Airprox over Central Scotland
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Airprox over Central Scotland
Announced on several news channels today, the Airprox Board has listed a near miss between two aircraft to the north west of Pitlochry in Scotland on 23 June. I know this thread has been started on Spotters Corner, but perhaps the implications of a potential disaster on this scale merit this post?
I won't quote the embellished press reports, just point folks in the direction of the Airprox report here :
http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/....09Reports.pdf
Curiosity got the better of me and I can see that the two aircraft were Lufthansa B748 D-ABYC enroute EDDF-KIAD and BA B744 G-BNLM enroute EGLL-CYVR.
One thing to add to the report is that press reports indicate that there "were up to" 1000 souls onboard both aircraft, though in reality likely in excess of 800.
I won't quote the embellished press reports, just point folks in the direction of the Airprox report here :
http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/....09Reports.pdf
Curiosity got the better of me and I can see that the two aircraft were Lufthansa B748 D-ABYC enroute EDDF-KIAD and BA B744 G-BNLM enroute EGLL-CYVR.
One thing to add to the report is that press reports indicate that there "were up to" 1000 souls onboard both aircraft, though in reality likely in excess of 800.
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Fairly routine loss of separation exacerbated by crews failing to follow fairly simple instructions, failing to utilise spatial awareness, failing to follow SOP's (advising TCAS RA) & then failing to operate AFS (I would imagine. . or cr@p hand flying? ) to provoke a 2nd alert.
All in all a bit shabby for 1st world legacy crew I would suggest.
All in all a bit shabby for 1st world legacy crew I would suggest.
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However, from a professional standpoint when a controller gives 'avoiding action' in Class C airspace the instruction should be treated in the same way as a TCAS RA - do not second guess, chat amongst yourselves on the flight deck, take a look out of the window to see if it's necessary - react at once and turn. From the controller point of view - ALWAYS expect your instruction to be ignored and watch carefully and reissue the instruction immediately it is apparent that it is being ignored. (I speak from experience in the same airspace). Unfortunately, the track smoothing algorithms can hide a turn on the controller display until 2 or 3 updates - that is a long time.
This has all the hallmarks of crews only half listening to their current controller and already settling into 'oceanic mode'. Perhaps..... As there were two 'avoiding action' instructions close together I think the first PF didn't fully hear them picked up half the second heading and thought it was a repeat of the instruction to his aircraft and turned onto it. The second aircraft PF heard the heading for the first and was not sure it was not for them - then heard their callsign in the second instruction and took the heading heard first. This is always going to be a problem with crews where PNF talks and the PF acts. It is obvious that both the PNFs read back correctly yet watched PF turn to a different heading.
All the masterly pilots on here who never make any mistakes - should think about this one.
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I find it concerning when the pilots' "misunderstanding" (by both crews) is given as the "cause" when the root cause was 2 aircraft at the same FL on a converging course. The "RT was clearly stated on the VHF recording" which I suspect means a recording of what was being transmitted, prior to it going over the airwaves, maybe not clearly received, maybe blocked by Box 2 or I/c or Cabin chit chat etc.
SOPs likely permit at that stage only 1 pilot on the Flight Deck, maybe using speakers / microphone, when compared to busier climb/decent phases.
I think you are correct... when ATC order a Go Around it is "C/S Go Around I repeat Go Around", no doubt with good reason...
SOPs likely permit at that stage only 1 pilot on the Flight Deck, maybe using speakers / microphone, when compared to busier climb/decent phases.
As there were two 'avoiding action' instructions close together I think the first PF didn't fully hear them picked up half the second heading and thought it was a repeat of the instruction to his aircraft
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<<The "RT was clearly stated on the VHF recording" which I suspect means a recording of what was being transmitted, prior to it going over the airwaves,>>
Recording takes place simultaneously with the transmission going over the "airwaves".
Recording takes place simultaneously with the transmission going over the "airwaves".
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Thanks HD... my point was that the Airprox board seem to guarantee the quality of that recording as that as heard by each crews' ears...
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I have no experience of working en route, so I shouldn't really comment. I just find it a bit strange that the a/c were converging and cleared to same level without being on headings. Especially in this day and age when we are constantly reminded to be "defensive".
The final numbers in terms of separation certainly don't make it headline news, but how the incident developed and how the holes in the cheese are always there makes it interesting and educational read.
