NTSB update on Asiana 214

[IcePack]

IMHO those that say they fully understand the system, actually don't completely.
Granted the nuances that are forgotten when under stress & the aircraft has done something odd are minor & taking manual control instantaneously solves the issue. But I have yet to see a pilot who under all circumstances has a full & complete grasp of the more complex aircraft. Unlike in days of old, when most did.

[olasek]

IMHO those that say they fully understand the system, actually don't completely.

It doesn't matter. Clearly no one has equal understanding as those who actually developed/designed the logic/system. But you don't need to study one million lines of code to operate them safely. A beauty of those systems however is they are telling you exactly what they are doing at any moment - one glance at the top of the PFD and 777/737/747..etc pilot knows exactly what autopilot/throttle are doing at the moment - if you don't like what they are doing - either force them to do what you want or fly manually. When I transitioned from an old Cessna to a highly sophisticated G1000 equipped aircraft the first thing they force feed you during training is to always check the autopilot status bar - don't assume it is doing something unless you verify what it is actually doing. In other words flipping switches or pressing buttons without verification is simply a very poor airmanship which as no place even among amateur aviators least commercial ones.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Olasek

nothing more than "average intelligence" is required to understand current logic, also there were arguments presented why actually it is more logical they way it is.

No, there's no current logic, and it is not at all logical that an allegedly highly sophisticated but simple jet can be stalled so simply.

[porterhouse]

Baloney, all jets can be stalled, Boeings, Airbuses (AF447,AF296), Gulfstreams, Falcons, Hawkers, Bombardiers, etc, get used to it. All very sophisticated by the way. It takes a determined pilot to do it but as string of accidents shows it can be done, "simply".

[aterpster]

Bloggs:

No, there's no current logic, and it is not at all logical that an allegedly highly sophisticated but simple jet can be stalled so simply.

This airplane has been in service since 1998 or so. How many stall crashes have there been with this type since then?

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?

[ironbutt57]

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?

agreed especially if one sets G/A altitude at which point the aircraft will climb to MCP altitude....

this fellow obviously was in "airbus mode" in regards to the thrust automatics..which IMHO is a better system than the Boeing...after several thousand hours in both...both types have their merits, a properly trained pilot, and a vigilant crew can safely operate any modern jet....

[FGD135]

Would Asiana 214 have crashed had the airspeed indicator been the big round dial of yesteryear?


I bet it would not.


Would Turkish 1951 have crashed at Amsterdam if its airspeed indicators were the big round dials of yesteryear?


I bet not.


For those on this thread convinced that "cultural factors" are the explanation for the Asiana crash, consider the previous fatal accident to a scheduled airline service in the USA.


That was Colgan 3407, the Dash 8 Q400, that stalled on approach to Buffalo, New York in 2009. That aircraft had an American crew.


But note that it too, stalled. Would it have crashed if, for airspeed indicators, it had the big round dials of yesterday? I bet not.


All of these aircraft had airspeed "tapes", which is typical for "glass cockpit" aircraft.


To the pilots of glass cockpit aircraft: Have you noticed how much more brain power is required to use the airspeed tape?


To assess airspeed, you must train your gaze at a tiny 1 inch x 1 inch patch on your glass panel (the PFD), then read and process the digits.


With the big round dial of yesteryear however, you only need to glance at a point within about 3 inches of the pointer. The angular position of the pointer instantly tells you whether your airspeed is too fast, too slow, or "about right". No need to read digits.


What about Air France 447? It too stalled. Would a big round dial for airspeed have helped those highly stressed pilots? I bet it would!


The airspeed tape may be 3-5 inches long, but the bit where you look is the central 1 inch x 1 inch. This is where the action is. But this size is too small - and the brain power to use it is just too much.


You don't notice the extra mental processing demands created by the tape in normal, low workload, low stress situations.


In high stress, high workload situations however, the airspeed tape might as well be invisible! The brain ignores it - either because it takes the eyes too long to land on the little patch, or turbulence makes it too difficult to hit the patch, or because the brain knows it will need too much work to process.


With airspeed indicators that become "invisible" at high workload moments, with the aircraft in a low speed flight phase, we should expect they will stall every now and then.


And this is exactly what we are seeing.

[ATC Watcher]

FGD135 : excellent point, which I share, but I am not that young anymore and have made all my flight hours ( since 1967) with round dials and still use them today in my aircraft, so I feel more confident with them of course.
That said the young generation seems to have no problems with Glass /Garmin displays and speetapes. We have.

