Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.

[Sergey Tachenov]

I know, I read that article at compromat.ru. It sounds like a deliberate attempt to cause widespread panic among public for whatever reason. It doesn't look like a genuine research or even personal opinion. Just my feeling, though.

What I was talking about is that it's not 'Найти настоящих пилотов на такие зарплаты невозможно', it's 'Найти (любых) пилотов на такие зарплаты невозможно'. There are NO pilots (no matter how bad they are) that would agree to work for 20000 RUB. None at all.

For example, what do they pay to software developers at Microsoft? Say, $60/hour or around that. (Just my guess.) Now imagine a company that pays $30/hour. Obviously they won't have those best Microsoft kind of programmers, but they will still be able to find some. Now what if someone said that there are a company that offers $3/hour to a full-time programer in the US? You get the picture. You don't need to be a programmer to figure out that it's a complete nonsense.

[Karel_x]

It sounds like a deliberate attempt to cause widespread panic among public for whatever reason.

Journalists are similar all around the world... But in fact I don't believe that crew salaries are reason for worse safety record of Russian air traffic. I think, there are primarily historical reasons. In times of USSR, airliners pilots originate very often from military pilots, which is not ideal for safety (easy to risk, drink). In times of Yelcin era of destroying USSR, the Aeroflot was divided into a tens of companies, often some of them were without good background and appropriate conditions. At the same time the number of passengers sharply drops (from 90 millions drops to 20!) and a new generation of people arises in Russia that had never flown by plane. In those times it was very easy to buy one or two old planes and start to do business. But it is not easy to do it safe without money (experiences, training, maintenance)... In recent years the numbers of passengers are increasing very steep and now there is lack of experienced pilots. And of course some companies are controlled by wild managers that think only how to make money. But I believe that it is getting better and by several years the safety problems will be only history.

[MrSnuggles]

Karel, Sergey...

Could it be that it's just a typo? Someone forgetting a number?

That seems like the simplest solution to the salary confusion.

[hamster3null]

There is a number of Russian-language sources reporting salaries on the order of 200k to 350k rubles/month for an A320 captain at 90 hours/month. Pilots make less than captains, Aeroflot pays above average in the industry, and pilots of domestic aircraft (e.g. Tu-154) make substantially less than pilots of Boeings and Airbuses.

This article Профсоюз требует с АК «Татарстан» свой процент reports that an average salary of a pilot at Tatarstan Airlines is 100k rubles/month ($3,000/month). Their 737 captain could have bene making 200k/month. 20k/month is completely implausible.

"This article cites an Aeroflot A320 captain flying 90 hours a month as making 400,000 rubles a month or $12K."

The article cites an intention to raise salaries to this level, which is obviously not the same thing as actually raising them.

[paulmoscow]

But I believe that it is getting better and by several years the safety problems will be only history.

Disrespect to rules is in Russian blood. The situation is similar to a service sector (including flight attendants,) where in most cases Russians are quite arrogant to serve other people.

[Karel_x]

Disrespect to rules is in Russian blood. The situation is similar to a service sector (including flight attendants,) where in most cases Russians are quite arrogant to serve other people.

I flew several times with TSO and UTA and I was quite satisfied with level of their service. I didn't notice any difference in relation to an average western company. Also ground services seems to be OK. Deicing was always done very carefully, un/loading baggages too. Maybe I can remember one a little creative t/o but surely no one was arrogant to me. Security rules at DME were very strict, similar to GB, but I was not surprise - it was after that terrible bombing attack.

Could it be that it's just a typo? Someone forgetting a number?

Yes of course it can be a typo, but in Russian they comment it "ludicrously" little... But those articles describes also very poor economic situation of TAK, problems of Bulgarian investors, blind management, long term debts for fuel, months without a salaries, crews going away, local political pressure etc etc. I am not sure that is true, it can be biased or written by a sensationalist journalist.

[Redredrobin]

According to AVH:

MAK have announced that the CVR has been read.

A number of safety recommendations have been made, including procedures for ATC assistance for aircraft with technical failures.

[Christodoulidesd]

news

from avherald:

Information released by Rosaviatsia on Nov 28th 2013 based on preliminary investigation results by MAK states, that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type) was rated for CAT II ILS approaches. According to preliminary information the crew was significantly (4km) off the approach track prompting ATC to query the crew. Corrections were made, the aircraft remained significantly right of the extended runway centerline however until the crew selected heading 250 into autopilot (heading select mode) and the aircraft intercepted the localizer automatically about 2nm short of the runway threshold at about 1000 feet AGL, the glideslope did not capture due to height however. After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch, then disengaged both autopilots engaged in the automatic approach and continued manually on flight director. Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact. The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically - nose down commanding the aircraft into a dive. In the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS at 700 meters/2300 feet above the runway, and began to rapidly descent, EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph at coordinates N55.608818 E49.276852, the impact occurred 45 seconds after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height. Initial safety recommendations released are to provide simulator training on balked landings, especially when close to the target altitude for the climb, provide training on recognition of complex spatial disorientation and upset recovery, provide training on operation and characteristics of aircraft systems especially autopilot and flight director during approach and missed approach, study the features of navigation system (FMS), consider revision of air traffic control procedures to provide more assistance to crews with technical failures including providing vectors to guide the aircraft onto the runway and conduct a conference to share technical flight experiences amongst operators.

[Herod]

After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch,

Incredible if true.

[ManaAdaSystem]

that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type)

What exactly do we have here? If these numbers are correct, two 47 year old pilots with next to no basic flight experience and straight on to a 737?

