NTSB update on Asiana 214
“Claims that watching manual flying increases the other pilots work load to an intolerable amount leading to a flight safety problem on the flight deck, is really laughable”.
Perhaps no so, either manual or auto flight, over a short but important timescales, and in specific situations; everything in context. There are good examples in the BEA AGASA study.
Note the similarities (not the speculative details) between Asiana and THY AMS. Training in a complex ATC/approach scenario, weaknesses in automation design; perhaps insufficient spare mental capacity to understand the developing hazardous situation, minds focussed elsewhere. Does industry have too high an expectation that monitoring / CRM will provide a safety defence in every situation.
These accidents involve aspects far greater than individual behaviour, we should consider all humans' behaviour in the more unusual / demanding ‘normal’ situations.
Perhaps no so, either manual or auto flight, over a short but important timescales, and in specific situations; everything in context. There are good examples in the BEA AGASA study.
Note the similarities (not the speculative details) between Asiana and THY AMS. Training in a complex ATC/approach scenario, weaknesses in automation design; perhaps insufficient spare mental capacity to understand the developing hazardous situation, minds focussed elsewhere. Does industry have too high an expectation that monitoring / CRM will provide a safety defence in every situation.
These accidents involve aspects far greater than individual behaviour, we should consider all humans' behaviour in the more unusual / demanding ‘normal’ situations.
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Obviously the new generation of pilots are not required to fly with automation failure as we were. We never got overloaded when it all went south but obviously that is not the case today reading these posts.
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if there is automation aboard a plane, one has to be able to fly OK if it fails. but there is a new view that if automation fails, the flight crashes.
I rather like the idea that someone posted a few pages back. During a sim session landing, suddenly freeze the sim and blank all the displays. Pilot has to repeat what the airspeed, altitude (above ground), where they were relative to glideslope, and any other parameters that might be considered relevant.
If the pilot can't immediately repeat - with reasonable accuracy - the parameters at the time the sim froze, they fail.
If the pilot can't immediately repeat - with reasonable accuracy - the parameters at the time the sim froze, they fail.
“Claims that watching manual flying increases the other pilots work load to an intolerable amount leading to a flight safety problem on the flight deck, is really laughable”.
Perhaps no so, either manual or auto flight, over a short but important timescales, and in specific situations; everything in context. There are good examples in the BEA AGASA study.
Note the similarities (not the speculative details) between Asiana and THY AMS. Training in a complex ATC/approach scenario, weaknesses in automation design; perhaps insufficient spare mental capacity to understand the developing hazardous situation, minds focussed elsewhere. Does industry have too high an expectation that monitoring / CRM will provide a safety defence in every situation.
These accidents involve aspects far greater than individual behaviour, we should consider all humans' behaviour in the more unusual / demanding ‘normal’ situations.
Perhaps no so, either manual or auto flight, over a short but important timescales, and in specific situations; everything in context. There are good examples in the BEA AGASA study.
Note the similarities (not the speculative details) between Asiana and THY AMS. Training in a complex ATC/approach scenario, weaknesses in automation design; perhaps insufficient spare mental capacity to understand the developing hazardous situation, minds focussed elsewhere. Does industry have too high an expectation that monitoring / CRM will provide a safety defence in every situation.
These accidents involve aspects far greater than individual behaviour, we should consider all humans' behaviour in the more unusual / demanding ‘normal’ situations.
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weaknesses in automation design;
Perhaps this should read "weakness in understanding the automation and how to use it properly in non-normal situations."
Obviously the new generation of pilots are not required to fly with automation failure as we were.
They should be able to do so if they switch it off and fly via Mk.1 eyeball and manual manipulation of the controls as the pax expect you to be able to do. Failing and switching off should be the same thing. Take a straw poll amongst the flying public and ask them what they'd expect the abilities of their crew should be. I doubt it will match up to the bi-annual test.
Perhaps this should read "weakness in understanding the automation and how to use it properly in non-normal situations."
Obviously the new generation of pilots are not required to fly with automation failure as we were.
They should be able to do so if they switch it off and fly via Mk.1 eyeball and manual manipulation of the controls as the pax expect you to be able to do. Failing and switching off should be the same thing. Take a straw poll amongst the flying public and ask them what they'd expect the abilities of their crew should be. I doubt it will match up to the bi-annual test.
Let's face it, watching the other pilot pole the aircraft isn't exactly a life threatening job,
If an airline pilot workload is getting right up to his upper limit by watching the other bloke flying,
While the ace of the base is flying manually, who do you suppose makes all the mode settings for the FD, continuously sets the HDG bug, sets the airspeed bug for every speed change, resets and confirms the altitude selector setting, makes the FMC entries, does the RT, runs the checklists, selects gear and flap, monitors the pressurisation system, addresses master caution alerts, monitors the position and altitude of the aircraft with reference to the departure/arrival, monitors terrain, monitors proximate traffic, talks to the cabin crew and if necessary runs the QRH?
That's what you call a workload.
"watching the other bloke fly"
are you having a laugh?
