Malaysian Airlines MH370 contact lost
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Having once upon a time been in the intercept/shoot em down business, I see this conversation about intercepts is getting into the very hypothetical unrealistic mode.
First off, most countries in peacetime do not establish alert conditions that require a prompt response from their interceptors. It is assumed that there will be intelligence received in sufficient time to increase the threat response level, We are talking days not hours of advance notice here. Then the alert level will be set based upon the perceived threat. Other than actual airborne alert status, the shortest practicable ground alert is 5 minutes with aircrew and line personnel continuously at the aircraft, but the engines not running.
If this level of alert is to be done continuously it requires either dedicated assets (bigger airforce) or surge tasking of existing interceptor units for a defined period. (expensive)
The next common level of alert would be 15 minute alert with the crews in a crew shack near the flight line. This requires almost the same level of assets, but is not so wearing on the personnel and so can be maintained longer.
Next level of alert would be several hours with designated personnel on call at home.
And finally, with no perceived threat, the intercept units would be in training mode, with all the vagaries of maintenance availability and individual levels of training affecting readiness.
It all comes down to tasking. What are the intercept units tasked to do by the leadership? Countries generally wish to keep their levels of readiness on a need to know basis.
I would personally be very surprised if any of the countries in the region had anyone in a short notice intercept role.
It is generally impractical in fuel requirements to chase down and intercept a subsonic target from the stern hemisphere beyond 50 nm range. It is also a technically challenging evolution, particularly at night, requiring a high level of training to assure success. If there was ever a desire to intercept MH370, it probably came too late to be implemented.
First off, most countries in peacetime do not establish alert conditions that require a prompt response from their interceptors. It is assumed that there will be intelligence received in sufficient time to increase the threat response level, We are talking days not hours of advance notice here. Then the alert level will be set based upon the perceived threat. Other than actual airborne alert status, the shortest practicable ground alert is 5 minutes with aircrew and line personnel continuously at the aircraft, but the engines not running.
If this level of alert is to be done continuously it requires either dedicated assets (bigger airforce) or surge tasking of existing interceptor units for a defined period. (expensive)
The next common level of alert would be 15 minute alert with the crews in a crew shack near the flight line. This requires almost the same level of assets, but is not so wearing on the personnel and so can be maintained longer.
Next level of alert would be several hours with designated personnel on call at home.
And finally, with no perceived threat, the intercept units would be in training mode, with all the vagaries of maintenance availability and individual levels of training affecting readiness.
It all comes down to tasking. What are the intercept units tasked to do by the leadership? Countries generally wish to keep their levels of readiness on a need to know basis.
I would personally be very surprised if any of the countries in the region had anyone in a short notice intercept role.
It is generally impractical in fuel requirements to chase down and intercept a subsonic target from the stern hemisphere beyond 50 nm range. It is also a technically challenging evolution, particularly at night, requiring a high level of training to assure success. If there was ever a desire to intercept MH370, it probably came too late to be implemented.
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You can't police what you don't see and I quote from the preliminary report;
"A playback of a recording from military primary radar revealed that an aircraft with a
possibility of MH 370 had made an air-turn back onto a Westerly heading crossing
Peninsular Malaysia. The search area was then extended to the Straits of Malacca."
Despite various press reports and overwhelming conflicting information, the Malaysian government are not prepared to say that they actually saw MH370 on radar in real time. That report indicates that it was only after playing back the tapes that they took any kind of action based on radar information.
Mr 2hats on 4 corners was IMO disingenuous in answering a question with the rhetorical of asking should he have ordered it shot down. The answer he should have given was; you can't intercept what you can't see.
At this point in time I haven't seen a single reliable report of what was seen on radar and more importantly nothing released in any briefing. The altitudes perceived of between 12 & 45000 haven't been mentioned in the prelim report
and IMO the only reliable one is 5000ft based on the gap in the unidentified track which was shown to the Chinese press.
IMO the only radar data they had is that single 200nm NW track and that was discovered only after replaying tapes.
Embarassing for the Malaysian government to admit that a B777 can transit their airspace without being seen but in the interests of finding this plane it's time they specifically stated what they saw on radar.
"A playback of a recording from military primary radar revealed that an aircraft with a
possibility of MH 370 had made an air-turn back onto a Westerly heading crossing
Peninsular Malaysia. The search area was then extended to the Straits of Malacca."
Despite various press reports and overwhelming conflicting information, the Malaysian government are not prepared to say that they actually saw MH370 on radar in real time. That report indicates that it was only after playing back the tapes that they took any kind of action based on radar information.