[olasek]

If these numbers are correct that's a very respectable flight experience, 4500 hrs combined for both plus almost 4000 hrs on type that's pretty darn good.

[mike734]

<<If these numbers are correct that's a very respectable flight experience, 4500 hrs combined for both plus almost 4000 hrs on type that's pretty darn good.>>

Really? It looks like the captain had about 3 years on the airplane and only 6 months in command. That not exactly a ton of time.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50

The question asked by me is related to a few comments on the speed of the initial report, and whether or not ( I asked, since I don't know) it may take a deeper look at subtle cues and signals held in the FDR to find out if a hardover may or may not have been involved.

Clandestino's typically combative approach aside, I think I understand what he's getting at. The information released so far makes no reference to rudder deflection or a significant yaw component in the sequence. If my memory serves me correctly, even the old (even at the time it was referred to unofficially as "Stone Age technology") FDR fitted to the UA535 aircraft registered significant rudder deflection and yaw in the flightpath. Lack of such information would infer a hardover is not a likely culprit or contributory factor here.

Agricarus bisporus said :

The most likely cause is quite simply overpitching due to a mishandled g/s and botched recovery, I'd be astonished if it were anything else.

I'm more out on a limb here, but as an educated guess - given that a botched pitch/power coupling would be likely to involve a gradual and repeated correction to the pitch angle, the FDR's apparent recording of a single, consistent and sustained pitch down command would indicate against this assertion.

Please feel free to correct me!

[olasek]

.gradual and repeated correction to the pitch angle,

It doesn't have to be neither 'repeated' nor 'gradual'. It is enough to read the report from the very similar Iclendair incident. The report uses phrases like 'automation trap', pilot confusion and pilots falling behind the airplane. They had 1000 ft more to play with than these 2 russian pilots so they managed to recover, but barely, with a single last ditch attempt to save themselves. If this crew had only 5-10 s to 'unconfuse' themselves that's not much.

[Machinbird]

Originally Posted by from avherald

........EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph.......

For the g to go negative, they must have had way too much nose down trim by that point.

It is hard to continue pushing the nose down when you are floating in the straps.

[Frosch]

Trim

Looks like what I feared in my initial post 149. (http://www.pprune.org/8162353-post149.html)

Unlike what ist stated at AvHerald, I do not think the stabtrim went to full ND "automatically". Seen pilots do it before. At low altitude time will be up before having a chance to regain control. When beeing disorientated too: no chance.

[Machinbird]

Looks like what I feared in my initial post 149. (http://www.pprune.org/8162353-post149.html)

Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact.

So no pitch down due to thrust reduction.

[Clandestino]

Originally Posted by Herod

Incredible if true.

Not true. "Диспетчер" literally means "dispatcher" but here actually denotes ATCO so they were talking to ATC, not flight dispatch.

For the time being, I can't find anything on either MAK or Rossaviyatsiya pages resembling what was posted on AvHerald and quoted here. As it runs quite contrary to first official statements, I'd advise "see and wait approach" before making fat assumptions of technical aspects on it.

Originally Posted by Mountain Bear

Duh. That assumes however that the PF is able to recognize the illusion as an illusion in the first instance. If the crew fails to recognize the illusion then for their minds it isn't an illusion at all; they are reacting to reality. The reason is that SGI is deadly is because crews fail to recognize it for what it is.

That's exactly why we teach people about it - so when it hits they are able to believe their instruments more than their senses.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50

Care to answer that?

Why the should I answer that on professional pilots forum?!?!? It's very easy.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50

The question asked by me is related to a few comments on the speed of the initial report, and whether or not ( I asked, since I don't know) it may take a deeper look at subtle cues and signals held in the FDR to find out if a hardover may or may not have been involved.

MAK ıs not your everyday BEA or NTSB or OVV. They know their stuff pretty well and are currently pursuing their goals with ruthless efficiency. Their reports are fast out and to the point, as they should be in the country with dismal safety culture. While unlike their western counterparts they currently waste no time on consultations with any and every party interested in investigation, lack of discussion does not seem to hurt quality of their reports and English translations (when available) are quite good.

Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50

Not all readers here are instrument rated pilots.

That's all very well as long they are readers. It's still well when they come, ask, get the answers and point out what they don't agree with and support it with good quality arguments. Sometimes the outsider view is quite helpful on the road to better understanding but this has too often been used around here as an excuse to promote theories that are utter nonsense.

I'm not particularly happy to see that misunderstanding of the way aeroplanes work combined with the ardent desire to share opinion with the world is not limited to Airbus cases anymore.

[Aluminium shuffler]

To contradict Olasek's post 302, this crew were not experienced. The FO was reasonably so for his position, but not the Captain. Both were clearly former cadets, with less than 200 hours each on ac other than the 737, so their manual handling and raw data skills were never honed. To have a Captain on such an aircraft at c.2300 hours total time is very unusual in the West, though I couldn't guess whether it's more normal in other regions, but regardless, it's a very small amount of time to have been promoted.

I fly with a lot of cadet pilots, and some of them are astonishingly sharp and able, while others not so much. However, they all lack basic skills which would be honed by more experience before jumping into a jet where the automatics prevent a development of handling and instrument interpretation. It is crucial to encourage cadets to hand fly and make visual and raw data approaches when the circumstances are good for such practice in order to hone their skills (and likewise for experienced crews to retain them). Whether such inexperience in manual IMC handling was a factor in this specific incident remains to be seen, but seeing that background and the Captain's lack of experience jumps out at me as being a plausible contributing factor.

[F14]

looks like a Go-Around without pressing TOGA. Followed the FD's into the ground