All this gliding dead-stick stuff is great for the bar, but as likely to happen as a pay rise/pension plan in a LoCo.
We practice volcanic ash events where loss of both engines occurs. But always magically in the sim we get one engine going to save the day. I have never seen failure not to get one engine going in the sim which would logically lead to a forced landing like the Gimli glider and other examples of successful dead stick landings in transport jets.
What we do see in the simulator where I work, is the inevitable lack of basic flying skill displayed by even the most experienced pilots when confronted with a loss of all engines at 20,000 ft because they flew into a super size 63,000 ft storm and drowned both engines and couldn't get a restart. Never happens, you say? Try reading the Garuda 737 report where they finished up dead stick flapless ditching in a river. Sully did a good job too after losing both engines to bird strikes.
What I have seen in the simulator is not necessarily the direct fault of the captain when he crashes trying to dead stick. It is more the training department who do the ostrich head in the sand trick and think to themselves why practice something which is great for the bar, but as likely to happen as a pay plan pension etc etc?
Pilots spend hours in the simulator practicing ILS which they do every day of their career in real time. By then they know every facet of how to fly an ILS on one or two engines. However throw in a standby flight instrument ILS with manual stab trim and only a couple of flight instruments plus a baby ILS all in IMC and most are so far outside standard instrument rating flight tolerances they would fail the test. But they never do of course because the box must be ticked and sim time is limited...
If you accept that probably 95% of jet transport pilots have never practiced a dual engine failure followed logically by a dead stick landing, then what an indictment on training departments. But stick a MPL 200 hour pilot as second in command of a 300 passenger jet, then no flight safety problem at all; even if the captain keels over with food poisoning at 20,000 ft. The chances of an MPL pulling that off successfully is great stuff for the bar etc etc
While the ace of the base is flying manually, who do you suppose makes all the mode settings for the FD, continuously sets the HDG bug, sets the airspeed bug for every speed change, resets and confirms the altitude selector setting, makes the FMC entries, does the RT, runs the checklists, selects gear and flap, monitors the pressurisation system, addresses master caution alerts, monitors the position and altitude of the aircraft with reference to the departure/arrival, monitors terrain, monitors proximate traffic, talks to the cabin crew and if necessary runs the QRH?
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hec7or
wow. and the pilot flying is monitoring what the pilot monitoring is doing too. sheesh, you really don't have a clue do you?
tell me the pilot is listening to the "RT" (that's the radio for most of us)
tell me the pilot flying isn't making sure that the heading bug has been properly set (wow, I've even been hand flying and moved the heading bug myself, I must be superman huh?)
And while hand flying I"ve looked over to make sure the pilot monitoring hasn't fallen asleep, or made sure the cabin pressure was right.
oh, and I've done all of that while hand flying and watching my altimeter, airspeed, heading, course , and keeping situational awareness of nearby terrain, traffic and how cute the senior flight attendant is.
I can't believe some of the stuff I'm reading. Have we forgotten how to tie our shoe laces too?
wow. and the pilot flying is monitoring what the pilot monitoring is doing too. sheesh, you really don't have a clue do you?
tell me the pilot is listening to the "RT" (that's the radio for most of us)
tell me the pilot flying isn't making sure that the heading bug has been properly set (wow, I've even been hand flying and moved the heading bug myself, I must be superman huh?)
And while hand flying I"ve looked over to make sure the pilot monitoring hasn't fallen asleep, or made sure the cabin pressure was right.
oh, and I've done all of that while hand flying and watching my altimeter, airspeed, heading, course , and keeping situational awareness of nearby terrain, traffic and how cute the senior flight attendant is.
I can't believe some of the stuff I'm reading. Have we forgotten how to tie our shoe laces too?
well glendale,
yes it's against SOP for the PF to set the HDG, ASI bugs or the ALT selector, this is what increases the workload for the PM.
gosh you're good
meanwhile, you don't agree with the SOPs? fine, your choice, but not in my airline.
nice comment, thanks, but the CAA were very complimentary on my last examiner's revalidation
glendale...goon? yes you appear to have that one pegged
yes it's against SOP for the PF to set the HDG, ASI bugs or the ALT selector, this is what increases the workload for the PM.
And while hand flying I"ve looked over to make sure the pilot monitoring hasn't fallen asleep, or made sure the cabin pressure was right.
meanwhile, you don't agree with the SOPs? fine, your choice, but not in my airline.
wow. and the pilot flying is monitoring what the pilot monitoring is doing too. sheesh, you really don't have a clue do you?
glendale...goon? yes you appear to have that one pegged
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Geez, how do all the commuters do it? Thousands of hours flown in solid IMC with no automation, no autopilot, no FD? Guess they were just overloaded all the time.
PM overloaded watching the other guy hand fly, give me a break.
PM overloaded watching the other guy hand fly, give me a break.
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Centaurus - I work for easyJet and nearly every pilot in the company (2500 of us) will have practiced a dual engine failure followed by a dead stick landing at some stage. No all have been successful but they have certainly had a go!
