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Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......

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Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......

Old 11th Sep 2013, 14:58
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means that people are very focused as they fly them, energy management has been thoroughly planned and a missed approach is considered a high probability
You know, as the SOP advocates circle the wagons and defend them at all costs they also ridiculize any kind of hand-flying proficiency and leave it for the nice, CAVU, no-wind days.

Your quote above, Yellow Pen, startles me as I always thought that this was how every approach was done. regardless of the weather or the wind. I now understand why accidents can happen since, according to your thinking, any kind of "out the box thinking" has to be properly briefed before hand. AF over the Antlantic comes to mind. Had they thought of properly briefing this loss of speed indication event, they then would have reacted appropriately. Funny how they didn't brief it. I wonder why...

Once again, refering to your quote above, are you implying that Alpageur and other such cow-boys were not managing their energy in a planned fashion or that they were otherwise not focused on the approach? Isn't a missed approach always "likely". I do think he was arguing that very fact a few pages ago.

I see this thinking creep up on our side of the airwaves, in ATC, where we favor automation for any kind of "hand controlling" and then see controllers turn into Air Traffic Spectators when CBs abound.

I know what the answers will be, but just thought it had to be said. I'll check the flames in a week.
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 16:02
  #122 (permalink)  
 
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Your quote above, Yellow Pen, startles me as I always thought that this was how every approach was done. regardless of the weather or the wind.
No, it isn't. Perhaps you are not quite up to speed with the latest thinking? Approach briefings need to be relevant to the circumstances of the day. Labour the same points each and every time and people stop listening. The first element on our approach briefing is THREATS. I rarely brief the threat of a high energy approach with a go-around at LHR because the ATC is almost always excellent, I'm unlikely to be held so high that it becomes a handling issue and the go around routing is benign. I'm more likely to discuss the possibility of a low go-around due to a blocked runway than a rushed approach. On the other hand at SFO I'll always brief energy management in more detail as it's pertinent, as ATC have unrealistic expectations of what our aircraft can do and it's the worst place on our network for unstable approaches by a long margin.

I now understand why accidents can happen since, according to your thinking, any kind of "out the box thinking" has to be properly briefed before hand
Properly briefing in advance helps you to avoid having to think "outside the box". My goal is to stay in the box whenever possible. Perhaps if Air France had done some proper briefing they'd have avoided having to think out of the box as they careered off the end of the runway at YYZ? As for the AF447, unreliable IAS indications is hardly classified as 'out of the box' thinking. It's pretty routine fodder for throwing into the end of a take off briefing as todays 'food for thought' item. Perhaps if they had briefed it they wouldn't have responded to it by pulling and holding full back stick and stalling the aircraft?

Once again, refering to your quote above, are you implying that Alpageur and other such cow-boys were not managing their energy in a planned fashion or that they were otherwise not focused on the approach? Isn't a missed approach always "likely". I do think he was arguing that very fact a few pages ago.
No, I'm stating my opinion that aiming to be stable at the gate rather than before is unwise and leaves you very little slack when things go wrong. I believe it was Alpagueur who was implying that being slick was somehow terribly impressive and more conservative flying demonstrated a lack of skill. As to 'likely', there are varying degrees of 'likeliness'. It's always a possibility, just like the wings might fall off, but you brief the important threats, not the trivia.
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 16:23
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Yellow pen I wasn't going to post again inspite of what I read in your post until say again posted.
So you have two lots of standard proceedures with respect to stabilised approach.
Of course the 500ft limit is the limit and not the target.
Perhaps I am wrong but I sense that an approach into home base is briefed and performed differently to a "tricky" airport.
I had a post deleted after I commented on a post of someone who was being wound up...his post was along the lines that "I wont reply as I have a sim check in 3 weeks and I need to open the books"... I stated the obvious (to me) that perhaps it might save his life if his knowledge was up to date all of the time.
Interestingly - to some - most of my near calls were at home base in benign weather...an unplanned go around on the Trident during my annual route check at LHR. A take off at Max AUW ZRH 16 one autumn evening when we hit a vicious wind shear and temperature inversion...both of the above we had to throw away SOP.
Another was a summer approach on 10L where we had a tailwind and wake turbulence..on two consequtive approaches.
No doubt you will see the similarity of the 777 at LHR where if they had been prepared they might have got away with it.
And the latest airbus fiasco ...I was taught "never change configuration" if you suspect airframe damage - again home base...and what did they apparently do...fly the whole departure before (and if) they realised the significance of loosing part of the aircraft.
Pilots like Sulley demonstrate what can be done and what the public expect from professionals.
Sith happens and it can happen at any time...
What is important is that you are ready for it.

