Airbus 380 loses engine, goes 5000 miles
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I have some real drivel in this thread. I have to admit I heard the same when BA attempted an engine out transatlasntic flight.
I don't know what UAE's rules are, but taking the FARs (§121.565 ) as exemplary, the rules are
Two engines: Nearest suitable airport in point of time.
More than two engines: Nearest suitable airport unless the pilot determines that it is at least as safe as the nearest suitable airport.
I don't see how in the world one can say attempting to fly toDubai is at least as safe as landing in Nova Scotia or even Europe.. I understand arguments about inconvenience and the cost, etc., but the word convenience doesn't appear in FAR 121.565. By the way, wasn't there any inconvenience by landing short in Kuwait.
(The same arguments apply to BA replacing Nova Scotia, Dubai, and Kuwait with Los Angeles, London, and Manchester.
I know people have done ion one engine (I have) but we're talking about air carriers.
I don't know what UAE's rules are, but taking the FARs (§121.565 ) as exemplary, the rules are
Two engines: Nearest suitable airport in point of time.
More than two engines: Nearest suitable airport unless the pilot determines that it is at least as safe as the nearest suitable airport.
I don't see how in the world one can say attempting to fly toDubai is at least as safe as landing in Nova Scotia or even Europe.. I understand arguments about inconvenience and the cost, etc., but the word convenience doesn't appear in FAR 121.565. By the way, wasn't there any inconvenience by landing short in Kuwait.
(The same arguments apply to BA replacing Nova Scotia, Dubai, and Kuwait with Los Angeles, London, and Manchester.
I know people have done ion one engine (I have) but we're talking about air carriers.
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Another non event that prompts a boat load of uninformed comments from many here who have never qualified to fly anything with more than one or two engines, and probably not even jet ones!
How could the crew (and engineering) have known at the time of failure that there wasn't more to it than a simple engine failure? How do we know that a fuel pump wouldn't leak before we start our trans-Atlantic crossing? Small fuel leak, increasingly becoming bigger could have changed the whole scenario. Pushing one's luck doesn't make it safe.
With passengers in the back I believe the convenience of service facilities and whether you have to buy room nights should not be the issue. The only issue should be "Which airport is the safest option at this point."
There have been a number of successfully continued flights in the last few years but I am wondering what the inspector would say in the case of a further shutdown and crash when the aircraft has flown past a safe landing point and further, what the flying public would think of the airline.
But then I prefer safety to convenience. Once we do something marginal we get used to it and sooner or later it becomes 'standard practice.' Just personally I think adjusted power take offs for noise reduction and 'saving the engines' are madness and the idea that we should fly an aircraft with three hundred passengers on it five thousand miles with a major systems failure, (and a quarter of your engine power lost is a major failure,) as an alternative to a safe landing that is immediately available is madness too. Just because the aviation community has got used to the idea doesn't make it sensible.
Sooner or later this will go wrong and then we'll have a major reset.
There have been a number of successfully continued flights in the last few years but I am wondering what the inspector would say in the case of a further shutdown and crash when the aircraft has flown past a safe landing point and further, what the flying public would think of the airline.
But then I prefer safety to convenience. Once we do something marginal we get used to it and sooner or later it becomes 'standard practice.' Just personally I think adjusted power take offs for noise reduction and 'saving the engines' are madness and the idea that we should fly an aircraft with three hundred passengers on it five thousand miles with a major systems failure, (and a quarter of your engine power lost is a major failure,) as an alternative to a safe landing that is immediately available is madness too. Just because the aviation community has got used to the idea doesn't make it sensible.
Sooner or later this will go wrong and then we'll have a major reset.
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I see a repeat:
link
Sun, Feb 27, 2005
British Airways 747 Crosses Atlantic On Three Engines
Engine Failed On Takeoff, Pilot Chose To Continue, Ran Short Of Fuel But Saved Company Nearly $200,000
On Saturday, February 19, a British Airways flight took off from Los Angeles' LAX airport, destined for Heathrow, with 351 pax and crew aboard. Shortly after takeoff, with the aircraft not more than 100 feet over the ground, controllers notified the pilot that a shower of sparks could be seen coming out of one of the engines. The pilot responded by throttling back, but the engine continued to overheat and the crew decided it had to be shut down.