[A friend said: you aren't really an instrument rated pilot until you can hand fly an ILS to minimums on one engine while eating a hamburger.]
and as my Nav instructor said - you'll never make a Navigator until you've been over Berlin with the shells coming through the cockpit as you make the pilot fly steadily on 3 headings 120 deg. apart as you try to work out the upper wind from readings you take through the drift sight !
I never had to.
One of our WWII Captains flew his last 707 flight to New York and back to London before retirement by hand flying the thing all the way. ( I guess he had to make some arrangement to drink his coffee and visit the toilet, but other than that ...... )
Not saying it was a good thing, just saying he did it ! ( I was told )
Once had to fly across the Atlantic with a u/s autopilot, the Captain and I took it in turns, 30 minutes each was about all we could manage before losing concentration.
I seem to recall that passing 10,000 - up or down - was a signal to engage autopilot, unless there was some problem that needed attention, in which case engaging the autopilot was a recommended practice, to release hand/brain resources to attend to the problem.
Wasn't it Eddie Rickenbacker, of Easten Airlines fame, who refused to instal auto-pilots in the '30's, he said "our pilots are paid to fly, let the b***ers fly" and it was only when the Sperry Autopilot of the day proved to help with fuel saving, i.e. money saving, that he relented ?
Such fun, sounds like it's all gone now. I blame Bill Gates.
and as my Nav instructor said - you'll never make a Navigator until you've been over Berlin with the shells coming through the cockpit as you make the pilot fly steadily on 3 headings 120 deg. apart as you try to work out the upper wind from readings you take through the drift sight !
I never had to.
One of our WWII Captains flew his last 707 flight to New York and back to London before retirement by hand flying the thing all the way. ( I guess he had to make some arrangement to drink his coffee and visit the toilet, but other than that ...... )
Not saying it was a good thing, just saying he did it ! ( I was told )
Once had to fly across the Atlantic with a u/s autopilot, the Captain and I took it in turns, 30 minutes each was about all we could manage before losing concentration.
I seem to recall that passing 10,000 - up or down - was a signal to engage autopilot, unless there was some problem that needed attention, in which case engaging the autopilot was a recommended practice, to release hand/brain resources to attend to the problem.
Wasn't it Eddie Rickenbacker, of Easten Airlines fame, who refused to instal auto-pilots in the '30's, he said "our pilots are paid to fly, let the b***ers fly" and it was only when the Sperry Autopilot of the day proved to help with fuel saving, i.e. money saving, that he relented ?
Such fun, sounds like it's all gone now. I blame Bill Gates.
Last edited by ExSp33db1rd; 5th Mar 2014 at 19:31.
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hec7or
tell me, what do you do when the pilot monitoring has to do two things at once like answer the radio and move the heading bug or altitude alerter?
or God Forbid, what if the pilot monitoring has been busy making a PA announcement while the pilot flying is hand flying and has to answer a radio call?
My airline has a similar SOP but it also allows for other methods to accomplish the tasks at hand. It specifically allows for the PF to set the altitude alerter, airspeed bug etc if the PNF (pilot monitoring) is busy doing something else. With a quick double check when back "ON".
I'm so sorry that an increased workload is so tough on you, but it also makes for the side benefit of increased hand flying skills for the other pilot.
I'm so happy that the CAA was so complimentary to you. Did you get a Victoria Cross for working the radio and setting the altitude alerter and heading bug all at the same time?
FOLKS, if automation is going to be so good for everyone, did anyone think it might replace the copilot? JOB SECURITY!
And hec7or. Is there any conceivable situation where autoflight and the pilot monitoring would all be inop at the same time?
Oh my, what would we all do?
tell me, what do you do when the pilot monitoring has to do two things at once like answer the radio and move the heading bug or altitude alerter?
or God Forbid, what if the pilot monitoring has been busy making a PA announcement while the pilot flying is hand flying and has to answer a radio call?
My airline has a similar SOP but it also allows for other methods to accomplish the tasks at hand. It specifically allows for the PF to set the altitude alerter, airspeed bug etc if the PNF (pilot monitoring) is busy doing something else. With a quick double check when back "ON".
I'm so sorry that an increased workload is so tough on you, but it also makes for the side benefit of increased hand flying skills for the other pilot.
I'm so happy that the CAA was so complimentary to you. Did you get a Victoria Cross for working the radio and setting the altitude alerter and heading bug all at the same time?
FOLKS, if automation is going to be so good for everyone, did anyone think it might replace the copilot? JOB SECURITY!
And hec7or. Is there any conceivable situation where autoflight and the pilot monitoring would all be inop at the same time?
Oh my, what would we all do?
clearly never done your after takeoff checks correctly have you?
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You may well be right Centaurus - if the checks are actually done. The Helios Airways Flight 522 crew missed the settings on at least three occasions - during the pre-flight procedure, the after-start check, and the after take-off check. Six occasions the error might have been picked up, seven if you count when maintenance asked if it was set to"AUTO", or does that make nine occasions?