Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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There is a majority (but not universal) feeling that the ATC advisory "180 kts to 5nm"/4-degree approach was a possible contributory factor.
I am sure that ATC did not impose this as a whim, in fact a couple of people have indicated that it is a common call for noise abatement reasons.
I am sure that ATC did not impose this as a whim, in fact a couple of people have indicated that it is a common call for noise abatement reasons.
In Mpls the FAA has been trying to enact a new set of approach and departure routes they claim will improve safety. This will shift some noise to different neighborhoods. There has been a significant public backlash, including from the affluent community of Edina who complained pretty strongly.
That effort has successfully delayed implementation and spawned a bunch of neighborhood meetings etc.
I can't tell you about the pro's and con's of the new routing, but I do think if any ATC procedure has an appreciable potential effect on flight safety the decision should be easy.
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firewall
Maybe there is a million miles gap understanding the culture as well as the pilots skill.
Within months the investigation result will show whether it is really somthing from pilots mistakes or other causes since Korean goverment organzied special TFT to look into this issue.
Already I realized that information released by NTSB is far from whole story but just a bunch of bags containing contraversial situation unawareness, drawing ones attentions pilots faults.
Somehow most people who are experienced at Boeing jets seem to bring disccussion onto single stream that I cannot buy. Because I see the most speculations are based on unfactual and missing information from NTSB.
I will wait for investigation report from Korean government.
If investigation results would weigh pilots fault, I would suggest stop Airlines and pilots converting planes from Airbus to Boeing. I would rather suggest them switch from Boeing to Airbus.
The pilots are operators and customers. I dont think we have to push them such a danger by running incompetent products being unable to secure lives.
Within months the investigation result will show whether it is really somthing from pilots mistakes or other causes since Korean goverment organzied special TFT to look into this issue.
Already I realized that information released by NTSB is far from whole story but just a bunch of bags containing contraversial situation unawareness, drawing ones attentions pilots faults.
Somehow most people who are experienced at Boeing jets seem to bring disccussion onto single stream that I cannot buy. Because I see the most speculations are based on unfactual and missing information from NTSB.
I will wait for investigation report from Korean government.
If investigation results would weigh pilots fault, I would suggest stop Airlines and pilots converting planes from Airbus to Boeing. I would rather suggest them switch from Boeing to Airbus.
The pilots are operators and customers. I dont think we have to push them such a danger by running incompetent products being unable to secure lives.
Last edited by kaokao; 16th Jul 2013 at 06:10.
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If autopilot OFF, A/T ON is so complicated, how come that's how USN pilots do a lot of traps that way? It's not a problem; except I would submit on an Airbus where the throttles don't move.
Flying an autothrottle approach to the carrier is a LOT different than a manual approach. It requires a finesse with the stick in pitch that is different than a manual approach. While the newest airplanes (F-18x) may have the differences ironed out in FBW software, the older (A-6, A-7) airplanes required distinctly different techniques.
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Pilots back home
Now that the 4 pilots are back on Korean soil, if they are found guilty of breaking the aircraft, are they required to go back to the US and defend their actions, or will the Airline put them back to flying status to make a point that they are good pilots?, or will they go on long term holiday leave, or end up behind bars?. I was just thinking about this and hearing about the Korean Mindset Culture as to what they might do.
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4. The a/c was on profile at 400 ft..... but with a ROD at close to double the stabilised equivalent, way outside the ballpark.
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If investigation results would weigh pilots fault, I would suggest stop Airlines and pilots converting planes from Boeing to Airbus. I would rather suggest them switch from Airbus to Boeing.
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They do it because (1) the airplanes are designed for it; and (2) they practice it a lot.
We land that Airbus with AP off and AT on all the time unless you're doing an autoland.
THERE IS NOTHING ABNORMAL OR HARD ABOUT FLYING MIXED AUTOMATION.
Last edited by junebug172; 16th Jul 2013 at 05:04.
