Asiana Crew in Trouble
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On the 744 with the CF6, an ENG OIL FILT light requires an engine shutdown if the light does not go out when thrust is reduced to idle. If the light goes out at reduced thrust, the engine can be kept running.
Dunno 'bout the 767 installation...
Dunno 'bout the 767 installation...
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GE CF-6 Engines are required to be shut-down if, at idle, an ENG OIL FILTER CLOG message is still present.
Having in mind that this flight would be an ETOPS one, and that the engine issue came out after 1 hour of flight, rules dictate that the aircraft could not have even entered the ETOPS sector in that condition and that a diversion would have to be made to a suitable airdrome.
It is a stupid thing to do, to fly over water with such warning and it not only puts everyone at jeopardy but will also put at stake the company's ETOPS certification..
It is much better (even much cost effective) to return to the company's facilities, where maintenance have all the required equipment to do the job and where a second aircraft can be scheduled to take the passengers safely to destination, than to take the risk of a worse scenario and get to the destination and find yourself in hands with the problem (and the cost) of having to displace a spare engine and a maintenance crew to do the work outside their base. And remember, mission was not accomplished, because there were certainly passengers waiting to be taken back to Seoul...
I guess people will never learn...
Having in mind that this flight would be an ETOPS one, and that the engine issue came out after 1 hour of flight, rules dictate that the aircraft could not have even entered the ETOPS sector in that condition and that a diversion would have to be made to a suitable airdrome.
It is a stupid thing to do, to fly over water with such warning and it not only puts everyone at jeopardy but will also put at stake the company's ETOPS certification..
It is much better (even much cost effective) to return to the company's facilities, where maintenance have all the required equipment to do the job and where a second aircraft can be scheduled to take the passengers safely to destination, than to take the risk of a worse scenario and get to the destination and find yourself in hands with the problem (and the cost) of having to displace a spare engine and a maintenance crew to do the work outside their base. And remember, mission was not accomplished, because there were certainly passengers waiting to be taken back to Seoul...
I guess people will never learn...
Last edited by aguadalte; 2nd May 2014 at 18:51. Reason: added text
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Correct me if I'm wrong, but from memory wasn't the BA 744 engine shut down due to a fire warning ? Even a precautionary shutdown demands a landing at the nearest suitable airport. I fly a Boeing twin and if I ever have an engine fire successfully extinguished I am going to LAND at the nearest suitable airport. Any thought of continuing to destination is folly (unless it is the nearest suitable anyway). Having had a fire, how do you know what if any associated damage has been caused and to what system or component, four engines or otherwise ? Just my take on things and I'm sure there will be plenty of armchair experts out there who will be only too willing to shoot me down in flames (ouch). Slightly off thread for which I apologise.
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NOT a fire warning - nothing external to the engine case.
Rather, an internal malfunction - likely a compressor surge, indicated by high turbine gasflow temperature. Typically managed by throttle retard, or simple shutdown.
Rather, an internal malfunction - likely a compressor surge, indicated by high turbine gasflow temperature. Typically managed by throttle retard, or simple shutdown.
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Crew finger trouble over fuel management at the end of trip marred a text book operation
Although the fuel system was fully described in the aircraft manuals, the operator’s fuel balancing procedures were different from that of the manufacturer.
The crew had been using the override/jettison pumps to maintain fuel balance but these became ineffective towards the end of the flight. Thereafter, there was a reluctance to turn both main pumps off in a tank and a lack of confidence that this would be effective. There was increasing concern that they would not be able to keep the main tanks balanced and that some of the fuel might be unavailable.
A better understanding of the fuel system should have reassured the crew that fuel should have been avialable to all engines even with one tank empty. Nevertheless, the awareness of the apparent problem came at a time when the crew had made the decision to divert, had started the descent to Manchester and was therefore busy. If the crew had been in the habit of utilising the manufacturer’s procedures for balancing fuel by only using the main pumps, it is possible that they would have become more confident with the procedure. Although the problem had not previously been encountered by other company pilots, the potential difficulties might have been foreseen by the operator. After the incident, the operator reverted to the manufacturer’s fuel handling procedures.
The operator has a training programme for pilots who are qualified to carry out planned 3-engined ferry flights, the emphasis of which rightly concentrates on the takeoff. Additionally, all flight crews are subject to regular simulator evaluation of 3-engine handling. However, this later training is necessarily limited in time and crews are not normally subject to an extended period of 3-engine flight with the associated fuel balancing requirements. It is therefore recommended that the operator include relevant instruction on 3-engined fuel handling during initial and recurrent training.
The crew had been using the override/jettison pumps to maintain fuel balance but these became ineffective towards the end of the flight. Thereafter, there was a reluctance to turn both main pumps off in a tank and a lack of confidence that this would be effective. There was increasing concern that they would not be able to keep the main tanks balanced and that some of the fuel might be unavailable.
