MH17 down near Donetsk
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>Is the SA-11 TELAR not able to do some IFF on itself?
IMO, the TELAR never does that. On the same second the TELAR radar is activated, the enemy a/c knows it's targetted, so the missile must be launched immediately. Otherwise the target has too much time to do evasive maneuvers and potentially launch a radar homing missile at BUK TELAR.
IMO, the TELAR never does that. On the same second the TELAR radar is activated, the enemy a/c knows it's targetted, so the missile must be launched immediately. Otherwise the target has too much time to do evasive maneuvers and potentially launch a radar homing missile at BUK TELAR.
I don't think that SA-11 is so much different in operations. No IFF = foe
For the rest, I have had usually deployed 3 to 4 spotters which were connected by radio, to tell me if friend or foe
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For the rest, I have had usually deployed 3 to 4 spotters which were connected by radio, to tell me if friend or foe
spotters can be used to distinguish an aircraft on 10 km? In cloudy conditions?
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at MartinM, thanks for the details
From what I've read from Finnish military sources, BUK Telar units would not seem to have device(s) needed to detect if target is a friend or foe. (at least the models that Finland uses) They say the FF detection is done by separate radar (or control) unit.
From what I've read from Finnish military sources, BUK Telar units would not seem to have device(s) needed to detect if target is a friend or foe. (at least the models that Finland uses) They say the FF detection is done by separate radar (or control) unit.
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From what I've read from Finnish military sources, BUK Telar units would not seem to have device(s) needed to detect if target is a friend or foe. (at least the models that Finland uses) They say the FF detection is done by separate radar (or control) unit.
A Buk TELAR vehicle is fitted with radar, digital computer, missile erector and launcher, friend or foe identification system. It is operated by a crew of four and carries four missiles.
Cheers
Martin
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1. The Russian troops with the rebels (trained on Russian military base near Ukrainian border) had intel about Ukrainian military transport Il-76 scheduled for that day (indeed scheduled, but canceled) to drop (from altitude to avoid MANPADS, with varying success) ammunition and food for Ukrainian troops surrounded then near Russian border. A spotter in a quiet rural area heard a plane invisible over clouds. This seems incredibly unprofessional, but nothing unheard of for Soviet/Russian army.
Was Ukraine using civil airliners as a shield or was the Intel leaked by Ukraine to trick the russian or pro Russians to fire at a civil aircraft?
Either way the worldwide condemnation of Mr Putin is secured.
I personally think there is a lot more to this than just an accidental shot down.
Politics in these countries is a lot more tactile than western Europe, as the Nemsov case shows!
D and F
xcitation and blackbird69
I posted the following in my post 298:-
Many years ago, when I was with a major airline, I was involved in the decision making process assessing the safety of flights, near, around or over areas of potential or active conflicts. From that experience, may I enlighten some of the posters on PPRuNe on the difficulties of the process.
The first problem is imprecise information, a civil airline is not told much - you have to go and investigate yourself. NOTAMS only promulgate what the state concerned has decided to say - airspace, airways closures and altitude restrictions. Next, the government of the state of registration may issue warnings, usually in ambiguous phraseology; 'we see no reason why you shouldn't', etc. Unless individuals in the airline concerned have the necessary security clearances and access to the right military/security departments, they will find it very difficult to determine the risk.
Then there is the eternal conflict between commercial interests and caution. This is a legitimate and important debate, there are no simple answers. How does the responsible person in Flight Operations convince the Commercial Department of the necessity to re-route around the conflict area when there is little or no convincing evidence of risk?
I remember several cases when the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was less than candid, and others when they issued advice that was much more restrictive than the advice given by other governments. How do you evaluate what you are being told by government? Such issues applied when deciding to overfly Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and when flying around Iraq during the run up to Gulf War 1 in 1991. These are not easy decisions.
