Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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3 Questions for a 777 pilot.
1) I totally get that you need to make a clear and rationale decision and weigh trade offs on an evac, but 90 secs seems long given all the damage and fire. What were the tradeoffs/checklists he was making during that 90 secs?
2) In the BA 777 crash at LHR, I think the pilots were faulted for not pulling some lever that stopped the fuel after the crash. Did this happen here?
3) 2 chutes opened inside. Is this just normal given hull damage, or is there likely going to be some changes that Boeing might need to make?
2) In the BA 777 crash at LHR, I think the pilots were faulted for not pulling some lever that stopped the fuel after the crash. Did this happen here?
3) 2 chutes opened inside. Is this just normal given hull damage, or is there likely going to be some changes that Boeing might need to make?
Last edited by hitchens97; 13th Jul 2013 at 06:58.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by obgraham
deSitter:
I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.
obgraham, if you had seen the post deSitter put up a couple of hours ago (and which it appears the mods correctly and promptly deleted) where he made some disgraceful comments about firemen on 9/11, you would realise he was simply a troll with an anti-firefighter agenda.
Originally Posted by obgraham
deSitter:
I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.
obgraham, if you had seen the post deSitter put up a couple of hours ago (and which it appears the mods correctly and promptly deleted) where he made some disgraceful comments about firemen on 9/11, you would realise he was simply a troll with an anti-firefighter agenda.
-drl
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RunSick
Yes of course, but now we’re back on the track discussing new sophisticated navigation systems vs. having a pilot flying the jet. As a software engineer, a professional developer, I know it’s possible to design software which removes the pilot from the loop. Automation has put robots on Mars.
But then pprune.org would be psdrune.org (Professional Software Developers rumour network), and the next crash would be speculations of a bug in the software. Perhaps even a Korean coder working at Boeing, and his cultural background… (just kidding!)
We have to face the fact that we cannot (yet) design a robot which walks better than a 3-year old child. Having pilots on the front row seats is an “intended design” for a reason.
bobcat, don´t you know the system knows the airfield elevation?
It´s there next to "LDG ELEV", it normally says AUTO and displays correctly the field´s elevation. Therefore a simple "landing elev + xxx feet" inhibition on the altitude selector shouldn´t be that difficult.
It´s there next to "LDG ELEV", it normally says AUTO and displays correctly the field´s elevation. Therefore a simple "landing elev + xxx feet" inhibition on the altitude selector shouldn´t be that difficult.
But then pprune.org would be psdrune.org (Professional Software Developers rumour network), and the next crash would be speculations of a bug in the software. Perhaps even a Korean coder working at Boeing, and his cultural background… (just kidding!)
We have to face the fact that we cannot (yet) design a robot which walks better than a 3-year old child. Having pilots on the front row seats is an “intended design” for a reason.
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SFO ATC...
Been to Ksfo numerous times.
I have rarely seen more dangerous ATC controllers anywhere in the world than in Sfo.
Speaking fast is considered to be a sign of efficiency. Speaking faster in English with a pilot for whom English is obviously a second or even a third language is considered to be super efficiency, bordering onto things in cheek humour for their colleagues.
What business does a controller have, to clear a heavy jet for a 'visual approach' into a fully controlled airfield where ALL landing aids are available.
That too, very frequently when simultaneous parallel ops are in progress.
Besides absolution of responsibility.
Notwithstanding the obvious lack of certain flying skills, I would have the ATC equally share the causal blame. And therefore have them partake equally in the cure.
I have rarely seen more dangerous ATC controllers anywhere in the world than in Sfo.
Speaking fast is considered to be a sign of efficiency. Speaking faster in English with a pilot for whom English is obviously a second or even a third language is considered to be super efficiency, bordering onto things in cheek humour for their colleagues.
What business does a controller have, to clear a heavy jet for a 'visual approach' into a fully controlled airfield where ALL landing aids are available.
That too, very frequently when simultaneous parallel ops are in progress.
Besides absolution of responsibility.
Notwithstanding the obvious lack of certain flying skills, I would have the ATC equally share the causal blame. And therefore have them partake equally in the cure.
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Will a finding of "low proficiency in conducting a hands on visual approach" as a cause of this mishap result in the pilots' unions publicly demanding that their members be required to do visual approaches a minimum of two or three times per month to maintain proficiency?
To maintain proficiency you have to have it in the first place. As explained the TQ courses include only a very rudimentary couple of hours on manual flying in an everyday environment. Thus I am discounting the jump through hoops SE handling. Then there is base training conducted in a calm controlled manner using level circuits and timings etc. This puts you in a good slot to make a 2-3nm finals on a good clear day. The real world is not like that; it usually means a descending circuit with anything from 270 degrees turn overhead to a straight in. The skills required to perform these basic manoeuvres are not taught, nor encouraged and so are not maintained. Then one day they are required; the end result is a dog's dinner or worse. The root cause could be said to lie in the approved TQ courses. The foundations have not been laid.
