AF471 - Nov 16th 2011 - Final Report
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No DH in France ?
Quoting "zippy monster" on page 1:
My operator (European lo-co) has to use 25' for a CAT IIIB in France, despite using "no DH" everywhere else. I can't remember the exact reason our flight ops people gave to us word-for-word, but it is something to do with the French not allowing "no DH" operations.
Quoting "A4" on page 2:
The NO DH was removed about three years ago - why, I have no idea.
No , one french operator has been using no DH concept for many years on 747-400 and AF A 380 are using it too .
Seems to be a case by case regulation ; more exactly a company/aircraft type case by case.
My operator (European lo-co) has to use 25' for a CAT IIIB in France, despite using "no DH" everywhere else. I can't remember the exact reason our flight ops people gave to us word-for-word, but it is something to do with the French not allowing "no DH" operations.
Quoting "A4" on page 2:
The NO DH was removed about three years ago - why, I have no idea.
No , one french operator has been using no DH concept for many years on 747-400 and AF A 380 are using it too .
Seems to be a case by case regulation ; more exactly a company/aircraft type case by case.
Has it been determined what caused the ‘No Land 3’ alert? This appears to be the initiating factor in the event.
Might the crew have been looking for a cause or contributing (distracting) factor?
Might the crew have been looking for a cause or contributing (distracting) factor?
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Has it been determined what caused the ‘No Land 3’ alert? This appears to be the initiating factor in the event.
But it still begs the question what is AF SOP's. In a previous life & a different a/c LAND 3 = Fail operational autoland. LAND 2 = Fail Passive autoland. In both cases it was continue and autoland. Why the G/A? What was briefed before the approach. Some airlines had the policy Land 3 = CAT 3 & Land 2 = CAT 2. That would require a change of DH. Why for heavens sake did they have this idea? HE only knows, but they though it was simpler for the crews to remember. Either way it was still a continue and autoland.
I'd like to know the human factors involved in this event and what the SOIP's are. If the G/A was not necessitated by SOP's then why did they do it? Was the call "Alarm" an SOP by any pilot, and following such a call is the SOP to G/A?
I would have expected a CAT 3 approach to have been briefed fully and well understood by all. This brief would have included the "alarm" call if it was an SOP.
Was the G/A initiated by any confusion caused by such a call? When in doubt etc. etc. but it still begs the question……...
But it still begs the question what is AF SOP's. In a previous life & a different a/c LAND 3 = Fail operational autoland. LAND 2 = Fail Passive autoland. In both cases it was continue and autoland. Why the G/A? What was briefed before the approach. Some airlines had the policy Land 3 = CAT 3 & Land 2 = CAT 2. That would require a change of DH. Why for heavens sake did they have this idea? HE only knows, but they though it was simpler for the crews to remember. Either way it was still a continue and autoland.
I'd like to know the human factors involved in this event and what the SOIP's are. If the G/A was not necessitated by SOP's then why did they do it? Was the call "Alarm" an SOP by any pilot, and following such a call is the SOP to G/A?
I would have expected a CAT 3 approach to have been briefed fully and well understood by all. This brief would have included the "alarm" call if it was an SOP.
Was the G/A initiated by any confusion caused by such a call? When in doubt etc. etc. but it still begs the question……...
In a previous life & a different a/c LAND 3 = Fail operational autoland. LAND 2 = Fail Passive autoland. In both cases it was continue and autoland.
Ut Sementem Feeceris
@VNAV PATH - we always used to be able to CAT 3B NO DH ops in France until approx 3 years ago. Now, without exception, all airfields in France have 25' DH for 3B ops. Nothing changed in our outfit (major European LoCo), but suddenly we weren't allowed. So I don't see why AF A380 ops are exempt.....but thinking about it, may be I do 
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Wiggy: If the company declared that Land 2 = CAT 2 then this would include the CAT 2 DH & RVR. If Land 3 changed to Land 2 <1000', and the last RVR given was <CAT 2 there are options. Ask for the latest RVR and decide what to do; say nothing and continue to CAT 2 DH; or what ever the company SOP said. There is no a/c technical reason to make a G/A. Remembering I'm not a B777, but ex-B767 pilot and I suspect they have a similar family of systems.
