Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
@Gysbreght
Once again to keep from confusing the folks that don't fly the 'bus or any other FBW plane.
The fore/aft movement of the stick in the 'bus commands gee!!!!! It does not command AoA as the planes we flew 25 or 30 years ago ( except me, that did the FBW thing in 1979). The AoA briefly increases or decreases to achieve the pitch-corrected gee ( not like our Vipers, which was pure gee and we could actually trim for a gee). It does not command a pitch attitude!!! Once you relax the stick the thing only maintains the attitude because the gee command is corrected for pitch.
Sheesh. Long ago we had the "control stick steering", and the A/P would stay connected while we "corrected" our pitch or bank angle. As with the 'bus, we had max gee limits and AoA limits. Yeah. This was back in the mid-60's.
The 'bus seems to be a hybrid of pure A/P, control stick steering and the limits like max bank angles, and such. No biggie. But the reversion sequence seems to attempt to maintain as many "protections" as possible versus simply reverting to AoA and gee for pitch, and a reasonable roll rate.
Once again to keep from confusing the folks that don't fly the 'bus or any other FBW plane.
The fore/aft movement of the stick in the 'bus commands gee!!!!! It does not command AoA as the planes we flew 25 or 30 years ago ( except me, that did the FBW thing in 1979). The AoA briefly increases or decreases to achieve the pitch-corrected gee ( not like our Vipers, which was pure gee and we could actually trim for a gee). It does not command a pitch attitude!!! Once you relax the stick the thing only maintains the attitude because the gee command is corrected for pitch.
Sheesh. Long ago we had the "control stick steering", and the A/P would stay connected while we "corrected" our pitch or bank angle. As with the 'bus, we had max gee limits and AoA limits. Yeah. This was back in the mid-60's.
The 'bus seems to be a hybrid of pure A/P, control stick steering and the limits like max bank angles, and such. No biggie. But the reversion sequence seems to attempt to maintain as many "protections" as possible versus simply reverting to AoA and gee for pitch, and a reasonable roll rate.
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@Healy and others.
Please stop using the word "reset". The FACs was not reset.
https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/...airasia-pilot/
A circuit breaker is not a reset.
Please stop using the word "reset". The FACs was not reset.
Sources close to the crash investigation said that Capt. Iriyanto was out of his seat trying to disconnect the critical dual flight augmentation computers. This is done through the circuit breakers behind and above the pilots, requiring the non-flying pilot to leave his seat.
A circuit breaker is not a reset.
Mountain Bear
Read my post again, I never said he used the a reset button for the FAC. What I'm saying is that the airbus has not only CB's but also reset buttons for many systems. A quick glance of the 330 panel and It doesn't even have a FAC reset. Again, as I mentioned I am not firmiliar with the 320 and not sure of its reset/ cb composition.
Maybe you have to ask yourself why Airbus would put a CB in a place that involved the FAC somewhere where you actually had to get out of your seat and pull. Especially in flight! Maybe it's there in that position for a reason, ergonomically the CB/reset buttons that can be accessed in flight shouldn't need more than moving the seat back a little.
Read my post again, I never said he used the a reset button for the FAC. What I'm saying is that the airbus has not only CB's but also reset buttons for many systems. A quick glance of the 330 panel and It doesn't even have a FAC reset. Again, as I mentioned I am not firmiliar with the 320 and not sure of its reset/ cb composition.
Maybe you have to ask yourself why Airbus would put a CB in a place that involved the FAC somewhere where you actually had to get out of your seat and pull. Especially in flight! Maybe it's there in that position for a reason, ergonomically the CB/reset buttons that can be accessed in flight shouldn't need more than moving the seat back a little.