All the guff on here about the fault lying in the A/T FLCH system, and how to design out the 'trap'; let's teach pilots how to fly an a/c and THEN train them how to operate it. Let's encourage them to hone and maintain those basic skills. This is not the case now. The emphasis is on operate, and the emphasis is also on designing fool proof systems, with so many back-ups, that a robotic trained monkey can operate from any educational culture in the world. Everytime something goes wrong (human) the answer is sought in technology. Let's design out the weakest link. I say let's strengthen the weakest link as well. The optimum lies with a combination of the two, but it seems cheaper and more reliable to concentrate on technology.
The single pilot and a dog is not far away.
To maintain proficiency you have to have it in the first place. As explained the TQ courses include only a very rudimentary couple of hours on manual flying in an everyday environment. Thus I am discounting the jump through hoops SE handling. Then there is base training conducted in a calm controlled manner using level circuits and timings etc. This puts you in a good slot to make a 2-3nm finals on a good clear day. The real world is not like that; it usually means a descending circuit with anything from 270 degrees turn overhead to a straight in. The skills required to perform these basic manoeuvres are not taught, nor encouraged and so are not maintained. Then one day they are required; the end result is a dog's dinner or worse. The root cause could be said to lie in the approved TQ courses. The foundations have not been laid.
All the guff on here about the fault lying in the A/T FLCH system, and how to design out the 'trap'; let's teach pilots how to fly an a/c and THEN train them how to operate it. Let's encourage them to hone and maintain those basic skills. This is not the case now. The emphasis is on operate, and the emphasis is also on designing fool proof systems, with so many back-ups, that a robotic trained monkey can operate from any educational culture in the world. Everytime something goes wrong (human) the answer is sought in technology. Let's design out the weakest link. I say let's strengthen the weakest link as well. The optimum lies with a combination of the two, but it seems cheaper and more reliable to concentrate on technology.
The single pilot and a dog is not far away.
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Originally Posted by obgraham
deSitter:
I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.
deSitter:
I fail to see how you can tell, by watching that video, which fire vehicle ran over the victim. Neither foam truck moves during the video, and the view is from a looong way away.
"Neither foam truck moves during the video" makes this certain.
This video is the most comprehensive:
It clearly shows the fire trucks engaging in a huge amount of jockeying and manoeuvring which to the lay eye appears to be unnecessary and indecisive.
With regard to "the view is from a looong way away", please make sure that your computer is capable of viewing it at its full resolution, which is 1080p. The clarity is astounding.
Once you have viewed the correct video at full resolution, I think you might wish to reconsider your quoted reaction to deSitters post.
Anyone who wishes to form a view of post-crash events really needs to watch this properly as their starting point.
You are correct that one cannot with any certainty identify which vehicle drives over the unfortunate victim, but at this level of clarity one can make a fair guess. I think that this video will provide vital evidence in the investigation, and I would be very surprised if knowledgeable investigators will be unable to deduce and see the moment it happens.
Are you aware that the latest NTSB announcements seem to be suggesting that this child was not in fact ejected during the crash, but evacuated normally, possibly almost unharmed?
Please, no more about the distress of the driver. What about her parents?
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re: SFO ATC
@King on a Wing
Early in this thread when very little data was available on the incident a lot of BA 38 comparisons were being made. I went back and listened to the ATC recordings from the BA 38 incident and compared them to the OZ 214 recordings. World of difference.
Ask yourself objectively... which controller's handling of an emergency would you have preferred?
Maybe there are some ATC tapes on separate freqs that have not been made publicly available at this time. We'll see.
Early in this thread when very little data was available on the incident a lot of BA 38 comparisons were being made. I went back and listened to the ATC recordings from the BA 38 incident and compared them to the OZ 214 recordings. World of difference.
Ask yourself objectively... which controller's handling of an emergency would you have preferred?
Maybe there are some ATC tapes on separate freqs that have not been made publicly available at this time. We'll see.
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Having operated into SFO many times over the years, I would not say it's inherently unsafe provided a crew prepares thoroughly.
Just because an approach is visual does not make it dangerous. But the risk factors need to be addressed for any approach. A good example is an autoland in non LVP conditions. Is it more risky than one flown when LVP are in force?Well, actually it is because of the lack of protection. But provided a crew has strategies to mitigate any threats, then it should be fairly routine.
SFO is a high workload airport for a crew that has perhaps arrived after many long hours of flying. So the detail in the planning and preparation must cover all eventualities including the possibility of a visual approach, sidestep or PRM to name a few examples.
All airline crew are trained to fly a visual approach. It does take more skill than an ILS but it certainly isn't rocket science.
