Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Elephant and Castle
It is certainly not something he was hired on his ability to do, has been extensively trained to do, or is encouraged to practice. (In fact) above FL 295 he is not allowed to even try.
It is certainly not something he was hired on his ability to do, has been extensively trained to do, or is encouraged to practice. (In fact) above FL 295 he is not allowed to even try.
Had a f/o lose control of the aircraft completely last year. Not entirely sure, but I think he was trying to do a barrel roll. But the odd thing is that having sent a thorough report to the relevant authorities, they did not even have the common decency to reply and say 'thank you'. For all I know, they have waste-bins full of these reports, waiting for their turn in the incinerator.
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All of the discussion about changing training practices still begs the question as to why on this particular flight an apparently experienced fighter jet background pilot could not recover from a stall? Whether all that has been leaked is accurate or not, it seems he was for the most part of the descent trying to recover the aircraft and could not. Obviously we need more information however in terms of ideal background and having learnt to hand fly, it seems AAI had an ideal candidate for captain on this flight and yet on this occasion it made no difference.
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I totally agree with the comments with regards to loss or never had basic flying skills.
Apart from employing ex military pilots, does anyone have any suggestions how this problem can be addressed as it seems to me the authorities don't seem to be addressing this very serious issue. How many more of these types of accidents do we have to endure before something is done? My money is on, a lot more.
Flame me if you wish but at least I am trying to put forward suggestions for a possible solution. There are obviously much smarter people than I who must have the answers.
Why are pilots getting into these situations in the first instance, that require superior flying skills to recover??
- How about 10% to 25% recurrent training be added for basic handling, more unusual attitude recovery, stalling and recovery practice, both VMC and IMC at altitude. More S & L in varying degrees of turbulence.You know all stuff we cant practice on the line. I just bet the accounts would love that.
- What about training before a computer licence is issued, on a "high performance" , tail wheel, aerobatic or semi aerobatic aircraft. 20 hours? Why a tail wheel. Well it would teach students to have some idea what to do with their feet when approaching the ground. Hours of xwind training thrown in. Basically give pilots the skills the older generation were given.
"Oh but we gonna' fly jets". BS same principals apply. A jet is the name of a type of power plant IIRC.
Apart from employing ex military pilots, does anyone have any suggestions how this problem can be addressed as it seems to me the authorities don't seem to be addressing this very serious issue. How many more of these types of accidents do we have to endure before something is done? My money is on, a lot more.
Flame me if you wish but at least I am trying to put forward suggestions for a possible solution. There are obviously much smarter people than I who must have the answers.
Why are pilots getting into these situations in the first instance, that require superior flying skills to recover??
- How about 10% to 25% recurrent training be added for basic handling, more unusual attitude recovery, stalling and recovery practice, both VMC and IMC at altitude. More S & L in varying degrees of turbulence.You know all stuff we cant practice on the line. I just bet the accounts would love that.
- What about training before a computer licence is issued, on a "high performance" , tail wheel, aerobatic or semi aerobatic aircraft. 20 hours? Why a tail wheel. Well it would teach students to have some idea what to do with their feet when approaching the ground. Hours of xwind training thrown in. Basically give pilots the skills the older generation were given.
"Oh but we gonna' fly jets". BS same principals apply. A jet is the name of a type of power plant IIRC.
RAT
I'm inclined to agree. Increasingly the term "good operator" seems to attached to anyone who has an almost unnatural level of recollection of all the FCOMs and Bulletins and is also "Johnny on the spot" with standard calls.......regardless of the stick and rudder skills or more worrying the lack thereof.
Some airlines have such stringent SOP's that it is a contest about "our trained monkeys are better than your trained monkeys".
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Unusual Attitude/Spins: back to basics.
Some folks tend to think they don't need this because they'll never be faced with a stall in their day job. As demonstrated recently, and not so recently: BULL. With averagely intelligent students, eight thirty minute hops in a CAP10, Chippie, Bucker, Stampe, Bulldog, Slingsby T-67, or SF260 (even a C-152 aerobat is better than nothing...) provide plenty of time to inculcate / validate basic skills. Four hours of unusual attitude and spins will hardly break a training department's budget. The toughest "students" are airline pilots, in their forties, who think feet are devices to show off expensive loafers. And that "Rudder Bar " is the name of a maritime tavern. Not to forget those who forgot, or never learned, the difference between relative wind, attitude and AoA. Not teaching basics is like omitting to show your kid of how to light a candle because your house has electricity.
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As I understand the T7 manuals the Boeing FBW aims to give "the same feel" as an FBH (Fly By Hydraulics) plus making the controls increasingly heavy in normal mode when the input would move the plane out of it's safe envelope.
This feel is computer calculated and generated. The feel is what the computer calculates "should be" in that situation but no more "direct" than an everquest joystick. The coupling of the two controls is virtual too I suppose, even a possible fight between two pilots for control becoming a gruesome video game. Goodness know what happens when some or other of the computers misbehave, especially in ways not yet considered. Probably we will find out in a few years when the 78's filter down to lowlier airlines with non elite drivers.
