"Safe Airline" vs. Unsafe Culture. We're discussing the wrong thing!
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"Safe Airline" vs. Unsafe Culture. We're discussing the wrong thing!
It seems to me that we are missing the point - or perhaps emphasising the wrong point in the current debate about an (any) airline's "safety".
This has been highlighted by a recent TV documentary that imo raised some very valuable and important concerns but seems to have largely missed the fundamental point.
Surely it is obvious that an airline that has not suffered an accident is not necessarily "safe", nor that one that has is "unsafe" rather than perhaps unfortunate. This definition of "safe" seems to be enshrined in black and whits rather than in shades of grey.
It is the likelihood of an accident that affects safety, not the bare statistics of whether one has occurred.
Dissecting a modern Eu company's fuel policy in order to determine "safety" is doomed to failure as we've seen, for the simple reason that the fuel policy is determined by legal requirements from the regulating authority. We all use essentially the same policy. This, then, is a cul-de-sac.
The three FR aircraft that diverted to VLC all seem to have applied and carefully stuck to the FR fuel policy (which I daresay differs hardly not one jot from most other EU airlines') and are thus unimpeachable. From that point of view...
When a journo starts a debate with an airline about something as specifically defined as a fuel policy it would be a good idea if he was sure what the phrase actually meant - because the airline knows full well that their fuel policy is fully approved by the regulator, published in the Ops Manual chapter and verse and if you want to challenge it you are effectively challenging the correctness of the approval from their CAA. That is the basis the FR denials were made from and were doubtless legally correct.
What should be of concern is the culture and company pressure on the decision makers (the flightdeck) that restricts their proper decision making. But this isn't strictly fuel policy. That culture is not written down in any comprehensive manner in any manual and is thus a subjective argument, and very hard to prove but it is aspect that turned the three diversions into a manifestation of something really scary. The prevention or discouraging (by conditioning perhaps) of crews from making airmanlike decisions. That is a safety issue - and a very serious one, but don't confuse it with "fuel policy" per se. Because the lawyers and company spokesmen wont - and they'll be correct.
Not much mileage in questioning the fuel policy - rather the practical implementation of it which is quite another matter - and that's where the spotlight should fall.
We have for some years now been developing airlines that recruit few/no-one but zero hour cadets and train them in a Company controlled manner. These supremely well trained paragons (I jest not) eventually become Captains, than taining Captains and the cycle continues. All very well on paper - hard to make a safety case out of that but...
But...we end up with a flight deck community of company trained clones who know nothing of aviation in general - nothing of standard practices - something many companies want weeded out - and who think that all aviation is conducted the same way.
Thus the company slowly develops its own culture which may be a good or a bad thing. But if it is developed so new pilots learn from day one that it is wrong, reprehensible or just plain risky for personal reasons to carry a bit of extra fuel when there are CBs about you've got a culture that may in some circumstances trend towards more hazard than it should. Add to this a culture where you daren't go sick because you think this is the way airlines work, you fly fatigued after traipsing around Europe on days off arranging your own hotac and transport and you're swinging the odds to an unnecessary degree.
Does this make for a "safe" operation? Clearly not, and, just like the fuel policy, the spokesman can indignantly defend the company's impeccable "safety" record" as it is, like the fuel policy, there in black and white. It's not necessarily correct or honest, but it is an undeniable statistic, and can thus be spun as "the facts".
Difficult to present this to the public in a documentary as so little of it is quantifiable but the skills that really make aviation safer are absorbed over the years by exposure to many different cultures and ideas, and in a strict cloned monoculture those pilots risk ending up genetically weak in paces and critically malnourished. We all know that too much interbreeding is a bad thing - but that's exactly what so many companies are doing with their pilot force.
If your entire flock of sheep is suffering beri-beri due to an inadequate diet it's pretty hollow to assert they're perfectly healthy on the basis that none have died. Yet. Just as it is to crow your's are healthier than your neighbours because one of his healthy flock died of a broken leg.