Last edited by blind pew; 11th Sep 2013 at 16:25.
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 16:51
  #124 (permalink)  
 
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You're quite right that an approach into home base is briefed differently to an approach into a tricky airfield. Are you seriously suggesting I should brief terrain issues into LHR in the same detail as I would at MEX? Perhaps you will hit a nasty windshear in CAVOK conditions somewhere. The recovery technique is a memory drill, it's known and will be performed. There's always the possibility of the unexpected in aviation and it's our job to deal with it, but I still wouldn't classify your examples as being particularly out of the box. Those were known phenomenon, seen many times and with established guidelines for dealing with them. If you want' out of the box' I'd suggest the QF 380 out of SIN, or the BA 747 that had uncommanded slat retraction on take off at JNB. There's no rule book for those and nobody had seen them before. That is 'out of the box', and I don't really see how months of flying your approaches slick to the 500ft gate would have been especially helpful in either of those scenarios.

I really don't see the relevance of the LHR 777, assuming you are referring to the BA38? What do you think further briefing might have achieved given they faced two unresponsive engines on short final? Perhaps the skipper raising the flaps might have been the 'out of the box' thinking talked about (although it's debatable if this actually had any effect).

As to the latest Airbus 'fiasco' as you term it, there's no hard and fast rule on not changing config if you suspect airframe damage, nor do I know at which point they learned the cowls had departed. I would imagine they were rather more focussed on the pressing issue of dealing with the engine fire/failure warning they had immediately after departure. Given they got the aircraft safely back on the ground with one engine failed, the other with an uncontrolled fire and a failure of one of the hydraulic systems it could be argued that they did a pretty good job themselves. Sully and his Hudson Miracle are rightly held up as examples of great flying, but in reality what saved them all was the early decision to ditch. Gliding an A320 at green dot speed is not a terribly difficult chore, and if you're going to ditch the barely restricted expanse of the Hudson on a flat calm day is about as easy as it's going to get. They still didn't manage to do the Ditching checklist right though!
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 17:28
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Well as said, you cant train or brief for every eventuality.

The main thing of course is to fly the aircraft and not fly it into the ground. Basics.

Without being critical of the dead crew, if you fly a power setting and a known attitude, the airspeed will look after itself. Fairly basic stuff, that should have been taught at flight school and perhaps should have been an instinctive reaction. Some of my training (VFR) years ago, was to have the instrument panel covered or partially covered, representing all or some instruments U/S. Basic training.

I fear we are and have been getting away from the basics for quite some time now. Yes it will get worse. There is too much emphasis on the computers and avionics and getting it all complicated. So much so, there is a line of aircraft, built by the new master race of Europe for e.g.,, that has had such an avionics "upgrade", it requires a whole new type rating. Where is the K.I.S. in that??

Where's our friend when you need him? I'm sure he would have a view on all this too.
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 17:43
  #126 (permalink)  
 
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I think some of the reluctance to accept what feel like ultra-conservative SAC comes from the fact that accidents, thankfully, are rare and becoming rarer over the long term. As an *individual*, the chances of all the holes lining up on a particular day are pretty low, so you can fly lots of very slick approaches (which could be categorised as unstable by some operators) and nothing bad will result. This falls into the classic "normalisation of deviance", although not with quite the risk levels of the space program.

