“They’d all be walking, talking and alive if they went around”...
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Ok so do you US ride reporters prefer being cleared to land in the US with a/c ahead / on r/w or do you like the UK / rest of world (safer) approach of being cleared once the r/w is clear?
Genuine question as i know which i prefer.
Genuine question as i know which i prefer.
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Originally Posted by Alan Levin-Bloomberg
Computerized flight-track records and a survey of 2,340 pilots sponsored by the safety foundation found that crews have a long way to go to comply with airline requirements to abort landings if their approaches were unstable. Almost all pilots, or 97 percent, continued to land in spite of the rules that they climb away from the runway and circle around to try again, according to the research.
“That’s a risk factor that we really need to work on,” Rudy Quevedo, director of global programs at the foundation, said in an interview.
“That’s a risk factor that we really need to work on,” Rudy Quevedo, director of global programs at the foundation, said in an interview.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
You left off some significant digits Bubbers.
More like 99.9999999% of US cowboys can do the VFR maneuver at SFO.
More like 99.9999999% of US cowboys can do the VFR maneuver at SFO.
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For extra credit you can explain how cowboy ATC caused Southwest to rip their nosegear off at LGA and UPS to crash at Birmingham.
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Given that I frequently fly in and out of fairly busy uncontrolled airports, I have a fair degree of confidence in my ability to not run into the airplane that landed ahead of me. As a result, I really don't worry much whether I get my landing clearance before or after the plane ahead clears.
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Yes, I think it is partially a US problem. cowboy ATC basically. I see it all
the time, mainly at JFK and SFO.
The other bits - fatigue, magenta
line/poor scan mentality, yup, a major long haul issue.
But cowboy ATC,
you yanks have got that covered nicely.
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I agree mb, after I posted I realized 1 in a thousand wasn't right. We don't need glide slopes to land safely. Any descent pilot can do it. Just don't say man on the ground to man in the tower, give me the word and I'll give her the power because that isn't ICAO phraseology.
Requiring a report means that the captain is thinking, at the back of his mind, that a GA report will admit a failing to perform an accurate approach and lead to questioning of his professional ability.
I would suggest that the precise opposite is the truth and would laud the pilot who decides it is all too messy and we'll just:
Go around. Max thrust (but watch that check alt
) Pos clb Gear up
Retune (If steam driven) Flaps up Oops! 500 to go! (Buggah! Missed the thousand call)
Go around. Max thrust (but watch that check alt
) Pos clb Gear upRetune (If steam driven) Flaps up Oops! 500 to go! (Buggah! Missed the thousand call)
Well, not belonging to the group you are trying to deride, I can tell you I much prefer the US (and at CDG) system of getting the landing clearance on check-in with tower to the very late landing clearances at LHR (has happened below 100´) which creates an additional stress factor. All it takes is some other flight checking in on LHR Twr freq at the same time the Twr is clearing you to land, where a cross transmission will mean the difference between landing or a go-around. I find these late landing clearances ridiculous especially in weather where you can see the previous traffic (usually at around 2-2,5nm ahead) and they could well use "LAND AFTER" conditional clearances which I believe was mentioned once on these forums as an option available to ATC. Your post reeks of "holier than thou" attitude" and btw I am not American.
Last edited by oceancrosser; 6th Sep 2013 at 16:35.
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FligHT PATH ANGLE
There seems to be some confusion regards height above sea level and height above ground level. The difference would be the threshold crossing height at 50 feet over the threshold.
What is the TCH (or the TZE) on runway 28L at SFO please ??
If I divide the 4300 ft AGL by 14 nm I would get a gradient of 307 ft per nm and thats AGL. I would have to add the TCH (TZE) to get altitude ASL.
By the way, that works out to be a 2.9 degree flight path angle. Not too bad as long as you don't go any lower.
Thanks.
What is the TCH (or the TZE) on runway 28L at SFO please ??
If I divide the 4300 ft AGL by 14 nm I would get a gradient of 307 ft per nm and thats AGL. I would have to add the TCH (TZE) to get altitude ASL.
By the way, that works out to be a 2.9 degree flight path angle. Not too bad as long as you don't go any lower.
Thanks.
Last edited by thermostat; 6th Sep 2013 at 16:45.
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Basil
There was no such requirement in the RAF where a GA was treated as a normal flight manoeuvre.
Trouble is they always have to start an inquisition in order to find fault, even if the GA was flown due to environmental or operational factors, eg; RWY engaged. The idiots can't help themselves, they have to try to find a crew error in order to blame the drivers, even when there isn't one.