If Land 3 changed to Land 2 <1000', and the last RVR given was <CAT 2 there are options.
Interesting.
Just for clarity in our case (EU-Land, 777 ops, but not AF) for a "No Land 3"/"Land 2" below 1000' we need to have been passed CAT 3A compliant RVRs at/before 1000' to allow continuation on down to the 3A DA (usually 50'), otherwise it is a go-around - there aren't any options (except for force majeur
).......
RAT, wiggy, et al, the points are all very interesting, but; “what caused the ‘No Land 3’ alert”.
Perhaps type rated specialists could speculate or add examples; is this type of alert a frequent occurrence?
Was a fault identified, was the aircraft returned to service NFF, has the alert happened since?
Perhaps type rated specialists could speculate or add examples; is this type of alert a frequent occurrence?
Was a fault identified, was the aircraft returned to service NFF, has the alert happened since?
wiggy, et al, the points are all very interesting, but; “what caused the ‘No Land 3’ alert”.
Perhaps type rated specialists.......
Perhaps type rated specialists.......
I don't see the point in me speculating in what can caused this particular "No land 3", there are a handful of failures I know of which will produce a "No land 3" but you'd need an engineer to come up with a full list...if there even is one. The AF engineers will have known the real story once they interrogated the Central Maintenance Computer post flight....maybe one of them will post here....
Last edited by wiggy; 8th Feb 2014 at 19:28.
Whilst the nuances of minima and LAND 2 are fascinating - the fact that two experienced crew nearly drove a 777 at Go Around thrust, straight down the glide slope and into the ground, is disturbing.
If I'd been on that Jumpseat during this multi second display of confusion, I'd have been a little tempted to reach forward and hit TOGA.
If I'd been on that Jumpseat during this multi second display of confusion, I'd have been a little tempted to reach forward and hit TOGA.
f I'd been on that Jumpseat during this multi second display of confusion, I'd have been a little tempted to reach forward and hit TOGA.
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Lots of the usual PPRuNe waffle. Only 200+ pages to go before the Mods close the thread down.
Maybe Air France should simply introduce a new flight deck announcement before departure:
"Bienvenue à l'émission de Muppet".
If I recall the exercise numbers correctly:
AF447 = Private Pilot Licence exercise 10
AF471 = Private Pilot Licence exercise 13
Maybe Air France should simply introduce a new flight deck announcement before departure:
"Bienvenue à l'émission de Muppet".
If I recall the exercise numbers correctly:
AF447 = Private Pilot Licence exercise 10
AF471 = Private Pilot Licence exercise 13
Thanks for the contributions of the ‘informed’ knowledge.
The technical inquiry is if there would be any other indication as to why the system degraded, e.g. rad alt fail; and if so would there be any other flight deck alert, independent of the autopilot.
As for ‘no land 3’, I presume that this is actually a change of status (system integrity / capability) for which there is no alert other than the change of annunciation. Thus an alert ‘warning’ call might be unwarranted; whereas the change of state – ‘LAND 2’ call could aid system awareness and cue remaining capability.
The lack of GA – mis selection, contributed to the incident, and appears to be associated with a weak design / switch location. Just because everyone else manages to select GA does not mean that the design is adequate for all situations, especially those with surprise.
The crew procedures should be considered in the context of the situation. If the crew choose to autoland in clear conditions – a practice approach without LVP, then an unwarranted change of state might be anticipated. A pre landing briefing should cover the alternative courses of action – land 2 or manual, etc.
Alternatively, as in this instance, the autoland was with LVP but > cat3 , thus a change of state might be less lightly, but still significant; the pre landing briefing again should specify the choice of action, e.g. if land 2 then continue, if AP disc then GA.
For visibilities requiring full Cat 3 capability then the alternatives would be further limited, but in all cases the annunciation call / change of state could be the same – consistency.
The GA flight procedure might vary - auto / manual, but the monitoring should be similar. The PNF should be able to select a change of configuration, quickly scan pitch, power, speed, then check back to the configuration.
In these instances it is not that the tactical situation management was weak, but more of the strategic plan. What was the pre landing briefing, what monitoring was expected - relative importance of modes vs aircraft flight path, what parameters should be scanned, why, when (cf BEA AGASA study).
Are crews prepared to be surprised?