You would think that the aircraft would immediately make plans to return, including dumping fuel if necessary, and turn back to land at LAX, no? Not this time.
After circling the Pacific for a few minutes while the captain contacted BA's control center, the crew decided to continue the 11-hour, 5,000 mile flight to Heathrow on three engines, rather than turn back and face a minimum five hour delay, at an estimated cost of nearly $200,000. Just three days before, a new EU regulation had come into force that would have required British Airways to compensate the passengers for long delays or cancellations.
The British Air Line Pilots' Association wasted no time in reacting to the incident with a statement warning the industry that the new regulation could have the result of pressuring pilots to take more risks for the sake of avoiding expensive compensation rules. Had the BA flight been delayed more than five hours, the airline would have been forced to compensate the passengers the full cost of their tickets as well as flying them to their destination for free and providing them with hotel accommodations for overnight delays.
The airline had initially stated that the engine failure occurred an hour into the flight, but the facts soon changed when it was determined the engine problem had happened only seconds into the flight. To make matters worse, the crew knew that the aircraft would burn more fuel because it would be unable to climb to FL360, its assigned altitude. Instead, it was forced stay down at FL290 with extra rudder drag due to the differential thrust created by the engine shut down. As the aircraft made its way to Heathrow over the Atlantic, the crew realized they wouldn't have enough fuel and requested an emergency landing at Manchester airport, where the London Times reports the aircraft was met by four fire engines and more than two dozen fire fighters.
BA denies that financial considerations played a part in the decision to continue the flight. Captain Doug Brown, BA's 747 Senior Captain, said the only issue was “what was best for passengers.”
“The plane is as safe on three engines as on four and it can fly on two. It was really a customer service issue, not a safety issue. The options would have been limited for passengers [if the plane had returned to Los Angeles],” Brown told the London times. He also pointed out that the captain of the 747 would have had to dump tens of thousands of gallons of Jet-A over waters just off the coast of California, which would have raised serious environmental concerns. “The authorities would have had words to say about that,” said Brown.
However, David Learmount, safety editor of Flight International, questioned the decision to continue the flight all the way to Great Britain. “It was a very odd decision to continue to London," said Learmount. "Even if the pilot didn’t want to dump so much fuel, he could have diverted to Chicago. You are not as safe on three engines as you are on four and I suspect that, given the choice, most passengers would have opted to return to LA.”
link
Sun, Feb 27, 2005
British Airways 747 Crosses Atlantic On Three Engines
Engine Failed On Takeoff, Pilot Chose To Continue, Ran Short Of Fuel But Saved Company Nearly $200,000
On Saturday, February 19, a British Airways flight took off from Los Angeles' LAX airport, destined for Heathrow, with 351 pax and crew aboard. Shortly after takeoff, with the aircraft not more than 100 feet over the ground, controllers notified the pilot that a shower of sparks could be seen coming out of one of the engines. The pilot responded by throttling back, but the engine continued to overheat and the crew decided it had to be shut down.
You would think that the aircraft would immediately make plans to return, including dumping fuel if necessary, and turn back to land at LAX, no? Not this time.
After circling the Pacific for a few minutes while the captain contacted BA's control center, the crew decided to continue the 11-hour, 5,000 mile flight to Heathrow on three engines, rather than turn back and face a minimum five hour delay, at an estimated cost of nearly $200,000. Just three days before, a new EU regulation had come into force that would have required British Airways to compensate the passengers for long delays or cancellations.
The British Air Line Pilots' Association wasted no time in reacting to the incident with a statement warning the industry that the new regulation could have the result of pressuring pilots to take more risks for the sake of avoiding expensive compensation rules. Had the BA flight been delayed more than five hours, the airline would have been forced to compensate the passengers the full cost of their tickets as well as flying them to their destination for free and providing them with hotel accommodations for overnight delays.
The airline had initially stated that the engine failure occurred an hour into the flight, but the facts soon changed when it was determined the engine problem had happened only seconds into the flight. To make matters worse, the crew knew that the aircraft would burn more fuel because it would be unable to climb to FL360, its assigned altitude. Instead, it was forced stay down at FL290 with extra rudder drag due to the differential thrust created by the engine shut down. As the aircraft made its way to Heathrow over the Atlantic, the crew realized they wouldn't have enough fuel and requested an emergency landing at Manchester airport, where the London Times reports the aircraft was met by four fire engines and more than two dozen fire fighters.
