NTSB update on Asiana 214
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Regardless of the protection systems on board the a/c-the crew is the final protection.
Idle thrust at 500' is a clue that something may be amiss, being on the proper glide path and monitoring the airspeed are basic tenets of flying a jet.
There were passengers in that cockpit, not pilots.
Idle thrust at 500' is a clue that something may be amiss, being on the proper glide path and monitoring the airspeed are basic tenets of flying a jet.
There were passengers in that cockpit, not pilots.
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Originally Posted by emjanssen
: "maybe because HE/THEY were eventually pulling 40kg they had zero reaction? Did the system work for them or against them?"
The back-driven thrust levers continuously indicated their idle position by not moving.
As the plane tried to save itself by preventing a stall, the pilot fought against this, pulling back with increasing pressure.
The pitch control system was definitely working for him. Had it not resisted the pilot, he'd have probably have stalled it at a higher altitude out over the water.
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@joema, others,
I am not defending the guy.
I am not saying they didn't make mistakes.
I am just interested in what happened below 560 ft and WHY?
I am interested if the protection feature(the 40kg) had any influence on his brains. Because if that's the case maybe we can learn something from that.
It happens several times a day in the world that aircraft for some reason end up high. I bet that even the selection made on the MCP aren't that uncommon. YES it is not clever to press LVLCHANGE with go-arround alt selected. But these things happen. NOT GOOD but they DO happen.
After ending up high, energy wise the Thrust Levers needed to be at idle until aprox 600 ft to be stabilized at 500 ft. This happens also several times a day, somewhere in the world. This approach was still do-able from 600ft. The only thing needed was the right thrust setting.
YES I know. Probably he thought that the AT would take care of his speed.
YES I know. He should have checked is airspeed.
I just can't believe that after pulling the yoke below 560 ft and after expecting the AT would take care of his airspeed there wasn't another reason why he/they increased thrust so late.
Anyway......enough said by me.
I am not defending the guy.
I am not saying they didn't make mistakes.
I am just interested in what happened below 560 ft and WHY?
I am interested if the protection feature(the 40kg) had any influence on his brains. Because if that's the case maybe we can learn something from that.
It happens several times a day in the world that aircraft for some reason end up high. I bet that even the selection made on the MCP aren't that uncommon. YES it is not clever to press LVLCHANGE with go-arround alt selected. But these things happen. NOT GOOD but they DO happen.
After ending up high, energy wise the Thrust Levers needed to be at idle until aprox 600 ft to be stabilized at 500 ft. This happens also several times a day, somewhere in the world. This approach was still do-able from 600ft. The only thing needed was the right thrust setting.
YES I know. Probably he thought that the AT would take care of his speed.
YES I know. He should have checked is airspeed.
I just can't believe that after pulling the yoke below 560 ft and after expecting the AT would take care of his airspeed there wasn't another reason why he/they increased thrust so late.
Anyway......enough said by me.
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Hmmm pilot error indeed .
From what i can tell the 777s systems do have some holes in them , but its a pilot's job to know them all and operate the ac safely.
And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.
From what i can tell the 777s systems do have some holes in them , but its a pilot's job to know them all and operate the ac safely.
And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.
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I just can't believe that after pulling the yoke below 560 ft and after expecting the AT would take care of his airspeed there wasn't another reason why he/they increased thrust so late.
Both pilots are alive and one of them tried to put a blame on a Sun reflection (that he was bothered by) - some very lame excuse. If there were some semi-valid reasons we would have heard it by now. NTSB report would probably mention it too, they interviewed both pilots extensively.
Last edited by porterhouse; 26th Jun 2014 at 22:12.
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Reverb_SR71:
I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.
I could even argue the more complex the plane, the more quirks may be found. But in a twenty-year-old, universally successful airliner, the quirks have all been found out and widely discussed and trained for, haven't they?
Or is Asiana exempted from this practice?
From what i can tell the 777s systems do have some holes in them , but its a pilot's job to know them all and operate the ac safely.
I could even argue the more complex the plane, the more quirks may be found. But in a twenty-year-old, universally successful airliner, the quirks have all been found out and widely discussed and trained for, haven't they?
Or is Asiana exempted from this practice?
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I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.
Of course; you ain't supposed to be there. You are in a 'mother nature' environment. Gravity and many other factors are trying to force you back to terra firma. It is your job to be alert to anything that is against you in this battle. They could be aerodynamic, mechanical or an off-spring of said mother-nature. When they try to wrestle control from you it is your task to resist with all resources at your disposal. That includes over-riding those delinquents that are under-performing. There is always manual over-ride. Just do it when necessary. Be it at your peril if you do not.
Of course; you ain't supposed to be there. You are in a 'mother nature' environment. Gravity and many other factors are trying to force you back to terra firma. It is your job to be alert to anything that is against you in this battle. They could be aerodynamic, mechanical or an off-spring of said mother-nature. When they try to wrestle control from you it is your task to resist with all resources at your disposal. That includes over-riding those delinquents that are under-performing. There is always manual over-ride. Just do it when necessary. Be it at your peril if you do not.
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Original Quote by Reverb: And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.
