Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and
alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle.
alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle.
What, none? - your kidding?
Last edited by parabellum; 13th Jul 2013 at 01:14.
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Erroneous FD Crew Names!
The NTSB has accepted responsibility for the names used by some media outlets.
July 12, 2013
WASHINGTON – The National Transportation Safety Board apologizes for inaccurate and offensive names that were mistakenly confirmed as those of the pilots of Asiana flight 214, which crashed at San Francisco International Airport on July 6.
Earlier today, in response to an inquiry from a media outlet, a summer intern acted outside the scope of his authority when he erroneously confirmed the names of the flight crew on the aircraft.
The NTSB does not release or confirm the names of crew members or people involved in transportation accidents to the media. We work hard to ensure that only appropriate factual information regarding an investigation is released and deeply regret today's incident.
Appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that such a serious error is not repeated.
WASHINGTON – The National Transportation Safety Board apologizes for inaccurate and offensive names that were mistakenly confirmed as those of the pilots of Asiana flight 214, which crashed at San Francisco International Airport on July 6.
Earlier today, in response to an inquiry from a media outlet, a summer intern acted outside the scope of his authority when he erroneously confirmed the names of the flight crew on the aircraft.
The NTSB does not release or confirm the names of crew members or people involved in transportation accidents to the media. We work hard to ensure that only appropriate factual information regarding an investigation is released and deeply regret today's incident.
Appropriate actions will be taken to ensure that such a serious error is not repeated.
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Similarities in perspective - 777 vs. A320
Apologies if this has been covered, but would the low airspeed, and cockpit (low) height above ground level when approaching the sea wall, be similar to an A320 on approach which the Flying Pilot was used to earlier?
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jientho wrote:
Quote:
Now, you seem to agree that there is NO condition where it makes any sense, so WHY IS IT ALLOWED BY THE SYSTEM to be entered if there is risk (even the tiniest bit)? That is my point.
No. You misunderstand. The requirement is to disallow entries that make zero sense in the real world. Take the lowest altitude of any possible airport in the real world, add say 500', and disallow any target flight levels below that. Probably eliminates FL000, FL001, FL002, FL003, and FL004 only. Yes it may only eliminate the "trap" for approach to near-sea-level airports. But that ain't peanuts. Or Boeing (or FAA) may determine that adding 1000' or even 2000' may be more in line with the only valid purpose of FLCH, which would bring in even more airports.
Editing to add: also see http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7937752 for an even better solution.
Quote:
Now, you seem to agree that there is NO condition where it makes any sense, so WHY IS IT ALLOWED BY THE SYSTEM to be entered if there is risk (even the tiniest bit)? That is my point.
Because it makes no sense to disallow FL0000. If is did, you have to disallow FL10 for runways 1000 ft ASL
Editing to add: also see http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post7937752 for an even better solution.
Last edited by jientho; 13th Jul 2013 at 01:32.
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For what it's worth, I just did a quick online search, finding (apologies if I'm getting any info wrong here) that in the USA fire-fighting vehicles are involved in about three collisions per year with pedestrians or bicycles. About 20% of those incidents results in fatalities.
Accidents happen. Not one of us is more or less than human.
Who doubts that as we discuss these events with such detachment, the soul of that truck's driver is in torment?
Accidents happen. Not one of us is more or less than human.
Who doubts that as we discuss these events with such detachment, the soul of that truck's driver is in torment?
Thesafepassenger------ there might be a slight difference in the Pilots seating height but hardly noticeable.
They still fly the same 3 deg ( actually 2.85 deg in SFO ) approach and look for the same lights beside the runway. ( PAPI lights should still show 2 white 2 red if on correct slope ) they should still cross the threshold around 50'.
The only real time a smaller Aircraft visual perspective looks/feels different to the Pilot is in the flare below 50'. If you're used to a small Aircraft you can flare to land too late in a big Aircraft until you get used to it. This had no bearing in this accident.
Conversely I'm used to large Aircraft and last time I sat in a 737 jump seat I thought the crew had forgotten to flare and expected a heavy landing!!
They still fly the same 3 deg ( actually 2.85 deg in SFO ) approach and look for the same lights beside the runway. ( PAPI lights should still show 2 white 2 red if on correct slope ) they should still cross the threshold around 50'.