Last but not least, good monitoring from the PM is essential as is his willingness to call out any deviation of correct flight path or SOP.
Just because an approach is visual does not make it dangerous. But the risk factors need to be addressed for any approach. A good example is an autoland in non LVP conditions. Is it more risky than one flown when LVP are in force?Well, actually it is because of the lack of protection. But provided a crew has strategies to mitigate any threats, then it should be fairly routine.
SFO is a high workload airport for a crew that has perhaps arrived after many long hours of flying. So the detail in the planning and preparation must cover all eventualities including the possibility of a visual approach, sidestep or PRM to name a few examples.
All airline crew are trained to fly a visual approach. It does take more skill than an ILS but it certainly isn't rocket science.
Last but not least, good monitoring from the PM is essential as is his willingness to call out any deviation of correct flight path or SOP.
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A hard reality check for some who post on here....
Third passenger dies of her injuries.
BBC News - Third Asiana flight 214 victim dies of her injuries
RIP.
BBC News - Third Asiana flight 214 victim dies of her injuries
RIP.
Last edited by glad rag; 13th Jul 2013 at 08:51. Reason: Add title
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King on a Wing
If you have a problem with SFO assigning visual approaches to you, then as part of your preflight planning, why not sent a message forward to ATC stating that you are unwilling or unable to accept one? That way, you have given them the common courtesy of having as much time to prepare for your limitations as you do for theirs.
If you have a problem with SFO assigning visual approaches to you, then as part of your preflight planning, why not sent a message forward to ATC stating that you are unwilling or unable to accept one? That way, you have given them the common courtesy of having as much time to prepare for your limitations as you do for theirs.
Tilnextime
I would suggest that there is a huge difference between a visual approach where the aircraft is in a position to fly said approach easily and one where the aircraft is vectored "high and fast" and then has to sort that out first before landing visually.
Whether that's a factor in this accident I don't know. I've not seen the recent NTSB press conferences so I don't know if there's any mention of them being "hot and high". There have been numerous posters, me included, who have mentioned the infamous "slam dunk" approaches practiced at SFO.
I would suggest that there is a huge difference between a visual approach where the aircraft is in a position to fly said approach easily and one where the aircraft is vectored "high and fast" and then has to sort that out first before landing visually.
Whether that's a factor in this accident I don't know. I've not seen the recent NTSB press conferences so I don't know if there's any mention of them being "hot and high". There have been numerous posters, me included, who have mentioned the infamous "slam dunk" approaches practiced at SFO.
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777 approach speed.
I read a lot of posts about how dangerous it is to fly the visual 28L into SFO. I am thus surprised that 99.9% of the time, things go well.
1800-1900 ft recommended altitude on a 5 mile final calls for a 4 degree descent. Meaning the VSI would show -1000 instead of -800 for example for a classic 3 degree slope at 160 ground speed.
Now apparently SFO also calls for 180kt till 5 DME, and not the classic 180 to 10 160 to 4 at most international airports. More difficult to achieve, but not impossible, especially when you have had 10 hours plus preflight to brief that possibility. Plus, you are getting paid big bucks for this, the least passengers expect is someone in front who knows how to fly the damn thing better than THEY can. Because honestly, everyone can push buttons...
Now I suppose they were already flying flap 5 @180 when descending. Vref was 137@ flap 30, leaving them about 90 seconds (1900 to 500AGL for stabilized approach criteria in VMC conditions) to loose 40 knots ideally, 20kt at minimum to meet the criteria. More than feasible. In fact NTSB report shows they were at 134 kts at 500 feet. BUT, obviously, instead of anticipating and letting the engines spool up, they remained at idle until about 150-200 feet. WHY??? That is the question we should be asking ourselves.
1800-1900 ft recommended altitude on a 5 mile final calls for a 4 degree descent. Meaning the VSI would show -1000 instead of -800 for example for a classic 3 degree slope at 160 ground speed.
Now apparently SFO also calls for 180kt till 5 DME, and not the classic 180 to 10 160 to 4 at most international airports. More difficult to achieve, but not impossible, especially when you have had 10 hours plus preflight to brief that possibility. Plus, you are getting paid big bucks for this, the least passengers expect is someone in front who knows how to fly the damn thing better than THEY can. Because honestly, everyone can push buttons...
Now I suppose they were already flying flap 5 @180 when descending. Vref was 137@ flap 30, leaving them about 90 seconds (1900 to 500AGL for stabilized approach criteria in VMC conditions) to loose 40 knots ideally, 20kt at minimum to meet the criteria. More than feasible. In fact NTSB report shows they were at 134 kts at 500 feet. BUT, obviously, instead of anticipating and letting the engines spool up, they remained at idle until about 150-200 feet. WHY??? That is the question we should be asking ourselves.
