UPS 747 Dubai Final Report

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by last747fe

I was overseas when this accident Happened and for many months was devastated thinking had I been there as a PFE It might of had a different outcome. After reading this excellent prepared report, I now see that for sure there would have been 3 dead crew members.

I'm glad that you said that, because coming from a former FE it means a lot more than it would coming from a non-flyer like myself.

Having read the report I felt much the same way - regardless of the smoke/incapacitation factor, once the flames and/or heat had begun affecting the control cables it would have been effectively "game over" within a matter of minutes. The seven-four may be a tough old bird - one of the toughest in service, but as I understand it from an outside perspective neither she nor any other airliner could withstand damage to those control junctions and stay flying.

The report is definitely a sobering read - between this accident and National 102 at Bagram we've been privy to two textbook examples of a worst-case/no-win scenario, and my heart goes out to everyone affected.

[Sqwak7700]

Not the appropriate forum but do you want to substantiate the above claim?

Yeah, gladly. Name one measure the FAA has put in place to mitigate fatigue? You do know that fatigue shows up in almost all accident reports as being a factor. Has been this way for a long time. Was part of the Colgan/continental Q400 and I'm sure it will be part of the Asiana report as well.

And the US aviation industry is still unable to implement a watered down version of the UK's AFTLS. This is long overdue, and still not implemented to this day. And on top of it, Cargo carriers are excluded. They took one of the most important parts of these regs (time behind the door) and reduced it by a few hours. No science behind that, just purely commercial. All science says you should have 8 hours of rest per night, but the FAA knows better.

If anyone needs to support their claim, then it should be the individual defending the FAA. I would REALLY love to see that turd polish.

[egravitics]

The final report is harrowing reading, dealing with an unstoppable, overwhelming event. However the wider question is whether the event was preventable, either by not flying that type of cargo or mandating specific packing and handling conditions to mitigate or limit the extent.

The FAA has 135 fire/smoke incidents with batteries classed as the cause, on or in the vicinity of aircraft between March 1991 through July 2013 (report).

Seems fortunate that most incidents are detected on the ground before or after a flight. Not included in the FAA battery-incident report is UPS flight 1307 (7th FEB 2006) as the NTSB couldn't determine an absolute cause of the cargo bay fire. The NTSB didn't rule out lithium-ion batteries as the fire's origin (last para, page 50).

The cynical view is that the aviation and/or battery industries have a Ford Pinto-esque approach which is partly rooted in pragmatism and partly actuarial - that 6 incidents a year is a very small proportion of the total number of batteries flown per year and the incovenience/cost of preventing each incident, most of which are on the ground, could easily exceed the associated losses. I hope the people who might be that cynical are given the opportunity to read this final report.

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Yeah, gladly. Name one measure the FAA has put in place to mitigate fatigue? You do know that fatigue shows up in almost all accident reports as being a factor. Has been this way for a long time. Was part of the Colgan/continental Q400 and I'm sure it will be part of the Asiana report as well.

Colgan - was that the FAA rules or commuting / sleeping habits of crewmembers?. Will the FAA have the balls to look at commuting?
Asiana - sleepiness maybe, jury is out on fatigue though.

[BOAC]

jury is out on fatigue though

- I would be very surprised if it was even a factor in this accident.

[ZFT]

Givemewings


All of our simulators too are equipped with smoke generation systems but many airlines don’t install them due to perceived health and safety issues.


Unfortunately neither EASA nor FAA regulations mandate them.

[barit1]

This may be too outlandish a concept for a profit-minded freight carrier, but nothing ventured, nothing gained:

The F-111 had an escape module that might look attractive to a 74F crew. The whole cockpit flies up and away from the unrecoverable aircraft.

It's really a matter of cost vs. the value of crews' lives.

[flyboyike]

The "escape module" would be an engineering challenge as well, I would imagine. The F-111 had the advantage of being much smaller, not to mention of being a military aircraft, where sitting on explosives was not as frowned upon.

[StormyKnight]

Even a parachute & a escape shoot may be enough like the one added to the 727 desert test crash aircraft.

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by Mr Angry from Purley

Colgan - was that the FAA rules or commuting / sleeping habits of crewmembers?. Will the FAA have the balls to look at commuting?

What is there to look at in commuting. Thousands do it every day.

[mutt]

And the US aviation industry is still unable to implement a watered down version of the UK's AFTLS. This is long overdue, and still not implemented to this day.

FAA 117 Duty Time, will come into affect 04th Jan 2014

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by Sqwak7700

You do know that fatigue shows up in almost all accident reports as being a factor. Has been this way for a long time. Was part of the Colgan/continental Q400 and I'm sure it will be part of the Asiana report as well.

While I am all for better rules to lessen fatigue, I have a great deal of difficulty believing that the Colgan accident had much to do with fatigue. Yes, they got forgot to turn of whatever anti-ice switch in their aircraft and therefore got a nuisance stall warning, but that has happened to plenty of people regardless of their level of fatigue(ask an ATR pilot who flies winter ops).

To think that the ridiculous reaction of the captain to the stall warning(pulling aggressively) was something that only happened because he was tired seems way off base. This is an instinct reaction by him, why? who knows but I highly doubt that if it had been earlier in his duty day after an nice long well-rested vacation that he would have done any different. The fact that he had an extremely poor flying record seems a more likely answer. He was just a weak pilot.