Terrorist or military risk must be assessed on the basis of 2 criteria - capability and intention...and probably a 3rd - incompetence. In the case of Afghanistan, before the Russians retreated, they had the capability but not the intention to shoot down an overflying civil airliner, they also had good command and control. After the Russians withdrew, the various factions had the missiles (capability), probably not the intention, but more importantly they lacked effective command and control. Therefore they constituted a risk and that airspace was avoided by UK airlines but not those of all other nations.
When the USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian Airbus, the US Navy had the capability, no intention to shoot down a civil airliner, but woefully inadequate command decisions (the command and control structure was OK but it was operated incompetently). During the run up to Gulf War 1 the capability was there, as was a very good command and control structure - BUT - at what point might the stress of the moment lead to a mistake?
As I understand it, the airspace in which the Malaysian flight was operating was declared open by the state involved, was being used by many other airlines, and thus the flight was legal. The problem was; who had access to the missiles concerned? Who had knowledge of this? And how could this be assessed? Probably no-one was in a position to know. It seems to me to have been a horrible cock-up by the rebel forces. I am sure no-one intended to shoot down a civil airliner.
But, please don't under-estimate the difficulty airlines have when deciding what is and what is not safe.
Not much seems to have changed since I posted that but I hope this tragic event will eventually lead to clearer lines of responsibility and a much better flow of information to those in government and airlines who have to make decisions re the safety of over-flights.
I posted the following in my post 298:-
Many years ago, when I was with a major airline, I was involved in the decision making process assessing the safety of flights, near, around or over areas of potential or active conflicts. From that experience, may I enlighten some of the posters on PPRuNe on the difficulties of the process.
The first problem is imprecise information, a civil airline is not told much - you have to go and investigate yourself. NOTAMS only promulgate what the state concerned has decided to say - airspace, airways closures and altitude restrictions. Next, the government of the state of registration may issue warnings, usually in ambiguous phraseology; 'we see no reason why you shouldn't', etc. Unless individuals in the airline concerned have the necessary security clearances and access to the right military/security departments, they will find it very difficult to determine the risk.
Then there is the eternal conflict between commercial interests and caution. This is a legitimate and important debate, there are no simple answers. How does the responsible person in Flight Operations convince the Commercial Department of the necessity to re-route around the conflict area when there is little or no convincing evidence of risk?
I remember several cases when the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was less than candid, and others when they issued advice that was much more restrictive than the advice given by other governments. How do you evaluate what you are being told by government? Such issues applied when deciding to overfly Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and when flying around Iraq during the run up to Gulf War 1 in 1991. These are not easy decisions.
Terrorist or military risk must be assessed on the basis of 2 criteria - capability and intention...and probably a 3rd - incompetence. In the case of Afghanistan, before the Russians retreated, they had the capability but not the intention to shoot down an overflying civil airliner, they also had good command and control. After the Russians withdrew, the various factions had the missiles (capability), probably not the intention, but more importantly they lacked effective command and control. Therefore they constituted a risk and that airspace was avoided by UK airlines but not those of all other nations.
When the USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian Airbus, the US Navy had the capability, no intention to shoot down a civil airliner, but woefully inadequate command decisions (the command and control structure was OK but it was operated incompetently). During the run up to Gulf War 1 the capability was there, as was a very good command and control structure - BUT - at what point might the stress of the moment lead to a mistake?
As I understand it, the airspace in which the Malaysian flight was operating was declared open by the state involved, was being used by many other airlines, and thus the flight was legal. The problem was; who had access to the missiles concerned? Who had knowledge of this? And how could this be assessed? Probably no-one was in a position to know. It seems to me to have been a horrible cock-up by the rebel forces. I am sure no-one intended to shoot down a civil airliner.
But, please don't under-estimate the difficulty airlines have when deciding what is and what is not safe.
Not much seems to have changed since I posted that but I hope this tragic event will eventually lead to clearer lines of responsibility and a much better flow of information to those in government and airlines who have to make decisions re the safety of over-flights.
