Thomas cook b757 incident, what a total mess

[framer]

Should pilots be growing some balls or should the CAA be stepping in to regulate for more realistic legal minimums ?

That's an easy question to answer. If we could rely on consistently judicious fuel uplifts from captains and the appropriate dose of 'balls', we wouldn't need regulations at all. But we can't.
That is life, that is human nature.

[Piltdown Man]

I think fuel is an unnecessary diversion. The main topic here is the difference between what we think should gave happened and what actually did. Fuel might have been a participant in this incident but it was not. Their low fuel state was perceived as being beneficial because they believed they might be performing a flapless landing at MAN. The big issue is why, given the training and investment in this crew did it all go wrong? Will chopping these guys make the skies safer? Only if these two are the only rotten apples. But they are not. I think you'll find these two are not untypical. This was just an example and the next incident is there waiting to happen. When it does, the same usual suspects will hop up and shout (again) about poor flying and how people like this shouldn't be in the air. All the time ignoring the real underlying reasons that are responsible. The ones that live inside the totally fallible, but totally remarkable Mk 1 human being. Work on those issues and we start moving forwards.

[beardy]

Will chopping these guys make the skies safer? Only if these two are the only rotten apples. But they are not. I think you'll find these two are not untypical. This was just an example and the next incident is there waiting to happen.

Opinion or fact? If fact back it up please you have made quite an incendiary statement there.

FWIW I don't agree with you.

[slowjet]

BEARDY : Do cease trying to be a misplaced journalist and stick to thread. Opinion, rumour, fact, all part of this excellent forum and we are all fully entitled to express as we wish. Oh and Landflap needs no lessons. I agree with him that the Airbus is NOT like any other aeroplane. I too went from Boeing to Airbus and after a long night, offered a runway change at LHR . I accepted Right rather than Left, quite late, click, click, pointed the big bus where I wanted it to go with my sidestick & left thrust to do it's own thing. That, sir, is NOT like any other aeroplane & I went to the pub thinking, ' what a easy piece of kit this is'. Indeed, another mate of mine referred to the aircraft as "a gentleman's perambulator". Darn right.

[Discorde]

To summarise earlier posts: there are three main areas of concern for today's airline pilots (disregarding pay and working conditions):

- inadequate opportunities for practising handling skills
- inadequate min fuel requirements
- inadequate safeguards against fatigue

In the current profit-above-all-else business culture I doubt if any of these shortcomings will be addressed until a fatal accident forces revisiting the regulations.

[framer]

This was just an example and the next incident is there waiting to happen. When it does, the same usual suspects will hop up and shout (again) about poor flying and how people like this shouldn't be in the air. All the time ignoring the real underlying reasons that are responsible. The ones that live inside the totally fallible, but totally remarkable Mk 1 human being. Work on those issues and we start moving forwards.

That's it in a nutshell folks.
Put Piltdown man in charge of the CAA and pax will have to pay an extra 33 cents per sector but our skies will be safer.

[Piltdown Man]

Beardy - Which facts do you want backing up? I'll let history and just a small amount imagination do my job. If you spend your time looking back through published AAIB, NTSB and other governmental bodies' reports you'll see multiple incidents and accidents involving human factors. There are similarities and common threads running between them. Lack of perception, confusion, fright, invalid mental models etc. and so on all played their parts. Many steps have been taken to address these issues but we still have a long was to go - as this incident proves. The Mk.1 human being hasn't changed so we either adjust the environment (King Knut proved thus was difficult), the equipment (it's already in service) or the training and culture. Which is where I think I started.

[Piltdown Man]

Thanks Framer, but I'd prefer a couple of extra quid per sector. And we can spend this on training. Something that might save lives rather than the expensive theatre of security.

[framer]

I have to admit I pulled the 33 cents out of thin air but I was envisaging it being spent on training.
The thing is that if extra training was mandated, it would be done and the airlines would all pass the cost on to passengers and very few of them would cease to be consumers.

[beardy]

I'll let history and just a small amount imagination do my job.

Facts, not biased interpretation please. Unbiased, objective studies not self selected reports of when it goes wrong. What is happening when it goes right and what is the relationship, both as a fraction and causality between the two.