The only real time a smaller Aircraft visual perspective looks/feels different to the Pilot is in the flare below 50'. If you're used to a small Aircraft you can flare to land too late in a big Aircraft until you get used to it. This had no bearing in this accident.
Conversely I'm used to large Aircraft and last time I sat in a 737 jump seat I thought the crew had forgotten to flare and expected a heavy landing!!
Last edited by nitpicker330; 13th Jul 2013 at 01:48.
The FMS knows the landing elevation and all the needed approach altitudes, when an approach is loaded. It wouldn't be hard to inhibit FLC when within some altitude above the FAF altitude or field elevation. Say, 3,000' above the field or 1,000' above the FAF crossing altitude, FLC inhibits an altitude selection below those.
GF
GF
I have read many accident reports involving scattered passengers, dead and alive, and never once heard of a single one being run over by a vehicle. They sprayed foam everywhere but on the small fire near the still-present engine. Yes, it is inexcusable.
For someone who wasn't there, you sound awfully high and mighty. There was a massive debris field where that girl was lying - likely including lots of clothing and such that would do a nice job of camouflaging a young girl lying amidst the debris. Especially since airport fire fighting vehicles are designed to contain the fire-fighters within a (relatively) safe interior compartment. These aren't the fire trucks that drive down the street with guys hanging off the side.
Also, according to the reports I've seen, they've not determined if the girl was still alive when she was run over.
Tragic - definitely. Inexcusable? That's a highly questionable call.
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passengers ejected
NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman stated in one of her daily briefings that three flight attendants from the rear of the aircraft , in their seats, were ejected from the aircraft and received serious injuries. No passengers.
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Approach
I am an old pilot who has not had the joy of all the automation gobbledegook and I get rather disgusted with all the acronym-driven jargon about what or what was not on and this or that was engaged or charged that caused the undershoot. It was a clear, a no-wind day and the airplane was doing everything that it should have. The target that was the end of the runway was in sight, if the target moved up you add power. If it moves down, you retard power. You concentrate on where you want to land and act accordingly...but then, that is if you are a pilot.
Dirty
I understand where you are coming from. But, many (most?) of the posts are 'how and why' - learning from our (collective) mistakes in order to prevent future mistakes. How the heck could a professional flight crew do a CFIT of a modern jetliner doing a visual approach on an ideal summer day, and how do we make sure it doesn't happen again?
20 years ago, I was directly involved in the investigation of the Lauda 767 that crashed when the thrust reverser deployed in-flight. It was the first fatal on a 767 - an airplane that - at the time - I'd worked most of my professional life. Initial reports pointed at a bomb, or other terrorism. While it still bothered me, designing an airplane that is 'terrorism proof' isn't reasonable. Then, several days after the crash, we got data (I was among the first to see) that said, definitively, it was an in-flight T/R deployment. Something we'd designed to "never happen". We'd missed something.
I will never forget that feeling - even though it wasn't my system. An older supervisor - who had been involved in several fatal accident investigations over the years - told me "you'll never look at your job the same way again". Truer words have never been uttered. I went home that night and downed the better part of a bottle of Scotch. The only way it could have been worse is if it had been my system
.
So I have an idea how those involved in Asiana feel. By most accounts, the cabin crew performed admirably - but they will still have nightmares - for the rest of their lives - about what they might have done differently that might have saved a life or prevented a serious injury.
I want to either laugh or cry when I see press speculation that Boeing employees have 'covered up' the cause of a crash. My second worst nightmare is that my system causes a fatal crash. My worst nightmare is that I know there is a problem with my system and I covered it up, resulting in a fatal crash.
I've done my professional best to make sure my second worst nightmare never comes true. Not only do I know my worst nightmare will never come true, if there is an engineer that would allow it to happen, I've never met him or her.
I understand where you are coming from. But, many (most?) of the posts are 'how and why' - learning from our (collective) mistakes in order to prevent future mistakes. How the heck could a professional flight crew do a CFIT of a modern jetliner doing a visual approach on an ideal summer day, and how do we make sure it doesn't happen again?
