NTSB update on Asiana 214
"Without knowing the 777 in detail,"
That pretty much covers your input to the FLCH discussion on the 777 or any Boeing for that matter. Thanks for playing.
Any pilot using FLCH in a 757/767/777/737 on final approach is an abject fool.
A trap? If that is a trap then so is walking into traffic and getting run over in front of the terminal. Some people need to find another line of work.
That pretty much covers your input to the FLCH discussion on the 777 or any Boeing for that matter. Thanks for playing.
Any pilot using FLCH in a 757/767/777/737 on final approach is an abject fool.
A trap? If that is a trap then so is walking into traffic and getting run over in front of the terminal. Some people need to find another line of work.
Originally Posted by Barit
Very well - it's such an excellent idea let's petition to make it a universal cert requirement (like throttles fwd for TO, etc.). And write AD's for retrofit too.
I didn't think so.
Bloggs, to my simple airplane designing mind, it's pretty simple.
Asiana was high and hot. They then input a FLCH command that would have made the aircraft climb (no idea why they would have done that, but according to published reports that's exactly what they did) so the throttles started to advance. Since advancing throttles would be contrary to capturing glideslope when high and hot, the throttles were manually retarded and held at idle for several seconds which, by design, caused the A/T to disconnect (EICAS message and aural "beep beep beep" alert). Little more than a minute later they were caught unaware when that disconnected A/T, which they had programed for a climb, failed to maintain VREF airspeed for landing.
If you design an autothrottle such that it doesn't allow the pilot to override it if deemed necessary, why the
do you even need the pilot?
Asiana was high and hot. They then input a FLCH command that would have made the aircraft climb (no idea why they would have done that, but according to published reports that's exactly what they did) so the throttles started to advance. Since advancing throttles would be contrary to capturing glideslope when high and hot, the throttles were manually retarded and held at idle for several seconds which, by design, caused the A/T to disconnect (EICAS message and aural "beep beep beep" alert). Little more than a minute later they were caught unaware when that disconnected A/T, which they had programed for a climb, failed to maintain VREF airspeed for landing.
If you design an autothrottle such that it doesn't allow the pilot to override it if deemed necessary, why the
do you even need the pilot?
...not the 'Bus..it calls "retard" the pilots closes the thrust levers..
Amazes me that the Wright Brothers survived their first flight !
World's Gone Mad.
‘The more lofty words like "foresight" or "tolerant of misuse" the more meaningless they are’.
This depends on your viewpoint; you can choose the ‘person view’ or the ‘system view’, both adequately described by James Reason et al.
With the person view, often biased by hindsight, blame is an easy solution but does little to provide deeper understanding of the safety issues. What value is there in concluding that you or your operation would not suffer the hazards of human / system / situational limitation; self-satisfaction does not equate to safety.
A system view might not provide a uniquely packaged primary cause, where new SOPs / training etc can be applied (but to what effect in scenarios differing from this accident); but such a view could provide generic indicators of weaknesses or opportunities for error in higher workload situations where crews are expected to manage unusual environments – monitoring when training, descending/decelerating without ILS, poorly identified system failures (737 AMS) or systems intolerant of misuse (777), - simultaneously.
Life is understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards where foresight might help avoid the pitfalls which are so easy to identify with hindsight.
‘Without knowing the 777… …’; recognising individual limitations, knowledge, operation, might help avoid or resolve difficult situations, but labelling professionals who might have may have learnt from their mistakes, as fools, might suggest that it takes one to know one – FLCH that is.
How many 777 pilots have been caught out by Boeing FLCH … is the mode the same in all models?
How do operators train or guard against the differences between A or B when changing type; ‘first learnt best remembered’?
What avoidance strategies are used when flying types with particular ‘weaknesses’ (people also have weaknesses); … how have people adapted to crossing the road in the UK vice the USA? At least we might consider taking care and looking both ways – considering other people’s points of view.
This depends on your viewpoint; you can choose the ‘person view’ or the ‘system view’, both adequately described by James Reason et al.
With the person view, often biased by hindsight, blame is an easy solution but does little to provide deeper understanding of the safety issues. What value is there in concluding that you or your operation would not suffer the hazards of human / system / situational limitation; self-satisfaction does not equate to safety.
