Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[NigelOnDraft]

capt log

NB for Perpignan, the BEA said:

This absence de
reference to the use of the trim is also mentioned in AAIB report into a serious
incident to a Boeing 737 on 23 September 2007(59).

In short, any pilot, with full power, full forward stick yet nose high and getting higher should not need (and will not notice) a small "Use Man Pitch Trim" message. They should be trained to know that Pitch Trim may be needed, but in both cases, IIRC, the Pitch Trim was not the whole issue, but the high power as well?

It certainly didn't help 2 very respectable pilots on D-AXLA A320-232 over Perpignan when THS stayed nose up, with the combination of the AOA sensors freezing and normal law dropping out they were unable to save it with the above aforementioned method. After reading the report, i was worried by the lack of notification to the pilots, in that moment id expect 'USE MAN PITCH TRIM' to be slapping me round the face.

We do need to remember they ignored numerous signs that the AoAs were incorrect, they failed to follow every safety procedure in the test they were doing. I am afraid there gets a point when the crew have to be "accountable" (even if it their training or management the ultimate cause), rather than just blaming the systems / manufacturers because their aircraft are not "uncrashable"

[Owain Glyndwr]

@zzuf


OK, I guess I misread your intent. You obviously meant others than Gysbreght!. I spent some time with Nick also.

[Jwscud]

Nigel, that flight amongst other incidents and accidents (the upset to G-EZJK comes to mind) was why the procedures, discipline and training requirements for post-maintenance check flights have been substantially changed.

[A0283]

Scorch marks ...

It looks like someone has taken a welding torch to it. One wonders also what exactly the guy with the huge crowbar is hoping to achieve.

After the fuselage was lifted from Crest Onyx to shore, at some stage, there was a guy using a torch. He was cutting at at least two places.

Have not seen that before. Will be clear though during reassembly that it was not from the crash.



Picture 1 -Torch is handled by a man with a medium dark blue shirt with logo “ST” on it. He is closely observed by another man in civvies (@ I found later that this man is from KNKT). Cutting is vertical on the side of the first frame between the last window and the lavatory section, on the'inside' of the lavatory section.

Picture 2 –Cutting itself not observed. But ashore, 10 guys putting the structure up, you can see a very long horizontal scorch mark. Running from the door to the fuselage painted word “Fly”. Part that was cut away was a strip with 5 windows and PK-AXC registration letters. That part was still there in daylight when Crest Onyx was already in Kumai port in daylight. That same (lefthand aft part of fuselage – watch out, it is lying upside down) strip was hinged about 135 degrees outside when still on deck.

Picture 3 –The man with the long crowbar. You can see torch marks on the longitudinal stiffener just below his torso.

Picture 4 –The man making the vertical cut, view from outside, ... have seen the picture.. (@ later -same torch operator as in Picture 1)

[A0283]

CVR type

I found one good picture of the QZ8501 CVR after recovery.

Cockpit Voice Recorder = Model FA2100, L3communications
CVR carried Emergency Locating Beacon = TELEDYNE BENTHOS

Other CVR configuration information like serial, manufacturing number, and HW and SW config nrs were clear for parts. I wait till I get a better picture before posting that.

[NigelOnDraft]

Nigel, that flight amongst other incidents and accidents (the upset to G-EZJK comes to mind) was why the procedures, discipline and training requirements for post-maintenance check flights have been substantially changed

Appreciated, but I do not understand the point?

Any pilot conducting any test flight should be aware of some basic principles, well documented well before this accident, and probably before WW2. There is no point in testing something if you are betting your life on the test succeeding? Surely you test "High AoA protection" on the assumption it might not work?

As the BEA report stated, another crew had done a similar profile and:

During take-off, a series of messages appeared on the ECAM and the aeroplane switched to alternate law. The CHECK GW message appeared on the MCDU. The crew decided not to continue the flight, which had lasted thirty-six minutes.

and next flight:

The programme available to the crew indicated, for this weight and in clean configuration, a V alpha prot of 171 kt (+/- 4 kt) and a V alpha max of 152 kt (+/- 4 kt). The PF placed the thrust controls in the IDLE position while keeping one hand on the trim wheel. The crew noted the absence of autotrim shut-off and decided to continue verification. The alpha floor function was not activated. The PF noticed that the speed was ten knots less than expected V alpha max. The crew felt the aeroplane sinking and the Captain decided to stop the check. The PF carried out a manoeuvre similar to a stall recovery. There was no stall warning.

Somewhat nearer ideal

[zzuf]

Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr

@zzuf


OK, I guess I misread your intent. You obviously meant others than Gysbreght!. I spent some time with Nick also.

Funny my recollection was, despite the time stamps, Gysbreght's post was not on my browser when I selected reply. So, yes, lots of others!

[Jwscud]

Nigel, sorry, the point I was trying to make as simply that those undertaking that type of flight were not properly prepared, briefed or understanding the consequences of what they were doing, which is something for which I agree they must bear responsibility.

[Volume]

An interesting discussion would be how deep into the stall one ends up during power on, 3kts/per second

That will definitively be individual for every aircraft, and even depending on actual weight (the lighter you are, the steeper you climb and the longer the nose needs to come down). It also depends on how quickly you reduce thrust, which may significantly help to get the nose down quickly.

CS-25:
Following the stall, engine thrust may be used as desired to expedite the recovery.

It also very much depends on how and when you would define the airplane to be stalled.