[Capn Bloggs]

What is there to look at in commuting. Thousands do it every day.

Like she did? You should be thrown in jail for being irresponsible.

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Like she did? You should be thrown in jail for being irresponsible.

I should be thrown in jail for saying that thousands commute everyday?

Whatever this FO did, I doubt it has anything to do with the captain's reaction to the stall warning.

Commuting by airline is like any other activity on time off. You can be responsible or irresponsible. I know a guy that wakes up at about 2 AM to drive more than a couple of hours for his 6 AM show for his 13 hour duty day that he bids. Should the FAA look at this as well. What about people who come back from a holiday on the other side of the world with a 12 hour time change the night before their early morning start at work. Should the FAA regulate our holidays. Maybe they should say that we need to make an effort to be well rested but can't micromanage our lives.

[Capn Bloggs]

Jammed old chap, I made my comment on jail based on what she did. Go and find that out and you'll see what I'm on about. I don't have a problem with pilots commuting a sector or two on their days off.

In my country it is a legal requirement that you be adequately rested before flight. That does not mean paxing (or driving) at all hours of the night to get to work! Why should you be allowed to pax back from a holiday and not have exactly the same time free of duty afterward before working as you would have had if that pax ride had been duty travel, considering the time zones?

[birdstrike]

I think there is a bit of hypocrisy going on here.

As pilots we are all very quick to criticise airline management / accountants, the CAA, the FAA etc for failing to take measures to enhance safety

but

when there is any call to restrict long time / distance commuting immediately pre-flight the immediate response is 'not fair, shouldn't interfere' etc.

Whilst it might be hard to PROVE that long commutes cause fatigue, it certainly cannot be argued that they in any way improve safety.

[flyboyike]

Originally Posted by JammedStab

While I am all for better rules to lessen fatigue, I have a great deal of difficulty believing that the Colgan accident had much to do with fatigue...

That's funny, I have no such difficulties.

[tdracer]

Quote:
Experience from this accident investigation in conjunction with FAA experiments suggest passive fire suppression in large cargo compartments due to oxygen deprivation may not be effective.
Uh, any other freighter pilots that have a problem with this statement? How does the FAA retain a valid certification for freighter aircraft with Class E compartments while simultaneously acknowledging this little gem.

Why can't we have the same level of protection in the main deck as we do in the lower lobes? I know it takes more structure, but the prediction in the accident report is for 4.1 more hull losses between now and 2021. At the very least, make self-fueled hazmat a road or water transport only class.

Unfortunately 'active' fire suppression wouldn't have much mattered - Li-Ion batteries provide their own oxidizer when they start to burn. So any conventional aircraft fire suppression would have - at best - marginally slowed the fire's progression to surrounding materials (same thing with chemical oxygen generators as was the case in the ValueJet crash in the Everglades).

The only fire suppression agent that's been demonstrated to be truely effective for aviation cargo fires is Halon - manufacture of which has been effectively banned due to environmental concerns (there has been success with a baking soda based agent in smaller areas - specifically engine fires - but not for the area of a massive cargo hold). We're basically using stockpiled and recycled Halon for new aircraft production - how long do you think that's going to last? Oh, and it would take a LOT of Halon to produce the minimum 5% concentration necessary to extinguish a conventional fire in an area the size of a 747F main deck.

The only real viable option is your last sentence - ban self oxidizing materials from air freight. It was done years ago for model rocket motors (with no reported self-ignition incidents). Yet we continue to allow a material with a known history of self ignition a free pass.

[givemewings]

Stormy, it's been awhile since I watched that doco on the desert crash test, but I don't think they added anything to that 727- those stairs were standard fit on that model... they just modified it to allow deployment in flight (or was it removed altogether- need to watch again)

As long as the consumer wants low priced batteries and the companies turn a profit, it will be difficult to change anything. I too used to be guilty of buying spare camera batteries etc online and having them sent to me... without even thinking to ask the shipper how they sent them. After working in freight, I then understood the issues and risks involved. I've even reported seller to Ebay after they repeatedly refused to ship items to me safely or notify the actual contents of parcels (even after offering to pay extra costs) The key is education, sadly like most industries the almighty dollar wins and the average Joe consumer does not care about some poor freight crew who died while bringing their cheap batteries from China....

[tdracer]

Stormy, it's been awhile since I watched that doco on the desert crash test, but I don't think they added anything to that 727- those stairs were standard fit on that model... they just modified it to allow deployment in flight (or was it removed altogether- need to watch again)

The aft stairs on the 727 were never intended to be operable 'in-flight', but pre-D.B. Cooper there was nothing to prevent their deployment in-flight (I recall the DC-9 having a similar setup). After the D.B. Cooper hijacking, a fix was implemented to prevent in-flight deployment. It was super simple - basically a spring loaded weather-vane that would rotate with free-stream airflow and block the door from opening (again, memory says a similar fix was implemented on the DC-9). Naturally this became known as the "D.B. Cooper fix" .

I've seen the documentary on the 727 desert crash - as best as I could tell all they did was remove the 'D.B. Cooper fix' .