Mr 2hats on 4 corners was IMO disingenuous in answering a question with the rhetorical of asking should he have ordered it shot down. The answer he should have given was; you can't intercept what you can't see.
At this point in time I haven't seen a single reliable report of what was seen on radar and more importantly nothing released in any briefing. The altitudes perceived of between 12 & 45000 haven't been mentioned in the prelim report
and IMO the only reliable one is 5000ft based on the gap in the unidentified track which was shown to the Chinese press.
IMO the only radar data they had is that single 200nm NW track and that was discovered only after replaying tapes.
Embarassing for the Malaysian government to admit that a B777 can transit their airspace without being seen but in the interests of finding this plane it's time they specifically stated what they saw on radar.
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Thank you IanW and Machinbird. Two voices of reason and experience after a lot of blaah blaah.
For me the beginning of the flight, the lack of ATC/military response and the delay for announced SAR have never seemed to be a big issue, so your posts make sense. Obviously the why, the wherefore and finally the where are different questions.
The last couple of days there has been a lot of discussion about the validity of the CVR/FDR pings. I get the impression that the media have picked up and rehashed old info so that suddenly all the detections are suspect despite the lack of a statement from the JACC to this effect. Something very strange is going on if the double acoustic pings with the right duration have nothing to do with MH370, so here's hoping that the new search finally finds the aircraft.
For me the beginning of the flight, the lack of ATC/military response and the delay for announced SAR have never seemed to be a big issue, so your posts make sense. Obviously the why, the wherefore and finally the where are different questions.
The last couple of days there has been a lot of discussion about the validity of the CVR/FDR pings. I get the impression that the media have picked up and rehashed old info so that suddenly all the detections are suspect despite the lack of a statement from the JACC to this effect. Something very strange is going on if the double acoustic pings with the right duration have nothing to do with MH370, so here's hoping that the new search finally finds the aircraft.
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Something is not right here
These folks are truly experts and immensely experienced. They expressed no doubts as to the origin of the Pings, which occurred where, obviously, they expected them to occur. Now they all believe the Pings were not from 370 and that is the reason for not releasing the recordings. I'm not much into conspiracy theories but something very odd has happened here.
These folks are truly experts and immensely experienced. They expressed no doubts as to the origin of the Pings, which occurred where, obviously, they expected them to occur. Now they all believe the Pings were not from 370 and that is the reason for not releasing the recordings. I'm not much into conspiracy theories but something very odd has happened here.
In fact from what I've seen Angus Houston seems to have hindered the search effort at every corner!
As far as I've seen the original location where China heard their pings has never been searched.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Machinbird, thank you, that is exactly what we have been saying for weeks now until modded out each time. Even yesterday - there is no requirement for States to maintain an interceptor alert or even have the capability so to do.
One more point to the interception option, which may be moded out though.
Remeber the first days of the missing MH370?
I remeber one statement repeated for some days until the questions got painful, then the statement was demented officially. Two month later we are used to receiving information, which is revoked few days later. Therefore make up your own mind whom you believe.
General Rodzali said interceptors were not scrambled because the unidentified plane appeared to be a civilian aircraft.
What can we read out of that information:
- There would have been interceptors available.
- There are procedures implemented under those a scramble would commence
- The plane was observed and reported in time
- With the information available the plane was declared civil no threat
I do not agree with Machinebirds analysis, that the discusssion gets unrealistic.
I know no airforce around my country with no air policing procedures in force. The end of the cold war nearly 20 years ago didn't change those procedures. The necessity for the grade of readiness is defined by the advance warning available. The costs of such a readiness is negligable. Soldiers are not paid for hours and aircraft cost not more money when they are kept in any kind of higher alert state.
It is unrealistic to assume an alert state of 5 minutes over prolonged time, and nobody did that. But having an alert state of 60 minutes or 30 minutes allows a gradual increase of the alert state when situation dictates. The persons on 60 minute alert will then raise out of bed, cloth up, aircraft are powered up and when ready to launch within the new readiness state next orders are awaited.
It is no argument that the task of interception of an unidentified target may turn out impossible due to fuel exhaustion or other factors, as those factors are only known in hindsight. A target may turn and solve the range problem, or it may turn away and create a range problem to the interceptor. Interceptor forces all over the globe can be considered useless, when the possibility of failure prevents the implementation of such force beforehand.