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Coagie I'd say you are pretty close to the mark but it is also down to the most aggresive personality on the review committee or on the board. They usually get their way on the understanding that they will fall on their sword if they get it wrong. Its how half the CEO's in this world get made (making your mark) . The other half are the risk avoiders who keep their heads down and slide in after the most recent round of hari kari. I would say Airbus culture favours the risk avoiders and they probably do rely a lot on 'advice' whether from PR, lawyers or accountants.
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xcitation:
Sorry to be pedantic, but in the swiss cheese model of accident causation weather is not a hole in the swiss cheese. Weather is a hazard. The slices of cheese are defences that sit between hazards and losses. A hole in the cheese is an inadequacy in part of the defence. Assuming weather was the primary hazard in this event, the defence layers might include aircraft design, AB FBW control philosophy, cockpit ergonomics, pilot training, pilot behavioural aspects, airline SOPs, crew resourcing, CRM, management behaviours, scheduling, maintenance, information provision and analysis, etc. Inadequacies in these defences are holes. When the inadequacies manifest at once, the holes line up. Some holes could be much bigger than others. This is only one conceptual model of accident causality. I make this point because it seems to be a much misunderstood model on this forum. But it is also a good argument against the people here who are speculating a single cause as the cause.
The weather is just one hole in the swiss cheese.
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I am seeing a pattern here. Three major aviation disasters (AF, Mali, this one) involving western pilots trying to tangle with heavy tropical thunderstorms. Is it possible that better education on tropical weather might prevent this toll from increasing? Those of us who are used to the weather in the temperate zones are also used to seeing severe storms moving east. Tropical severe storms move west. Their dynamics are similar but everything about them moves opposite to what we are used to seeing.
I wonder if this basic fact underlies the tragic end results of these three confrontations of aircraft and severe tropical thunderstorms.
Pre-flight planning of avoidance should stress the fact that tropical cells move west and planning a slight deviation west as you might do with storms further away from the equator is the wrong way to proceed. You would do better to be thinking of avoidance to the east in low latitudes.
I wonder if this basic fact underlies the tragic end results of these three confrontations of aircraft and severe tropical thunderstorms.
Pre-flight planning of avoidance should stress the fact that tropical cells move west and planning a slight deviation west as you might do with storms further away from the equator is the wrong way to proceed. You would do better to be thinking of avoidance to the east in low latitudes.
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captain left seat before ' climb "
per AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources | Reuters
[quote](Reuters) - The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.
and
GEEEZE !!!
[quote](Reuters) - The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.
After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.
Reuters reported this week that maintenance problems on the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to them, were at the heart of the investigation.
After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.
People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.
The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions.
The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel.
"You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."
After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.
People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.
The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions.
The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel.
"You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."
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New to this thread. Airbus mostly has a "training problem". When flown by properly trained crews, 320's never crash. The one that deadsticked into the Hudson River is the only hull loss in the US, and maybe all of N America. Same Same big carriers in Europe and elsewhere. When flown by Airbus trained pilots, their safety record is not so good.
The bus also has an "auto" function on the weather radar that Airbus tells pilots to use. My legacy airline put a "INOP" sticker on it. I never used it till I got to Asia. It just doesn't work. If you want proof just jump on the airway that goes over Wuhan, PRC. Half the jets in China are asking for radar vectors around it in VFR, severe clear weather. The city shows up as a huge thunderstorm 120 miles out in "Auto". All the airbuses ask for vectors around it, the Boeings fly over it. The windows are all covered with newspapers and blankets.
Flying through a thunderstorm in an airbus is very easy to do in "auto"
I am betting the THS is full nose up on the tapes.
The bus also has an "auto" function on the weather radar that Airbus tells pilots to use. My legacy airline put a "INOP" sticker on it. I never used it till I got to Asia. It just doesn't work. If you want proof just jump on the airway that goes over Wuhan, PRC. Half the jets in China are asking for radar vectors around it in VFR, severe clear weather. The city shows up as a huge thunderstorm 120 miles out in "Auto". All the airbuses ask for vectors around it, the Boeings fly over it. The windows are all covered with newspapers and blankets.