A system view might not provide a uniquely packaged primary cause, where new SOPs / training etc can be applied (but to what effect in scenarios differing from this accident); but such a view could provide generic indicators of weaknesses or opportunities for error in higher workload situations where crews are expected to manage unusual environments – monitoring when training, descending/decelerating without ILS, poorly identified system failures (737 AMS) or systems intolerant of misuse (777), - simultaneously.
Life is understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards where foresight might help avoid the pitfalls which are so easy to identify with hindsight.
‘Without knowing the 777… …’; recognising individual limitations, knowledge, operation, might help avoid or resolve difficult situations, but labelling professionals who might have may have learnt from their mistakes, as fools, might suggest that it takes one to know one – FLCH that is.
How many 777 pilots have been caught out by Boeing FLCH … is the mode the same in all models?
How do operators train or guard against the differences between A or B when changing type; ‘first learnt best remembered’?
What avoidance strategies are used when flying types with particular ‘weaknesses’ (people also have weaknesses); … how have people adapted to crossing the road in the UK vice the USA? At least we might consider taking care and looking both ways – considering other people’s points of view.
‘The more lofty words like "foresight" or "tolerant of misuse" the more meaningless they are’.
This depends on your viewpoint; you can choose the ‘person view’ or the ‘system view’, both adequately described by James Reason et al.
With the person view, often biased by hindsight, blame is an easy solution but does little to provide deeper understanding of the safety issues. What value is there in concluding that you or your operation would not suffer the hazards of human / system / situational limitation; self-satisfaction does not equate to safety.
A system view might not provide a uniquely packaged primary cause, where new SOPs / training etc can be applied (but to what effect in scenarios differing from this accident); but such a view could provide generic indicators of weaknesses or opportunities for error in higher workload situations where crews are expected to manage unusual environments – monitoring when training, descending/decelerating without ILS, poorly identified system failures (737 AMS) or systems intolerant of misuse (777), - simultaneously.
Life is understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards where foresight might help avoid the pitfalls which are so easy to identify with hindsight.
‘Without knowing the 777… …’; recognising individual limitations, knowledge, operation, might help avoid or resolve difficult situations, but labelling professionals who might have may have learnt from their mistakes, as fools, might suggest that it takes one to know one – FLCH that is.
How many 777 pilots have been caught out by Boeing FLCH … is the mode the same in all models?
How do operators train or guard against the differences between A or B when changing type; ‘first learnt best remembered’?
What avoidance strategies are used when flying types with particular ‘weaknesses’ (people also have weaknesses); … how have people adapted to crossing the road in the UK vice the USA? At least we might consider taking care and looking both ways – considering other people’s points of view.
This depends on your viewpoint; you can choose the ‘person view’ or the ‘system view’, both adequately described by James Reason et al.
With the person view, often biased by hindsight, blame is an easy solution but does little to provide deeper understanding of the safety issues. What value is there in concluding that you or your operation would not suffer the hazards of human / system / situational limitation; self-satisfaction does not equate to safety.
A system view might not provide a uniquely packaged primary cause, where new SOPs / training etc can be applied (but to what effect in scenarios differing from this accident); but such a view could provide generic indicators of weaknesses or opportunities for error in higher workload situations where crews are expected to manage unusual environments – monitoring when training, descending/decelerating without ILS, poorly identified system failures (737 AMS) or systems intolerant of misuse (777), - simultaneously.
Life is understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards where foresight might help avoid the pitfalls which are so easy to identify with hindsight.
‘Without knowing the 777… …’; recognising individual limitations, knowledge, operation, might help avoid or resolve difficult situations, but labelling professionals who might have may have learnt from their mistakes, as fools, might suggest that it takes one to know one – FLCH that is.
How many 777 pilots have been caught out by Boeing FLCH … is the mode the same in all models?
How do operators train or guard against the differences between A or B when changing type; ‘first learnt best remembered’?
What avoidance strategies are used when flying types with particular ‘weaknesses’ (people also have weaknesses); … how have people adapted to crossing the road in the UK vice the USA? At least we might consider taking care and looking both ways – considering other people’s points of view.
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Heirarchy of command
Recent reports on the Korean ferry ship disaster indicate an unwillingness of junior officers to take charge and call for evacuation when the captain was indisposed. Does anyone see a parallel with AZ214?
What does the Korean press have to say on the subject?
What does the Korean press have to say on the subject?