The statistics say, however, that a very significant proportion of landing accidents occur off an unstable approach. To try and reduce the frequency of these accidents, we need to ensure that pilots don't fly unstable approaches AT ALL.

Because going off the side/end of the runway and/or taking the undercarriage off are rare events, not many of us have experienced them. They happen to *other* (stupid) people, don't they?

To put it into perspective, you could spend your whole career taking off grossly overweight but only suffer from it if you lost an engine in a certain timeframe on a limiting runway. No-one has suggested this is good practice, as it isn't, but it illustrates that just because you've done something many times without incident it doesn't imply that it's a great idea, especially when you are dealing with statistically rare but severe events...
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Old 11th Sep 2013, 20:34
  #127 (permalink)  
 
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TFS Topography

Gentlemen, please...

We all know that in TFS we have to sometimes overcome the most difficult scenario in which upper winds are westerly, hitting a huge 10,000'+ rock in centre of the island and then creating a flow of air around the rock which causes very strong tailwinds on approach to even <500' and headwinds thereafter.

Whether the pilots breached common sense, standard operating procedures, aircraft limits, etc/etc is one possible factor.
But the topographical layout of the island must never be underestimated as the most causal factor to a very strange phenomena called unstable approaches.

Even the most skilled pilot, using the best avionics the industry can provide in the most modern aircraft of modern times cannot change the environmental occurrences regularly on display at TFS.

Essential is an early acknowledgement of this phenomena, planning for it to happen, and crating a margin against it. Delaying configuration certainly doesn't help in such scenario where a increasing headwind component is felt by the aircraft at low level.

Most of us flying in TFS will remember a day where an increasing speed tendency happened at low level, easily approaching unstable approach criteria for speed +XX kts.

But irrespectively, this phenomena causes a higher than average ground speed due to the tailwind on final approach (I've seen >30 kts @<2000')... Let's not forget the topography in this discussion, TFS is not your average airport.
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 07:54
  #128 (permalink)  
 
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spool-up at 500

Then your airline and you are not complying with safe practice. The main issue is not that you have land flap at 500 ft latest - it is that the plane is configured in every respect for a safe landing and that includes engines at normal approach power. What if you had to go around from 450 ft? 12 seconds spool up time! And if they don't spool up symmetrically?
The airline I flew for did include spool up as part of the stable approach criteria, and even if they had not, airmanship and common sense dictate that engines spooled up is a pre requisite. Otherwise it is a glide approach.
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 08:40
  #129 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by yanrair
What if you had to go around from 450 ft? 12 seconds spool up time!
Are engines really allowed to take 12 seconds from Approach Idle to full power? In any case, provided you don't actually hit the ground, I can't see a GA from 450ft would be a big issue even if you kept going down for 12 seconds.
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 10:58
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Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......

Easa cs-25 and far25 say maximum 8 seconds from approach idle to 95% of toga rating.
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 14:26
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When going around from low altitudes (eg CAT2/3) a touch is to be expected.
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 20:47
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12 seconds from Approach idle to TOGA...
ok.
What airline do you fly for and why did they strap 707 engines on an A321?
last time I visited TFS I noticed approach idle at 31%N1, spool up time to stable setting +-55% was less than 2, we all know what it takes from 55 up to 90+...
12seconds? my *ss

About the incident:
Poor ATC, poor IB pilot management but hey, it happens to everyone and if today is not your lucky day even you might end up in such a situation.
Not an excuse for it, but I don't see any reason to 'blame' them for anything.
Going around with traffic about to lift off in my opinion is an option but in this case it becomes a completely visual manoeuvre requiring all necessary elements. Landing an aircraft on a long runway when there is still traffic on it. Well I wouldn't do it, but then again there are places where this is actually legal...
Does anyone know why in TXL they don't allow your takeoff until the approaching a/c is below a certain altitude? (26L/R)
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Old 12th Sep 2013, 21:39
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It is really interesting to not only see generations clash but also different cultures.