Do cease trying to be a misplaced journalist and stick to thread. Opinion, rumour, fact, all part of this excellent forum and we are all fully entitled to express as we wish.

I want to separate opinion and rumour from fact. Its not journalism its a scientific analytical approach devoid of emotion.

FYI I currently fly 4 different types, one of which is Airbus. "Click, click" and you have an aircraft which feels like a conventional aircraft with thrust levers that can supply thrust according to their position, as you should know. I am not sure Landflap is quite aware, from his comments he doesn't seem to be.

Much is made of whether their is an endemic handling problem and if it exists whether it contributed to this incident. I am not sure there is one, but I could be wrong and am willing to be proven wrong; repetition and shouting is not proof. I don't believe that the Airbus/Boeing debate has any place in this incident, each is different and each has it's own procedures neither of which was used in this incident.

This crew did not perform to the acceptable standards they had demonstrated in the past; they knew what to do, but didn't do it. Why has to be addressed. The starting point should be to confirm that the procedure had been taught and that they understood and had practiced it not too long ago for it to be no more than a distant memory. If that is confirmed (which I believe to be the case) then Human Factors need to be examined. Was the teaching adequate was practice recent? Was a Go Around briefed? If so, adequately? If all of that seems to be in order, what got in the way? Distraction? Fixation? Overload? Fatigue? Stress? I don't believe that these have been properly addressed, I do believe that they are important.

[Centaurus]

This A320 incident report from Australia reveals how easily the automatics can lead you into strife.

Investigation: AO-2013-159 - Stall warning event involving an Airbus A320, VH-VFJ, near Auckland Airport, New Zealand on 7 September 2013

[Aluminium shuffler]

Fireflybob, while I agree to a point that the raw data and manual skills of the average old school guy are better than the average new guy because the old kit required those skills, while new aircraft are flown with the automatics and electronics plugged in, I also think you're comparing apples and oranges. Even within the 737 variants, operational, handling and instrument scanning complexities vary - I recently flew raw data manually on a 73-3 sim, despite not being in one for well over a decade, and it was a doddle, while the NG is much harder to hand fly and the scan is less efficient. When comparing completely different manufacturers and design ethos, rather than just a generations of the same type, then these issues are going the be enormous. I am one of those who believe that modern pilots' apparent decrease in basic skills are not just due to lack of practice in the old arts but also due to the poor design of modern aircraft with bad ergonomics and a contempt for handling characteristics; every effort is made to make the aircraft efficient, with seemingly no regard for how easy they are for the pilots to operate. The operation margins are being eroded from both ends.

[Pininstauld]

Mk 1 Human not the issue

Checking the AAIB reports for October to read up the original report, it's interesting to see that juxtaposed next to the TC incident is this gem from Grand Cayman - defo worth a read if you agree with PM. The frequency of such events has been accelerating for many years - put simply, across the board, it seems as though we are gradually losing the ability to fly manually and simultaneously practise safe decision making. Could it be as simple as this?

We are not providing anything like sufficient opportunity to regularly practise manual flying skills, on line or in the sim.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...KY%2010-14.pdf

[fireflybob]

The operation margins are being eroded from both ends.

Aluminium shuffler, Agreed - I see a convergence of several factors in our industry as this incident shows.

[Oilhead]

Staggeringly long day - I do not think that would be a legal assignment in the US. Fatigue could very easily have played a leading role in this unfortunate debacle. My brain certainly gets fried quite easily on a long duty day.

I was also amazed to see CAA recommend go round practice minimum of every 3 years. Are you kidding?! I expect to see 2 engine G/A's every time I am in the sim. I am far more likely to have to make an unplanned go around than see a post V1 engine failure.

And what was the company doing pulling the CVR to use on an "internal investigation" - before AAIB ramped it up.

I wonder what the working climate is like with management at this company? Sounds quite fraught to me.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Staggeringly long day - I do not think that would be a legal assignment in the US. Fatigue could very easily have played a leading role in this unfortunate debacle. My brain certainly gets fried quite easily on a long duty day.

