UPS 747 Dubai Final Report
Some FAA movie about laptop battery fires. When you see how difficult it is to just cool it down you get an idea that to deal with lithium battery cargo fires is next to impossible in flight. Just scary. How about iPads and all that EFB stuff inside the cockpit?
How about some fireproof insulated bag with a fire suppression system inside to put burning stuff in and contain the gases? (for just a single burning laptop)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS6KA_Si-m8
How about some fireproof insulated bag with a fire suppression system inside to put burning stuff in and contain the gases? (for just a single burning laptop)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS6KA_Si-m8
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Does UPS have USA loaders and handlers there or local ones.
I worked for Midex airlines 3 years there in UAE,
A300.
We did many flights to Afghanistan same time this accident happened.
Many times we would have the cargo manifest and no Dangerous goods listed,
Then while DXB ground ones locals loaded we would see the orange stickers on the cargo.
Where is the NOTAC, was none.
Happened often.
Like we need need to overlook this issue.
I hope they look deeper into this.
I worked for Midex airlines 3 years there in UAE,
A300.
We did many flights to Afghanistan same time this accident happened.
Many times we would have the cargo manifest and no Dangerous goods listed,
Then while DXB ground ones locals loaded we would see the orange stickers on the cargo.
Where is the NOTAC, was none.
Happened often.
Like we need need to overlook this issue.
I hope they look deeper into this.
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Could somebody do me or actually those two deceased UPS pilots a favor and mail this accident report to Jörg Handwerg, Captain and spokesperson for the German pilot union Vereinigung Cockpit (VC)? He was the first person I know to publicly criticize those two pilots in the German newspaper "Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)" for taking too long to return back to the airport. 
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Could somebody do me or actually those two deceased UPS pilots a favor and mail this accident report to Jörg Handwerg, Captain and spokesperson for the German pilot union Vereinigung Cockpit (VC)? He was the first person I know to publicly criticize those two pilots in the German newspaper "Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)" for taking too long to return back to the airport.
While it may not have made a difference in this case, it may have in another situation. Perhaps if the pallet on fire had been in a different location, arriving 10 or 15 minutes earlier would have made a difference. Perhaps if Pack 1 had been working or the smoke evacuation handle in the cockpit had not been pulled or an early descent accomplished(all of which made things worse), that extra 10-15 minutes early arrival would have made a difference.
Aside from the radio communication difficulties that resulted from returning to Dubai, it is difficult to say what the difference would have been if they had arrived 15 minutes earlier into Doha.
Choosing a significantly farther very suitable airport to return to is not the best choice as a general rule in this situation even if subsequently turns out that it would not have made a difference.
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I am not saying that the end result would have been different for me or that my actions would have been any different. However, with the benefit of hindsight and time to calmly think about things and what to do if this happens in the future.....
....while it happened to be batteries this time, it can be and could have been another source for the fire. The crew was not aware of the source at the time. Decisions at the time have to be based on the fact that there is smoke, not what the exact source is which doesn't really matter at that point.
We have known for a long time that fires are bad so land at the nearest suitable airport.
The checklist says to stay at FL250. I am not sure of the point of disregarding it and going to a much lower altitude so early based on the new destination distance. The report says that this may have made the fire worse. It certainly didn't make things better. I suppose one could be thinking that they want to be close to the water in case an immediate ditching is required if things get desperate all of a sudden instead of having to take 10 minutes to descend from FL 250.
I am not sure what the smoke evacuation checklist said at the time but it now says that pulling the smoke evacuation handle which opens a port in the ceiling in the cockpit. This is for when the smoke source is in the cockpit and that if the smoke or fumes source is not on the flight deck, this action may bring the smoke or fumes into the flight deck or increase the amount flowing into the flight deck which appears to be the case here.
The O2 mask on the right side was apparently not set to the 100% mode for departure according to the report. They claim that they can tell by sound analysis(if you believe that). They also seem to feel that it was never set to 100% during the emergency which seems difficult to believe but that is what the report says. If so, it shows the importance of checking that the mask is at 100% on the pre-flight. As well, the continuous flow option was never used. Unfortunately we don't get a lot of opportunity to practice selecting continuous flow in newer aircraft as the mask is stowed in that compartment instead the way it was in the old days with the mask hanging nearby. It can be very handy to practice making that selection whenever one gets the opportunity in the sim as it is done by feel only. This will ensure that no smoke is going in the mask.
The pack 1 failure had to be the worst luck in the world(as it is designed to keep smoke out of the cockpit through a higher pressure level) and happened after the fire warning sounded. Perhaps things were already bad at that point, I'm not sure. But I believe they followed the checklist to manually turn off the other packs. The checklist has subsequently been changed by Boeing.
....while it happened to be batteries this time, it can be and could have been another source for the fire. The crew was not aware of the source at the time. Decisions at the time have to be based on the fact that there is smoke, not what the exact source is which doesn't really matter at that point.
We have known for a long time that fires are bad so land at the nearest suitable airport.