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There were no other Ukrainian planes in the sky. This version was examined in depth by the Dutch and Australian investigators. They confirmed that a liner of Boeing-777 type could not be intercepted by a strike fighter, even by theory.
Anyway, it was important to establish the type of the missile. The investigators received access to all kinds of anti-aircraft missiles used by Air Force and Air Defense of Ukraine.
The configuration of missile's submunitions was identified fairly quickly. The extracted submunitions are very similar to those of Buk-M1. Ukraine has such Buks in its defense, but of course, there were none of them near Torez, in the rear of the occupied area, only Russian ones.
NATO intelligence services have carried out a large-scale parallel search of modern Russian ground-to-air missiles submunitions. By an operation the details of which have not been yet disclosed, a warhead of a Buk-M1-2 missile of Russian production fell into hands of investigators. When it was disassembled, it turned out that submunitions that hit the Boeing are exactly the same as those of the warhead of this modern Russian anti-aircraft missile. Buk-M1-2 complex was developed in 1997, supplied to the Russian Armed Forces in 1998, and never delivered to Ukraine.
Boeing MH-17 downing: SUBMUNITIONS OF RUSSIAN MISSILE BUK-M1-2 (AKA SA-17) WHICH DOWNED THE MALAYSIAN BOEING MH-17. EXCLUSIVE PHOTO REPORT - Netherlands, terrorism, Yurii Butusov, Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines, Buk, Russian Terrorists, Boeing MH-17 do
Anyway, it was important to establish the type of the missile. The investigators received access to all kinds of anti-aircraft missiles used by Air Force and Air Defense of Ukraine.
The configuration of missile's submunitions was identified fairly quickly. The extracted submunitions are very similar to those of Buk-M1. Ukraine has such Buks in its defense, but of course, there were none of them near Torez, in the rear of the occupied area, only Russian ones.
NATO intelligence services have carried out a large-scale parallel search of modern Russian ground-to-air missiles submunitions. By an operation the details of which have not been yet disclosed, a warhead of a Buk-M1-2 missile of Russian production fell into hands of investigators. When it was disassembled, it turned out that submunitions that hit the Boeing are exactly the same as those of the warhead of this modern Russian anti-aircraft missile. Buk-M1-2 complex was developed in 1997, supplied to the Russian Armed Forces in 1998, and never delivered to Ukraine.
Boeing MH-17 downing: SUBMUNITIONS OF RUSSIAN MISSILE BUK-M1-2 (AKA SA-17) WHICH DOWNED THE MALAYSIAN BOEING MH-17. EXCLUSIVE PHOTO REPORT - Netherlands, terrorism, Yurii Butusov, Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines, Buk, Russian Terrorists, Boeing MH-17 do
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I suspect that at the bottom on the photo is not "a whole subammunition, extracted from a missile warhead", but its model produced on a 3D printer (with the printing head not scanning each layer like in 2D printers, but with molten plastic-extruding head moving along a calculated trajectory for speed).
P.S. Compare with photos of dissected training warhead: 1 2 3 (from here).
P.S. Compare with photos of dissected training warhead: 1 2 3 (from here).
Last edited by Lena.Kiev; 18th Mar 2015 at 12:20.
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Given other civilian transports were operating in the area at the time, the strarting question must be why was it that MH17 was brought down.
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Because Buk-M1 and Buk-M1-2 TELARs' acquisition radar covers only 6-7° elevation (and 120° bearing). After the TELAR crew was notified "bird flew to you", they turned on the acquisition radar, the first aircraft which entered the narrow scanned area was locked - the radar switched to target tracking, then target illumination (in these modes the radar covers only 2.6° elevation and 1.4° bearing).
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Someone with the callsign "Naemnik" ("Naimanets" in Ukrainian, "Mercenary" in English) or someone who told him. Naemnik was a subordinate of Igor Bezler. Bezler at the time was a lieutenant-colonel of Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of Russian army who sent Bezler and others to make a mutiny in Eastern Ukraine.