The technical inquiry is if there would be any other indication as to why the system degraded, e.g. rad alt fail; and if so would there be any other flight deck alert, independent of the autopilot.
As for ‘no land 3’, I presume that this is actually a change of status (system integrity / capability) for which there is no alert other than the change of annunciation. Thus an alert ‘warning’ call might be unwarranted; whereas the change of state – ‘LAND 2’ call could aid system awareness and cue remaining capability.
The lack of GA – mis selection, contributed to the incident, and appears to be associated with a weak design / switch location. Just because everyone else manages to select GA does not mean that the design is adequate for all situations, especially those with surprise.
The crew procedures should be considered in the context of the situation. If the crew choose to autoland in clear conditions – a practice approach without LVP, then an unwarranted change of state might be anticipated. A pre landing briefing should cover the alternative courses of action – land 2 or manual, etc.
Alternatively, as in this instance, the autoland was with LVP but > cat3 , thus a change of state might be less lightly, but still significant; the pre landing briefing again should specify the choice of action, e.g. if land 2 then continue, if AP disc then GA.
For visibilities requiring full Cat 3 capability then the alternatives would be further limited, but in all cases the annunciation call / change of state could be the same – consistency.
The GA flight procedure might vary - auto / manual, but the monitoring should be similar. The PNF should be able to select a change of configuration, quickly scan pitch, power, speed, then check back to the configuration.
In these instances it is not that the tactical situation management was weak, but more of the strategic plan. What was the pre landing briefing, what monitoring was expected - relative importance of modes vs aircraft flight path, what parameters should be scanned, why, when (cf BEA AGASA study).
Are crews prepared to be surprised?
As for ‘no land 3’, I presume that this is actually a change of status (system integrity / capability) for which there is no alert other than the change of annunciation. Thus an alert ‘warning’ call might be unwarranted; whereas the change of state – ‘LAND 2’ call could aid system awareness and cue remaining capability.
Last edited by wiggy; 10th Feb 2014 at 05:48.
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This is a question and maybe a little bet of speculation I hope you don't mind me posting this here, and please feel free to correct me if you think I am wrong.
In 1972 Eastern Air Lines, Flight 401 crashed. The probable cause was: "The failure of the fight crew to monitor the flight instruments during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed."
However in the final report, http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR73-14.pdf the NTSB alluded to the possibility that the captain may have caused the autopilot to disconnect when the captain bumped his control column while turning around and ordering his co pilot down to look at the visual nose gear indicator, down a hatch in the cockpit. This only required 15 lbs, or 7.5 kg of force to deactivate the autopilot's pitch control. This might have been a spit second bump on the control column.
I am wondering if Boeing saw that report and decided that more assertive inputs were needed on the control column to kick the auto pilot off to prevent a similar accident from happening again? The NTSB made loads of recommendations, but nothing like that.
In 1972 Eastern Air Lines, Flight 401 crashed. The probable cause was: "The failure of the fight crew to monitor the flight instruments during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed."
However in the final report, http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR73-14.pdf the NTSB alluded to the possibility that the captain may have caused the autopilot to disconnect when the captain bumped his control column while turning around and ordering his co pilot down to look at the visual nose gear indicator, down a hatch in the cockpit. This only required 15 lbs, or 7.5 kg of force to deactivate the autopilot's pitch control. This might have been a spit second bump on the control column.
I am wondering if Boeing saw that report and decided that more assertive inputs were needed on the control column to kick the auto pilot off to prevent a similar accident from happening again? The NTSB made loads of recommendations, but nothing like that.
Last edited by PPL Hobbyist; 10th Feb 2014 at 20:01.
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Guys, we're still arguing in circles around the crux of the matter. Why did Land 2 necessitate a G/A? The G/A procedure was messed up, but why was it performed in the first place? Perhaps someone inside AF can enlighten us as to their SOP's. If the G/A was not necessary then that decision is the root cause of the subsequent problems. Why, how it was messed up; autopilot disconnect forces, the position of switches, etc.etc. are all consequent of the initial action and worthy of discussion under another topic.
In direct discussion of this incident I'm curious if the G/A decision was appropriate yes/no.
In direct discussion of this incident I'm curious if the G/A decision was appropriate yes/no.