The final numbers in terms of separation certainly don't make it headline news, but how the incident developed and how the holes in the cheese are always there makes it interesting and educational read.
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"He also noted that, during simulation training, avoiding action was only practiced as a result of a TCAS alerts, and not as a result of ATC instructions; this was an important consideration as to their potential familiarity with receiving, assimilating and actioning such RT instructions in a timely manner."
What?? I'm not having a go at either crews actions, but this statement by the board member surprises me. Avoiding Action instructions should be expected at any stage of flight surely, and from my experience precede/prevent many TCAS alerts. After all a change of heading so you don't hit something is not exactly the most challenging of tasks to assimilate and action.
Apologise for the thread creep here, but this would appear to be the correct course of action following an "Avoiding Action" command from ATC. http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadba...2006-08-17.pdf
2.2.2 Responses to ‘Avoiding Action’ instructions should not be made via autopilot vertical or lateral flight path control selectors
because, due to the design of this equipment, the turn, climb or descent that the Air Traffic Controller has requested and expects to see
actioned will be initiated too slowly to serve the needs of the moment.
It's maybe my gashness, but I'll be honest in that I have never responded to an "avoiding action" instruction by disconnecting the automatics as this would (I think) increase, what can become, a high workload situation. Likewise, I've never seen anyone else do it.
I often wonder if ATC expect us to respond as per the above AIC.
What?? I'm not having a go at either crews actions, but this statement by the board member surprises me. Avoiding Action instructions should be expected at any stage of flight surely, and from my experience precede/prevent many TCAS alerts. After all a change of heading so you don't hit something is not exactly the most challenging of tasks to assimilate and action.
Apologise for the thread creep here, but this would appear to be the correct course of action following an "Avoiding Action" command from ATC. http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadba...2006-08-17.pdf
2.2.2 Responses to ‘Avoiding Action’ instructions should not be made via autopilot vertical or lateral flight path control selectors
because, due to the design of this equipment, the turn, climb or descent that the Air Traffic Controller has requested and expects to see
actioned will be initiated too slowly to serve the needs of the moment.
It's maybe my gashness, but I'll be honest in that I have never responded to an "avoiding action" instruction by disconnecting the automatics as this would (I think) increase, what can become, a high workload situation. Likewise, I've never seen anyone else do it.
I often wonder if ATC expect us to respond as per the above AIC.
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Terrifying report over Scottish Skies..CNN
CNN is currently airing his "terrifying report" by non other than "Aviation expert" Richard
Quest!!!
It all boils down to..CRM says Mr. Quest! I guess ATC/PILOT CRM is the new hot topic...or is it crew fatigue,Automation,inexperience AND CRM?
Quest!!!It all boils down to..CRM says Mr. Quest! I guess ATC/PILOT CRM is the new hot topic...or is it crew fatigue,Automation,inexperience AND CRM?
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I'm obviously missing something here, if the recording was made at the 'sending' end how do you know what was heard at the other end? Without a recording of the audio output from the receiving end that is?
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Converging aircraft means holes are lining up in the proverbial cheese. Two aircraft then making incorrect turns to increase rate of convergence is blowing a couple of huge new holes in the cheese.
Yeah yeah, 3 miles separation is great, but the 747 is still one of the fastest heavies and two of them swinging towards each other will gobble that distance up in no time, even if they're not approaching head-on.
Certainly would like to know reason for initial convergence path but much more disturbed by lack of insight into reason four experienced personnel on two flight decks were lulled into making a potentially catastrophic change of direction.
Yeah yeah, 3 miles separation is great, but the 747 is still one of the fastest heavies and two of them swinging towards each other will gobble that distance up in no time, even if they're not approaching head-on.
Certainly would like to know reason for initial convergence path but much more disturbed by lack of insight into reason four experienced personnel on two flight decks were lulled into making a potentially catastrophic change of direction.
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Was the word "say again" or "confirm" ever used by these convergent crew? It might well have been another Tenerife..or worse still..another Zagreb!
Last edited by Trackdiamond; 21st Oct 2013 at 20:50.
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Trackdiamond, I guess it depends how you view "worse still". 577 souls perished at Tenerife, 176 over Zagreb.
Last edited by OntimeexceptACARS; 21st Oct 2013 at 21:05. Reason: Spelling