(3) As soon as the aeroplane is stalled, recover by normal recovery techniques.
(d) The aeroplane is considered stalled when the behaviour of the aeroplane gives the pilot a clear and distinctive indication of an acceptable nature that the aeroplane is stalled.
(See AMC 25.201 (d).)
Acceptable indications of a stall, occurring either individually or in combination, are –
(1) A nose-down pitch that cannot be readily arrested;
(2) Buffeting, of a magnitude and severity that is a strong and effective deterrent to further speed reduction; or
(3) The pitch control reaches the aft stop and no further increase in pitch attitude occurs when the control is held full aft for a short time before recovery is initiated.

[wheelsright]

Dismantling techniques

I presume that the investigators have authorised the somewhat barbarous dismantling that is shown in the pictures.

The assumption must be that they do not expect to learn a great deal from the wreckage. ie they already have a pretty clear idea of the cause of the incident.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by oblivia

The constant reference to "beancounters" as a threat to airline safety is a bit fanciful. It's not the accountants' fault if safety standards are insufficient.

If there are failings (the evidence isn't convincing) then the problem is regulation and enforcement. From food to finance, we have seen constant pressure on funding to regulators during the past few decades (not to mention the busting of unions). It wasn't beancounters who did this — it was right-wing ideologues.

A more apt user name there isn't. Ian W's response hopefully shed some light. In a competitive industry, and an industry wherein to remain in service one must earn revenue in excess of expenses or not exist, the cost of everything matters. Therefore, the bean counters are directed to analyze cost. The problem is for beancounters, not everthing pertaining to safe and effective ops can be numerically quantified to three decimal places. Sadly, between management and number crunches, that leaves Safety Critical issues like training underfunded and under-resourced. Politics have nothing to do with it. Your point on regulation being lax also is a matter of cost, in terms of how many tax dollars are allocated to that function. That's another group of bean counters at work, right?

[AirScotia]

I presume that the investigators have authorised the somewhat barbarous dismantling that is shown in the pictures.

The assumption must be that they do not expect to learn a great deal from the wreckage. ie they already have a pretty clear idea of the cause of the incident.

I'm surprised to see this dismembering too. It looks more like disposal than careful dismantling.

A previous poster mentioned that Airbus had advised on the breaking up of the tail section, and I believe this was before the DFDR was found. So I think they decided on the sawing-up before they had any other evidence. Why would this be?

[oldchina]

they decided on the sawing-up before they had any other evidence. Why would this be?

It could be that Airbus has been passed information that has not yet been (and may never be) released to the media. That's not a conspiracy, that's normal.

[justforfun]

Chains?

Look further on the tail pic to the left of the guy with no crowbar is - looks like a chain in that crease from the "balloon" that raised the tail - if you zoom/enhance?

[wheelsright]

After MH370 I think everyone is looking for a mystery... This looks to be straightforward with little room for conspiracy theories.

[Mudman]

This Getty Images photo shows a torch being used... An Indonesian worker cuts the tail of the AirAsia flight QZ8501 in... News Photo 461419122 | Getty Images

[justforfun]

Thanks

Ok, thanks. - missed that.

Bit worrying having some guy using a cutting torch to chop it up without - from the pics apparently - nobody in authority guiding/controlling him.

Anyway, fuselage found so hopefully some closure for the relatives on the way.

[NigelOnDraft]

Nigel, sorry, the point I was trying to make as simply that those undertaking that type of flight were not properly prepared, briefed or understanding the consequences of what they were doing, which is something for which I agree they must bear responsibility.

Agreed I had recently done my "CAA Check Pilot" (post-maintenance Test Pilot) on ex-Mil jets, and learned a lot re the approach, attitude and philosophy such testing needed. Perpignan then happened, and everything that (ex-)CAA & RAF TP rang ominously true.

[A0283]

To justforfun, mudman

On the previous page, number 101, are posted results of photos I got last night. And can add that there are many more photos today. The mr 1 in my post is the same as mr 4 by the way.

Bit worrying having some guy using a cutting torch to chop it up without - from the pics apparently - nobody in authority guiding/controlling him.

On the first photos that you find (Google) you do not see a supervisor. I had the same question that you had. Later I found the mr 1 photo, which shows a person who appears to be supervising closely. In other photos he may stand behind the wreckage. Hope this helps.

Would be interesting to know why they cut it this way, and why in this manner. Hope to find an answer in the Prelim or Final Report.

Also note that the 'strip with windows' that I mentioned in my post on 101, was mangled further when they pulled the tail wreckage onboard the Crest Onyx. Was searching for photos that show this, and there are a few.

[A0283]

On the structure found ...

I twice posted a scenario that could explain a number of questions that I had about the finds and their sequence. Both times they were rejected. So I won't post the sequence again.

Starting point was an earlier post which was accepted though. In which it looks like a 'giant hand' grabbing the horizontal stabilizer and rotating it.

In the scenario referred to, one sequence might lead to opening up the pressure bulkhead. Leading to a sequence of failures, and in line with that a sequence of specific finds.

I have not had time to think about what kind of aerodynamic forces would shape this 'hand'. Perhaps another poster would be able to shed some light on that. If not, then we would have to change over to hydrodynamic forces, and that would steer the scenario in another direction.

And perhaps there is somebody who has an idea about what kind of forces would be required for such an 'opening up', scenario. Is it realistic with a THS span of 12.45m. You can mail that to me if you dont want to post it.

It is not possible to collect and analyze and make aerodyn/hydrodyn and stress/strength calculations at the same time ...