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Enough bullsh1t from general public and 100 hr private pilots
I have flown into KSFO numerous times with 21 years flying Boeing a/c, stated only to advise that this is not ill informed comment. Whilst the traveling public and pvt pilots are entitled to their opinion, this wild speculation does nothing to get to the crux of the accident.
1. The a/c was NOT given a slam dunk approach. Aligned on final at 4000 odd feet at 14 miles is not a slam dunk.
2. 230 kts at 14 miles is NOT a challenge.
3. Stabilised approach criteria was NON existant.
4. The a/c was on profile at 400 ft..... but with a ROD at close to double the stabilised equivalent, way outside the ballpark.
5. The 3 muppets up front said NOTHING. (I won't honour them with the term pilots)
6. A/T hold is a normal A/T sub mode. It only becomes a "trap" when you don't know what you are
doing.
7. It is preferable that the guys up the pointy end know what they are *&$^ doing !
8. All ULH operations have a fatigue element. It is a professional's responsibility to mitigate that fatigue element by inflight rest, professional competence and knowing your game. The last two items were NON existent.
These morons masquerading as pilots deserve jail time, the charge professional incompetence.
Last edited by fire wall; 15th Jul 2013 at 14:39.
I have flown into KSFO numerous times with 21 years flying Boeing a/c, stated only to advise that this is not ill informed comment. Whilst the traveling public and pvt pilots are entitled to their opinion, this wild speculation does nothing to get to the crux of the accident.
1. The a/c was NOT given a slam dunk approach. Aligned on final at 4000 odd feet at 14 miles is not a slam dunk.
2. 230 kts at 14 miles is NOT a challenge.
3. Stabilised approach criteria was NON existant.
4. The a/c was on profile at 400 ft..... but with a ROD at close to double the stabilised equivalent, way outside the ballpark.
5. The 3 muppets up front said NOTHING. (I won't honour them with the term pilots)
6. A/T hold is a normal A/T sub mode. It only becomes a "trap" when you don't know what you are
doing. 7. It is preferable that the guys up the pointy end know what they are *&$^ doing !
8. All ULH operations have a fatigue element. It is a professional's responsibility to mitigate that fatigue element by inflight rest, professional competence and knowing your game. The last two items were NON existent.
These morons masquerading as pilots deserve jail time, the charge professional incompetence.
Last edited by fire wall; 15th Jul 2013 at 14:39.
However, in view of the blindly defensive Korean attitude after reading some of the most ridiculous and childish Korean news, nationally in Korea, or in US, or for that matter idiot coming on to Pprune in trying to convince the professional pilots' world of failure of automation or "bright light" at 500ft, they can all refer to probably the best written posting in this thread by Fire Wall.
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180/5 is possible, just not ideal. You can configure gear and flaps 30 at 180 knots. The airplane will slow nicely from 5 miles/1500' agl to reach stabilized approach by 1000' agl. Maybe I missed it somewhere in this string, but flaps 30 could have been selected long before 160 knots.
Lifted from 777 FCOM:
[-200LR, 777F, -300ER, -300ER/ULR]
1 Flap Limit Placard
Flaps extended speed limits.
Normal Flap Position Indication
Displays combined flap and slat positions when all surfaces are operating
normally and control is in the primary (hydraulic) mode. The indicator shows
continuous motion.
The indication is no longer displayed 10 seconds after slat retraction.
FLAP LIMIT
1 - 255K
5 - 235K
15 - 215K
20 - 200K
25 - 190K
30 - 180K
Lifted from 777 FCOM:
[-200LR, 777F, -300ER, -300ER/ULR]
1 Flap Limit Placard
Flaps extended speed limits.
Normal Flap Position Indication
Displays combined flap and slat positions when all surfaces are operating
normally and control is in the primary (hydraulic) mode. The indicator shows
continuous motion.
The indication is no longer displayed 10 seconds after slat retraction.