Some generalisations to put some more oil on the fire.
Anglosaxons:
-are afraid to handfly
-reject a visual approach whenever the ILS is available, and whenever available they will keep the AP/FD/ATHR engaged for as long as possible
-reduce to 185 knots on every approach because the UK AIP says so
-are always worried about the subsequent board of enquiry/courtcase (???)
-do not disconnect the autopilot until landing clearance has been received and preceding aircraft has vacated the runway
-do long and boring briefs, but at least the CVR has recorded it so we are covered.
-when the book says stable at 1000ft, they are stable at 1500ft just to be on the safe side . Not realizing that the ground is actually at 0 ft as pointed out by my colleague.
-when checking in with the approach controller at some Greek/Spanish island will check in with ATIS identifier, QNH and a/c type just because at LGW you have to do this!
-when doing a readback on R/T outside of the UK will consistently apply UK phraseology whilst not being aware that UK cap413 is different from ICAO doc 8143 standard.
-take home crewfood to eat at home
-only talk about aircraft when on board
-have a 40kg brightonboy guarding the cockpitdoor whenever one of the flightcrew goes to the toilet
-have to say 3 times during the day: let´s make it a nice day out, whilst being a complete

The Mediterreneans:
-smoke in the flightdeck
-always get preference over other foreign carriers
-fly cowboy approaches
-always fly manually and visually
-bust their minima and stabilisation criteria
-listen to flamengo music in the cruise
-have the flightdeck door open
-invite people on the jumpseat all the time even without ticket
-go to the terminal to drink a coffee whilst the pax are waiting

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Old 12th Sep 2013, 22:50
  #134 (permalink)  
 
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....and in your world you do it better than anyone else because you're the only guy who knows how to REALLY do it. Yes, totally, without doubt

I love generalisations. The generalizers keep this profession and, more importantly, this forum on it's toes. Love it, love it, LOVE IT

Just adding my facetious 2 cents.

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Old 12th Sep 2013, 23:18
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Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......

I am glad I've been able to make your day.
I am generalizing both ends of the camp to illustrate the madness.
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Old 13th Sep 2013, 14:32
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Sarah37, decelerated approaches hitting 210 at 3.8nm and "being stable between 5 and 600ft", is this "skilled pilots"?! Sorry but that's a load of rubbish.
Sounds like it, I guess the workload on those last 2nm should be quite something !
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Old 14th Sep 2013, 10:09
  #137 (permalink)  
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Stable at 1000 ft as standard?

Yellow Pen, Full Wings et al

I've worked for three companies and they all used 1000 ft as the "normal" gate with exceptions for non standard approaches like the Canarsie at JFK. Similarly for circling approaches. Everything configured, on speed, on slope and spooled up. Not too difficult unless ATC mess you around eg SFO, MIA, JFK, IAD etc.....

I went to a talk by a BA skipper about 20 years ago and he said exactly the same thing so I don't know if much has changed. The hardest thing, IMHO, is being able to recognise you're unstable and force yourself to go around. I'm sure I'm not the only one who has continued when, maybe, a G/A would have been advisable. ASR'd one such event and went in to be debriefed. The company were excellent. Learn from it and I did so I suppose that's tea with biscuits!

Then alternative is a real risk of an overrun. I'm sure, as someone else said, that the pilots who do overrun thought "it'll never happen to me!"

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Old 14th Sep 2013, 17:34
  #138 (permalink)  
 
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The hardest thing, IMHO, is being able to recognise you're unstable and force yourself to go around.
I think that has been one of the weakest links in the chain, too.

Fairly recently, we changed our SOPs so that the monitoring pilot, who at some point below 1,000R becomes the handling pilot, assesses the stability of the approach so when the 1,000R call occurs and it isn't stable he calls for a go-around. The statistics seem to show a reduction in continued unstable approaches after this change, so it appears to have been a reasonable one.

Of course, once handover of control has happened, it is still possible for the approach to become unstable and/or require discontinuing. That's not an easy monitoring/decision task either...
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