Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[ExSp33db1rd]

.............WHY would an IP, even an inexperienced one, not monitor and correct a low airspeed situation?

(Sorry if I'm repeating what has already been stated, I just don't have time to wade back through 2000+ posts.)

As a one-time I.P myself, I can appreciate a situation that is "Supervising" rather than "Instructing". If one instructs, then one tells the student what to do, but in this situation I see it as an experienced pilot who has presumably gone through "instruction" about the B.777 and passed simulator checks, and maybe even other flights, and is now being "supervised", in which case I can also appreciate a need to give the subject enough rope to - not hang himself as in this case - but to recognise and correct his own mistakes, i.e. as the Supevisor not leap in too soon with criticism and condemnation. But in this case of course he left it too late before intervening.

I would sometimes tell my, apparenty experienced, candidates for route supervision, that I wouldn't interfere unless they were going to kill me. Clearly this was a necessity - the interference that is ! - in this case, why it didn't happen is a mystery.

If 'Loss if Face' is considered a factor, surely the I.P. wouldn't have 'lost face', the student would, and why not if he is about to kill everybody ?

I've picked up from a previous post a suggestion that the handling pilot might have had a 'mind-set' that stationary throttles with A/T engaged was OK, because he was recently from the Airbus, and so thinking that the A/T was engaged, as has been reported, stationary throttles on the Boeing that he was now flying might not have alerted him - maybe - but that again begs the question of what the I.P. was thinking ?

Not excusing, just saying.

[clayne]

Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd

If 'Loss if Face' is considered a factor, surely the I.P. wouldn't have 'lost face', the student would, and why not if he is about to kill everybody ?

Just wanted to add a note about the subtleties of face within these cultures. It's not always about you or I admitting fault and hence losing face - in a lot of cases it's frowned upon to point out fault in others because *they* lose face. Literally, admonishment of the type that can embarrass others is frowned upon - it's mostly delivered in a way that gives the other party a "chance" to correct something while at the same time not pinpointing their fault. Lots of heavy contextual cueing and reading between lines involved.

Now would the instructing pilot take it to this level when it's a matter of life and death? I sure as heck hope not. Even if he gave the PF plenty of hints to correct something, sooner or later survival reaction should kick in (and hopefully not 7 seconds before impact).

[Rananim]

Lots of political correctness going on here.We need to cut the bs.This was a crew training error.They had not been trained to fly the plane.Forget stabilized approach criteria,SFO ATC,long flight,no electronic guidance,FLCH trap etc etc.The crew were not properly trained.Such a basic error(failure to monitor your flight instruments) can only be explained by incorrect training.All this malarkey about the pilot expecting the AT to have alpha floor and take care of it for him is just like saying the THY crashed at AMS because of a faulty radalt.They crashed because they couldnt fly the plane.Tough I know.But you have to be.Lives are at stake.The NTSB have the chance now to call it for what it is.Not pilot error but rather an endemic problem that is rooted in incorrect training,political correctness and automation reliance.This should be their probable cause.The problem is worldwide but worst in Asia(recruitment cant catch up with economic growth rate plus the unique culture).
Mandate the following:
a)Call a worldwide conference to address issue with Qantas and SWA taking the lead.They are both persistent in rejecting rote push-button ops and should be heralded as beacons of hope to turn the industry around.
b)Identify the weak spots and clean out those airline training establishments .Change of personnel from CP down.Reject political correctness(ie.no visual approaches,fly the 15 mile procedure turn and burn more fuel,we want our pilots to use the automation OR we cant fly manually it puts too much stress on PM OR the pilots are running scared of the QAR)at all costs.
c)Back to basics for new hires.De-emphasize automation,paperwork,SOP,FCOM whilst maintaining a min standard.Instead focus on FLYING.Does the pilot know target pitch and thrust N1 for all flight phases rather than FCOM/SOP theory.This is the way it was.Mandate 3 manual approaches a week policy,more if needed.No AP,No AT,No FD,nothing.Just you and the stick and your hand firmly on the thrust levers,your feet guarding the rudders(not planted on the floor),and YOUR FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS.FLY THE PLANE.AFter 3 months when the guy has it mastered,introduce the superfluous items like SOP,FCOM,paperwork.But instill in that recruit from day 1 that he/she has a lifelong duty to maintain basic flying skills.

Lets never ever have pilots hiding behind automation again.Its a tool,nothing more.

[costalpilot]

i agree with rananim absolutely as to the cause.

the ip failed.

the airlines training department failed because they put him there.

find out how and why and make changes.

[techgeek]

FQA?

FQA is an acronym for ... ?

[mangere1957]

techgeek

"FQA is an acronym for ... ?"