BA denies that financial considerations played a part in the decision to continue the flight. Captain Doug Brown, BA's 747 Senior Captain, said the only issue was “what was best for passengers.”
“The plane is as safe on three engines as on four and it can fly on two. It was really a customer service issue, not a safety issue. The options would have been limited for passengers [if the plane had returned to Los Angeles],” Brown told the London times. He also pointed out that the captain of the 747 would have had to dump tens of thousands of gallons of Jet-A over waters just off the coast of California, which would have raised serious environmental concerns. “The authorities would have had words to say about that,” said Brown.
However, David Learmount, safety editor of Flight International, questioned the decision to continue the flight all the way to Great Britain. “It was a very odd decision to continue to London," said Learmount. "Even if the pilot didn’t want to dump so much fuel, he could have diverted to Chicago. You are not as safe on three engines as you are on four and I suspect that, given the choice, most passengers would have opted to return to LA.”
Last edited by Jetdriver; 12th Nov 2013 at 03:42.
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As a skipper on the 380 I feel well enough qualified to comment on this. The simple fact is the A380 on 3 engines is as safe as any modern twin. This crew made the correct decision to continue the flight given the amount of information they had. For those that worry about fuel contamination and further failure they are using an outdated argument. The 380 has telemetry on a level greater than a formula 1 car and every plane is monitored not just by Emirates but Airbus and Engine Alliance, the fuel pump problem would in all probability be known about before the crew got any warning.
I don't expect people who have not flown this aircraft to fully understand its capabilities and it's huge redundancy in every department ( including engines!!) but the comments from the few people on here about this being unsafe are just ludicrous and show a complete lack of understanding of 4 engined operations.
I don't expect people who have not flown this aircraft to fully understand its capabilities and it's huge redundancy in every department ( including engines!!) but the comments from the few people on here about this being unsafe are just ludicrous and show a complete lack of understanding of 4 engined operations.
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I wonder what captain smith spoke about when the capabilities of the TITANIC were discussed.
Did he speak of modern technology, of redundancy, of making a fast crossing?
technology vs judgment vs money, vs inconvenience
Did he speak of modern technology, of redundancy, of making a fast crossing?
technology vs judgment vs money, vs inconvenience
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How could the crew (and engineering) have known at the time of failure that there wasn't more to it than a simple engine failure?
Most pilots today have absolutely NO incentive to continue a flight which could reflect badly on his or her record. Most airlines have absolutely NO incentive to endanger their passengers.
The A380 "knows" more about its engines, etc., through sensors and monitors than you probably knew about your children attending school.
It's nice to see the uproar, but this is really a non-issue - except for bored aficionados who desperately need something to talk about, something which lets them show how much they know about the industry and how much lore they can pull up.
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Spot-on Emratty
Most of the blogs appears to be from people stuck on 2 engine mentality. Yes on a 2 engined, you look for the nearest safe runway to put down the bird. There will be hardly any other considerations.
But on a four engined plane you have lost only 25% when one engine goes to sleep. As a technical person I have dealt with similar situations several times. I remember when my company flew an aircraft for over 5 hours on 3 engines, without a hitch. That was a B747 classic. I can quote several such instances on B747 with various airlines.
Those days none of the modern instrumentation or data down link existed. You go by what you experienced in the cockpit and what you saw on your instruments before and during the event. The decision is made by the pilots to continue or not. Rarely they contacted Maintrol for advice for those critical decisions, because we were blind on the ground with out the data dump those days.
But now things are different, fortunately. Moment the engine shuts down, there is a huge data dump to the maintrol and to the engine manufacturer, RR or EA or GE. The events that follow are as below.
If it is a complex issue, a conference call to the engine manufacturer is made to analyse the event. The concurrence on what has gone wrong is very swift. By that time the Captain will be on a SAT call to give us a run down as to what he saw or experienced. The technical team then advise the crew what their conclusion is, and whether to continue or turn around. The captain normally concur, though their decision is final and rarely questioned later.