-Engines speed at flight idle
-Late application of go-around power
Sound familiar?
This was the A-320 at Habsheim, Alpha floor didn't advance the throttles, there are no guarantees.
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Originally Posted by Reverb_SR71
And for all those people debating the fbw and whose incharge all i can say is on an a320 the alpha floor would have advanced the throttles and this might not have happened.
It might be more interesting to discuss if the Airbus implementation of the low speed warning ("Speed Speed Speed" spoken by the CMV, as opposed to a quadruple chime and a text message on the EICAS) would have been a better help to this Asiana crew.
Originally Posted by Noske
It might be more interesting to discuss if the Airbus implementation of the low speed warning ("Speed Speed Speed" spoken by the CMV, as opposed to a quadruple chime and a text message on the EICAS) would have been a better help to this Asiana crew.
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As this "yoke resists pull" feature obviously comes gradually it might be suitable to delay a less observant pilot in intuitively understand the speed is way low.
iceman50, your comments (#823) infer that pilots have to be infallible, be able to cope with all system related ‘traps’ or holes irrespective of the operational situation.
There is no need to defend either pilots or aircraft systems, they have been judged against standards set by others – training / certification. If with hindsight this judgement appears to be inadequate, then perhaps we should look at the processes of training / certification.
Training has been discussed, certification less so, thus my reference to part 25. I recommend that pilots read the advisory and explanatory material in 25 AMC 1302 to understand the balance required in system certification to avoid error and the difficulties of ‘quantifying’ human behaviour.
This accident could be an indication of weakness in the processes of training / certification. However, instead of considering the human or the machine independently, consider them in combination, as a unit which together are necessary for safe operation; thus one view of this accident is that the effectiveness of this combined unit was inadequate for the situation (human, aircraft, operations, training). We could question if the original balance of these factors made several years ago is still relevant in today’s increasingly complex operational environment, or with pilots under training, and the influence of modern commercial pressures, etc.
Fundamentally humans don’t change; they still err, more often influenced by the situation. Aircraft systems rarely change, but the situations in which both elements have to provide an adequate margin of safety do change. Thus look at the situation first, consider the combined human and the aircraft view of this, and then consider each element's view of each other - what was trained / taught, what was designed / certificated, and finally what assumptions were made about these to achieve a safety balance.
Although the NTSB’s recommendations are directed at specific issues – each side of the balance, the overall theme is to readjust the balance in order to maintain the required level of safety.
There is no need to defend either pilots or aircraft systems, they have been judged against standards set by others – training / certification. If with hindsight this judgement appears to be inadequate, then perhaps we should look at the processes of training / certification.
Training has been discussed, certification less so, thus my reference to part 25. I recommend that pilots read the advisory and explanatory material in 25 AMC 1302 to understand the balance required in system certification to avoid error and the difficulties of ‘quantifying’ human behaviour.
This accident could be an indication of weakness in the processes of training / certification. However, instead of considering the human or the machine independently, consider them in combination, as a unit which together are necessary for safe operation; thus one view of this accident is that the effectiveness of this combined unit was inadequate for the situation (human, aircraft, operations, training). We could question if the original balance of these factors made several years ago is still relevant in today’s increasingly complex operational environment, or with pilots under training, and the influence of modern commercial pressures, etc.
Fundamentally humans don’t change; they still err, more often influenced by the situation. Aircraft systems rarely change, but the situations in which both elements have to provide an adequate margin of safety do change. Thus look at the situation first, consider the combined human and the aircraft view of this, and then consider each element's view of each other - what was trained / taught, what was designed / certificated, and finally what assumptions were made about these to achieve a safety balance.
Although the NTSB’s recommendations are directed at specific issues – each side of the balance, the overall theme is to readjust the balance in order to maintain the required level of safety.
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this "yoke resists pull" feature obviously comes gradually it might be suitable to delay a less observant pilot in intuitively understand the speed is way low.
If a pilot is "less observant" there is no technology that can make up for pilot's lack of attention regardless what "type" of control feel you have - for example AF447 and AF296, etc illustrate it well.
I know of NO airplane that doesn't have a quirk, perhaps a potentially fatal one.
An airspeed indicator is placed in the cockpit for the benefit of a pilot, who is supposed to use it as a key reference to maintain or change aircraft performance to fit the desired performance for the maneuver being undertaking and remain flying, rather than falling, until back in touch with the ground in a controlled manner. (it is also supremely useful in determining when it is safe to take off and when one must abort a take off, another key performance criterion).
Get back to fundamentals: airspeed.
Root cause: airspeed decay well beyond standards and beyond acceptable limits, with no correction in a timely manner.
Who is flying the aircraft?
Bloggs, if the Company is happy that their flight deck crew are more or less passengers, rather than pilots, then the root cause certainly goes beyond the flight deck crew ... but it raises the question of why that Company remains in business.
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...but it raises the question of why that Company remains in business?
Watch your airspeed
Never flown an Airbus, so sorry if I'm off beam, but isn't it true that the Airbus throttles don't "hunt" all the time, but remain fixed ?
Just a thought, 'mindset' can be a real enemy.