My WAG; Flight Quality Assessment.

Edited to add the missing h from flight.

[Desert185]

Nitpicker said:

"I do like the idea of a Shallow Boat style ramp instead of a rock wall... Not as silly as it sounds..."

I like the idea of a professional pilot who can fly a visual approach to an 11,000' runway on a CAVU day with light winds and the automation off or failed. I don't really think that is too much to ask for at this level in the aviation food chain.

[Desert185]

ExSp33db1rd said:

"I've picked up from a previous post a suggestion that the handling pilot might have had a 'mind-set' that stationary throttles with A/T engaged was OK, because he was recently from the Airbus, and so thinking that the A/T was engaged, as has been reported, stationary throttles on the Boeing that he was now flying might not have alerted him - maybe - but that again begs the question of what the I.P. was thinking ?"

Regardless of aircraft system intricacies, airspeed is performance and throttles are control. Dependency on control without referencing performance is beyond poor technique. Three "pilots" and no one is noticing airspeed trending lower?

Three dead. Many more with lifetime consequences of the their injuries. Hull loss. This isn't Sunday afternoon flying a club spam can for a burger. Someone needs to lose their jobs.

I remember an in-house audit done on Korean Air in 1998 that more than likely outlines many contributing issues related to what will be probable cause for Asiana at SFO. Maybe three deaths will be sufficient body count by bureaucratic standards to resolve the apparent issues involved. I hope so.

[twotigers]

All this is nonsense.

FLCH and A/T..

NO ONE was looking at the screen. If they had been they wouldn't have let the speed drop A/T or not.

Period.

End of story.

Even if the A/T is in on the Airbus (330 in my case) it still can't hold the speed sometimes. One needs to scan.

These guys couldn't or land or do anything.. f*cking criminal.

[Tscottme]

Legacy driver wrote:

Hence, I predict that the call will go out from the airlines for ILS to be active on every major airport, because that externalises the risk onto the airport operators. It also means that the costs are borne by someone else, and the airlines' profits (and so boards' bonuses) are safe.

I predict this will happen regardless of the outcome of the crash inquiry. The question is, what are you, as professional pilots, going to do about this to ensure that you and I are *properly* safe?

Shortened: "Hey let's YOU and them fight for me."
Professional pilots have been complaining about the airline's over-reliance on automation to increase efficiency and shorten training times for a long time. Please make specific suggestions as to what pilots should do even as airlines are choosing not to listen? You want them to sacrifice a career because pilots in other airlines and other countries are not taking their responsibility seriously enough?

It's very easy to expect someone else to fall on a sword meanwhile passengers flock to airlines that sell a seat for $3 less than another.

[Coagie]

Sorry, you're right. If I'd been more careful, I wouldn't haven't truncated the last line, which was: "Just venting. I know I'm preaching to the choir." Anyway, maybe culturally challenged Korean pilots are, hopefully, on this forum now and could use things spelled out!

[220mph]

For someone who wasn't there, you sound awfully high and mighty. There was a massive debris field where that girl was lying - likely including lots of clothing and such that would do a nice job of camouflaging a young girl lying amidst the debris. Especially since airport fire fighting vehicles are designed to contain the fire-fighters within a (relatively) safe interior compartment. These aren't the fire trucks that drive down the street with guys hanging off the side.

I'm sorry - but this claim and others like it are simply not true - there was virtually NO debris in the place where the girl was run over. There was nothing to "camouflage" anything at that spot, and there is NO indication there was anyone, let alone a young girl, "lying" there. To the contrary there are several hi-rez photos showing passengers in that exact area.

Photo 1
Photo 2
Photo 3

These are in relatively chronological order (track individual people such as blue and white shirt). The first fire trucks had already arrived at front right side of aircraft. The next trucks per video arrived withing 20 seconds or less.

You can see the large number of people in the area to left of aircraft - exiting the slides. They show no signs or evidence that they see someone was down and hurt in the seconds between starting evacuation and when fire trucks arrived on that side of aircraft. And there are people in nearly the exact spot. Photo 3 in fact shows a backpack or bag on the ground that looks much like the one seen under the tarp, with a woman standing next to it.

There was also no fire on the left side of the aircraft at all, and initially only a beginning fire on the other side.

The video in post 1955, couple with the hi-rez photos, provide an excellent picture of what was occurring.

Addtl hi-rez photos provide more evidence:

This Photo "A" appears to provide direct evidence. WARNING - appears this may be graphic at hi-resolution.

First - it provides evidence of the amount of fire vehicle travel in the area of the left side near the slides and how close that travel was.

Second, there is no backpack or luggage near tarp, as in later shots - however a pile of luggage appears to be next to red fire truck - with a single, what appears to be black/gray backpack, in front of red firetruck. This looks very similar to bag that appears next to tarp later.

