Thomas cook b757 incident, what a total mess
Another outstanding post, Rat. 
I'd say that the confidence you talk of is created by practising; that's why we're all so good at engine failures at V1. The problem is, where do you get the time. "Preferred" to use full automation, even flying around in VS and HDG frightens some, let alone the various scenarios for "go Rounds" or should they be "discontinued approaches" from a bit higher up...
In the Sim, "Can I..." "Sorry, no time". Or feel so knackered or annoyed you don't feel like it...
Originally Posted by Rat5
Then use the controls & AFDS as necessary to achieve the task required in a calm manner. Having confidence in understanding the /c and systems allows this. That is more important than practice. Practice is too often trained monkey repetition.
In the Sim, "Can I..." "Sorry, no time". Or feel so knackered or annoyed you don't feel like it...
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I am not here to criticize!!
Could this have stemmed from target fixation?
It is apparent from the report that the captain was concerned about the localiser capture issue, and referred to it for a little while after.
This could have been the single factor that led to the loss of situation awareness and the subsequent inability to regain it throughout the higher workload.
Target fixation is such a natural phenomenon, if you add extra factors such as stress it is so easy to completely lose SA.
An eventual safe outcome none the less by the crew and no-one hurt!!
Could this have stemmed from target fixation?
It is apparent from the report that the captain was concerned about the localiser capture issue, and referred to it for a little while after.
This could have been the single factor that led to the loss of situation awareness and the subsequent inability to regain it throughout the higher workload.
Target fixation is such a natural phenomenon, if you add extra factors such as stress it is so easy to completely lose SA.
An eventual safe outcome none the less by the crew and no-one hurt!!
Pilots should learn and be taught in-depth how to control the a/c and make it do what they want; by either manual raw data, manual with AFDS help or use of the MCP and automatics.
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There should be criticism. If I had made those mistakes I would want to be criticised. I have a job to do and responsibility for peoples lives. When I screw things up I want to understand that and learn. The fact the P1 was facing a change in his career structure should have no impact on his performance. Call it professionalism.
It happened and they screwed up. The issue for me is is this a one off or is there a real problem out there with basic airmanship. If two trained crew on a B757 for Thomas Cook can not manage the situation they were presented with that day would you want your wife and kids in the back? God help them if they had a real problem.
It happened and they screwed up. The issue for me is is this a one off or is there a real problem out there with basic airmanship. If two trained crew on a B757 for Thomas Cook can not manage the situation they were presented with that day would you want your wife and kids in the back? God help them if they had a real problem.
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I'd say that the confidence you talk of is created by practising;
You're correct, Bloggs. Badly expressed. Practicing in the sim to tick a box every 3 years is what I might have been alluding to. It's the type of scenario that is thrown in as a recurrency exercise; "you've seen it now, so let's move on." The true practicing I was referring to was a/c manipulation, by whatever means, on a day to day basis. That is how I learnt, not in the sim. The variety of captains going into a variety of destinations showed a variety/spectrum of skills and techniques from which I and every other F/O learnt our trade. And especially from the mistakes, both from them and myself. Minor ones, of course, so we can still talk about them. The culture of the companies was to have good sound trustworthy capable pilots who knew how and what to do with their a/c in the whole spectrum of circumstances. Nowadays it is every pilot flies exactly the same way as written in the bible of that company and when circumstances shift them out of their comfort zone of the written word they are left floundering.
Now, if I was an a/c manufacturer, or AAIB/NTSB investigator called in after a pilot induced incident, I would be asking more questions than perhaps is the modern trend; i.e.what happened to cause the accident? I would go much further and ask "Why did they do that? Why didn't they realise and do something different? How did they get themselves into that predicament and why did they not know how to extricate themselves?" As a manufacturer I would expect type rated pilots to be able to handle the a/c, understand its limits and capabilities, and know how to use all its systems in all circumstances. I would not expect my design to cause confusion thus adding to the woes, or even creating them. I would be concerned and confused how my wonder toy could have behaved in such an adolescent and rebellious manner. I might then discover that the SOP's were very restrictive and that the training was strict adherence to those SOP's, no discretion, and that the box within which crews operated and were educated was tiny compared to the possibilities and safe capabilities of my design. i.e. yes, strict adherence to SOP's would have prevented the scenario developing, but because of various circumstances they did indeed find themselves in rough waters, but with sound knowledge and ability they should have been able prevent further worsening of the situation and re-eastablished stable control of the a/c, as my design was intended to do. I would ask the question why that had not happened.