Never a thought goes in our mind about the $ involved for diversion etc, during the decision process. It is always about safety first. The huge data that is received these days helps to take a safe and very correct decision. So please do not speculate that decisions are based on how many thousand $ saved etc. That is far from reality. If some one quotes a figure of the thousands saved, it is just an after thought, or a good press story.
Of course if the same engine failure on this A380 had taken place with a bang and fire warning etc, I am sure crew would have taken a U turn immediately, without even bothering to call any body. The Kuwait stop was probably as they consumed too much fuel at low altitude. Otherwise the flight would have made it to the destination and few would have known about it.
But on a four engined plane you have lost only 25% when one engine goes to sleep. As a technical person I have dealt with similar situations several times. I remember when my company flew an aircraft for over 5 hours on 3 engines, without a hitch. That was a B747 classic. I can quote several such instances on B747 with various airlines.
Those days none of the modern instrumentation or data down link existed. You go by what you experienced in the cockpit and what you saw on your instruments before and during the event. The decision is made by the pilots to continue or not. Rarely they contacted Maintrol for advice for those critical decisions, because we were blind on the ground with out the data dump those days.
But now things are different, fortunately. Moment the engine shuts down, there is a huge data dump to the maintrol and to the engine manufacturer, RR or EA or GE. The events that follow are as below.
If it is a complex issue, a conference call to the engine manufacturer is made to analyse the event. The concurrence on what has gone wrong is very swift. By that time the Captain will be on a SAT call to give us a run down as to what he saw or experienced. The technical team then advise the crew what their conclusion is, and whether to continue or turn around. The captain normally concur, though their decision is final and rarely questioned later.
Never a thought goes in our mind about the $ involved for diversion etc, during the decision process. It is always about safety first. The huge data that is received these days helps to take a safe and very correct decision. So please do not speculate that decisions are based on how many thousand $ saved etc. That is far from reality. If some one quotes a figure of the thousands saved, it is just an after thought, or a good press story.
Of course if the same engine failure on this A380 had taken place with a bang and fire warning etc, I am sure crew would have taken a U turn immediately, without even bothering to call any body. The Kuwait stop was probably as they consumed too much fuel at low altitude. Otherwise the flight would have made it to the destination and few would have known about it.
Having done quad in the past a little "there I was" story". I just once had to shut an engine down in the cruise (due to low oil pressure - the engine was running fine). We were over a part of the world where whilst we had alternates with nice long runways they would have been a nightmare from both a political and a logistical /passenger handling POV. Head office and the engine manufacturers were on the case before we'd finished drifting down, thanks to the wonders of datalink and satcom, all our onward alternates were pretty much CAVOk so after due consideration we plodded on a scant three engines for several hours to destination. Safety report filed, never made the papers, didn't even make the company's horror comic 
.
I suspect if we'd dumped fuel and landed on the nearest suitable piece of concrete, which seems to have been the knee jerk solution some are suggesting it would have taken days to get the passengers out and weeks to move the aircraft.....but I guess we would have had plenty of time to debate the merits of continuing. So FWIW so would I do the same again in the same circumstances if I was on a quad - yes, absolutely.
Now I fly a twin as Hi_Tech has said the thinking is somewhat different, but we're discussing engine failure on a quad, right?.........
. I suspect if we'd dumped fuel and landed on the nearest suitable piece of concrete, which seems to have been the knee jerk solution some are suggesting it would have taken days to get the passengers out and weeks to move the aircraft.....but I guess we would have had plenty of time to debate the merits of continuing. So FWIW so would I do the same again in the same circumstances if I was on a quad - yes, absolutely.
Now I fly a twin as Hi_Tech has said the thinking is somewhat different, but we're discussing engine failure on a quad, right?.........
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I don't know what UAE's rules are, but taking the FARs (§121.565 ) as exemplary, the rules are
Two engines: Nearest suitable airport in point of time.
More than two engines: Nearest suitable airport unless the pilot determines that it is at least as safe as the nearest suitable airport.
I don't see how in the world one can say attempting to fly toDubai is at least as safe as landing in Nova Scotia or even Europe.. I understand arguments about inconvenience and the cost, etc., but the word convenience doesn't appear in FAR 121.565. By the way, wasn't there any inconvenience by landing short in Kuwait.
Two engines: Nearest suitable airport in point of time.
