Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.

[jaja]

I am not trying to speculate on what might have happened here, but have a read about the ICELANDAIR B-757 that was very close to crash during a go-around at Oslo Gardermoen in 2002 .

Shocking to see how quickly a well trained north-european crew nearly lost it during a standard procedure in an fully operational aircraft.

Pitch - 49 degrees, and lowest RA 321 !

REPORT ON THE serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757

[DOVES]

Somatogravic Illusion (SI)?: I know because I've mentioned her several times in my classes; but in 45 -plus years of honest profession, mainly in the commercial Sector, conduct, thank God , without even getting a scratch on my plane , I never met her.
And in any case on the liner as everything that is fungible and redundant , even the pilots are 2 and it is not 'statistically' possible that both have simultaniously the same illness.
As for the gruesome accident in question, maybe we better wait the results of the investigation.
But let me express.
Given the increasing number of incidents/accidents occurring during a go-around with all engines operative , as we perform derated TO, why do we use max thrust, and the weight is certainly lighter, and we are not provided a reduced thrust for GA?

[Denti]

Actually, the 737 uses reduced thrust for G/A. At least as long as you only press the TOGA buttons once.

[aaben]

Yesterday I found a preliminary report issued on 19th Nov by Norwegian AIB. It describes incident on a B738 in Finland. During intermediate approach horizontal stabilizer moved to position full nose up, a/c pitched up +38,5 deg, KTAS dropped to 118. Fortunately crew was able to recover.

During investigation it has been found that at certain conditions de-icing fluid can ingress into tail cone compartment and it is possible that it freezes, blicking PCU input arms. This concerns all B737.

Abovementioned report: http://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporte...-File&attach=1

[A37575]

Anyone who wants to experience the power of somatogravic illusion only needs to sit inside a full flight simulator during take-off - the sense of acceleration is created by using the illusion in reverse.

.

Interesting that. Done lots of simulator sessions but haven't struck that problem. Have seen airsickness especially when taxiing and doing a 180 on the runway. The fix for airsickness was to close your eyes before starting the turn and don't open them until taxiing straight. You need a kind and understanding instructor, though. Also happens when coming out of reverse when slowing up after landing.

[Sergey Tachenov]

It may be a lame question, but why nobody implemented a system which could override pilot's action just before the moment when the collision becomes imminent? It looks like a kind of silly that a fully operable plane with all the modern sophisticated computers can fly into terrain just because pilots suffered some kind of illusion.

[BOAC]

A37575 - JH is simply describing a form of SI used all the time in simulators - not 'a problem' - and you will have experienced it on every detail. It is the use of a tilt of the box to simulate a longitudinal acceleration, that's all. It 'stimulates' all the body's acceleration sensors including the inner ear. As an example of the power of SI, it is extremely convincing, as we all know. The point JH is making is that if you 'reverse' the 'illusion' it can be equally convincing.

[Sunamer]

but why nobody implemented a system which could override pilot's action just before the moment when the collision becomes imminent

because that system is not 100% fail proof and when it fails in such a way that it still can override but the logic of that system is erroneous, it overrides pilot's actions and crashes the plane. now what?

[Sergey Tachenov]

Well, if the probability of a system error is significantly lower than the probability of a pilot error, isn't that still a good thing? What's worse, 10 planes crashing because of a pilot error or 1 plane crashing because of a system error? Not to mention that it is actually possible to fix the system error after the first accident so that it never happens again (although a different error can still happen), but you can't 100% "fix" all the pilots, even though you can give them better training. And as I understand, there are already similar systems. For example, I remember NGE's Mayday episode Pilot vs Plane, where the pilot pulled up and the nose went down because of the Alpha Protection or something, in order to prevent stalling. The plane still crashed anyway, but it was determined that the crash would be worse if the plane obeyed the pilot's command and crashed after stalling.

[The Ancient Geek]

Wihout getting into a stupid Boeing vs Airbus war PLEASE.

ISTM that the envelope protection of an A320 could possibly have prevented this. Or possibly not ?

[DOVES]

Thank you so much Jazz Hands and BOAC
I'm really ignorant on the subject.

And so I have to change my sentence:
...but in 45 -plus years of honest profession, mainly in the commercial Sector, conduct, thank God , without even getting a scratch on my plane , I've never met her in the real world. ...

So I experienced unknowingly the SI thousands of times.
As a matter of fact, often my students said they had felt unwell during certain maneuvers in the simulator.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by Dan Winterland

In my opinion, this crash is a classic SI case.

If the only tool you have is a hammer, it all looks like a nail.

If you are at night, and trying to visually acquire the airport, and realize "this is AFU" and call for a Go Around, the first thing you do is GET ON THE GAUGES! You set GA attitude as power comes on and you, or the dear old Otto, holds it. Since these guys were in manual, the objective is to set the go around attitude, and hold it. As your C/P changes configuration via flaps or gear up in due course, you still fly on the gauges, and your primary reference is your pitch and roll indicating instrument, with cross check on your airspeed and VSI to make sure your GA is within bounds.

I don't know how well trained this crew were in doing a go around, but I saw Agricus' post and believed his point: pilots behind the aircraft shortly after GA decision. Flying visual wasn't a choice, flying with a proper instrument scan is the ONLY choice in IMC missed appproach, and Night IMC missed approach. It appears from the information that their condition was night/IMC.

If you don't stick to the basics, you'll get behind the plane. If behind the plane, it is possible to overcontrol when trying to correct.

Dan, the issue is Instrument Scan. Is the devleopment and application of one not considered a core competency of a professional pilot? Does the pilot force of a given airline get sufficient reps in instrument flying to keep the scan skill current, and not rusty?