I have read last week an interesting article about 4 Cirrus SR20 and 22 recent accidents in France , where overconfidence in glass cockpits info and automation was a contributing factor in all cases.
The article did not say round dials would have saved their days, but with a traditional aircraft probably more caution would have been used , elimating this sense of " computer is allowing me to that" , or "to go beyond " . that we saw also in the Asiana case.
And you are right , this is not an "Asian " thing . It could have caught anyone overconfident in automation.

[barit1]

Interesting comment, FGD135.

This was the subject of a study (studies?) of analog indicators on electronic panels (radio dials, etc.) - maybe 50 years ago. In that case, it was:

o Moving pointer against fixed background scale - vs.

o Fixed index pointer over a moving background scale.

I do not remember the overall outcome, but each had its own pros and cons. For quick comprehension, however, the former (older technology) was deemed superior.

I guess there is nothing new under the Sun.

[Pontius]

What tripe.

Look at the speed tape on the big sheet of glass. See the pointer is in the big, bad, red & black bit and you know instantly that's not good.

Look at the pointer on the big round dial of yesterday and see that it's pointing at some arbitrary point. It might be bad, it might not be so bad. But you don't know until you compare it to the stall speed for the weight of the aircraft at the time. That is NOT something that is done as instantly as seeing the pointer in the amber (not so bad) or the red/black (bad) on glass.

It's all very well going on about maintaining hand flying skills etc and I agree with that. But suggesting that we revert back to old style instruments just because that's what they did 'back then' is just nonsense. Many of the modern instruments have been developed so that we can instantly ascertain the situation and the speed tape is certainly one of them.

IF the Asiana crew had looked at their speed tape they would have known the situation. They either didn't look or they obviously didn't do the correct thing to resolve the situation if they did look. The lack of A/T awareness was key in this lack of correction.

[RAT 5]

Pontius: I agree with you on this. An analogue dial had to be used to fly a number. You had to interrogate the instrument to confirm what it was telling you and decide if it was what you wanted. The glass tape display cockpit is a picture. Is the a/c performance bug lined up with the command bug. The number doesn't matter. The error can be seen and corrected with intuitive reaction; if taught how correctly at the beginning. A scan is now much faster than before and more relaxed. The trouble comes with the F.D. tunnel vision pilots. No scan.
On the speed tape the added picture of the manoeuvre margin and stall margin bands adds a greater sense of comfort that a raws dial. Critical information gleaned at a glance. Excellent.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by aterpster

This airplane has been in service since 1998 or so. How many stall crashes have there been with this type since then?

Further, it seems that flight level change is not an appropriate mode for final approach, wouldn't you agree?

This, in spades.

Also, if the investigators are going ape on the manufacturers, they utterly miss the point. The industry all over the world, which is the companies that provide passenger service, need to have the training and currency tools in place, and stress on the basics (see recent FAA commentary on same) as a requirement, not on an "if we can afford a bit now and again" basis.

It's the cost of doing business to keep your aircrew current and proficient.
Current and proficient aircrew who know their aircraft inside and out is a reasonable expectation of the fare paying public. A great many professional pilots meet that description, but as we can see from Asiana, not all do.

A basic principal:

Don't send partially or poorly trained, or non-current, pilots out to carry people about.
Seems a basic rule of airline management to me.
But is it?

[olasek]

.I have read last week an interesting article about 4 Cirrus SR20 and 22 recent accidents in France , where overconfidence in glass cockpits info and automation was a contributing factor in all cases.
The article did not say round dials would have saved their days, but with a traditional aircraft probably more caution would have been used

Speed tape is one thing but there is also aircraft attitude much better visible on new glass avionics. I fly a 'glass' Cirrus and I have much better info on my PFD about the pitch attitude - a very important indication. On old style steam gauges pitch was specially poorly visible, it was in fact so bad it was almost useless. With Cirrus I think it is more overconfidence that stems from capability of the aircraft itself (speed, performance, CAPS) than with glass avionics.

. But note that it too, stalled. Would it have crashed if, for airspeed indicators, it had the big round dials of yesterday? I bet not.

You are welcome to have your own opinions but multiple studies (including NASA's) on this subject do not support your conjecture.

[Cows getting bigger]

If we're digging around in human factors, I think that power indication is more important than speed. Personally I don't warm to speed tapes but that is because I spent over 30 years looking at dials. The youngsters are far more comfortable with the TV screens. However, so many seem to forget (not attribute enough weight) to the Power + Attitude = Performance mantra. Asiana crashed because of a lack of basics, together with (semi)-automation, CRM, cultural etc. Letting the aircraft manage the power, or worse thinking that the aircraft is managing the power, takes away a key indicator of how the aircraft is performing. FFS, point and power.

[KatSLF]

the study

This document explains every study done between WW2 and about 2000.