Two versions.
Two versions.
Last edited by Lena.Kiev; 18th Mar 2015 at 20:11.
From the latest evidence/analysis it looks like it was a Buk that took down MH17:
Bewijs voor neerhalen MH17 door BUK-raket | RTL Nieuws
Bewijs voor neerhalen MH17 door BUK-raket | RTL Nieuws
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Evidence of BUK-Missile
Today RTLNieuws, a dutch commercial news organization claims to have proof that a BUK-missile shot down MH-17.
The journalist Jeroen Akkermans, who we know from his pictures and correspondence on the MH-17 crash, collected fragments of the missile last november, before the debris of the plane was recovered.
These fragments have been analyzed by three different independent agencies and these conclude that the fragments are from a later model BUK-missile.
Fragments were shown not only from the warhead (deformed rusty metal that resembles the typical part of fragmentation warhead, but also a fragment which is from the rest of the missile and a stanced 2 in it. Next to this pitting was shown on parts of MH-17.
For a change, the RTLnieuws site decided to run the story in English as well. See link below.
Evidence proving that flight MH-17 was taken down by a BUK missile | RTL Nieuws
The journalist Jeroen Akkermans, who we know from his pictures and correspondence on the MH-17 crash, collected fragments of the missile last november, before the debris of the plane was recovered.
These fragments have been analyzed by three different independent agencies and these conclude that the fragments are from a later model BUK-missile.
Fragments were shown not only from the warhead (deformed rusty metal that resembles the typical part of fragmentation warhead, but also a fragment which is from the rest of the missile and a stanced 2 in it. Next to this pitting was shown on parts of MH-17.
For a change, the RTLnieuws site decided to run the story in English as well. See link below.
Evidence proving that flight MH-17 was taken down by a BUK missile | RTL Nieuws
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1. Taking evidence from a crash site is a criminal offense. Who is that reporter and his company to be trusted in the final instance? Imagine tomorrow some strangers are knocking the door of the investigation team office, one carrying pieces of Р-73, another one of Python-5, and the third one bringing pieces of Patriot.
2. Even if it is finally proved that it was Buk (quite likely, IMHO), this actually says little about the rascals who pressed the buttons. The separatists had a single launcher (likely damaged) while the Ukrainian army had several Buk batteries along the MH-17 route on that tragic day (satellite data were widely published shortly after the crash), then disappeared quickly (which, as well, proves nothing alone).
2. Even if it is finally proved that it was Buk (quite likely, IMHO), this actually says little about the rascals who pressed the buttons. The separatists had a single launcher (likely damaged) while the Ukrainian army had several Buk batteries along the MH-17 route on that tragic day (satellite data were widely published shortly after the crash), then disappeared quickly (which, as well, proves nothing alone).
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2 triumph61:
You wrote: "Where is the Source for that? Along which Route? RU displayed Route or real Route?"
Sorry, do not understand that. The route is well-known and recorded. If there are some discrepancies among different sources of measurement, they are minor, at least as compared with the operating range of the Buk missile (c.a. 35 km).
The pictures taken by the Russian military satellites were published a few days after the tragedy. Thought they were discussed here. Whether to trust them or not is rather a matter of religion or social psychology. Anyway, the US and Western Europe did not present anything similar to be discussed. Here is the full article with maps and pictures:
http://www.kp.ru/daily/26258.5/3137481/
Sorry it's in Russian, therefore some comments on some images (enlarged)
Map with locations of Ukrainian Buk batteries on that day:
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/image/50/59/825950.jpg
Pictures taken on 14/07, i.e. 3 days before. The Buks started arriving in the war area:
http://s5.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...03926831454887
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...33229944007336
http://s1.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...41225791035507
I assume you skipped all the above, therefore here are some video footages generated by the Ukrainian official media:
The following promo was shown the day _before_ the catastrophe. From 4.45 thru 4.55 the commentary addresses the Ukrainian forces operating in the "anti-terror operation area". The Buk is clearly visible with the Ukrainian army staff around:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=Q3MomxNHnUA
The Ukrainian analyst is pointing to this fragment:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=Lgfa_kWm4_k
Again, for me all this does not mean anything. No serious proof concerning who IS to be blamed. Looks like the current civilization has totally forgotten the Roman principle stating "presumption of innocence" though formally it is declared under e.g. the Anglo-American Common Law.