FLAP LIMIT
1 - 255K
5 - 235K
15 - 215K
20 - 200K
25 - 190K
30 - 180K
Last edited by TOGA!; 16th Jul 2013 at 05:40.
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I understand that all non-Koreans wish they were Korean and it is simply an accident of birth that we are not.
Obviously the same thing applies to those born with increased juniority. When you generally think like this, all types of weird seniority problems can exist on the flight deck.
Obviously the same thing applies to those born with increased juniority. When you generally think like this, all types of weird seniority problems can exist on the flight deck.
Last edited by autoflight; 16th Jul 2013 at 21:20.
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All ULH operations have a fatigue element. It is a professional's responsibility to mitigate that fatigue element by inflight rest, professional competence and knowing your game. The last two items were NON existent.
Many professions have shifts where end-of-shift fatigue's an issue. But professionals handle this every day. We don't let a trucker excuse a crash because it was "end of shift". We don't let an ER doctor away with negligence because it was late at night. A process-plant operator that causes an accident cannot get away saying "it was a long day"
Professions have shift-lengths that were chosen to reflect the degree of fatigue. Ship watch-keeping is 6-hours-on 6-hours-off. Swimming pool life guards are supposed to rotate every 20 minutes.
If long haul flights are too long and the profession thinks it needs 3 sets of pilots that'd be a separate argument. I don't think we do.
Long Haul Fatigue might be a contributing factor but it surely isn't a mitigating factor or an excuse. That's only apologetics.
Firewall
Firstly, I note that your original post has been edited. The part about "commie pinkos" etc has gone. If you removed that yourself then well done.
Here, briefly, is my take on the accident. IMHO it is far too simplistic to say that the crew are guilty of pilot error and that is all there is to it. The questions remain of WHAT, HOW and WHY this accident occurred. If we adopt your methodology then there in no need for an investigation. What a number of us have tried to argue on this forum is that a visual approach, especially at SFO, may not be as simple as it appears.
Factors that may be relevant are: fatigue, mode confusion, inexperience on type, inexperience as trainer, vectors on final, language, CRM/HF aspects etc. There are far more of course which is why the report will take at least a year to be completed.
When you talk about the "facts" are you saying that you, personally, have seen the FDR data? Have you listened to the CVR? If not then how do you justify your position of absolute certainty.
I have flown into SFO enough to know that it can be very challenging ie landing a large jet when being given inappropriate speed/height constraints. The speed one learns to ignore otherwise you will not make your stabilised approach criteria. As far as the vertical profile I prefer taking all the automatics out and switching the FD off as it just gets too messy otherwise. Not an ideal situation I would argue when (a) you are tired and (b) as a long haul pilot you never get that many landings especially as an FO.
Firstly, I note that your original post has been edited. The part about "commie pinkos" etc has gone. If you removed that yourself then well done.
Here, briefly, is my take on the accident. IMHO it is far too simplistic to say that the crew are guilty of pilot error and that is all there is to it. The questions remain of WHAT, HOW and WHY this accident occurred. If we adopt your methodology then there in no need for an investigation. What a number of us have tried to argue on this forum is that a visual approach, especially at SFO, may not be as simple as it appears.
Factors that may be relevant are: fatigue, mode confusion, inexperience on type, inexperience as trainer, vectors on final, language, CRM/HF aspects etc. There are far more of course which is why the report will take at least a year to be completed.
When you talk about the "facts" are you saying that you, personally, have seen the FDR data? Have you listened to the CVR? If not then how do you justify your position of absolute certainty.
I have flown into SFO enough to know that it can be very challenging ie landing a large jet when being given inappropriate speed/height constraints. The speed one learns to ignore otherwise you will not make your stabilised approach criteria. As far as the vertical profile I prefer taking all the automatics out and switching the FD off as it just gets too messy otherwise. Not an ideal situation I would argue when (a) you are tired and (b) as a long haul pilot you never get that many landings especially as an FO.
