Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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Without the ILS, it's likely they tried VNAV approach. This, however, does not always work in SFO (FMS glitch, witnessed by some airlines), and the plane can go into VNAV ALT instead of VNAV PTH descent.
It may be that the pilot got high on approach (maybe for the reason stated above, or maybe just trying to fly visually).
Next, he possibly selected FLCH to get down. If he then got too low and tried to recover the profile, this might explain why he disconnected the A/P.
If he then flew in manual without disconnecting the FD, two things would happen.
First, the elevators, hitherto controlling speed (in FLCH), are now being used to control pitch (F/D would still be demanding attitude for speed control in FLCH) and, two, the thrust, hitherto controlling ROD (in FLCH this could mean IDLE or 'HOLD' IDLE), is now 'controlling' (not much control if in IDLE) speed.
But, and this is the BIG but, there will be no automatic speed protection or speed control, for that matter, without pilot input, regardless of whether the A/T is engaged or not (in this case, it was).
It's easy to imagine the pilot, late in the approach, struggling to recover the path with pitch inputs, staring outside, not keeping an eye on his speed, believing he has A/T speed protection, and not realizing that the throttles are near idle and will stay there without his input. Classic stall scenario.
Educated guess.
It may be that the pilot got high on approach (maybe for the reason stated above, or maybe just trying to fly visually).
Next, he possibly selected FLCH to get down. If he then got too low and tried to recover the profile, this might explain why he disconnected the A/P.
If he then flew in manual without disconnecting the FD, two things would happen.
First, the elevators, hitherto controlling speed (in FLCH), are now being used to control pitch (F/D would still be demanding attitude for speed control in FLCH) and, two, the thrust, hitherto controlling ROD (in FLCH this could mean IDLE or 'HOLD' IDLE), is now 'controlling' (not much control if in IDLE) speed.
But, and this is the BIG but, there will be no automatic speed protection or speed control, for that matter, without pilot input, regardless of whether the A/T is engaged or not (in this case, it was).
It's easy to imagine the pilot, late in the approach, struggling to recover the path with pitch inputs, staring outside, not keeping an eye on his speed, believing he has A/T speed protection, and not realizing that the throttles are near idle and will stay there without his input. Classic stall scenario.
Educated guess.
Last edited by 'round midnight; 12th Jul 2013 at 03:36.
It seems to me that the posters calling for greater automation are in the main not pilots of airliners and don't quite 'get' why the airline pilots are so adamant that more automation is not the answer. Maybe an non flying analogy would help.
Lets say you owned a fleet of 18 wheeler truck and trailer units that deliver goods to super markets and the most likely time for an incident was when your drivers were backing the trailer unit into the loading docks of the supermarkets. Each incident cost you money and was a risk to personnel but 99% of the time your drivers got it right, after all they are backing up to the docks two or three times a day and have become very skilled at it over the years.
Then, an automatic parking mode becomes available on all your trucks. It is very reliable and in an effort to reduce the number of broken tail lights etc you mandate use of the system for all parking and the drivers use it often. The young drivers coming through use it exclusively. Furthermore, when training drivers, you teach and asses their skills only at using the automatic system, not at actually backing the truck into the dock.
When, as is bound to happen every so often, the automatic system is not available for some reason, how do you think the new generation of truck drivers will fare when it comes time to back the truck and trailer unit in manually? For that matter, how do you think the older drivers will go having not backed a truck for a year or so?
That is a fairly crude analogy but it roughly aligns with the problem we are discussing in my opinion. More automation is not the solution. Capable, well trained and current truck drivers is the answer.......but who pays for the training?
Lets say you owned a fleet of 18 wheeler truck and trailer units that deliver goods to super markets and the most likely time for an incident was when your drivers were backing the trailer unit into the loading docks of the supermarkets. Each incident cost you money and was a risk to personnel but 99% of the time your drivers got it right, after all they are backing up to the docks two or three times a day and have become very skilled at it over the years.