Third - tire tracks show pulling up very close to aircraft and slide - considerably closer than yellow truck # 9 - and then backing out again.

Fourth - it shows the tarp lying directly over (within the footprint of) both sets (driving in, and backing out) of the tire tracks of the left side of the truck.

Last - sadly, and again a warning - a hi-resolution enlarged view of the tarp area appears to confirm the speculation - that this is the young woman who perished.

A slightly different (Photo "B")view of above photo "A" - note, no luggage/backpack next to tarp. And one more (Photo "C") different view yet.

Here is a subsequent view:(Photo "D") ... red firetrucks are gone - note the tarp has been pulled towards the right side wheel tracks of the fire truck, and the luggage/backpack now next to the tarp (possibly holding it in place. The reason why the tarp has been pulled toward right side wheel tracks seems apparent from a zoom of Photo "A".

Another couple views of Photo "D" area. Photo "E" and Photo "F" ... note Photo "F" well shows the large amount of movement by fire trucks around the aircraft, particularly in the left side PAX evac area ... there are numerous wheel tracks directly in the area passengers were attempting to evacuate and get away from the aircraft in.

The Youtube Video shows at appx the 3:05 mark, a fire truck moving around the nose towards left side of the aircraft. You can clearly see passengers scrambling both directions to get out of the way, followed by a puff of black exhaust from the truck. At appx 3:22 two more fire trucks enter frame at high rate of speed.

One of those - on the left side of aircraft, and the one coming around the nose, through the evac'ing PAX, proceed to rear of aircraft. The outside one turns around and heads back towards the front - stopping in front of the slides. Several responders who seem to have come on foot are seen running up slides into the aircraft.

At appx 6:10 the truck sitting by left side moves off towards nose, as the first of large group of ambulances and police respond to scene.

Appx 7:12 the fire truck turns around again and makes its way back toward left wing area. At appx 7:59 this truck begins spraying foam under the left wing area. This is the first foam applied to this side of the aircraft since the crash. It appears they only spray a single spot - the wing pylon area. Some goes over top of wing, but they immed reduce pressure to get back under the wing.

This truck remains stationary, intermittently spraying small shots of foam, until appx 10:32, when it starts moving forward and turns to right - making large circle to right and coming around to point at aircraft from a further distance. At appx 11:18 it again sprays same wing area.

The first video ends at this point. At that time it had appeared the fire on right side is largely out (just a little white smoke sporadically), people are still going in and out of the aircraft, and there is no evidence of fire inside or in roof.

As this second video opens - its apparent at least a few minutes have passed - the fire has reignited the aircraft is largely engulfed in smoke. It would appear that while the exterior fire was controlled it seems the composite hull had caught fire and burned thru the roof.

The same truck we left off with on left side at end of first video is still in position on left side after having circled right in a 360 turn.

Before the 360 degree turn it cannot have been as close to the aircraft as in Photo "D" - as it was able to make a right turn while missing the wing.

It appears the truck had moved closer in the cut between videos - pulling straight ahead towards the aircraft.

This truck was the FIRST foam applied on the left side of the aircraft - both before its 360 degree turn and after. During the initial foam application they should have had an excellent view - before any foam was applied in the area - of the location the girl was found. She would have been less than fire truck length almost straight ahead it would appear.

At appx 5:40 in 2nd video the left side truck backed away and shortly after the opposing side truck did the same, and drove off, presumably empty of foam?

It seems likely it was during this period of pulling ahead and backing out that the girl was run over.

At appx 8:01 a fire truck lined up at rear and began foaming along the length of fuselage. At about 8:40 another fire truck, from right side of aircraft, leaves - again presumably empty.

At appx 8:58 - more than 20 minutes after the crash - emergency vehicles are responding at speed to the tail section area. Survivors reported after evacuating and moving away from the aircraft they found the ejected crew near the tail section some 2000' away. They apparently had to call the Hwy Patrol as no help had arrived even that long after the crash!

At appx 9:40 a airport fire truck appears to have arrived back on left side of aircraft, and was again pumping foam.

At appx 10:30 local fire department is seen arriving (red trucks).

The left side truck was spraying the SIDE of the fuselage between the two forward doors. At appx 10:39 there was a small explosion at the rear forward section door as it was sprayed with foam.

The video continues but it bounces around and is not continuously focused on fuselage offering little further value.

It would seem photos 1, 2 and 3 show it highly unlikely someone was injured and lying in that spot. Way too many people passed by - someone would have stopped and helped. These were shot appx 4 minutes after impact - before all but first two fire trucks (stationed on right side near nose) arrived.