A better understanding of the fuel system should have reassured the crew that fuel should have been avialable to all engines even with one tank empty. Nevertheless, the awareness of the apparent problem came at a time when the crew had made the decision to divert, had started the descent to Manchester and was therefore busy. If the crew had been in the habit of utilising the manufacturer’s procedures for balancing fuel by only using the main pumps, it is possible that they would have become more confident with the procedure. Although the problem had not previously been encountered by other company pilots, the potential difficulties might have been foreseen by the operator. After the incident, the operator reverted to the manufacturer’s fuel handling procedures.
The operator has a training programme for pilots who are qualified to carry out planned 3-engined ferry flights, the emphasis of which rightly concentrates on the takeoff. Additionally, all flight crews are subject to regular simulator evaluation of 3-engine handling. However, this later training is necessarily limited in time and crews are not normally subject to an extended period of 3-engine flight with the associated fuel balancing requirements. It is therefore recommended that the operator include relevant instruction on 3-engined fuel handling during initial and recurrent training.
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How many more incidents involving major Korean carriers have to occur before they start to see they are doing it wrong. I'm amazed how in this day and age international aviation organisations are unable to enforce a rethink in mentality in that region.
The sad sad thing is nothing is changing there which is why we continually see lives lost to archaic thinking/culture both in the companies concerned and their flight decks. We know a great deal about this crm stuff now, we know a good deal about effective training too. How about we start applying some of this in that region of the World?
The sad sad thing is nothing is changing there which is why we continually see lives lost to archaic thinking/culture both in the companies concerned and their flight decks. We know a great deal about this crm stuff now, we know a good deal about effective training too. How about we start applying some of this in that region of the World?
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It sure is, that far out there into the Pacific!
What ETOPS/EDTO are they approved for on their B767 with the GE CF-6's?
aguadalte - "...are required to be shut-down if, at idle, an ENG OIL FILTER CLOG message is still present... rules dictate that the aircraft could not have even entered the ETOPS sector in that condition and that a diversion would have to be made to a suitable airdrome."
BINGO! Spot-on Aquadaite and both these are very serious concerns.
Jabbara raises another question with his comments referencing A330's. Sure, different engine type BUT do Asiana operate Airbus and Boeing fleets on a combined single checklist, OR do they follow the individual manufacturer's checklists and procedures? This alone may provide confusion. EK & Brunei tried briefly combined checklists but threw it out as dangerous while SIA remain with it, thinking they know better than the maker.
Rules are rules and types are different.
What ETOPS/EDTO are they approved for on their B767 with the GE CF-6's?
aguadalte - "...are required to be shut-down if, at idle, an ENG OIL FILTER CLOG message is still present... rules dictate that the aircraft could not have even entered the ETOPS sector in that condition and that a diversion would have to be made to a suitable airdrome."
BINGO! Spot-on Aquadaite and both these are very serious concerns.
Jabbara raises another question with his comments referencing A330's. Sure, different engine type BUT do Asiana operate Airbus and Boeing fleets on a combined single checklist, OR do they follow the individual manufacturer's checklists and procedures? This alone may provide confusion. EK & Brunei tried briefly combined checklists but threw it out as dangerous while SIA remain with it, thinking they know better than the maker.
Rules are rules and types are different.
Last edited by Chocks Away; 8th May 2014 at 03:16.
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OMG
Indeed fox niner...
Further more and this is not for you, thinking that Asiana is using combined engine/Airbus-Boeing chek list despite 2 radically different engines, indicates that chocks are really away...
Further more and this is not for you, thinking that Asiana is using combined engine/Airbus-Boeing chek list despite 2 radically different engines, indicates that chocks are really away...
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Good diagram VNAV thanks. I obviously overlooked Iwo Jima 
Regarding your second comment I think you misread my question.
Do Asiana have strict Boeing Checklists for their individual Boeing types or is it a combined Airbus-Boeing Asiana "special" like SIA (and just a few others) have?
I ask this because with so much cross-type training going on, with an event like this, in the absence of any real understanding or knowledge (which aguadiate pointed out), some pilots have tended to fall back on their own knowledge or previous type experience instead... hence pushing on.
For me, it's cut-and-dry engine and aircraft type specific, with religious adherence to SOPS... no questions!
Regarding your second comment I think you misread my question.
Do Asiana have strict Boeing Checklists for their individual Boeing types or is it a combined Airbus-Boeing Asiana "special" like SIA (and just a few others) have?
I ask this because with so much cross-type training going on, with an event like this, in the absence of any real understanding or knowledge (which aguadiate pointed out), some pilots have tended to fall back on their own knowledge or previous type experience instead... hence pushing on.
For me, it's cut-and-dry engine and aircraft type specific, with religious adherence to SOPS... no questions!
Last edited by Chocks Away; 8th May 2014 at 03:16.