A "Safe airline" is demonstrably NOT one that has an impeccable accident record, that is far too a shallow assessment for such a serious subject.
A safe airline is one with a safe culture. Not just a legally untouchable Ops Manual.
Did I mention Airmansh.......?
Oh bugger..it's not in the manual. Sorry.
I'll get my coat.
This has been highlighted by a recent TV documentary that imo raised some very valuable and important concerns but seems to have largely missed the fundamental point.
Surely it is obvious that an airline that has not suffered an accident is not necessarily "safe", nor that one that has is "unsafe" rather than perhaps unfortunate. This definition of "safe" seems to be enshrined in black and whits rather than in shades of grey.
It is the likelihood of an accident that affects safety, not the bare statistics of whether one has occurred.
Dissecting a modern Eu company's fuel policy in order to determine "safety" is doomed to failure as we've seen, for the simple reason that the fuel policy is determined by legal requirements from the regulating authority. We all use essentially the same policy. This, then, is a cul-de-sac.
The three FR aircraft that diverted to VLC all seem to have applied and carefully stuck to the FR fuel policy (which I daresay differs hardly not one jot from most other EU airlines') and are thus unimpeachable. From that point of view...
When a journo starts a debate with an airline about something as specifically defined as a fuel policy it would be a good idea if he was sure what the phrase actually meant - because the airline knows full well that their fuel policy is fully approved by the regulator, published in the Ops Manual chapter and verse and if you want to challenge it you are effectively challenging the correctness of the approval from their CAA. That is the basis the FR denials were made from and were doubtless legally correct.
What should be of concern is the culture and company pressure on the decision makers (the flightdeck) that restricts their proper decision making. But this isn't strictly fuel policy. That culture is not written down in any comprehensive manner in any manual and is thus a subjective argument, and very hard to prove but it is aspect that turned the three diversions into a manifestation of something really scary. The prevention or discouraging (by conditioning perhaps) of crews from making airmanlike decisions. That is a safety issue - and a very serious one, but don't confuse it with "fuel policy" per se. Because the lawyers and company spokesmen wont - and they'll be correct.
Not much mileage in questioning the fuel policy - rather the practical implementation of it which is quite another matter - and that's where the spotlight should fall.
We have for some years now been developing airlines that recruit few/no-one but zero hour cadets and train them in a Company controlled manner. These supremely well trained paragons (I jest not) eventually become Captains, than taining Captains and the cycle continues. All very well on paper - hard to make a safety case out of that but...
But...we end up with a flight deck community of company trained clones who know nothing of aviation in general - nothing of standard practices - something many companies want weeded out - and who think that all aviation is conducted the same way.
Thus the company slowly develops its own culture which may be a good or a bad thing. But if it is developed so new pilots learn from day one that it is wrong, reprehensible or just plain risky for personal reasons to carry a bit of extra fuel when there are CBs about you've got a culture that may in some circumstances trend towards more hazard than it should. Add to this a culture where you daren't go sick because you think this is the way airlines work, you fly fatigued after traipsing around Europe on days off arranging your own hotac and transport and you're swinging the odds to an unnecessary degree.
Does this make for a "safe" operation? Clearly not, and, just like the fuel policy, the spokesman can indignantly defend the company's impeccable "safety" record" as it is, like the fuel policy, there in black and white. It's not necessarily correct or honest, but it is an undeniable statistic, and can thus be spun as "the facts".
Difficult to present this to the public in a documentary as so little of it is quantifiable but the skills that really make aviation safer are absorbed over the years by exposure to many different cultures and ideas, and in a strict cloned monoculture those pilots risk ending up genetically weak in paces and critically malnourished. We all know that too much interbreeding is a bad thing - but that's exactly what so many companies are doing with their pilot force.
If your entire flock of sheep is suffering beri-beri due to an inadequate diet it's pretty hollow to assert they're perfectly healthy on the basis that none have died. Yet. Just as it is to crow your's are healthier than your neighbours because one of his healthy flock died of a broken leg.