This feel is computer calculated and generated. The feel is what the computer calculates "should be" in that situation but no more "direct" than an everquest joystick. The coupling of the two controls is virtual too I suppose, even a possible fight between two pilots for control becoming a gruesome video game. Goodness know what happens when some or other of the computers misbehave, especially in ways not yet considered. Probably we will find out in a few years when the 78's filter down to lowlier airlines with non elite drivers.
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DrPhillipa
"the Boeing FBW aims to give "the same feel" as an FBH (Fly By Hydraulics)"
The A320 and 777 are fly-by-hydraulics, you know. Only the signalling is electric.
The A320 and 777 are fly-by-hydraulics, you know. Only the signalling is electric.
It had been suffering maintenance faults with a key flight control computer for over a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device just days before the crash.
The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground. Could it be that ground maintenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?
The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground. Could it be that ground maintenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?
The pressure by management on engineers NOT to replace items needs looking at in much greater detail.
The casual notation: "tested found serviceable" is all-too common in all airlines, and is becoming engineer-speak for "they are complaining about nothing, again". (hint: a bench-test is not the same as a flight test).
Code: A799 (unable to determine/replicate fault)
Comment: Works 4.0 on deck. (4.0 is Navy speak for "excellent.")
Flying and troubleshooting: an exercise in CRM, to be sure.
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It does not seem to be the first LOC accident which at first glance seems to be caused by the interruption of communications among pilots and automation.
This time too it happened in the middle of nowhere on a heavily uninhabited area.
God forbid that there is a next time, and on a heavily ...
Don't You think that something has to be done?
This time too it happened in the middle of nowhere on a heavily uninhabited area.
God forbid that there is a next time, and on a heavily ...
Don't You think that something has to be done?
Last edited by DOVES; 2nd Feb 2015 at 14:45.
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jcjeant at 22:40 feb 1
great article in link - BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breaker . . 
Captain leave his seat ? not so sure ...
QZ8501: Circuit breakers and pilot seats ? Turning snowballs into avalanches | GerryAirways
QZ8501: Circuit breakers and pilot seats ? Turning snowballs into avalanches | GerryAirways
One of the big beefs with the Airbus design is that the opposite stick does not mirror the movement inputs that is being done with the stick of the PF and I agree this is perhaps a flaw in their design. If in doubt from what I understand there is a “Master” switch on the left side stick that disables the RH side stick.
As far as their “LAWS” are concern, I don’t think having some protection is a bad idea.
Even the Boeing C-17, another FBW aircraft as built in protection for stall via AOA sensors, perhaps not as extensive in some ways as the Airbus but also more permissive in other ways because of the theatre of operation it conducts its flights in. Even these protections did not stop a C-17 from stalling and crashing killing all 4 crew members while performing an over aggressive manoeuvre prior to an airshow.
Another interesting design philosophy the designers of the C-17 went for was a stick like on a vintage aircraft like the Piper Cub, not a side stick like on the Airbus nor a regular column like the B777 for their FBW aircraft and again unlike Airbus both sticks move in tandem.
In the end no manufacturer can make a “full proof” aircraft and it is up to the pilots to know each aircraft’s “quirks” and systems to fly it properly and safely.
As far as their “LAWS” are concern, I don’t think having some protection is a bad idea.
Even the Boeing C-17, another FBW aircraft as built in protection for stall via AOA sensors, perhaps not as extensive in some ways as the Airbus but also more permissive in other ways because of the theatre of operation it conducts its flights in. Even these protections did not stop a C-17 from stalling and crashing killing all 4 crew members while performing an over aggressive manoeuvre prior to an airshow.
Another interesting design philosophy the designers of the C-17 went for was a stick like on a vintage aircraft like the Piper Cub, not a side stick like on the Airbus nor a regular column like the B777 for their FBW aircraft and again unlike Airbus both sticks move in tandem.
In the end no manufacturer can make a “full proof” aircraft and it is up to the pilots to know each aircraft’s “quirks” and systems to fly it properly and safely.
Last edited by Jet Jockey A4; 2nd Feb 2015 at 19:42.
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@SAMPUBLIUS, with reference to post #2959 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/553569-air-asia-indonesia-lost-contact-surabaya-singapore-148.html#post8850384, "BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breaker . ."
Recycling either FAC pb on the overhead panel disengages the FAC but retains flight envelope protections.
Pulling the CBs to reset the FACs, (the term "reset" is used in the FCOMs to describe the pulling-and-resetting of Circuit Breakers on the A320), kills the FAC and as has been stated by several posters, is prohibited when the aircraft is in flight.
With reference to the "GerryAirways" article, if true, one does have to loosen the seatbelt to reach the aft-overhead panel, but not to reach the FAC switches which are on the main overhead panel.
From the FCOM, ATA 22, Auto Flight:
Recycling either FAC pb on the overhead panel disengages the FAC but retains flight envelope protections.