Flying through a thunderstorm in an airbus is very easy to do in "auto"
I am betting the THS is full nose up on the tapes.
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USMC
Yes seen the blankets and newspapers covering the windows. The first rule of airmanship is lookout, which should be taught and insisted upon from day one. However the sound basics seem to be out the window these days.
I observed an EX senior Captain of a flag carrier, based in the region who had his eyes glued to the WX radar and flying around Islands, being certain they were CB's. I did suggest in passing that if he ever did have the time available it might be worth a look outside.
Yes seen the blankets and newspapers covering the windows. The first rule of airmanship is lookout, which should be taught and insisted upon from day one. However the sound basics seem to be out the window these days.
I observed an EX senior Captain of a flag carrier, based in the region who had his eyes glued to the WX radar and flying around Islands, being certain they were CB's. I did suggest in passing that if he ever did have the time available it might be worth a look outside.
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Coagie & ekw
You're way overestimating the influence of what you call 'PR' people. Even when they exist they're way down the pecking order and I don't think the (company) lawyers would pay too much attention to them.
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Captain was out of "his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure"
(Reuters) - The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.
Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have stressed publicly that it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.
It had been suffering maintenance faults with a key flight control computer for over a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device just days before the crash.
AirAsia (AIRA.KL) said it would not comment while the matter was under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia. Reuters reported this week that maintenance problems on the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to them, were at the heart of the investigation. After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.
The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions. The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel. "You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."
It is also significant because to pull the circuit breaker the captain had to rise from his seat.The circuit breakers are on a wall panel immediately behind the co-pilot and hard or impossible to reach from the seated position on the left side, where the captain sits, according to two experienced pilots and published diagrams of the cockpit. Shortly afterwards the junior pilot pulled the plane into a sharp climb from which investigators have said it stalled or lost lift. "It appears he was surprised or startled by this," said a person familiar with the investigation, referring to the decision to cut power to the affected computer.
The captain eventually resumed control, but a person familiar with the matter said he was not in a position to intervene immediately to recover the aircraft from its upset. Data already published on the plane's trajectory suggest it may have been difficult for someone to move around the cockpit in an upward-tilting and by then possibly unstable aircraft, but there is so far no confirmation of the cockpit movements. "The co-pilot pulled the plane up, and by the time the captain regained the controls it was too late," one of the people familiar with the investigation said. Tatang Kurniadi, chief of Indonesia's NTSC, told Reuters there had been no delay in the captain resuming control but declined further comment.
Airbus declined to comment.
Lawyers for the family of the French co-pilot say they have filed a lawsuit against AirAsia in Paris for “endangering the lives of others” by flying the route without official authorisation on that day. Investigators have said the accident was not related to the permit issue. AirAsia did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the lawsuit. Although more is becoming known about the chain of events, people familiar with the investigation warned against making assumptions on the accident's cause, which needed more analysis.
Safety experts say air crashes are most often caused by a chain of events, each of which is necessary but not sufficient to explain the underlying causes of the accident.
Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have stressed publicly that it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.
It had been suffering maintenance faults with a key flight control computer for over a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device just days before the crash.
AirAsia (AIRA.KL) said it would not comment while the matter was under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia. Reuters reported this week that maintenance problems on the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to them, were at the heart of the investigation. After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.
The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions. The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel. "You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."
It is also significant because to pull the circuit breaker the captain had to rise from his seat.The circuit breakers are on a wall panel immediately behind the co-pilot and hard or impossible to reach from the seated position on the left side, where the captain sits, according to two experienced pilots and published diagrams of the cockpit. Shortly afterwards the junior pilot pulled the plane into a sharp climb from which investigators have said it stalled or lost lift. "It appears he was surprised or startled by this," said a person familiar with the investigation, referring to the decision to cut power to the affected computer.