A "Safe airline" is demonstrably NOT one that has an impeccable accident record, that is far too a shallow assessment for such a serious subject.
A safe airline is one with a safe culture. Not just a legally untouchable Ops Manual.
Did I mention Airmansh.......?
Oh bugger..it's not in the manual. Sorry.
I'll get my coat.
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 18th Aug 2013 at 11:07.
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"We have for some years now been developing airlines that recruit few/no-one but zero hour cadets and train them in a Company controlled manner. These supremely well trained paragons (I jest not) eventually become Captains, than raining Captains and the cycle continues. All very well on paper - hard to make a safety case out of that but...
But...we end up with a flight deck community of company trained clones who know nothing of aviation in general - nothing of standard practices - something many companies want weeded out - and who think that all aviation is conducted the same way."
But the accident rate IS going down - so maybe that's the way to go...............
But...we end up with a flight deck community of company trained clones who know nothing of aviation in general - nothing of standard practices - something many companies want weeded out - and who think that all aviation is conducted the same way."
But the accident rate IS going down - so maybe that's the way to go...............
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Safety culture starts at the top, with management. Then their ethos and or mantra is promulgated to flight ops, which is forced upon the troops. Unfortunately, the zero to heros don't know any better, and those that do are reprimanded for exercising "Safe Judgement" which against the "Safety Culture" which has been established by management.
Sort of like the "North Korean philosophy".
Sort of like the "North Korean philosophy".
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Good thread and a very tricky problem to solve.
Perhaps this thread could be joined to the current discussion on a separate thread in Terms and Endearment, called "Ryanair sacks Captain Goss" which is going down a similar path.
Perhaps this thread could be joined to the current discussion on a separate thread in Terms and Endearment, called "Ryanair sacks Captain Goss" which is going down a similar path.
The FAA seem to realise this and have implemented that 1500 hour rule for operating aircraft in rpt operations. I believe Indonesia has/is about to implement a 1500 hour rule for expat pilots. Maybe one day when there is a plane crash in europe similar to the circumstances of the Colgan Air crash, the European authorities will pull their socks up and actually do something about it.
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We already have had
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/fil...2011_005-0.PDF
It won't change in Europe due to the RHS position being a revenue stream for alot of airlines.
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/fil...2011_005-0.PDF
It won't change in Europe due to the RHS position being a revenue stream for alot of airlines.
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Chance of diversion vs carriage of extra fuel has nothing to do with safety, this is commercial decision.
What makes you think that zero hours cadets are less safe than others who flew another few hundreds in Cessna? Please no BS like "common sense" because I do not see any common sense here. Do you have a reference to some study which has proven it?
Your post smells like "bring me back my old good Pan Am", nothing to do with safety, all about personal comfort and perks
What makes you think that zero hours cadets are less safe than others who flew another few hundreds in Cessna? Please no BS like "common sense" because I do not see any common sense here. Do you have a reference to some study which has proven it?
Your post smells like "bring me back my old good Pan Am", nothing to do with safety, all about personal comfort and perks
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Originally Posted by ag bis
The three FR aircraft that diverted to VLC all seem to have applied and carefully stuck to the FR fuel policy
However, what they do not appear to have done, and it is not 'written' anywhere in any airline OM I know of, is divert at the right time. Although I recall they all diverted from altitude with more than CMR, waiting in the hold to near CMR is pointless and wrong. I expect this lesson has been absorbed at RY - and needs to be over the whole of aviation.
It has already been pointed out on the previous thread that no matter how many extra tonnes of fuel you load, if you use it up before diverting you will still be 'short'. The 'safety culture' we need is that which enables the right decisions at the right time, and 'experience' helps here. This is what the 'rookies' should be learning from the 'oldies', but as you say, the P2F to LHS cycle degrades that process.
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How does the song go, LSM? "It ain't what you do it's the way that you do it...."
Second verse "It ain't what you got it's the way that you use it...."?