There might still be the option that no alert force in some readiness state was available, but why would the minister of defence not dodge those questions with something like
"i can not coment in public on the readiness state of our forces...."?
He clearly expressed that it was not necessary to launch, as he had no intention to shoot it down.
AIP Malaysia concerning interceptions.
http://aip.dca.gov.my/aip%20pdf/ENR/...20Aircraft.pdf
Remeber the first days of the missing MH370?
I remeber one statement repeated for some days until the questions got painful, then the statement was demented officially. Two month later we are used to receiving information, which is revoked few days later. Therefore make up your own mind whom you believe.
General Rodzali said interceptors were not scrambled because the unidentified plane appeared to be a civilian aircraft.
What can we read out of that information:
- There would have been interceptors available.
- There are procedures implemented under those a scramble would commence
- The plane was observed and reported in time
- With the information available the plane was declared civil no threat
I do not agree with Machinebirds analysis, that the discusssion gets unrealistic.
I know no airforce around my country with no air policing procedures in force. The end of the cold war nearly 20 years ago didn't change those procedures. The necessity for the grade of readiness is defined by the advance warning available. The costs of such a readiness is negligable. Soldiers are not paid for hours and aircraft cost not more money when they are kept in any kind of higher alert state.
It is unrealistic to assume an alert state of 5 minutes over prolonged time, and nobody did that. But having an alert state of 60 minutes or 30 minutes allows a gradual increase of the alert state when situation dictates. The persons on 60 minute alert will then raise out of bed, cloth up, aircraft are powered up and when ready to launch within the new readiness state next orders are awaited.
It is no argument that the task of interception of an unidentified target may turn out impossible due to fuel exhaustion or other factors, as those factors are only known in hindsight. A target may turn and solve the range problem, or it may turn away and create a range problem to the interceptor. Interceptor forces all over the globe can be considered useless, when the possibility of failure prevents the implementation of such force beforehand.
There might still be the option that no alert force in some readiness state was available, but why would the minister of defence not dodge those questions with something like
"i can not coment in public on the readiness state of our forces...."?
He clearly expressed that it was not necessary to launch, as he had no intention to shoot it down.
AIP Malaysia concerning interceptions.
http://aip.dca.gov.my/aip%20pdf/ENR/...20Aircraft.pdf
Last edited by RetiredF4; 24th May 2014 at 10:25. Reason: Link for AIP Malaysia
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"... interceptors were not scrambled because the unidentified plane appeared to be a civilian aircraft."
"... it was not necessary to launch, as he had no intention to shoot it down."
This is just talk, excuses, not reasons or explanations. You can't deduce anything from it.
"... it was not necessary to launch, as he had no intention to shoot it down."
This is just talk, excuses, not reasons or explanations. You can't deduce anything from it.
Last edited by Ornis; 24th May 2014 at 09:21.
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"I know no airforce around my country with no air policing procedures in
force."
That's in Europe with a history of possible conflict and a very visible air threat
there is no such thing in East Asia or Australia
India & pakistan are probably the nearest to a C European condition - even N Korea poses no immediate air threat
None of the countries, including Australia, have aircraft on standby ready to intercept in the way the Luftwaffe or the RAF do
force."
That's in Europe with a history of possible conflict and a very visible air threat
there is no such thing in East Asia or Australia
India & pakistan are probably the nearest to a C European condition - even N Korea poses no immediate air threat
None of the countries, including Australia, have aircraft on standby ready to intercept in the way the Luftwaffe or the RAF do
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... resources were mobilised on the basis of the results of a system that they did not have, I mean really...?
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The China Rubber raft pings
As far as I've seen the original location where China heard their pings has never been searched.
And as I recall- some sort of surface search for debris was made in that same area by a few ships before moving to the more north ( current ) area.
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chinese pings
sampublis
I recall that HMS Echo was working in concert with the Chinese Ping ship. For a number of days.
I am sure someone can "cull" the reports to verify, or take my word.
I recall that HMS Echo was working in concert with the Chinese Ping ship. For a number of days.
I am sure someone can "cull" the reports to verify, or take my word.
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JACC Media release:
Media Release
7 April 2014—am
Up to nine military planes, three civil planes and 14 ships will assist in today's search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.
The search area is expected to be approximately 234,000 square kilometres.
Good weather is expected throughout the day with showers in the afternoon although this is not expected to affect the search.
ADV Ocean Shield is continuing investigations in its own area.