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Recent reports on the Korean ferry ship disaster indicate an unwillingness of junior officers to take charge and call for evacuation when the captain was indisposed. Does anyone see a parallel with AZ214?
When people have been trained by their culture to defer to authority, how do you get them to speak up when they really need to?
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This 'culture' problem has been thrashed about for years. If memory is correct did not Delta's training & safety department go into Korean years ago to try and sort it out? I thought they had some modicum of success, at first.
RAT 5, Aren't Korean Airlines and Asiana two different airlines? 
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How many 777 pilots have been caught out by Boeing FLCH … is the mode the same in all models?
Recent reports on the Korean ferry ship disaster indicate an unwillingness of junior officers to take charge and call for evacuation when the captain was indisposed. Does anyone see a parallel with AZ214?
The key, of course, is to recognize your mistake (or for someone else to recognize it) and then take timely action to correct it. The two go hand-in-hand.
I wonder if there was anyone else on the bridge of the ferry who failed to speak up when they should have.
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"If memory is correct did not Delta's training & safety department go into Korean years ago to try and sort it out? I thought they had some modicum of success, at first."
They tried. A squillion years of socialization was never going to be fixed by a simple airline audit though.
They tried. A squillion years of socialization was never going to be fixed by a simple airline audit though.
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If you design an autothrottle such that it doesn't allow the pilot to override it if deemed necessary, why the do you even need the pilot?
Why do you need one of Bill Gates' Magic Boxes to tell you to close the throttles to complete the flare and landing ?
Amazes me that the Wright Brothers survived their first flight !
Amazes me that the Wright Brothers survived their first flight !
Last edited by sflaperons; 22nd Apr 2014 at 05:20. Reason: didn't mean to put words in @Capn Bloggs' mouth
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In my very early days as a student, I had this drilled into me: "Stick controls airspeed, throttle controls altitude". Of course, the machine weighted about 15 pounds per horsepower.
Today's airliners are so overpowered, that the relationship can be reversed, and indeed the automatics do the opposite: Autothrottle controls airspeed, autopilot controls altitude.
And when you fly in this mode leg after leg, the basic principle in my first paragraph - if not completely forgotten - might not be readily called up from long-term cranial storage when it's really needed.
Today's airliners are so overpowered, that the relationship can be reversed, and indeed the automatics do the opposite: Autothrottle controls airspeed, autopilot controls altitude.
And when you fly in this mode leg after leg, the basic principle in my first paragraph - if not completely forgotten - might not be readily called up from long-term cranial storage when it's really needed.
In my very early days as a student, I had this drilled into me: "Stick controls airspeed, throttle controls altitude". Of course, the machine weighted about 15 pounds per horsepower.
Today's airliners are so overpowered, that the relationship can be reversed, and indeed the automatics do the opposite: Autothrottle controls airspeed, autopilot controls altitude.
And when you fly in this mode leg after leg, the basic principle in my first paragraph - if not completely forgotten - might not be readily called up from long-term cranial storage when it's really needed.
Today's airliners are so overpowered, that the relationship can be reversed, and indeed the automatics do the opposite: Autothrottle controls airspeed, autopilot controls altitude.
And when you fly in this mode leg after leg, the basic principle in my first paragraph - if not completely forgotten - might not be readily called up from long-term cranial storage when it's really needed.
Push to Go, Pull to Whoa
Really...........
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Automation was designed to make the competent pilots job easier; not be a replacement for incompetent pilots.
I am amazed at how many people are trying to make excuses for incompetence.
Let the fodder fly!
I am amazed at how many people are trying to make excuses for incompetence.
Let the fodder fly!
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Digital control is illusory and brittle.
Once something is totally digital eg. fly by wire, physics doesn't really hold anymore for the user where the computer is doing the work. Eg. the plane will go in any direction just by being pointed there.
And once you go off the edge of the world, the illusion collapses.
If you train people only inside the illusion, the first time they go off the edge into reality will quite possibly kill them - eg by a CFIT when the plane just doesn't have enough energy to clear an obstacle.
Once something is totally digital eg. fly by wire, physics doesn't really hold anymore for the user where the computer is doing the work. Eg. the plane will go in any direction just by being pointed there.
And once you go off the edge of the world, the illusion collapses.
If you train people only inside the illusion, the first time they go off the edge into reality will quite possibly kill them - eg by a CFIT when the plane just doesn't have enough energy to clear an obstacle.