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Surely the point of the survey and this particular thread was that there appears to be a culture of breaking the rules (Company SOPs etc)? Personally I think that is far more worthy of discussion than bad RT and the TCH at SFO.
So, we have an Asiana hitting the wall, a SW doing a wheelbarrow, a UPS which may possibly have done an Asiana but at night and, over this side of the Atlantic, a Super Puma which appears to have flown into the sea on a NPA. Meanwhile, in my part of the World we are waiting on an accident report where a Metroliner had three goes on the ILS at Cork, crashing on the third attempt. I'll hazard a guess, but all of these look as if they failed to comply with SOPs.
So, we have an Asiana hitting the wall, a SW doing a wheelbarrow, a UPS which may possibly have done an Asiana but at night and, over this side of the Atlantic, a Super Puma which appears to have flown into the sea on a NPA. Meanwhile, in my part of the World we are waiting on an accident report where a Metroliner had three goes on the ILS at Cork, crashing on the third attempt. I'll hazard a guess, but all of these look as if they failed to comply with SOPs.
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Basic flying skills normally take care of all of these accidents. They seem to be missing in all of these accidents.
SOP's are usually designed to take care of the pilots that have problems with basic flying skills and need to go to SOP's to survive.
SOP's are usually designed to take care of the pilots that have problems with basic flying skills and need to go to SOP's to survive.
The Bloomberg article is very retrospective and takes its journalistic lead from recent FSF activities.
It’s easy with hindsight to conclude ‘if only the pilots had …’.
The focus on ‘the lack of a GA decision’ implies human failure – end of investigation; this overlooks any underlying factors. Instead of viewing the failure to GA as a cause, it should be considered as a consequence of preceding activity or aspects of operation. Perhaps the crew never realised the need to make a decision; their (flawed) understanding of the situation (with hindsight) never triggered the unstable approach criteria. There was no ‘need’ to make a decision.
There could be many contributions to this situation – workload, weak cues, poor awareness, peer pressure, safety culture, habit, or biased perceptions of risk, most of which involve human performance – sharp end and blunt end of the organisation.
Often in these approach situations the human becomes mentally maxed out, and significantly in rare circumstances, both crew at the same time. Thus not only are there individual weaknesses, but also crew weaknesses, difficulties with monitoring, intervention, CRM.
Thus the industry should be asking why is human performance apparently limited in these circumstances, was human performance a dominant factor, or were there external factors which have stronger influence.
It’s easy with hindsight to conclude ‘if only the pilots had …’.
The focus on ‘the lack of a GA decision’ implies human failure – end of investigation; this overlooks any underlying factors. Instead of viewing the failure to GA as a cause, it should be considered as a consequence of preceding activity or aspects of operation. Perhaps the crew never realised the need to make a decision; their (flawed) understanding of the situation (with hindsight) never triggered the unstable approach criteria. There was no ‘need’ to make a decision.
There could be many contributions to this situation – workload, weak cues, poor awareness, peer pressure, safety culture, habit, or biased perceptions of risk, most of which involve human performance – sharp end and blunt end of the organisation.
Often in these approach situations the human becomes mentally maxed out, and significantly in rare circumstances, both crew at the same time. Thus not only are there individual weaknesses, but also crew weaknesses, difficulties with monitoring, intervention, CRM.
Thus the industry should be asking why is human performance apparently limited in these circumstances, was human performance a dominant factor, or were there external factors which have stronger influence.
Last edited by alf5071h; 6th Sep 2013 at 20:03. Reason: typo
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Alycidon - that is not my personal experience. I cannot give an exact figure, but i think i have flown around ten go-arounds in the last ten years for one reason or another. All I have ever had is an acknowledgement of the ASR (Air Safety Report) followed a short time later by a one-liner from the flight data guys that the go-around was correctly flown and that the matter is now closed. If you make an honest error during the manoeuvre, you may hear something by quick telephone call and if you make a complete mess of it you will receive further sim training to ensure you do it right the next time. If, however, you continue to land from an unstable approach, you will most certainly hear a whole lot more about it and your job is at risk, as I said previously. Personally, I cannot find fault with any part of that process.
Last edited by Alexander de Meerkat; 7th Sep 2013 at 07:49. Reason: Typo
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As a result, I really don't worry much whether I get my landing clearance before or after the plane ahead clears.
Last edited by olasek; 6th Sep 2013 at 23:34.