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"whoever manuver the flight at the cockpit, none can save thier lives if engine is not working as intended."
Are you nuts?
If they pushed the throttles up at 1000' or 500' when the approach was unstable, you might have a case, but they did not.
Are you nuts?
If they pushed the throttles up at 1000' or 500' when the approach was unstable, you might have a case, but they did not.
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What a number of us have tried to argue on this forum is that a visual approach, especially at SFO, may not be as simple as it appears.
Obviously, a visual into SFO, is not something that a majority of crew thinks is unreasonably dangerous. If that was the case, fine.
It is up to the crews that are not comfortable pulling it off to refuse ATC's offer.
Besides, it's not as if accepting the visual was their last chance to correct this disaster. As things kept getting worse, the Asiana crew demonstrated a lack of corrective measures at several different points.
This wasn't a one-off error. This was a series of blunders.
Factors that may be relevant are: fatigue, mode confusion, inexperience on type, inexperience as trainer, vectors on final, language, CRM/HF aspects etc.
Last edited by ross_M; 16th Jul 2013 at 06:14.
Maybe SOME SFO visual approaches are slam dunks or provide a challenge on some days.That's a differing argument if as been widely quoted the crew was on profile quite a few miles out.
Let's cut the BS.
Fatigue can, in general, play a role during long haul flying. But it is still a pilot's responsibility to handle it accordingly.
About a year ago two guys up front were fatigued when making a landing in Munich. They DEMANDED enough separation on the ILS to perform an autoland.
See this thread:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...-into-muc.html
This is how fatigue should be handled if it occurs.
Probably was not the case here.
Besides, for an augmented crew composition:
"The longer the flight, the longer your rest period will be."
Fatigue can, in general, play a role during long haul flying. But it is still a pilot's responsibility to handle it accordingly.
About a year ago two guys up front were fatigued when making a landing in Munich. They DEMANDED enough separation on the ILS to perform an autoland.
See this thread:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...-into-muc.html
This is how fatigue should be handled if it occurs.
Probably was not the case here.Besides, for an augmented crew composition:
"The longer the flight, the longer your rest period will be."
SFO
We seem to be loosing the plot with a lot of technical jargon in this incident.
On a visual approach look out of the window, which you should already be doing, and if the piano keys on the runway end are about to end up in your 777 flight deck, there are only two things to decide, either push the thrust levers forward which you should already have in your hands during a visual approach, and go around. Or crash.
Don't wait for the Automatics to save you, you can work out afterwards what went wrong, either crew errors with AP/AT mode confusion, or a technical fault.
On a visual approach look out of the window, which you should already be doing, and if the piano keys on the runway end are about to end up in your 777 flight deck, there are only two things to decide, either push the thrust levers forward which you should already have in your hands during a visual approach, and go around. Or crash.
Don't wait for the Automatics to save you, you can work out afterwards what went wrong, either crew errors with AP/AT mode confusion, or a technical fault.
Last edited by cessnapete; 16th Jul 2013 at 07:47.
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Flap speed limits for 777-200ER
TOGA!
The Asiana plane was a 777-200ER which has a different wing and different flap limit speeds. 30 flap at 180 knots was not an option to the Asiana 214 crew.Your post has the flap speed limits for the heavier and longer winged -300ER/200LR
"Lifted from 777 FCOM:
[-200LR, 777F, -300ER, -300ER/ULR]
1 Flap Limit Placard
Flaps extended speed limits.
Normal Flap Position Indication"
The Asiana plane was a 777-200ER which has a different wing and different flap limit speeds. 30 flap at 180 knots was not an option to the Asiana 214 crew.Your post has the flap speed limits for the heavier and longer winged -300ER/200LR
"Lifted from 777 FCOM:
[-200LR, 777F, -300ER, -300ER/ULR]
1 Flap Limit Placard
Flaps extended speed limits.
Normal Flap Position Indication"