Then, an automatic parking mode becomes available on all your trucks. It is very reliable and in an effort to reduce the number of broken tail lights etc you mandate use of the system for all parking and the drivers use it often. The young drivers coming through use it exclusively. Furthermore, when training drivers, you teach and asses their skills only at using the automatic system, not at actually backing the truck into the dock.
When, as is bound to happen every so often, the automatic system is not available for some reason, how do you think the new generation of truck drivers will fare when it comes time to back the truck and trailer unit in manually? For that matter, how do you think the older drivers will go having not backed a truck for a year or so?
That is a fairly crude analogy but it roughly aligns with the problem we are discussing in my opinion. More automation is not the solution. Capable, well trained and current truck drivers is the answer.......but who pays for the training?
As one who regularly flies heavies throughout USA the big concern with visual approaches is the lack of protection from other aircraft. The restricted vision and manoeuvrability in a B744 means, to me, that it is unprofessional to give up positive radar control.
As far as SFO goes, regular "slam dunks" are what I am used to.
I'll await the investigation results before passing opinions on the accident although I would ensure, if possible, that the engines were shutdown before evacuating.
As far as SFO goes, regular "slam dunks" are what I am used to.
I'll await the investigation results before passing opinions on the accident although I would ensure, if possible, that the engines were shutdown before evacuating.
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@ 'round midnight
not familiar with the A/T on the 777. PF according to reports has 9000 hrs on 320 and 43 hrs on 777. Quantum difference between Boeing and Airbus is the A/T (and speedbrakes) --- T/Ls (and speedbrake lever) move on Boeing and don't move on Airbus. The early transition can be dangerous. But dispatching per MEL with the A/T u/s on any modern aircraft is a steep learning curve
not familiar with the A/T on the 777. PF according to reports has 9000 hrs on 320 and 43 hrs on 777. Quantum difference between Boeing and Airbus is the A/T (and speedbrakes) --- T/Ls (and speedbrake lever) move on Boeing and don't move on Airbus. The early transition can be dangerous. But dispatching per MEL with the A/T u/s on any modern aircraft is a steep learning curve
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Automatic pilots are the problem here. Can't you see this? Three pilots let a perfectly good B777 fly into the rocks because they didn't know how to fly an airplane. They were trained to program a computer, not fly an airplane.
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Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
Quote.
Personally I suspect that the evac probably should have been called earlier, maybe even much earlier, in an ideal world. But I do not have the knowledge/data to criticise a fellow professional from afar, so will await that information.
Oh yes, NigelOnDraft, I for one, will await that information with bated breath.
Personally I suspect that the evac probably should have been called earlier, maybe even much earlier, in an ideal world. But I do not have the knowledge/data to criticise a fellow professional from afar, so will await that information.
Oh yes, NigelOnDraft, I for one, will await that information with bated breath.
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I was just wondering if the seawall could have been missed with less pitch in those final few seconds? Less pitch would have also reduced the forces on the rear paxs on impact.
Glob99
Don't fly much? Lowering the pitch angle would have progressively "unloaded" what lift the wing was producing to increase the rate of descent and impact forces.
Don't fly much? Lowering the pitch angle would have progressively "unloaded" what lift the wing was producing to increase the rate of descent and impact forces.
Could they have preserved precious speed and extended the glideslope by not pitching up as much, as well as arrest the sink rate a bit?
Could pitching-up less have given them those few extra knots, after they commanded go-around, that would've allowed them to get enough altitude to clear the sea wall?
Wouldn't the pitch-up slow them down more and increase their sink rate?
Or would not pitching-up have made it more likely to hit head on into the seawall/runway?
Could pitching-up less have given them those few extra knots, after they commanded go-around, that would've allowed them to get enough altitude to clear the sea wall?
Wouldn't the pitch-up slow them down more and increase their sink rate?
Or would not pitching-up have made it more likely to hit head on into the seawall/runway?
Obviously they should have never gotten to the point of being in extremis in the first place with an apparently fully functional aircraft on a visual approach in CAVOK weather.