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To everyone banging on about how disgraceful it is that pilots these days can't fly visual approaches:
Please tell me how I am supposed to achieve and maintain proficiency. I typically fly 90 hours a month and am lucky to do two take offs and landings. This is because I share sectors with the FO and am regularly rostered as relief crew where we don't do the landing. Often the landing will be off an RNP1 arrival or vectors to an ILS. The traffic situation is usually heavy and the flight time can be up to 15hrs. The airport is often unfamiliar with foreign ATC and maybe QFE metric altimetry procedures. Haze commonly reduces visibility in the Middle East, India and Asia to around a mile or less. Multiple runways and parallel taxiways create the risk of identifying the wrong runway.
We do not faff around trying to do visual approaches in those conditions with 300 people paying for the highest level of safety down the back.
So I only do about two or three a year in the actual aircraft, usually only in the USA, perhaps one or two to 13L in JFK (more of a visual segment) and one to fit into the traffic situation in SFO.
I have thousands of visual approaches under my belt from my domestic flying days but these days my skills are only adequate at best. So please try to understand why most long haul operations recommend an instrument approach. It is an extra level of safety for the benefit of passengers, not because the pilots are lazy or stupid.
PS - for the laymen out there; usually the final part of an approach is flown manually by visual reference. Autolands are not that common because the ground antennae is only 'protected' when visibility is low.
Please tell me how I am supposed to achieve and maintain proficiency. I typically fly 90 hours a month and am lucky to do two take offs and landings. This is because I share sectors with the FO and am regularly rostered as relief crew where we don't do the landing. Often the landing will be off an RNP1 arrival or vectors to an ILS. The traffic situation is usually heavy and the flight time can be up to 15hrs. The airport is often unfamiliar with foreign ATC and maybe QFE metric altimetry procedures. Haze commonly reduces visibility in the Middle East, India and Asia to around a mile or less. Multiple runways and parallel taxiways create the risk of identifying the wrong runway.
We do not faff around trying to do visual approaches in those conditions with 300 people paying for the highest level of safety down the back.
So I only do about two or three a year in the actual aircraft, usually only in the USA, perhaps one or two to 13L in JFK (more of a visual segment) and one to fit into the traffic situation in SFO.
I have thousands of visual approaches under my belt from my domestic flying days but these days my skills are only adequate at best. So please try to understand why most long haul operations recommend an instrument approach. It is an extra level of safety for the benefit of passengers, not because the pilots are lazy or stupid.
PS - for the laymen out there; usually the final part of an approach is flown manually by visual reference. Autolands are not that common because the ground antennae is only 'protected' when visibility is low.
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Given the navaids available, in this case an rnav approach and at bare minimum an extended centerline that is easily created i should think a visual would be relatively easy to remain proficient on. It's rare these days i do a visual approach with absolutely no internal aids.
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Piper;
Flying GA on the side keeps your eyes out and your handling skills up, with the obvious differences in mass/thrust/momentum. But the basics remain the same.
777/748 driver.
Flying GA on the side keeps your eyes out and your handling skills up, with the obvious differences in mass/thrust/momentum. But the basics remain the same.
777/748 driver.
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If retaining currency in fully visual approaches from 10 miles or more out with 'special' speed and level restrictions such as SFO is considered 'required as part of the job', then it MUST be trained for. If pilots demonstrably cannot do this and have incidents/accidents due to lack of training or continuation training, then the airline training system should be called to account for a crash and take legal/financial responsibility for certifying a crew that cannot fly as 'required as part of the job'. If the training department can show documented, and objected to financial constraints that led them to reduce training for crews to fly as 'required as part of the job', then the accountants/finance department/CFO of the airline that issued those spending constraints should be held accountable for a crash and take legal/financial responsibility for their decision to reduce the amount of training for what is 'required as part of the job'.
This accountability trail of course does not absolve the pilot - the end result of the limited training - replying 'UNABLE' when given an approach by ATC that they are uncomfortable with.
Out of interest to all you active 'heavy' pilots, what would be your company's response if you said "I need more continuation training on manually flown visual approaches and landings"? Almost certainly a negative response - both in denying the extra training and on your career with that carrier; negative to the extent that you would not even consider admitting that you needed more training. But it should be the opposite. That is a stone that should be lifted.
This accountability trail of course does not absolve the pilot - the end result of the limited training - replying 'UNABLE' when given an approach by ATC that they are uncomfortable with.
Out of interest to all you active 'heavy' pilots, what would be your company's response if you said "I need more continuation training on manually flown visual approaches and landings"? Almost certainly a negative response - both in denying the extra training and on your career with that carrier; negative to the extent that you would not even consider admitting that you needed more training. But it should be the opposite. That is a stone that should be lifted.