The captain eventually resumed control, but a person familiar with the matter said he was not in a position to intervene immediately to recover the aircraft from its upset. Data already published on the plane's trajectory suggest it may have been difficult for someone to move around the cockpit in an upward-tilting and by then possibly unstable aircraft, but there is so far no confirmation of the cockpit movements. "The co-pilot pulled the plane up, and by the time the captain regained the controls it was too late," one of the people familiar with the investigation said. Tatang Kurniadi, chief of Indonesia's NTSC, told Reuters there had been no delay in the captain resuming control but declined further comment.
Airbus declined to comment.
Lawyers for the family of the French co-pilot say they have filed a lawsuit against AirAsia in Paris for “endangering the lives of others” by flying the route without official authorisation on that day. Investigators have said the accident was not related to the permit issue. AirAsia did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the lawsuit. Although more is becoming known about the chain of events, people familiar with the investigation warned against making assumptions on the accident's cause, which needed more analysis.
Safety experts say air crashes are most often caused by a chain of events, each of which is necessary but not sufficient to explain the underlying causes of the accident.
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SOP Monkey;
I saw it twice at my legacy carrier in 15 years. Really embarrassing.
I saw it every single day in the far east at two airlines. I even landed once at an airport with half a dozen Boeings. Every single airbus but me diverted. 7 km visibility, ceiling 2000 ft. Light rain. Auto radar showed a big huge thunderstorm. Eyeballs and manual radar showed light rain. My FO wanted to divert.
I saw it twice at my legacy carrier in 15 years. Really embarrassing.
I saw it every single day in the far east at two airlines. I even landed once at an airport with half a dozen Boeings. Every single airbus but me diverted. 7 km visibility, ceiling 2000 ft. Light rain. Auto radar showed a big huge thunderstorm. Eyeballs and manual radar showed light rain. My FO wanted to divert.
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I have never flown Airbus but all this is pointing once again to the fundamental flaw in Airbus design logic.
If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.
Will someone familiar with all the airbus specific "laws" and terms "alpha floors" etc. answer in lay pilot's terms exactly what actions have to be taken to enable basic control to be directly recovered.........or is this always "subject to the approval of" software that will overrule if it perceives an excedence ( maybe of its own creation)
If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.
Will someone familiar with all the airbus specific "laws" and terms "alpha floors" etc. answer in lay pilot's terms exactly what actions have to be taken to enable basic control to be directly recovered.........or is this always "subject to the approval of" software that will overrule if it perceives an excedence ( maybe of its own creation)
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If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.
This accident is not worth discussing yet in regard to this item. AF447 and Perpignan both occurred because, for various reasons, protections did not prevent PF essentially leading to unrecoverable situations.
Until recently there was no FCOM technique to "force" the aircraft to a "basic law" - albeit much debate here and in cockpits about "how" to. The recent OEB alters this, and covers an unlikely (but not impossible) scenario where protections inappropriately kick in. It requires 2 PBs pressed to cause the required downgrade. IIRC in the incident triggering this the downgrade happened anyway, but presumably the boffins have now found a scenario that might not. The actions required are to turn off 2 of 3 ADRs.
I would much prefer to fly a "basic" stick and throttles aircraft, but I do not make the big $$ decisions. The accidents to date show a mismatch between pilots' interpretations and the technology - but ironically it is not the pilots misunderstanding the "complex" part of the technology, but the basic flying aspects
2 routes we can go down: either further the technology, try and really make the aircraft uncrashable, and take the pilot further out of the loop (and eventually the cockpit). Or alter pilot training and practices such that they still have basic skills, and realise the technology is there to help most of the time, but is not infallible. I know which route I prefer, but many here seem to favour the former
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In my books a FAC reset can be done via circuit braker on the ground, engine off brakes on and hydrolics on, big no no in the air.... Ecam action only no airborne reset for FAC fault.....I only have 1700h on type and 11000h total, not a test pilot....