft maintenance, etc.

Normally ISO systems work well, such as in factories, where it is important that the employees do exactly what their job is every time. Of course, there are many ways within that system that employees can initiate changes and improvements to their particular processes, but only after review that is not instantaneous. But day in, day out, what works best is that they do what is written in their SOP's for that job.

However, seems to this non-pilot that while pilots have to have guidelines, checklists, etc., their qualifications and training has to be at a high enough level that they can handle the emergencies that can arise and may not be covered in a manual or a procedure.
1953Buick is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 17:19
  #3158 (permalink)  
IGh
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Castlegar
Posts: 251
Investigating-the-"investigator"

Question posed:
Investigative approach ... KNKT/NTSC ?
Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
at slot #3182 (permalink), dated 10Feb

See discussion in http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post8861604
IGh is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 17:54
  #3159 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 3,949
I've been quite surprised to see a number of posts along these lines recently, basically criticising CRM for empowering whipper-snappers to challenge wise old greybeards. I thought that Tenerife (and numerous accidents before and since) had demonstrated that "years of hard earned experience" do not necessarily equate to correct judgement in any given situation, and that a far greater risk is the FO cowered into silence by the higher status of their more experienced captain? It might be irritating to have your judgement regularly queried by a relative novice, but haven't we all (in whatever field) had the experience at one time or another of being challenged and thinking "damn, the kid's right"?
Heavymetallist, I think you are conflating the issues here. I don't think we are talking about good CRM etc.

The issue is that new pilots (through no fault of their own - they have been trained that way) are good at complying with SOPS etc but lack the hands on skills which given the current level of automation can leave them lacking when things don't go according to plan.

The fact is that oldies that have done lots of flying on older generation types are "hard wired" neurologically for manual flying (they may be a bit rusty but they can confidently hand fly). New pilots do not have those skills to fall back on.
fireflybob is offline  
Old 10th Feb 2015, 18:02
  #3160 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Not far from a big Lake
Age: 76
Posts: 1,452
What I would like to understand is the huge difference between how the AirAsia and the latest TransAsia accidents are treated by the respective national authorities (both acting under ICAO Rules).
Maybe the Indonesian KNKT/NTSC is scratching their heads still over how the wobbly flight path initially observed relates to the later loss of control in the vertical direction.
Machinbird is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us Archive Advertising Cookie Policy Privacy Statement Terms of Service

Copyright 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.