20 years ago, I was directly involved in the investigation of the Lauda 767 that crashed when the thrust reverser deployed in-flight. It was the first fatal on a 767 - an airplane that - at the time - I'd worked most of my professional life. Initial reports pointed at a bomb, or other terrorism. While it still bothered me, designing an airplane that is 'terrorism proof' isn't reasonable. Then, several days after the crash, we got data (I was among the first to see) that said, definitively, it was an in-flight T/R deployment. Something we'd designed to "never happen". We'd missed something.
I will never forget that feeling - even though it wasn't my system. An older supervisor - who had been involved in several fatal accident investigations over the years - told me "you'll never look at your job the same way again". Truer words have never been uttered. I went home that night and downed the better part of a bottle of Scotch. The only way it could have been worse is if it had been my system
. So I have an idea how those involved in Asiana feel. By most accounts, the cabin crew performed admirably - but they will still have nightmares - for the rest of their lives - about what they might have done differently that might have saved a life or prevented a serious injury.
I want to either laugh or cry when I see press speculation that Boeing employees have 'covered up' the cause of a crash. My second worst nightmare is that my system causes a fatal crash. My worst nightmare is that I know there is a problem with my system and I covered it up, resulting in a fatal crash.
I've done my professional best to make sure my second worst nightmare never comes true. Not only do I know my worst nightmare will never come true, if there is an engineer that would allow it to happen, I've never met him or her.
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Back to Basics
I agree completely.
On July 11 the NTSB practically ruled out mechanical and avionics problems with the Asiana Boeing 777.
The NTSB was practically saying that the accident was caused by human factors, and not by the equipment.
The aircraft was far above glide slope at 4.5 NM and 190 knots. Then it began to descend to acquire glide slope. It acquired glide slope at 1.3 NM and 140 knots, but continued descending! Then increased its rate of descent!! And continued to slow, until it hit the seawall.
You can see it all in this analysis of the approach radar and FDR data : What Happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214 - Analysis by Sooeet.com
We must look carefully at too much reliance on automatic controls during landings. Either fully automate landings, or land manually. Trying to mix both is problematic, as this accident shows.
On July 11 the NTSB practically ruled out mechanical and avionics problems with the Asiana Boeing 777.
The NTSB was practically saying that the accident was caused by human factors, and not by the equipment.
The aircraft was far above glide slope at 4.5 NM and 190 knots. Then it began to descend to acquire glide slope. It acquired glide slope at 1.3 NM and 140 knots, but continued descending! Then increased its rate of descent!! And continued to slow, until it hit the seawall.
You can see it all in this analysis of the approach radar and FDR data : What Happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214 - Analysis by Sooeet.com
We must look carefully at too much reliance on automatic controls during landings. Either fully automate landings, or land manually. Trying to mix both is problematic, as this accident shows.
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Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
The FMS knows the landing elevation and all the needed approach altitudes, when an approach is loaded. It wouldn't be hard to inhibit FLC when within some altitude above the FAF altitude or field elevation. Say, 3,000' above the field or 1,000' above the FAF crossing altitude, FLC inhibits an altitude selection below those.
Here's a couple of alternative ideas: don't use FLCH for approach, don't enter in stupid values, manually control the throttles. They all require paying attention and not letting a computer make all the choices for you.
Last edited by clayne; 13th Jul 2013 at 05:23.
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TDracer,
Concur sir, the human aspect is the most tragic here. 3 deaths, god forbid more?? Yet there are idiots arguing over semantics for what propose?
The crew of this flight will never get over this incident, the drivers frankly may not deserve to if what the NTSB are inferring is true.
The meat will be pulled from the bones no doubt, the truth will out as they say. What concerns me is how much will it be digested, distilled and ACTIONED? The industry has managed to sleep walk into a state where being a "good" pilot has less to do with stick and rudder and more to do with managing a computer (sh!t in,sh!t out). I find it abhorrent that alleged lack of basic aircraft systems knowledge and/or inability to fly the aircraft in near perfect conditions killed 3 kids.
Hoping for some official FACTS soon so that armchair pundits move onto the next salacious episode.
Concur sir, the human aspect is the most tragic here. 3 deaths, god forbid more?? Yet there are idiots arguing over semantics for what propose?
The crew of this flight will never get over this incident, the drivers frankly may not deserve to if what the NTSB are inferring is true.