Pulling the CBs to reset the FACs, (the term "reset" is used in the FCOMs to describe the pulling-and-resetting of Circuit Breakers on the A320), kills the FAC and as has been stated by several posters, is prohibited when the aircraft is in flight.
With reference to the "GerryAirways" article, if true, one does have to loosen the seatbelt to reach the aft-overhead panel, but not to reach the FAC switches which are on the main overhead panel.
From the FCOM, ATA 22, Auto Flight:
The aircraft has two flight augmentation computers (FACs) that perform four main functions:
Yaw function
Yaw damping and turn coordination
Rudder trim
Rudder travel limitation
Flight envelope function
PFD speed scale management
. Minimum/maximum speed computation
. Maneuvering speed computation
Alpha-floor protection
Low-Energy Warning function
Windshear detection function
In performing these functions the FAC uses independent channels :
- Yaw damper
- Rudder trim
- Rudder travel limit
- Flight envelope
Each FAC interfaces with the elevator aileron computers (ELACs) when the APs are disengaged, or with the FMGS when at least one AP is engaged.
Both FACs engage automatically at power-up.
The pilot can disengage or reset each FAC (in case of failure) by means of a pushbutton on the flight control overhead panel.
When a FAC is disengaged (FAC pushbutton set off) but still valid, the flight envelope function of the FAC remains active.
If both FACs are valid, FAC1 controls the yaw damper, turn coordination, rudder trim, and rudder travel limit, and FAC2 is in standby.
FAC1 keeps the aircraft within the flight envelope through FD1 ; FAC2 performs this function through FD2.
If a failure is detected on any channel of FAC1, FAC2 takes over the corresponding channel.
Yaw function
Yaw damping and turn coordination
Rudder trim
Rudder travel limitation
Flight envelope function
PFD speed scale management
. Minimum/maximum speed computation
. Maneuvering speed computation
Alpha-floor protection
Low-Energy Warning function
Windshear detection function
In performing these functions the FAC uses independent channels :
- Yaw damper
- Rudder trim
- Rudder travel limit
- Flight envelope
Each FAC interfaces with the elevator aileron computers (ELACs) when the APs are disengaged, or with the FMGS when at least one AP is engaged.
Both FACs engage automatically at power-up.
The pilot can disengage or reset each FAC (in case of failure) by means of a pushbutton on the flight control overhead panel.
When a FAC is disengaged (FAC pushbutton set off) but still valid, the flight envelope function of the FAC remains active.
If both FACs are valid, FAC1 controls the yaw damper, turn coordination, rudder trim, and rudder travel limit, and FAC2 is in standby.
FAC1 keeps the aircraft within the flight envelope through FD1 ; FAC2 performs this function through FD2.
If a failure is detected on any channel of FAC1, FAC2 takes over the corresponding channel.
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Amen on the comment about the sidestick controller of each pilot being out of view of opposite pilot. Also, in the A320 series, when sidestick controller are active, the flight computers will ADD the inputs of BOTH pilot sidesticks together.
Some posts ago, mention was made of the artificial feel in "conventional" yokes of FBW jets, (a big help) especially when each "conventional" FBW yoke is just that, yoked together.
Not to mention a "quirk" in the A330 where the audio stall warning signal is removed below a certain IAS, then resumes blaring should the IAS begin accelerating. Haven't delved thru the A320 manuals, so don't know if 320 series has same low speed stall warning "quirk"
Enough already of low-time idiot new age FO's and their pitiful flying skills. The overwhelming majority of jet transport aircraft losses thru the decades were by and with old school experienced Captains and FO's
Some posts ago, mention was made of the artificial feel in "conventional" yokes of FBW jets, (a big help) especially when each "conventional" FBW yoke is just that, yoked together.
Not to mention a "quirk" in the A330 where the audio stall warning signal is removed below a certain IAS, then resumes blaring should the IAS begin accelerating. Haven't delved thru the A320 manuals, so don't know if 320 series has same low speed stall warning "quirk"
Enough already of low-time idiot new age FO's and their pitiful flying skills. The overwhelming majority of jet transport aircraft losses thru the decades were by and with old school experienced Captains and FO's
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The A320 and 777 are fly-by-hydraulics, you know. Only the signalling is electric.
great article in link - BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breaker
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I don't know the specifics of the A320 FAC reset button but even if it powers the processor down and back up again to do a full system restart it will have had time to shutdown properly. If you power off at the breaker - yes if it's smoking - you're taking a risk of corrupting data and never being able to get it back online at all.
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catch21
"I don't know the specifics of the A320 FAC reset button"
Unless they've changed recently they're not "reset buttons" on the overhead but off/on switches. This matches with the FAC 1 + 2 fault procedure someone already posted here.
Unless they've changed recently they're not "reset buttons" on the overhead but off/on switches. This matches with the FAC 1 + 2 fault procedure someone already posted here.
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Originally Posted by Jet Jockey A4
..."If in doubt from what I understand there is a Master switch on the left side stick that disables the RH side stick"
The other stick is not permanently disabled. After either left or right side takes over, the other side can take it right back by pressing his own switch. This happened with AF447, repeatedly.