More than two engines: Nearest suitable airport unless the pilot determines that it is at least as safe as the nearest suitable airport.
I don't see how in the world one can say attempting to fly toDubai is at least as safe as landing in Nova Scotia or even Europe.. I understand arguments about inconvenience and the cost, etc., but the word convenience doesn't appear in FAR 121.565. By the way, wasn't there any inconvenience by landing short in Kuwait.
Taking a 380 into Nova Scotia (yes I've been there) for anything other than an emergency is plain stupidity on the basis of half a hundred different factors, moreover given the nature of the engine issue, I'm fairly certain that the crew would have made a no nonsense "reasonable decision" (despite all the rumblings about EK as an employer, I am yet to meet anyone here that values their job over their life)
Thank you emratty and Hi_Tech for a much needed dose of knowledge and good common sense. I spent my whole career flying long-haul 4 engine aircraft and totally agree with you.
I remember, on a 747 Classic shutting down an engine because of reducing oil pressure when over Nova Scotia. It was a simple precautionary shut down. We continued to London where the weather was good rather than landing in Canada in winter. In those days there were no data links and it didn't require any discussion with HQ, the decision was obvious and totally safe.
I remember, on a 747 Classic shutting down an engine because of reducing oil pressure when over Nova Scotia. It was a simple precautionary shut down. We continued to London where the weather was good rather than landing in Canada in winter. In those days there were no data links and it didn't require any discussion with HQ, the decision was obvious and totally safe.
Oh no, here we go again!
Maybe there should be some sort of "sticky" FAQ on "flight with one engine less than normal" at the top of R&N, which people could review before posting on threads like this.
In the current absence of such a document, how about a few facts:
* Aircraft like the A380 are designed and certified to fly for an unlimited period, one engine inoperative (OEI).
* Following an engine failure, a diagnosis and exhaustive review of the options available will take place. This will normally include input from pilots, engineering, the aircraft & engine manufacturers and management.
* If the captain makes a decision to continue, possibly to destination, the effects of a further failure will have been explored and prepared for.
* Because of its size and weight, airfields that are suitable for an A380 to operate in and out of are rather thin on the ground. There are plenty that could be used in a time-critical scenario (smoke/fire, etc.) but you'd likely be stuck on the runway and/or unable to park, taxi or anything else.
* Despite arguments to the contrary, convenience and cost do come into consideration. The passengers have paid to go from A to B, not by way of a day or two in F. If you can achieve this without a significant increase in risk, which is what the aircraft is designed to do, then it is a proper option.
* The professionals who operate these types of aeroplane are fully aware of the nuances of flight continuation and regularly practice losing one or more power plants and the decision making process involved afterwards. They also wish to survive the experience.
Maybe there should be some sort of "sticky" FAQ on "flight with one engine less than normal" at the top of R&N, which people could review before posting on threads like this.
In the current absence of such a document, how about a few facts:
* Aircraft like the A380 are designed and certified to fly for an unlimited period, one engine inoperative (OEI).
* Following an engine failure, a diagnosis and exhaustive review of the options available will take place. This will normally include input from pilots, engineering, the aircraft & engine manufacturers and management.
* If the captain makes a decision to continue, possibly to destination, the effects of a further failure will have been explored and prepared for.
* Because of its size and weight, airfields that are suitable for an A380 to operate in and out of are rather thin on the ground. There are plenty that could be used in a time-critical scenario (smoke/fire, etc.) but you'd likely be stuck on the runway and/or unable to park, taxi or anything else.
* Despite arguments to the contrary, convenience and cost do come into consideration. The passengers have paid to go from A to B, not by way of a day or two in F. If you can achieve this without a significant increase in risk, which is what the aircraft is designed to do, then it is a proper option.
* The professionals who operate these types of aeroplane are fully aware of the nuances of flight continuation and regularly practice losing one or more power plants and the decision making process involved afterwards. They also wish to survive the experience.
With all of these safety systems, telementry and full time monitoring in place please explain how Quantas nearly lost a 380?
Submissions on a post card to Old [email protected] a so called professional.
Submissions on a post card to Old [email protected] a so called professional.
Oh, FFS.
The only reason the BA flight made the media was the FAA saw a chance to promote USA based airlines.