The meat will be pulled from the bones no doubt, the truth will out as they say. What concerns me is how much will it be digested, distilled and ACTIONED? The industry has managed to sleep walk into a state where being a "good" pilot has less to do with stick and rudder and more to do with managing a computer (sh!t in,sh!t out). I find it abhorrent that alleged lack of basic aircraft systems knowledge and/or inability to fly the aircraft in near perfect conditions killed 3 kids.
Hoping for some official FACTS soon so that armchair pundits move onto the next salacious episode.
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Run over
RangerOne post 1946
The NTSB stated that 3 flight attendants had been ejected, and NO passengers. The three flight attendants are alive. 3 passengers sadly died, amongst them 2 Chinese girls of which it was first reported that they had been ejected.
It seems that these two girls had thus deplaned AFTER the accident and at least (as per the police's statement) one of the girls had been run over. They were found in the vicinity of the aircraft.
I don't need to be such a smart detective to figure this one out. Hopefully something can be learned from this, emergency services can also receive recommendations from the NTSB
The NTSB stated that 3 flight attendants had been ejected, and NO passengers. The three flight attendants are alive. 3 passengers sadly died, amongst them 2 Chinese girls of which it was first reported that they had been ejected.
It seems that these two girls had thus deplaned AFTER the accident and at least (as per the police's statement) one of the girls had been run over. They were found in the vicinity of the aircraft.
I don't need to be such a smart detective to figure this one out. Hopefully something can be learned from this, emergency services can also receive recommendations from the NTSB
Last edited by Tallman; 13th Jul 2013 at 05:55.
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IIRC, reports were that one of the girls was found by the seawall and was dead when found. The other girl may possibly have managed to leave the aircraft on her own and was the one that was run over. Reports are she had massive injuries from being run over, but so far no apparent injuries from being ejected from the aircraft.
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They do not produce pilots and their line flying does not either. I reckon that give a modern young pilot a visual approach from 20nm 6000' 210kts on a severe clear day, with no ILS or PAPI's they could not do a CDA and be stable at 1000'. I doubt many new young captains could either.
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Dirty Sanchez:
Dirty- If I wanted to talk to "the industry" about this, who would I call? Kinda reminds me of the notorious "They" who are at the heart of every dysfunction in the military, but when I would turn to the section of the phone book for the letter "T", I can never find "Them". Probably because "They" are really "Us", individually and/or collectively.
Will a finding of "low proficiency in conducting a hands on visual approach" as a cause of this mishap result in the pilots' unions publicly demanding that their members be required to do visual approaches a minimum of two or three times per month to maintain proficiency? Or will the unions fault ATC and airport officials? Have the unions ever struck for higher standards or more rigorous training to be imposed on them? Or are the pilots not "Them"?
Fortunately, mishap investigators are not in the "blame game", but are tasked to make a technical investigation that identifies causal factors. Eliminate the cause, and you don't get the effect. Unfortunately, when human factors are involved, humans don't like being identified as the cause. Rather, we default to the, "you don't understand" mode, or "the other guys made me do it." Knowing that an aircrew will "carry this burden for the rest of their lives" does not provide me with the knowledge necessary to avoid their errors - assuming that I am willing to admit that I am also capable of such errors.
Thus, we see a hodge podge of comments that may or may not shed light on what is wrong.
The industry has managed to sleep walk into a state where being a "good" pilot has less to do with stick and rudder and more to do with managing a computer (sh!t in,sh!t out).
Will a finding of "low proficiency in conducting a hands on visual approach" as a cause of this mishap result in the pilots' unions publicly demanding that their members be required to do visual approaches a minimum of two or three times per month to maintain proficiency? Or will the unions fault ATC and airport officials? Have the unions ever struck for higher standards or more rigorous training to be imposed on them? Or are the pilots not "Them"?
Fortunately, mishap investigators are not in the "blame game", but are tasked to make a technical investigation that identifies causal factors. Eliminate the cause, and you don't get the effect. Unfortunately, when human factors are involved, humans don't like being identified as the cause. Rather, we default to the, "you don't understand" mode, or "the other guys made me do it." Knowing that an aircrew will "carry this burden for the rest of their lives" does not provide me with the knowledge necessary to avoid their errors - assuming that I am willing to admit that I am also capable of such errors.
Thus, we see a hodge podge of comments that may or may not shed light on what is wrong.