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstr...pdf?sequence=2

Upshot of ~100 pages is
if you need accurate details (how fast am I going) = numeric display is best (accurate to smallest detail)
if you need to check something (am I going too fast or too slow) = pointer display is best (shows surrounding ranges for comparison)

In both cases of course you'd need to have some mental idea of what you SHOULD be doing ... or colour sections on the display can indicate for you. But pointer position indicators in every test led to much faster acquisition of the data than numeric, which has to be "read" not just recognised at a glance.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50

It's the cost of doing business to keep your aircrew current and proficient.
Current and proficient aircrew who know their aircraft inside and out is a reasonable expectation of the fare paying public. A great many professional pilots meet that description, but as we can see from Asiana, not all do.

Of course you are correct, Lonewolf 50, however, or, in addition, I believe that focusing on the Asiana accident is far and away much too narrow, as it doesn’t begin to focus on a situation that I have been harping on for what seems to be decades … and that is first, the complete and competent training of the pilot, but just as important is the complete and competent training of those who are charged with the responsibility of training those pilots (the instructors) and those who will evaluate those pilots against an appropriately documented standard. I am currently aware of the following on-going efforts that have been mounted by some of the most prestigious aviation oriented groups around.

Initially, the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society started the ball rolling with the development of an international working group – subsequently named the International Committee for Advanced Training in Extended Envelopes (or “ICATEE”) supported by a wide-based representation through out the aircraft industry, simulator manufacturers, training providers, regulators, researchers and airline customers. Participants include Boeing, Airbus, CAE, Opinicus, ETC, APS Emergency Maneuver Training, Calspan, FAA, NTSB, NASA, NLR, DLR, ALPA, IFALPA, KLM Flight Training, IDT, UTIAS and many others. ICATEE is chaired by Dr. Sunjoo Advani, Mr. Peter Tharp, and Capt. Gordon Woolley (Chairman of the RAeS Flight Simulation Group) where all three are members of the RAeS Flight Simulator Group.

Following this, another group began to form with a slightly different focus … this one being the International Pilot Training Consortium or “IPTC.” This working group was created to improve the safety, quality and efficiency of commercial aviation by developing international agreement on a common set of training and evaluation standards for pilots, instructors, and evaluator. Initially, this effort has focused on training and evaluation standards for pilots, but, it is hoped that the process will then be extended to address exactly those features for both instructors and evaluators. The ultimate goal has always been the development of recognized and logical processes for the benefit of the industry worldwide and which will hopefully result in clearly stated provisions that would then, hopefully be adopted, first by ICAO, and then individual national regulatory authorities.

You may be correct with your statement that “…in order to improve or just maintain the industry’s high level of safety we have to find alternative methods to complement the existing initiatives.” This precisely the goals of the 2 working groups I described above. I still believe that we are able to at least maintain, and more likely, improve the industry’s safety record by understanding more completely – perhaps only more basically – what it is we expect out of the training we currently accomplish. I fully understand the concerns voiced regarding “cultural issues” being at least a contributing factor, if not more basic, to the successful completion of training – but I think that we have to return to the basic premise of training.

I firmly believe that this premise is, or certainly should be, to train a pilot to the degree that he/she is able to recognize, correctly, what the airplane is currently doing; make an immediate decision as to whether or not what the airplane is currently doing is what is desired by that pilot; and if the airplane is NOT doing what is desired, be able to make an immediate decision as to what must be done to the airplane’s control and power systems to correct that condition ... and to execute that decision quickly and accurately. Lastly, during this execution, continually monitor the condition of the airplane with respect to whether or not the resulting airplane condition is changing in the desired direction and magnitude. Once again, this part demands that the pilot correctly identify the changing airplane condition, determining whether or not that change is what is desired. This process is a continual process – taking place all the time – and in situations that are rapidly changing, requiring more directly focused attention to the airplane condition by the pilot flying.

In summary, the pilot flying must have an accurate knowledge of what he/she is expecting of the airplane – at all times – and have accurate knowledge of what control applications are appropriate should any adjustments in the airplane condition become necessary at any time under any circumstance – and knowing when, where, how, and how much of those control applications have to be made – and then make them, accordingly.

Lastly, to ensure that the pilot flying, does, indeed, have this knowledge and ability, the training program must have been designed to provide that pilot with the opportunity to experience various scenarios where such recognition, decision making, decision execution, and continual evaluation of each, is provided initially and then sufficiently repeated, throughout the multiple combinations of conditions and situations, to provide that pilot the recognition and reinforcement of actions, recognized responses, and, when or if appropriate, reactions that will ultimately be required. Throughout this exposure, the instructor must take careful notice of when, where, and how the student addresses each scenario, judging whether or not the student’s performance should be modified, and if it should be modified, understand why, and then how, that modification can be accomplished. This process has to be completed for each required scenario, with each appropriate modification scrutinized, and, obviously, the resulting airplane condition properly and completely evaluated.