Last edited by Airbubba; 12th Jul 2013 at 04:23.
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Pitch up was probably due to the go-around call, however it takes between 5 & 8 seconds for the engines to reach full throttle after being commanded to do so from idle.
I read here somewhere that the engines had only reached 50% throttle at the point of impact. So whilst the nose it up, there's considerable time before the thrust comes on...
If the pilot knew he was going to crash, he may have planned a more level angle of attack, but since he was intending to abort the landing altogether and gain altitude as quickly as possible the high angle resulted in the tail striking the wall.
I read here somewhere that the engines had only reached 50% throttle at the point of impact. So whilst the nose it up, there's considerable time before the thrust comes on...
If the pilot knew he was going to crash, he may have planned a more level angle of attack, but since he was intending to abort the landing altogether and gain altitude as quickly as possible the high angle resulted in the tail striking the wall.
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Pushing the stick forward on the flare only works if you are at the proper speed. If you are in stick shaker as they were it won't work. Pilots know how to fly an aircraft with adequate airspeed but they didn't have any.
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Regarding the Evac, its not always safer outside the plane than inside....Its possible to have engines still running at moderate throttle & other external dangers....
An assessment needs to be made (quickly) as to the threats & then act.
Not as easy as it sounds in the moments after a crash however.
I also suspect that the default answer by airlines is to stay in the plane as the safest place in most circumstances & they need a strong reason to override that. It was clear that the stewardesses by procedure had to ask the pilot for a decision no doubt as their training advises them to do so.
An assessment needs to be made (quickly) as to the threats & then act.
Not as easy as it sounds in the moments after a crash however.
I also suspect that the default answer by airlines is to stay in the plane as the safest place in most circumstances & they need a strong reason to override that. It was clear that the stewardesses by procedure had to ask the pilot for a decision no doubt as their training advises them to do so.
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Considering the total damage to the airframe - separation of tail plane, landing gear and engines, and post impact fire - it was truly miraculous that the wing tanks didn't rupture and ignite a nightmare inferno TG. (I have to assume there was fuel left in the wings)
Crap, the high AOA was needed to keep the thing in the Air as the speed bled off with no thrust......simple aerodynamics....
If he had lowered the nose back down to normal it would have impacted the water short of the sea wall just like Lion Air did in Bali.
Maybe then it would have floated intact long enough for all to EVAC without any deaths.......?
I do like the idea of a Shallow Boat style ramp instead of a rock wall... Not as silly as it sounds...
If he had lowered the nose back down to normal it would have impacted the water short of the sea wall just like Lion Air did in Bali.
Maybe then it would have floated intact long enough for all to EVAC without any deaths.......?
I do like the idea of a Shallow Boat style ramp instead of a rock wall... Not as silly as it sounds...
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Hope this is a wake-up call to all PNF..PM whatever you prefer to call them....to be monitoring inside the flt deck...as one should be...it is the PF's job to be "outside" flying the plane when in visual conditions...this accident and many others show what happens when nobody is minding the store...
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NTSB says the autopilot, flight director, auto-throttle: 'all responded normally'.
Read between the lines and see they were programmed incorrectly for approach.
Still blown away by the stoutness of the airframe..It really was the main reason the wreck was survivable IMO.
Read between the lines and see they were programmed incorrectly for approach.
Still blown away by the stoutness of the airframe..It really was the main reason the wreck was survivable IMO.
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Note that in her press conference on 11 July Deborah Hersman appeared to state that all of the passenger seating structures remained in the aircraft. This suggests that the two pax were ejected because they were not properly seated for the final phase of landing with belts tight across hips. If so, sounds like a CC responsibility, not fulfilled.
From all these posts, I'm getting the impression that A/T is almost never switched off in the T7.
If the 3 pilots all have the mindset A/T is always there, then why bother monitoring the airspeed?
Just set it in the window and it will be taken care of
If the 3 pilots all have the mindset A/T is always there, then why bother monitoring the airspeed?