You're correct, Bloggs. Badly expressed. Practicing in the sim to tick a box every 3 years is what I might have been alluding to. It's the type of scenario that is thrown in as a recurrency exercise; "you've seen it now, so let's move on." The true practicing I was referring to was a/c manipulation, by whatever means, on a day to day basis. That is how I learnt, not in the sim. The variety of captains going into a variety of destinations showed a variety/spectrum of skills and techniques from which I and every other F/O learnt our trade. And especially from the mistakes, both from them and myself. Minor ones, of course, so we can still talk about them. The culture of the companies was to have good sound trustworthy capable pilots who knew how and what to do with their a/c in the whole spectrum of circumstances. Nowadays it is every pilot flies exactly the same way as written in the bible of that company and when circumstances shift them out of their comfort zone of the written word they are left floundering.
Now, if I was an a/c manufacturer, or AAIB/NTSB investigator called in after a pilot induced incident, I would be asking more questions than perhaps is the modern trend; i.e.what happened to cause the accident? I would go much further and ask "Why did they do that? Why didn't they realise and do something different? How did they get themselves into that predicament and why did they not know how to extricate themselves?" As a manufacturer I would expect type rated pilots to be able to handle the a/c, understand its limits and capabilities, and know how to use all its systems in all circumstances. I would not expect my design to cause confusion thus adding to the woes, or even creating them. I would be concerned and confused how my wonder toy could have behaved in such an adolescent and rebellious manner. I might then discover that the SOP's were very restrictive and that the training was strict adherence to those SOP's, no discretion, and that the box within which crews operated and were educated was tiny compared to the possibilities and safe capabilities of my design. i.e. yes, strict adherence to SOP's would have prevented the scenario developing, but because of various circumstances they did indeed find themselves in rough waters, but with sound knowledge and ability they should have been able prevent further worsening of the situation and re-eastablished stable control of the a/c, as my design was intended to do. I would ask the question why that had not happened.
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Understanding, and realizing, when you need to move up, or down, the automation scale is important. And how to re-establish a basic automation level (both FD's off then on) and what mode that puts you into.
Several years ago the training department started added G/A's slightly above and slightly below GA altitude as set in the FMC and altitude on the MCP. It can quickly demonstrate basic weaknesses in automation understanding and/or basic flying skills.
Several years ago the training department started added G/A's slightly above and slightly below GA altitude as set in the FMC and altitude on the MCP. It can quickly demonstrate basic weaknesses in automation understanding and/or basic flying skills.
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RAT 5 - I wish I had written your last post. I, like you and many others, have been sold short by our current system and have tried to fill in the blanks by myself. I also fly an aircraft which I find nasty because of its (in my opinion) poor design. I also agree that the AAIB should have done more - the why, who, how etc. was noticeably absent.
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Hmm interesting debate.
There is frequent reference to technical skills as the failings of this incident.
However, if you put this captain in the sim tomorrow and get him to fly the scenario again I am sure he will nail it.
However, could over learning something make it much easier to deal with from a non technical perspective - I have no doubt. Its so hard to set a training programme to absolutely nail everything though.......
There is frequent reference to technical skills as the failings of this incident.
However, if you put this captain in the sim tomorrow and get him to fly the scenario again I am sure he will nail it.
However, could over learning something make it much easier to deal with from a non technical perspective - I have no doubt. Its so hard to set a training programme to absolutely nail everything though.......
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Back to a solid grounding in the basics and a day to day operation that maintains those skills. This is not so simple as go to the sim, try it, and remember it incase it ever happens to you. You can not think of every scenario that the real world can throw at you and make a training program to cover them all. Impossible; but you can ensure your crews have a thorough grounding in a/c basics and should therefore be able to handle most scenarios. This thorough grounding can be encouraged in their daily routines and not discouraged as is often now the case.
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The cause of this incident was the crew's incompetence in not checking or understanding their FMAs.
The FMA is the pilot's interface with the flight systems and must be anticipated, understood and acted upon.
It doesn't matter if manipulation mistakes are made, they can be picked up in the FMA.
I think it is true to say that with the exception of AA587 every Airbus that has crashed has been fully airworthy before impact. They all crashed because the pilots did not understand what the FMA was telling them.
The same might well be true of other manufacturers, and the Boeing 757 in particular.
The FMA is the pilot's interface with the flight systems and must be anticipated, understood and acted upon.
It doesn't matter if manipulation mistakes are made, they can be picked up in the FMA.
I think it is true to say that with the exception of AA587 every Airbus that has crashed has been fully airworthy before impact. They all crashed because the pilots did not understand what the FMA was telling them.
The same might well be true of other manufacturers, and the Boeing 757 in particular.