[FGD135]

Bring back the big round airspeed indicator

You are welcome to have your own opinions but multiple studies (including NASA's) on this subject do not support your conjecture.

What studies, olasek? Can you give some pointers or links to at least one, please. There is just no way that a speed tape, which requires reading digits from a 1" x 1" patch of panel, can be better than the big dial with pointer - which requires only a glance for assessment of angular position, with no reading and processing of digits required.


Would be very interested to know about any studies that have been done. I suspect that no proper studies have actually been done. I did a search myself recently but couldn't find anything. I am in the process of writing to the NTSB to question them about the human factors of tape vs pointer. I will be asking them about studies.

See the pointer is in the big, bad, red & black bit and you know instantly that's not good.

That is AFTER THE PLANE HAS STALLED, Pontius, you clown. The key issue in all of these stalls is the airspeed decay (prior to the stall) that went undetected by the pilots.

Look at the pointer on the big round dial of yesterday and see that it's pointing at some arbitrary point. It might be bad, it might not be so bad. But you don't know until you compare it to the stall speed for the weight of the aircraft at the time.

Are you even a pilot, Pontius? Let me tell you how the pilot brain works when making an approach using the big round dial of yesteryear. Given that you have been trained on the aircraft, and done several approaches, you are familiar with where the airspeed pointer should roughly point, for each stage of the approach.


At the initial fix, for example, you know roughly where it should be. A quick glance will confirm whether it is. No need to read any digits. After the final fix, ditto. If you were seconds from stalling, the angular position would be very different and you would pick this, almost instantly - without having to read any digits.


One study I would really like to see is whether there is a correlation between stall-related accidents and the introduction of the glass cockpit speed tape. Over the last 5 years, 4 of the highest profile accidents have all involved a stall.

Many of the modern instruments have been developed so that we can instantly ascertain the situation and the speed tape is certainly one of them.

That is laughable, Pontius. Airspeed was made into a tape for the same reason that altitude was - because there was not enough room on the little screen to display them any other way.

IF the Asiana crew had looked at their speed tape they would have known the situation.

I suspect you are agreeing with me when I said that their speed tape had, in effect, become invisible. This is the whole problem with the speed tape - it requires way too much brain power to use.


When humans are in high work load and high stress situations they "task shed" - the more difficult the task, the sooner it gets shed. Reading a speed tape is easy in a low stress situation, but for Asiana 214, preoccupied with AFCS perhaps, Colgan 3407, Turkish 1951 and Air France 447, it is obvious that the tape indication was not utilised.


The plane was unable to tell the pilots about its airspeed, in other words. With the big round dial of yesteryear, the indications would have been so strong, the dial would have been practically yelling at them. With the tape, you have to ask it for what it has. But listen carefully for its reply, for it is only a whisper.

[amos2]

Started flying speed tape only aircraft in 1989.Didn't like it then, and still don't like it now, compared to the big round dial mentioned above. I have no doubt whatsoever that the speed tape has contributed to many of the prangs over the last 20 yrs! AF 447 to mention one.

[BOAC]

Ditto - first experience with the Lightning in 1971 and I STILL prefer the rotary. One of the great advantages is that rotary motion is more easily absorbed by the brain than linear.

[MrSnuggles]

FGD, amos2, BOAC

You are correct in your personal assessment of the rotary dial (angular motion) versus the speed tape (straight motion).

I have not checked with NASA but to say it short: The human eye detects motion much better than still objects. The human eye also have an affinity to remember angular displacements better than straight displacements. That is, it is easier to remember the position of a rotary display than the position of a speed tape.

The longer story:
What is more alarming in an aviation context is that the eye will have problems detecting digits on a moving speed tape - because the movement "silences" the underlying information. That is, a pilot can see the speed tape move, but it takes a concious effort to understand what it means since the movement itself blocks the information on the tape. One study found that the movement even could block colour information - dangerous when approaching stall speed!

We are designed to detect movement first and foremost. A heritage from our nomad ancestors. Movements were often dangerous (predators etc). Digits came much much later and we need extensive schooling to understand their abstract meaning.

I hope that some intelligent airplane designer puts back the rotary speed indicator. Not everything is better with a glass window.

You can have a bunch of references here:
Effects of stationary and moving textured backgrounds on the visuo-oculo-manual tracking in humans

Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis - Springer
(discusses human movements but they are in fact all angular - rotary - movements in some way)

Is it just motion that silences awareness of other vis... [J Vis. 2013] - PubMed - NCBI

Spatial and temporal selectivity of the human motion detection system