Just set it in the window and it will be taken care of
Controversial, moi?
I have avoided contributing to the 99% of utter drivel that can be read in this thread but statements like:
really cannot be left unchallenged.
Certainly in my company and several others that I am aware of the CC are trained to use their initiative to evacuate if events are clearly 'catastrophic'. Debate can often be interesting in SEP training regarding how you define 'catastrophic' but to the suggestion that the CC waited to be told to evacuate in this instance beggars belief.
The two (some reports say three) people ejected from the aircraft were CC.
Because that is basic airmanship and it is also part of being type rated that you understand the way a system operates and its LIMITATIONS!
It was clear that the stewardesses by procedure had to ask the pilot for a decision no doubt as their training advises them to do so.
Certainly in my company and several others that I am aware of the CC are trained to use their initiative to evacuate if events are clearly 'catastrophic'. Debate can often be interesting in SEP training regarding how you define 'catastrophic' but to the suggestion that the CC waited to be told to evacuate in this instance beggars belief.
This suggests that the two pax were ejected because they were not properly seated for the final phase of landing with belts tight across hips. If so, sounds like a CC responsibility, not fulfilled.
If the 3 pilots all have the mindset A/T is always there, then why bother monitoring the airspeed?
Last edited by M.Mouse; 12th Jul 2013 at 05:41.
Originally Posted by ogel
the press keeps telling that they were using auto-pilot until 1,600 feet. What were they doing with the autopilot when there is no ILS operative? Just set the heading and a rate of descent? Does not make sense to me...
Originally Posted by Ironbutt
this is a wake-up call to all PNF..PM whatever you prefer to call them....to be monitoring inside the flt deck...as one should be...it is the PF's job to be "outside" flying the plane when in visual conditions...
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No, the PF's job is to fly the aeroplane, that's in (speed and sink) and out (slope). Doesn't matter whether it's VMC or in the gloop. The PM's job is to monitor all of that.
Read my post..PM=pilot monitoring..PNF= Pilot Not Flying..or Pilot Monitoring....one of the biggest mistakes I have seen from the back seat of the sim is nobody inside monitoring sink rate/speed etc....the TRI has a busy job...I know...been there done that...
Read my post..PM=pilot monitoring..PNF= Pilot Not Flying..or Pilot Monitoring....one of the biggest mistakes I have seen from the back seat of the sim is nobody inside monitoring sink rate/speed etc....the TRI has a busy job...I know...been there done that...
Last edited by ironbutt57; 12th Jul 2013 at 06:02.
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1867 posts in the thread and all "trained pilots" know the key is that the speedo on the left of the PFD has to be looked at occasionally and the throttle then moved appropriately. I am not one to be overly critical but sorry, it is all getting pretty silly nowadays. It is now 70 years since the Link Trainer was used to teach folks how to fly on instruments; it doesn't matter how well designed the aircraft are if those in the seats can't fly!
We have had Afriqiah, Turkish, Lion, Colgan and now Asiana fly aircraft into the ground that were perfectly Servicable. Pay to fly is rife around the world and I'd guess less than 1% of pilots have their basic training paid for by the carriers that employ them. I heard at a conference that the only entry requirement into pilot training is a credit card with a big enough limit. At the time it seemed pretty trite but until the industry decides it wishes to pay to select and train pilots with the appropriate aptitude and skills this will continue. The bean counters rule and right now accept this as being a cost of doing business!
We have had Afriqiah, Turkish, Lion, Colgan and now Asiana fly aircraft into the ground that were perfectly Servicable. Pay to fly is rife around the world and I'd guess less than 1% of pilots have their basic training paid for by the carriers that employ them. I heard at a conference that the only entry requirement into pilot training is a credit card with a big enough limit. At the time it seemed pretty trite but until the industry decides it wishes to pay to select and train pilots with the appropriate aptitude and skills this will continue. The bean counters rule and right now accept this as being a cost of doing business!