The checklist says to stay at FL250. I am not sure of the point of disregarding it and going to a much lower altitude so early based on the new destination distance. The report says that this may have made the fire worse. It certainly didn't make things better. I suppose one could be thinking that they want to be close to the water in case an immediate ditching is required if things get desperate all of a sudden instead of having to take 10 minutes to descend from FL 250.
I am not sure what the smoke evacuation checklist said at the time but it now says that pulling the smoke evacuation handle which opens a port in the ceiling in the cockpit. This is for when the smoke source is in the cockpit and that if the smoke or fumes source is not on the flight deck, this action may bring the smoke or fumes into the flight deck or increase the amount flowing into the flight deck which appears to be the case here.
The O2 mask on the right side was apparently not set to the 100% mode for departure according to the report. They claim that they can tell by sound analysis(if you believe that). They also seem to feel that it was never set to 100% during the emergency which seems difficult to believe but that is what the report says. If so, it shows the importance of checking that the mask is at 100% on the pre-flight. As well, the continuous flow option was never used. Unfortunately we don't get a lot of opportunity to practice selecting continuous flow in newer aircraft as the mask is stowed in that compartment instead the way it was in the old days with the mask hanging nearby. It can be very handy to practice making that selection whenever one gets the opportunity in the sim as it is done by feel only. This will ensure that no smoke is going in the mask.
The pack 1 failure had to be the worst luck in the world(as it is designed to keep smoke out of the cockpit through a higher pressure level) and happened after the fire warning sounded. Perhaps things were already bad at that point, I'm not sure. But I believe they followed the checklist to manually turn off the other packs. The checklist has subsequently been changed by Boeing.
Last edited by JammedStab; 15th Jul 2015 at 10:45.
The pack 1 failure had to be the worst luck in the world(as it is designed to keep smoke out of the cockpit through a higher pressure level) and happened after the fire warning sounded. Perhaps things were already bad at that point, I'm not sure. But I believe they followed the checklist to manually turn off the other packs. The checklist has subsequently been changed by Boeing.
This was a "Fate is the Hunter" flight from hell. I hope we get something out of it. The report was well done.
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Game over
Does anybody really think anything will change? Sure the safety recommendations will be made bla bla bla but when push comes to shove there is to much money to be made than to worry about the safety of the crew, aircraft, and those below. And, yet you can't put extra lithium batts in your checked bag. Hell even GA Corporate A/C have the system that allows you to see the instruments in the event the cockpit is filled with smoke. I know I'm preaching to the choir but I just don't expect a thing to change. Still waiting for the Asiana final report, if it ever makes the light of day and I would bet it will be a very similar read.
It's a real joke but it will continue. Glad I will be retiring soon enough. I'm tired of playing Russian Roulette with this.
It's a real joke but it will continue. Glad I will be retiring soon enough. I'm tired of playing Russian Roulette with this.
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The single cause of this accident was a part of the cargo it carried.
Of significance is the quote from the accident investigation report:
"The Cargo Group examined shipping invoices for the cargo on board the
aircraft, and at least three shipments of lithium batteries which should have been declared as hazardous materials were identified in the pallets at positions 4 and 5. There were no declared shipments of hazardous materials on board the accident flight. "
If they should have been declared as hazardous, then why were they not so declared.
Given the lesson in the Valuejet flight 592 this is an accident that should not have happened.
Of significance is the quote from the accident investigation report:
"The Cargo Group examined shipping invoices for the cargo on board the
aircraft, and at least three shipments of lithium batteries which should have been declared as hazardous materials were identified in the pallets at positions 4 and 5. There were no declared shipments of hazardous materials on board the accident flight. "
If they should have been declared as hazardous, then why were they not so declared.
Given the lesson in the Valuejet flight 592 this is an accident that should not have happened.
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Given the lesson in the Valuejet flight 592 this is an accident that should not have happened.
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a bit off topic, but i was wondering if the South African authorities should have a look at the Herderberg crash again. It states in the final report that the fire originated in a pallet containing computers fitted with lithium batteries. They were considered not likely to cause any ignition or explosion by the time of the investigation, but how about now with further studies on lithium batteries?
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Good point. The Margo commission report of the Boeing 747Helderberg accident makes a summary case for the fire leading to an inflight break up when the report analyses the possible effect of a fire burning through the crown of the upper fuselage. Reading between the lines, Boeing where highly reticent regarding this possibility, and according to the commission, Boeing 'contested' any scenario that involved a break-up of the aircraft and thus the commission did no more than mention the two possible scenarios in the final report.
However, the Asiana B744F accident of 2011 which had a cargo of around 200kgs of Li-metal/Li-ion batteries at the rear of the upper deck does separate in flight at around FL140 following a sustained upper deck cargo fire, loss of control and a rapid descent. The fuselage separation location and the HazMat cargo location being approximate...therein lies a tale.
However, the Asiana B744F accident of 2011 which had a cargo of around 200kgs of Li-metal/Li-ion batteries at the rear of the upper deck does separate in flight at around FL140 following a sustained upper deck cargo fire, loss of control and a rapid descent. The fuselage separation location and the HazMat cargo location being approximate...therein lies a tale.