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Having spent 20+ years on a certain 3 engine, three crew aircraft where manual flying was encouraged I converted to the B757.
All of a sudden the emphasis was placed on using the automatics.. I remember one sim exercise being an ILS onto 14 at Zurich but with the wind 35 knots across the ILS approach was followed by a visual switch to land on 28.
The very junior training captain had us programming the FMC to fly the whole approach down to 500 feet including the visual switch on the autopilot. A total waste of simulator time.
The airline had the warning signs when someone almost stalled in the Bovingdon hold with the autothrottle disengaged. The response was to ban manual throttle, autothrottle had to be engaged at all times!!
Perhaps it all started with two crew, "your third pilot is the autopilot use it at all times" was the order of the day
All of a sudden the emphasis was placed on using the automatics.. I remember one sim exercise being an ILS onto 14 at Zurich but with the wind 35 knots across the ILS approach was followed by a visual switch to land on 28.
The very junior training captain had us programming the FMC to fly the whole approach down to 500 feet including the visual switch on the autopilot. A total waste of simulator time.
The airline had the warning signs when someone almost stalled in the Bovingdon hold with the autothrottle disengaged. The response was to ban manual throttle, autothrottle had to be engaged at all times!!
Perhaps it all started with two crew, "your third pilot is the autopilot use it at all times" was the order of the day
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The cause of this incident was the crew's incompetence in not checking or understanding their FMAs.
It doesn't matter if manipulation mistakes are made, they can be picked up in the FMA.
As numerous people have already pointed out.
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For those of you who don't do them with regularity, a day to the Canaries from Scotland or the North of the UK is significantly longer duty hours and more flying time than an East Coast sector. It involves probably a 4am alarm, nearly 5 hours sat on your backside, sometimes sporty Canaries approach, all of a sudden, rapid turnaround on the ground, then 5 hours home. If it's your first day on earlies as someone else mentioned you are probably bushed as you didn't sleep that well. Do TCX have a controlled rest policy? If not, did either crew member have a nap in flight anyway?
With his experience this flight should be bread and butter to a Charter Pilot.
Controlled rest - difficult in a B757 as the seat isn't made for it, headrest lack of.
The airline I work for puts it's new Commanders (upgrade) into a B757 and takes them up and fly go rounds from low decision height - I guess they have learned something
In my mind there is an issue with how airlines are being run now days.
Rat5 said
My guess would be that the airlines Rat is thinking of were run by people who actually knew what it was like, and what is required, to be a capable pilot. They would have understood the feeling of confidence that comes with being relaxed and comfortable manipulating the aircraft well in different situations and also how critical that confidence is to achieving good outcomes. In most airlines today, the people at the head of training who often understand this don't have much power within the company so their inclinations are watered down and tempered by those above them who are more concerned with short term economics. The result of this is that passionate people leave the roles in fairly short order to be replaced by people who are less concerned with the watering down of their ideas and more concerned with the office they hold.
Here is a question; Has the time allocated to simulator training increased subsequent to the CAA's requirements for manoeuvre
based assessment of RVSM contingencies, TCAS resolutions, Low Viz Ops, PRM break-outs, and RNP-AR approaches?
If not, what has been left out to fit all this in?
Rat5 said
The culture of the companies was to have good sound trustworthy capable pilots who knew how and what to do with their a/c in the whole spectrum of circumstances.
Here is a question; Has the time allocated to simulator training increased subsequent to the CAA's requirements for manoeuvre
based assessment of RVSM contingencies, TCAS resolutions, Low Viz Ops, PRM break-outs, and RNP-AR approaches?
If not, what has been left out to fit all this in?
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Just a thought from my limited experience flying: With a procedure which involves the two crew to do something in a set order (and is very thoroughly trained as such)....where one action or phrase triggers the next and so on.. if this flow gets broken or an incorrect phrase or type reversion occurs; both pilots can end up confused. Training for type conversion or initial type seems very much along the lines of 'flows' and set actions rather than really thinking just about what you want to achieve. Obviously the SOPs should be sat on top of basic airmanship and type knowledge rather than blindly following the procedure.. but time is money.
I find it totally unacceptable that ATC will order a G/A due to a dead bird/bunny on the runway. They should advise and let the crew make their own decision.
I guess the answer is a 'minimum fuel' pan call and ask to land anyway?
I guess the answer is a 'minimum fuel' pan call and ask to land anyway?
I find it totally unacceptable that ATC will order a G/A due to a dead bird/bunny on the runway. They should advise and let the crew make their own decision.
What if the bunny corpse bounces off the nose wheel and gets sucked into an engine or the bird has flockmates swirling around the touch down zone?