First few months after the tragedy there were hopes that the Dutch investigation team would quickly dig out the truth. Then these hopes vanished in the haze. Extremely slow work. Never heard that any team like that left that many aircraft pieces lying in the field for many months (some are still there).
You wrote: "Where is the Source for that? Along which Route? RU displayed Route or real Route?"
Sorry, do not understand that. The route is well-known and recorded. If there are some discrepancies among different sources of measurement, they are minor, at least as compared with the operating range of the Buk missile (c.a. 35 km).
The pictures taken by the Russian military satellites were published a few days after the tragedy. Thought they were discussed here. Whether to trust them or not is rather a matter of religion or social psychology. Anyway, the US and Western Europe did not present anything similar to be discussed. Here is the full article with maps and pictures:
http://www.kp.ru/daily/26258.5/3137481/
Sorry it's in Russian, therefore some comments on some images (enlarged)
Map with locations of Ukrainian Buk batteries on that day:
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/image/50/59/825950.jpg
Pictures taken on 14/07, i.e. 3 days before. The Buks started arriving in the war area:
http://s5.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...03926831454887
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...33229944007336
http://s1.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/imag...41225791035507
I assume you skipped all the above, therefore here are some video footages generated by the Ukrainian official media:
The following promo was shown the day _before_ the catastrophe. From 4.45 thru 4.55 the commentary addresses the Ukrainian forces operating in the "anti-terror operation area". The Buk is clearly visible with the Ukrainian army staff around:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=Q3MomxNHnUA
The Ukrainian analyst is pointing to this fragment:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=Lgfa_kWm4_k
Again, for me all this does not mean anything. No serious proof concerning who IS to be blamed. Looks like the current civilization has totally forgotten the Roman principle stating "presumption of innocence" though formally it is declared under e.g. the Anglo-American Common Law.
First few months after the tragedy there were hopes that the Dutch investigation team would quickly dig out the truth. Then these hopes vanished in the haze. Extremely slow work. Never heard that any team like that left that many aircraft pieces lying in the field for many months (some are still there).
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Map with locations of Ukrainian Buk batteries on that day:
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/image/50/59/825950.jpg
http://s3.stc.all.kpcdn.net/f/4/image/50/59/825950.jpg
Moreover, these alleged locations of Ukrainian Buks were at the time... inside Russia-occupied territory (yellow on this map):
This map is from answer to question 13 in the FAQ.
In November 2013 MAK (with headquarters in Moscow) began investigation according to ICAO rules of the aircrash in Kazan, Russia. Still no final report. How slow do you call that?
Russian criminal investigation of the aircrash in Smolensk (April 2010) is still ongoing (it's the reason why the debris is still not released by Russia to Poland). How slow do you call that?
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Now we warming up the Fake Press Briefing of MoD?
Only this:
1. False Fly Route
2. BUK at A1428 is still there and have never leaved their Place because broken. Compare Google Earth
3. There was no Buk´s at Zaroschenke, compare the Size;and it was SEPA Area
4. At Radar Vid there are no Military Jets nearby MH17
5. THe BUK with one missing Missile was at Luhansk.
That was dicussed a lot of times
Only this:
1. False Fly Route
2. BUK at A1428 is still there and have never leaved their Place because broken. Compare Google Earth
3. There was no Buk´s at Zaroschenke, compare the Size;and it was SEPA Area
4. At Radar Vid there are no Military Jets nearby MH17
5. THe BUK with one missing Missile was at Luhansk.
That was dicussed a lot of times