HMS Echo is en route to assist the Chinese vessel Haixun 01, which detected pulse signals in the Indian Ocean.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau continues to refine the area where the aircraft entered the water based on continuing ground-breaking and multi-disciplinary technical analysis of satellite communication and aircraft performance, passed from the international air crash investigative team comprising analysts from Malaysia, the United States, the UK, China and Australia.
Media Release
7 April 2014—am
Up to nine military planes, three civil planes and 14 ships will assist in today's search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.
The search area is expected to be approximately 234,000 square kilometres.
Good weather is expected throughout the day with showers in the afternoon although this is not expected to affect the search.
ADV Ocean Shield is continuing investigations in its own area.
HMS Echo is en route to assist the Chinese vessel Haixun 01, which detected pulse signals in the Indian Ocean.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau continues to refine the area where the aircraft entered the water based on continuing ground-breaking and multi-disciplinary technical analysis of satellite communication and aircraft performance, passed from the international air crash investigative team comprising analysts from Malaysia, the United States, the UK, China and Australia.
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from the international air crash investigative team comprising analysts from Malaysia, the United States, the UK, China and Australia.
Three of the nations UK China and Australia, have no direct involvement with MAH370, so there is plenty of independent experts on the board, so why all the continuing clamour for the data to be released?
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...there is plenty of independent experts on the board, so why all the continuing clamour for the data to be released?
Not too long ago we would have blamed gods for such a mysterious disappearance.
I believe they will find the plane, whether there's anything approaching a widely-accepted explanation is another matter.
Last edited by Ornis; 24th May 2014 at 20:38.
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None of the countries, including Australia, have aircraft on standby ready to intercept in the way the Luftwaffe or the RAF do
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Ho Chi Minh center would have then been trying everything to contact the aircraft - and this was their task and their responsibility - NOTHING to do with Subang center.
This is the way the rules are defined. That is why [donning tin foil hat] it is said that this was an ideal place to break out of the system and stop cooperating with the surveillance systems. For a flight emergency to occur at precisely that moment is possible but highly improbable.
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@ Ian W (25 May 15:25) and related posts:
Certainly the "one agency" only component of the way in which air traffic control and airspace management is handled across international borders as well as over international waters is as Ian W's post has stated it. At the same time, does not this situation call for asking a broader question? Particularly: is the current structure anything like optimum? Taking all the constraints of cost, international relations, and inertia of "the way things have been done for a long time now" into account, does "the System" actually accept this state of affairs as the best that can be done? Obviously by System I mean the web of ICAO (and IATA as well, probably) standards and recommended practices, subject matter MOUs, and presumably other components.
The several well-informed posts on interceptor scramble schemes and related costs seem incontrovertibly dependent for their pertinence on the observation that someone should have recognized the loss of contact sooner. But if the lost contact - and I hate to use a botched-up cliche, but it fits - "fell through the cracks", is it not a fair and reasonable inquiry to say "hey, is this as good as the System can do?", or are we left with, when reduced to simplest terms, a shrug, and an acceptance that this apparent gap in air traffic control and airspace management will be allowed to persist?
Certainly the "one agency" only component of the way in which air traffic control and airspace management is handled across international borders as well as over international waters is as Ian W's post has stated it. At the same time, does not this situation call for asking a broader question? Particularly: is the current structure anything like optimum? Taking all the constraints of cost, international relations, and inertia of "the way things have been done for a long time now" into account, does "the System" actually accept this state of affairs as the best that can be done? Obviously by System I mean the web of ICAO (and IATA as well, probably) standards and recommended practices, subject matter MOUs, and presumably other components.
The several well-informed posts on interceptor scramble schemes and related costs seem incontrovertibly dependent for their pertinence on the observation that someone should have recognized the loss of contact sooner. But if the lost contact - and I hate to use a botched-up cliche, but it fits - "fell through the cracks", is it not a fair and reasonable inquiry to say "hey, is this as good as the System can do?", or are we left with, when reduced to simplest terms, a shrug, and an acceptance that this apparent gap in air traffic control and airspace management will be allowed to persist?
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and an acceptance that this apparent gap in air traffic control and airspace management will be allowed to persist?
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Quote: "MH370 doesn't even register on a scale of importance where gaps should/could be mended." On the premise that the important gaps you contend can and should be mended would be off-topic, I'm asking just whether any of the gaps to which you refer - if they were fixed - would indirectly help resolve a situation such as this? Of course I'm also curious about the complete assessment you only encapsulated, but whether it would drift the thread, it's hard to know.