Second verse "It ain't what you got it's the way that you use it...."?
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Your post smells like "bring me back my old good Pan Am", nothing to do with safety, all about personal comfort and perks
Last edited by Tee Emm; 18th Aug 2013 at 13:31.
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- so you are agreeing that they all took the extra fuel they required over PLOG?
My understanding was that they took a hundred or two extra - maybe I'm wrong.
But whether they took 200 extra when they should have taken 1000 or whether they took the 1000 and hung around at MAD too long is by the by. Either case indicates severely faulty of judgement or - I am suggesting - impaired judgement due to company pressure and culture to take it to the edge, be that lowest uplift or last minute in the hold. It suggests to me that something unusual is affecting their thought processes; had just one flight done this there would be nothing to say, but three simultaneously makes a case for a pattern. A pretty good case, I'd say.
And that pattern, we understand from all the evidence is a fear of non-compliance with an inflexible and accusatory commercial culture as opposed to a healthy safety culture.
Regardless of a clear and present danger such as extensive forecast and existing CBs in the worst managed airspace in Europe - and the knowleghe that diversions there are few and far between and likely unable to cope with a fraction of the traffic involved.
As I'm currently in the business of creating a fuel calculation system which includes both legal reserve requirements and the flexibility to allow users to edit the assumptions - for example, to limit the FL assumed for diversion to the alternate rather than using 'best FL' figures, I am naturally quite interested in this topic.
However, when this topic was first discussed following the 'Spanish experience', it was clear to me that many 'professional pilots' don't actually understand the definition of 'final reserve' or even 'alternate' fuel. Typically, some thought that 'alternate fuel' included a 5% contigency allowance while others thought that, even when an alternate was required, 30 min holding fuel had to be included at destination, rather than at the alternate.
Having studied the IAA report, the reserve fuel carried by the affected aircraft seems to me to be entirely in line with EASA requirements. But when there is a strong possibility of being air-trafficked in a less than competent manner, a wise captain should bear that in mind when deciding alternate fuel, in my view.
If a diversion is managed normally, the aircraft will land at the alternate with final reserve (30 min) plus any unused contingency. The problem comes when the diversion cannot be managed normally, due to weather/poor ATC/other aircraft also diverting - and that's when the captain's airmanship decision is validated. Should an airline's management policy discourage, or even penalise, a captain using his/her experience and judgment to decide the reserve fuel to be carried, then that airline should well be open to question.
In my personal opinion, I thought that the Ch4 programme was naive and sensationalist. Frankly, I didn't see the point of it.
I choose not to fly Ryanair not because of any perceived safety issues, but for various other reasons.
However, when this topic was first discussed following the 'Spanish experience', it was clear to me that many 'professional pilots' don't actually understand the definition of 'final reserve' or even 'alternate' fuel. Typically, some thought that 'alternate fuel' included a 5% contigency allowance while others thought that, even when an alternate was required, 30 min holding fuel had to be included at destination, rather than at the alternate.
Having studied the IAA report, the reserve fuel carried by the affected aircraft seems to me to be entirely in line with EASA requirements. But when there is a strong possibility of being air-trafficked in a less than competent manner, a wise captain should bear that in mind when deciding alternate fuel, in my view.
If a diversion is managed normally, the aircraft will land at the alternate with final reserve (30 min) plus any unused contingency. The problem comes when the diversion cannot be managed normally, due to weather/poor ATC/other aircraft also diverting - and that's when the captain's airmanship decision is validated. Should an airline's management policy discourage, or even penalise, a captain using his/her experience and judgment to decide the reserve fuel to be carried, then that airline should well be open to question.
In my personal opinion, I thought that the Ch4 programme was naive and sensationalist. Frankly, I didn't see the point of it.
I choose not to fly Ryanair not because of any perceived safety issues, but for various other reasons.
A ‘Reasoned’ classic: Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice.
And in similar vogue: Safety Culture – Theory and Practice.
