Bird strike out of Guernsey continues on one Engine to Birmingham
dan the man
''From what I understand Dan is now an ex-dispatcher and is now looking for somewhere to land too!!''
yes i would have thought him working for an airline handling agent he would have been told in his training to keep his gob shut to the press in any incident - although he was off duty and a pax he would certainly be having tea with no biccies in his DM's office on his return to the island
yes i would have thought him working for an airline handling agent he would have been told in his training to keep his gob shut to the press in any incident - although he was off duty and a pax he would certainly be having tea with no biccies in his DM's office on his return to the island
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7AC & Airbanda - I don't agree you. I'm afraid the closest the report goes is saying that the "...decision was sensible in the circumstances." It never, ever, said that it was the right one. If you work your way through the factual elements of the report you'll see that the the fire damage was minimal with the greatest damage occurring on the ground. Absolutely nowhere does it state that the wing would have burnt off in x seconds or y minutes. And this is an important factor. Furthermore, this crash, for that is what it was, was the result a reaction rather than considered action. For example, how can you possibly know what is happening inside a cowled engine on the side opposite to where you are sat? There was no crew communication on this matter (unless it was done by sign language), the fire warning did not go off until five seconds after the first signs of the fire. But the most glaring omission from this report was any comment the training of the crew. As a result, it fails to make any comparison between with what should have happened and what actually happened on the day.
Lastly, it is not fair to contrast the lucky escape of Leeds United with a flight where the crew appear to have gathered information and worked as a team to ensure a safe outcome.
Lastly, it is not fair to contrast the lucky escape of Leeds United with a flight where the crew appear to have gathered information and worked as a team to ensure a safe outcome.
HS 748 at Stansted
Yes, the AAIB said "The Commander's decision to land the aircraft immediately on the runway remaining was sensible in the circumstances."
www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2001_g_ojem.cfm
www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/3_2001_g_ojem.cfm
manrow:
Obviously I'm not suggesting any such thing. The Stansted incident was brought up in post #99 and subsequently; I quoted the AAIB on that incident. The AAIB hasn't said anything about the Guernsey incident that I've seen.
Obviously the Guernsey incident that was the original subject of this thread is totally different in various ways. At Stansted the mode of failure was different and the captain was "aware that a considerable amount of runway remained ahead of the aircraft" (said AAIB) so that he had the option to make a split-second decision to put it back on the ground, which he did, and everyone walked away.
The similarity pointed out in post #99 is that both crews are castigated by people who weren't there* (but not by the AAIB in the Stansted case) for failing to follow standard procedures; yet both crews' decisions resulted in safe outcomes.
* And Dan, who was there, but has been pretty much dismissed in this thread.
Obviously I'm not suggesting any such thing. The Stansted incident was brought up in post #99 and subsequently; I quoted the AAIB on that incident. The AAIB hasn't said anything about the Guernsey incident that I've seen.
Obviously the Guernsey incident that was the original subject of this thread is totally different in various ways. At Stansted the mode of failure was different and the captain was "aware that a considerable amount of runway remained ahead of the aircraft" (said AAIB) so that he had the option to make a split-second decision to put it back on the ground, which he did, and everyone walked away.
The similarity pointed out in post #99 is that both crews are castigated by people who weren't there* (but not by the AAIB in the Stansted case) for failing to follow standard procedures; yet both crews' decisions resulted in safe outcomes.
* And Dan, who was there, but has been pretty much dismissed in this thread.
Last edited by OldLurker; 17th Nov 2014 at 13:12.
AAIB guidance
An aircraft accident is an occurrence associated with operation of an aircraft, which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which the aircraft incurs damage (with certain exceptions) or any person suffers death or serious injury.
in which the aircraft incurs damage (with certain exceptions)
It does not include engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin.
@Piltdown Man,
I am merely an observer of both the FlyBe incident and the Emerald Accident and am not qualified to make a detailed critique of flight deck action in either case. I do though stand by my comment that a longer time in the air would certainly, or at least very probably, have been catastrophic in the circumstances of G OJEM.
The AAIB report at Conclusions/Findings point 2 refers to an immediate substantial nacelle fire. At point 4 of conclusions it refers to significant leakage from the fuel heater and fire which posed a considerable hazard to the aircraft (my bold/italics).
The crew were alerted to the fire by the cabin crew via interphone (AAIB report p3).
I am merely an observer of both the FlyBe incident and the Emerald Accident and am not qualified to make a detailed critique of flight deck action in either case. I do though stand by my comment that a longer time in the air would certainly, or at least very probably, have been catastrophic in the circumstances of G OJEM.
The AAIB report at Conclusions/Findings point 2 refers to an immediate substantial nacelle fire. At point 4 of conclusions it refers to significant leakage from the fuel heater and fire which posed a considerable hazard to the aircraft (my bold/italics).