You mitigate the problems of those illusions by flying on your instruments, regardless of what you "feel" in the seat.

EDIT:

I don't know enough about 737 to guess intelligently, but IF they had a malfunction in the pitch trim motor/system, and had a trim hardover or runaway during this maneuver, how easy is it for FDR to figure that out?

[island_airphoto]

Light aircraft CFI/II/MEI here.
I have seen something like this when transitioning pilots from a very light airplane - like say a C-150 or J-3 size - to a "big" airplane like a C-182. A C-150 can be flown pretty well without ever touching the trim. Then you get that pilot in a C-182 and get him to start using trim. Coming down final with 2 aboard you'll be trimmed pretty much full back if you don't want to land nose first. Say Go Around and now you have a plane headed for the moon and a panicked pilot pushing full forward with many times the force his previous airplane ever needed. Even worse - hop in a C-208 with one big 600 or so HP engine out front and you really better be trimming it right.

As for the various illusions, I do everything I possibly can do to get my students to develope vertigo. You cannot imagine how hard it is to overcome your brain screaming WE ARE DIVING LEFT OMFG when the plane is really climbing to the right or vice versa until you have to do it for real. IMHO winning this mental battle reduces the brainpower left for any other task by a lot. The "black hole" issue is pretty common in GA. You take off with good visual reference - you think - on a dark overcast night and rotate. Now your world is pitch black. Or you break out on the ILS, switch to looking outside, and then go around. Suddenly your world disapears, the plane is loud and changing pitch and flaps need to come up and you can't see anything and it can get away from you with only 150-300-600 HP to manage. Can't imagine what a half-trained pilot in a 737 would be going through.

[fireflybob]

Lonewolf 50, excellent post which says it all - thanks for bringing us back to the basics.

[island_airphoto]

Lonewolf:
Every plane I have flown with a coupled autopilot can leave you with a big mess if it gets out of hand. You notice it going bad, kick it offline, and now you are hand flying with a badly out of trim airplane and sometimes the actions you took to kill Otto also take the electric trim offline. That said, it doesn't really look like this is the case here from my casual reading.

[The Ancient Geek]

Then you get that pilot in a C-182 and get him to start using trim. Coming down final with 2 aboard you'll be trimmed pretty much full back if you don't want to land nose first. Say Go Around and now you have a plane headed for the moon and a panicked pilot pushing full forward with many times the force his previous airplane ever needed.

Heh - and the other C182 gotcha, short field approach with flaps 40, instructor say go around, full power and push forward --- Eeek it wont climb.
Slow realisation - you still have flaps 40 = DUH.

[Lonewolf_50]

island, agreed that "catching" up when auto systems transition to your control can take some work.

I noted earlier in the thread that CVR does not appear to be intact. While we can guess what went on in that last few minutes, it would be better to know what was said between the two on the flight deck.

[olasek]

probability of a system error is significantly lower than the probability of a pilot error, i

Not necessarily, you would have to prove that, it is not going to be easy to demonstrate that your 'new system' (not the 'current system') is actually safer. Also the more stuff you put in like the more you risk pilot's complacency and reliance on automation unless you want to completely remove pilots from the cockpit.

[Old King Coal]

Denti: Wrt:

Actually, the 737 uses reduced thrust for G/A. At least as long as you only press the TOGA buttons once.

Err, yes & no, wherein what you've stated is not exactly how it works (and being that the two-engine go-around in the B737 is one of the most balls'd up manoeuvres, I hope you won't mind if we dot the I's and cross the T's on the matter?!)

A single press of the TOGA button will command an N1 that would provide a reduced level of thrust for a go-around, but only on the assumption that the pilots then move the thrust levers to match the demanded N1 (that is unless they're doing a dual-channel approach with a functional Autothrottle; or unless they're utilising the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' ?).

On that latter point, some airlines allow (and / or require) their pilots to fly an approach using the 'Autothrottle ARM mode' (a procedure which is also sometimes referred to as 'Speed Off' mode) and wherein, to cut a long story short, the principle behind that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' is that, the pilot can move the thrust levers at will with the Autothrottle in 'ARM' but, on the press of a TOGA button, the Autothrottle will re-activate and automatically advance the thrust levers to the relevant N1 thrust position (the demanded amount of N1 being based upon whether it was either one or two presses of the TOGA button... and / or also inject some thrust if the speed generally gets too low during the approach), BUT... and this is an important 'BUT'... that 'Autothrottle ARM mode' procedure is not recommended by Boeing (see also the Boeing B737 NG FCTM: Autothrottle ARM Mode; and there was also an FCOM Notice of Errata Bulletin about it too... though for the life of me I can't seem to locate it?!).

And, fwiw, amongst some of the other reasons that Boeing don't recommend the use of the 'Autothrottle ARM mode', is because the Autothrottle can come in too aggressively, i.e. when the TOGA button is pressed (especially relevant if it is re-activated when close to the ground, i.e. thus risking of a tail strike... which apparently has happened, so Boeing say), and that an Autothrottle malfunction (particularly a failure to advance the thrust levers) when the TOGA button is pressed would see a FD demand a pitch increase but without a corresponding increase in thrust (i.e. if the pilots were relying on the Autothrottle to move the thrust levers?!).

Needless to say, with a single-channel approach and / or manually flown approach (with both assuming that the Autothrottle is fully switched off), a click of the TOGA button will not advance the thrust levers automatically, but it will command the N1 bugs to an appropriate thrust demand... a demand which the pilot(s) can then match via manually moving of the thrust levers, and which will then attempt to give the desired rate of climb that you describe, based upon the number of TOGA button presses (as you describe).

[flash8]

Would be interesting to know the reason for the initial G/A.