And in similar vogue: Safety Culture – Theory and Practice.
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Did the three FR planes land at their diversion with their final reserves still intact?
If so, I don't see any talking point, except perhaps they declared fuel maydays incorrectly because as far as I understand the mayday should only be declared if the final reserves will be burned before landing?
I understand the point at which one has to divert is so one may arrive at the diversion airport and land with the final reserve still remaining, which in turn dictates what is the latest point/time one should start the diversion.
If one wants to hang around at destination waiting leaving only the minimum fuel available to get to the diversion field, plus final reserves, and land immediately without consideration for other traffic and other potentially unforeseen situations then I think the crew are the ones who are being unsafe.
For example I would always divert with diversion fuel + final reserve + a 'what if factor' and if that reduces the time I can hang around waiting then that's a decision me and my colleague have to come to and defend.
I think it's a high risk game to play to divert with diversion fuel and final reserves only and arrogant to think that one can then declare a fuel mayday to jump queues to guarantee landing with final reserves.
If so, I don't see any talking point, except perhaps they declared fuel maydays incorrectly because as far as I understand the mayday should only be declared if the final reserves will be burned before landing?
I understand the point at which one has to divert is so one may arrive at the diversion airport and land with the final reserve still remaining, which in turn dictates what is the latest point/time one should start the diversion.
If one wants to hang around at destination waiting leaving only the minimum fuel available to get to the diversion field, plus final reserves, and land immediately without consideration for other traffic and other potentially unforeseen situations then I think the crew are the ones who are being unsafe.
For example I would always divert with diversion fuel + final reserve + a 'what if factor' and if that reduces the time I can hang around waiting then that's a decision me and my colleague have to come to and defend.
I think it's a high risk game to play to divert with diversion fuel and final reserves only and arrogant to think that one can then declare a fuel mayday to jump queues to guarantee landing with final reserves.
Last edited by south coast; 18th Aug 2013 at 15:05. Reason: Error - to include final reserves
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To be honest BEagle in my experience it doesn't actually matter how much over plan you carry. You could have an extra 30 to an hour onboard it wouldn't make any difference.
Operations will always try and get you to stay in the hold to see if things clear up until you reach your min fuel before divert.
The running on min fuel + a little bit to be honest doesn't bother me. If I decide that its not going to work I divert early and that additional fuel is used as a safety buffer for my divert not for getting into destination.
So the extra stipulated by ops on the fuel plan is the company insurance that I won't have to divert. The extra I put on is mine to use how I see fit which for me is to have more options on the divert. The only way to get more company extra is to divert and make it cheaper to carry more fuel on a route.
To me the fuel policy is reasonable enough if not worded aggressively, but I have yet to see if there are repercussions of an early divert possibly not even bothering even reaching destination. If they are applying pressure for using airmanship and experience and defining when the commander is allowed to divert and penalising them when ops think they should have stayed longer thats a completely different situation.
Operations will always try and get you to stay in the hold to see if things clear up until you reach your min fuel before divert.
The running on min fuel + a little bit to be honest doesn't bother me. If I decide that its not going to work I divert early and that additional fuel is used as a safety buffer for my divert not for getting into destination.
So the extra stipulated by ops on the fuel plan is the company insurance that I won't have to divert. The extra I put on is mine to use how I see fit which for me is to have more options on the divert. The only way to get more company extra is to divert and make it cheaper to carry more fuel on a route.
To me the fuel policy is reasonable enough if not worded aggressively, but I have yet to see if there are repercussions of an early divert possibly not even bothering even reaching destination. If they are applying pressure for using airmanship and experience and defining when the commander is allowed to divert and penalising them when ops think they should have stayed longer thats a completely different situation.
Last edited by mad_jock; 18th Aug 2013 at 13:57.
If one wants to hang around at destination waiting leaving only the minimum fuel available to get to the diversion field and land immediately without consideration for other traffic and other potentially unforeseen situations then I think the crew are the ones who are being unsafe.