Oilhead - In the UK we're currently governed by time of day and number of sectors flown. On the assumption the crew checked in around 0700L the allowable Flying Duty in 12.15hrs.
Not sure if the F word is appropriate, maybe sleepiness. If we're looking at the F word we need to look at other area's,maybe commuting. The Airline the crews work for have a scheduling agreement which along with the regulations offer some protection against fatigue. The other area mentioned before was stress.

[Oakape]

This A320 incident report from Australia reveals how easily the automatics can lead you into strife.

From the report -

The crew resumed the approach, unaware that the auto-thrust system was disconnected, and therefore no longer controlling aircraft speed. As the aircraft continued to decelerate, soon after the final stage of flap was selected for landing, the Flight Management Guidance System generated a low energy warning. As the crew was responding to the low-energy warning, alpha-floor auto-thrust mode engaged. The crew accelerated the aircraft to approach speed using manual thrust control, and was able to continue the approach for an uneventful landing.

This is a common thread in a lot of recent accidents. Pilots seem to have the misconception that the auto-throttle system absolves them from monitoring airspeed. These guys were obviously not monitoring airspeed & the first indication that it was very low, was the low energy warning.

If you are monitoring airspeed (arguably part & parcel of flying the aircraft) you will notice if it drops below the required speed at any given time. You will then check that power is increased & that airspeed stabilizes. Non-moving thrust levers make that a little more difficult to do as you need to look at the engine instruments, where as with moving thrust levers you will feel them move under your hand. (You do have your hand on the thrust levers, don't you?!). Either way you will pick up a problem if thrust does not increase as speed falls below the bugged speed.

The problem these days seems to be over-reliance on the automation combined with a lack of complete understanding of how the automation works. The incident in this report backs that up.

[Capn Bloggs]

Pilots seem to have the misconception that the auto-throttle system absolves them from monitoring airspeed.

Rubbish. Pilots are subconsciously suckered into less monitoring by a system that works perfectly 99.9% of the time. That's why all these LOC accidents/incidents are occurring; pilots have been forced out of the loop. I'd be disappointed if you don't realise it's happening to you, right now, Oakape. And yes, I do realise that is our job, but the reality is...

[Oakape]

Rubbish. Pilots are subconsciously suckered into less monitoring by a system that works perfectly 99.9% of the time. That's why all these LOC accidents/incidents are occurring; pilots have been forced out of the loop. I'd be disappointed if you don't realise it's happening to you, right now, Oakape. And yes, I do realise that is our job, but the reality is...

If pilots are 'subconsciously suckered into less monitoring' it is because they are not trained correctly, or lazy, or unmotivated, or undisciplined or lacking in airmanship. Or a combination of all of those things.

The automatics are an AID, not a pilot. And any pilot who gives that level of control over to the automation will eventually find themselves in a bad place.

The pilot flys & the automation assists him/her in that task to reduced workload. The autopilot/auto-throttle system is not pilot #3, who can completely take over from you & allow you to completely focus your attention elsewhere.

The auto-throttle in my flight deck does not have any say in where it positions the thrust levers. I decide where they should be & if the auto-throttle is not smart enough to have put them there, I do it manually, by either over-riding temporarily or by disconnecting the auto-throttle all together.

The reality is that people have got lazy & think they can have a cool job where they don't have to pay attention or do any work. Lazy operation where the autopilot goes in shortly after gear up until fully configured & stable at 500' has led to this.

Pilots have not been forced out of the loop, they have willingly removed themselves from it & the automatics have simply allowed it to happen. It is human nature to enjoy the good times & not think about the future. To not concern themselves with the eventual degradation in skills, knowledge & ability. High levels of enthusiasm for the job will lead to the levels of discipline & airmanship required to ensure that this does not eventuate. Unfortunately enthusiasm is in short supply in the industry these days. The profession has been attacked in many ways over the years.

The final layer of protection is respect for the seriousness of the job. Operating complex equipment in a dynamic & challenging environment requires people to respect it, if it is to be accomplished safely. The problem here is that these days no one seems to have any respect for anything & certainly not their job.

As for 'rubbish', I will just have to disagree with you on that.

[Capn Bloggs]

So you reckon all these prangs where aeroplanes get away from the pilots are caused by slack-@rses who don't get a rat's anymore? Good one. As I say, rubbish.