The crew were alerted to the fire by the cabin crew via interphone (AAIB report p3).
e28 driver
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Eleven years ago I had an engine failure after take off at 1000' in a turbo prop. The Captain suggested we return where we had engineering cover and a strong gusty crosswind. I proposed we fly 35 miles to where there was no engineering cover and no crosswind, and he agreed. It was a mayday of course but an uneventful outcome. Had I known that the "good" engine had the same incorrect IGV settings that caused the other engine to fail I might have taken a different view. There was never a hint of criticism (as far as I'm aware) from the company but who knows if the outcome had been different. Sometimes, as in LOFT exercises I've done there's different outcomes which may not be wrong but help one to learn about failure management.
A genuinely unloaded question...
When an engine is subject to a precautionary shutdown should the continued progress of the flight be on the basis that this is a failed engine (only to be reconsidered in the event of critical problems with the remaining engine)?
When an engine is subject to a precautionary shutdown should the continued progress of the flight be on the basis that this is a failed engine (only to be reconsidered in the event of critical problems with the remaining engine)?
Are there not other alternatives?
Some things are rule based (Regs, FCOMs, etc.) while others are expected to be left to training, experience, and reasoned decisions.
The later category probably would take up a thread of their own elsewhere
Some things are rule based (Regs, FCOMs, etc.) while others are expected to be left to training, experience, and reasoned decisions.
The later category probably would take up a thread of their own elsewhere
When an engine is subject to a precautionary shutdown should the continued progress of the flight be on the basis that this is a failed engine
As you say, in dire straits, with second donk acting up you may HAVE to try a restart. Command decision depending upon reason for first shutdown.
Flying one of them there single turbo-props strikes me as a situation where the captain is going to have to nurse the engine if there's a problem. I'd a JP donk go nuts due severe icing but just closed the throttle and kept it in reserve for the subsequent deadstick. It worked for the taxi in but was knackered.
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I fly a similar category of twin turboprop and have flown into all the airfields mentioned. When I read this first I thought 'that seems like a hell of a long way to go on one engine...surely there was a 'suitable' airport nearer than that'. Then I read the location quoted as near the Needles and Deano777's post on the weather. I would not entertain going to any of the nearer airfields in that kind of crosswind on one engine. The best option of a bad bunch was EGHI; while the W/V was 10 degrees off the runway, the varying direction and the size of the gust factor (19013G32KT 150V230) would make for an uncomfortably turbulent final approach. From the Needles at that altitude there's probably not much to choose between EGHI and EGBB anyway. Cardiff; probably a rushed 'dive and drive' would have task-loaded the crew unnecessarily.
It showed me that a little factual information on what was actually happening around them totally changed my opinion on the crews decision making process. In hindsight I think it was a good call. EGHI might have been a good call also, or it could have resulted in LOC due windshear on short finals...we'll never know.
It showed me that a little factual information on what was actually happening around them totally changed my opinion on the crews decision making process. In hindsight I think it was a good call. EGHI might have been a good call also, or it could have resulted in LOC due windshear on short finals...we'll never know.
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I seem to remember an asymmetric crosswind approach in a turbo prop (probably more that 20 years ago now) which if I remember rightly resulted in a wing scrape, cartwheel' and many fatalities.
Others may recall the incident?
Others may recall the incident?
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The problem, as ever, is that the initial sparse information doesn't accurately describe the real situation.
It is easy to assume from the title/headline that there was some sort of engine failure after take off, followed by a decision to continue on to destination, whereas the actual situation appears to be damage incurred after take off/in the departure, but not adversely affecting performance. The crew then subsequently decided on a precautionary shutdown (for whatever reasons), along with an assessment of the actual situation in flight, as well as conditions and risks to be encountered as a result.
A plan was formulated, and a relatively uneventful outcome was the result.
Aren't we all expected to not make the situation any worse than it already is, if we can manage it?
The only casualties involved being to the reputation of a numpty who mistook the situation as an opportunity for 15 minutes of, as it turned out, infamy. And the bird. The latter being the only one unable to walk away from the subsequent landing.
It is easy to assume from the title/headline that there was some sort of engine failure after take off, followed by a decision to continue on to destination, whereas the actual situation appears to be damage incurred after take off/in the departure, but not adversely affecting performance. The crew then subsequently decided on a precautionary shutdown (for whatever reasons), along with an assessment of the actual situation in flight, as well as conditions and risks to be encountered as a result.
A plan was formulated, and a relatively uneventful outcome was the result.
Aren't we all expected to not make the situation any worse than it already is, if we can manage it?
The only casualties involved being to the reputation of a numpty who mistook the situation as an opportunity for 15 minutes of, as it turned out, infamy. And the bird. The latter being the only one unable to walk away from the subsequent landing.