We can speculate she must have been one of the later/last people out as fire and smoke were becoming an issue.

We can see the same truck (appx 7:12 in 1st video) to first apply foam (appx 7:59) made a large 360 degree turn to come back around and be in position to apply foam a second time (appx 11:18). This truck appeared to move closer to fuselage between 11:18 when 1st video ends - and I'm guessing a minute or two later when 2nd video begins( assuming they had to change card). At appx 5:40 in 2nd video this same truck backs away apparently empty.

This truck had good view before any foam applied, was 1st to apply foam, nd continued to apply from same spot. This is pretty clearly NOT truck #9 seen next to wing in later photos "A-F" linked above (unless it had moved position from earlier).


Other notes

1. A quote from the SFGate.com site:

"Ye's body was found near the front of the jet's left wing. Wang's was found near the seawall that the jumbo jet struck as it landed short of the runway."

2. And to Machacha-post 2010 - claiming the pic is not proof - here is the story link for the picture in post 1981 above conforming the tarp was covering the girls body.

3. A side note ... the fire crews appeared entirely unable to fight the fire in the fuselage. Only one used its boom. The others seemed on able to shoot foam over the top with almost no effect.

4. Also - unless there was some other flammable material in the top of the fuselage amidships - where the fire flared up considerably about 5 minutes into the 2nd video - it would appear that composite fuselages flammability might be a concern.

[PaperTiger]

Originally Posted by Machaca

That is in no way confirmation, let alone definite.

It seems a reasonable conclusion that the yellow tarp is covering a body. In the earlier photo there is something in the grass in the same position. This is before any foam was laid and, as someone noted elsewhere, the alleged tracks are already present but there is no vehicle to be seen.



In later photos a lone fireman is positioned guarding the tarp.

[junebug172]

I read a lot of posts about how dangerous it is to fly the visual 28L into SFO. I am thus surprised that 99.9% of the time, things go well.

Oh please. There's nothing dangerous about this approach. Not even a little bit.

Man, the drama is laughable.

[Diesel8]

Nothing hard about going into SFO.

I hope there are mitigating circumstances in this accident, certainly don't hope it was simple pilot error as it sadly looks like.

[ross_M]

Would a requirement to have flying "by hand" time in cheaper trainer aircraft help any? Just curious.

Reading the past posts, one summary could be:

1. Safety etc. is pushing airlines to minimize non-automation flying time. (especially landings etc.) during line flights

2. Simulator time is either not enough, or not useful enough.

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

4. Having training time in non-revenue "big" aircraft is expensive.

Would regular, scheduled flying hours on smaller craft (jet / non jet) help any? Something like a set number of non-sim trainer flight hours every month. With or without a FI in the next seat.

Just wondering if such non-type hours would help any or be too different to make any difference. Would regular (company funded) practice on light craft be of any use?

[junebug172]

1. Safety etc. is pushing airlines to minimize non-automation flying time. (especially landings etc.) during line flights

More like liability issues. We're only allowed day VFR to fly the aircraft with no automation.

2. Simulator time is either not enough, or not useful enough.

Not enough. Even less with AQP. Its all about saving money.

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

International guys might be. I get enough flying domestically.

4. Having training time in non-revenue "big" aircraft is expensive.

Very. Fuel isn't cheap any more.

Would regular, scheduled flying hours on smaller craft (jet / non jet) help any? Something like a set number of non-sim trainer flight hours every month. With or without a FI in the next seat.

LMAO! Like I said, we can't even get extra sim time.

Just wondering if such non-type hours would help any or be too different to make any difference. Would regular (company funded) practice on light craft be of any use?

See above.

[ross_M]

LMAO! Like I said, we can't even get extra sim time.

My unsaid assumption was trainer craft time being cheaper than sim time.

Not true? I don't know.

[junebug172]

Have you seen the price of oil lately?

And no airline is going to pay for any more training than they have to.

[tilnextime]

3. Many pilots are reporting a worrying lack of seat-of-pants flying time or general manual flying skills.

International guys might be. I get enough flying domestically.

Then perhaps, if the airline has the route structure, "long haul" crew members should be given short haul assignments on a regular and continuing basis? 2 months long, one month short?

And before a debate on the complexities of such an approach (pun intended) begins, if the skill in visual approaches is perishable, but necessary, then a bit of effort overcoming "complexity" might be worthwhile. Otherwise, it's an exercise in "you can't get there from here", which solves nothing.

In an occupational field where high flying hours is regularly touted as a badge of high skill and experience, isn't it a bit embarrassing to admit that the long haul folks, usually very high hour crew, have the least recent and refreshed skill in a very basic maneuver that is a requirement for even a Sport Pilot License - a visual approach?