Parts of the FAA are required to promote USA Aviation.
Other parts deal with safety.
The safety part was extremely embarrassed by the political part going public about this issue.
pprune readers would not even know about that BA flight if the politicians in the FAA had not heard of the story.
As wiggy says, with a 4 engine plane, it is perfectly OK to run with 3 of them.
End of story.
The only reason the BA flight made the media was the FAA saw a chance to promote USA based airlines.
Parts of the FAA are required to promote USA Aviation.
Other parts deal with safety.
The safety part was extremely embarrassed by the political part going public about this issue.
pprune readers would not even know about that BA flight if the politicians in the FAA had not heard of the story.
As wiggy says, with a 4 engine plane, it is perfectly OK to run with 3 of them.
End of story.
All that shows is that there was an active decision making process. Every day, all around the world, there are aeroplanes that set off to a particular destination but end up somewhere else, be it for weather, delays, technical or passenger issues.
Maybe they couldn't get optimum levels, the wind forecasts were out or they had to re-route across the Atlantic. Or maybe DXB wasn't reachable initially but they thought it might be if they could make fuel en-route. I'd guess that as they approached KWI, the fuel predictions for DXB were below what they had decided as a cutoff point, so they went into KWI instead. No drama, nothing to see...
Maybe they couldn't get optimum levels, the wind forecasts were out or they had to re-route across the Atlantic. Or maybe DXB wasn't reachable initially but they thought it might be if they could make fuel en-route. I'd guess that as they approached KWI, the fuel predictions for DXB were below what they had decided as a cutoff point, so they went into KWI instead. No drama, nothing to see...
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They knew from the outset that they wouldn't get to Dubai. Kuwait was chosen as it was close enough to position a relief 380 there at the same time as they would arrive.
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In reply to Blind Pew
Appropriate moniker, telemetry will only advise what is happening in real time (Or in the Qantas accident as fast as it gets to the head of the queue)
Do you really think that if the telemetry indicated a potential uncontained engine failure the crew (or company) would have carried on?
I fail to see any value in comparing these flights, controlled engiine shutdown vs uncontained engine failure with substantial damage to aircraft - Where's the relevance to this thread?
Appropriate moniker, telemetry will only advise what is happening in real time (Or in the Qantas accident as fast as it gets to the head of the queue)
Do you really think that if the telemetry indicated a potential uncontained engine failure the crew (or company) would have carried on?
I fail to see any value in comparing these flights, controlled engiine shutdown vs uncontained engine failure with substantial damage to aircraft - Where's the relevance to this thread?
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ACARS.
Most pilots today have absolutely NO incentive to continue a flight which could reflect badly on his or her record. Most airlines have absolutely NO incentive to endanger their passengers.
The A380 "knows" more about its engines, etc., through sensors and monitors than you probably knew about your children attending school.
It's nice to see the uproar, but this is really a non-issue - except for bored aficionados who desperately need something to talk about, something which lets them show how much they know about the industry and how much lore they can pull up.
Most pilots today have absolutely NO incentive to continue a flight which could reflect badly on his or her record. Most airlines have absolutely NO incentive to endanger their passengers.
The A380 "knows" more about its engines, etc., through sensors and monitors than you probably knew about your children attending school.
It's nice to see the uproar, but this is really a non-issue - except for bored aficionados who desperately need something to talk about, something which lets them show how much they know about the industry and how much lore they can pull up.
However, the 'all knowning' A-380 systems in this case did not say 'Excuse me captain but the duplicated for resilience fuel pumps in number 4 are going to fail in 30 minutes" Nor did they telemeter a warning to the IAE. The fuel pumps failed both of them- and the crew got the message that the engine had failed at the same time as IAE engineers.
Now when two separate, redundant, items fail at the same time that should raise flags that all is not good. There could be a common mode failure - perhaps line engineer 'Murphy' on DI's carefully did something which screwed each of the fuel pumps (or associated equipment) on number 4, and he had happily repeated the exercise on the other three engines.
While I agree that 4 engine aircraft are specifically designed to allow safe three engine operations, this may be more to cope with events such as birdstrike or a single point of failure such as an oil leak. Concurrent failures of redundant systems as in this case, are different animals and should be treated with a lot more caution.