Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

Old 11th Jul 2013, 19:23
  #1761 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: over the rainbow
Age: 75
Posts: 562
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
The NTSB can only recommend, not demand, that the FAA consider these procedural changes.


NTSB: FAA Can Do More To Prevent Go-around Midairs | Aviation International News
roving is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 19:30
  #1762 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: over the rainbow
Age: 75
Posts: 562
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
From the same website ...

July 8, 2013, 3:10 PM

The FAA has published details outlining new procedures for air traffic controllers conducting simultaneous approaches to offset parallel runways (SOIA) at airports separated laterally by less than 3,000 feet, such as San Francisco International (SFO). The new procedures, published on June 27, are expected to improve arrival rates at qualifying airports that employ the required high-updating radar–one second per update–to be able to track aircraft closely enough to warn pilots should one intrude on the other’s airspace during poor weather.

ATC must still provide a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical or a minimum of three-mile radar separation between aircraft during turns onto final approaches. The order also outlines a number of additional separation requirement standards as they are applied to the leading aircraft on one runway and the trailing aircraft on the parallel.

Simultaneous Approach Guidance Documents Updated | Aviation International News
roving is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 19:30
  #1763 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 64
Posts: 7,103
Received 295 Likes on 186 Posts
de facto, consider the time of day of the landing (oops, crash) and the landing direction.

Of note, some of the best posts in the thread since the OP went up:

suninmyeyes

ASRAAM

Rashid Bacon

pudljumpr

There are a number of other good points worth pondering. When a wreck happens and there is a possibility that pilot error was a contributing cause, it is usual for the investigating body to dig into what is behind that potential factor. The number of factors that feed an error in the cockpit is non trivial.

Photonic, I appreciate the points you make in terms of data availability and trying to quash rumors using the press as a tool. I get that.

The investigative process itself is supposed to be deliberate.
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 19:51
  #1764 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2013
Location: Earth
Age: 49
Posts: 152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency event?
Teldorserious is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:03
  #1765 (permalink)  
None but a blockhead
 
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: London, UK
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Request for information - in the NTSB briefing for the 10th July, they say at fifteen minutes that approaches to 28L and 28R are alternated so two don't happen in parallel.

I've flown into SFO many times and have most definitely been in a parallel landing; indeed, I remember asking about separation rules for this on Pprune a few years back, and someone has described a similar situation on this thread. It's unnerving enough as pax; I wouldn't like to be up front with TCAS complaining.

How often does this happen, and does the NTSB know? I know this wasn't the case here, but boy, thank goodness for that.
Self Loading Freight is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:29
  #1766 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: USA
Posts: 372
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
How often does this happen, and does the NTSB know? I know this wasn't the case here, but boy, thank goodness for that.
You have personally been on a parallel approach at KSFO and question if the NTSB knows?

No conspiracy here...

Paralell approaches have been standard operating procedure at KSFO for 10+ years. As 28L/R centerlines are in very close proximity to eachother, a PRM (precision runway monitor), think of it as a high speed radar (not as fast as the new one being installed) and using OSIA (Offset Simultaneous Instrument Arrival) procedures, aircraft are cleared for the 28L and R ILS approaches while required to maintain separation visually from the aircraft ahead on the parallel approach.

The PRM will warn ATC and ATC will issue an immediate instruction for the offending aircraft to safely abandon the approach.

The most likely reason it wasnt being used on the day, is that it requires both GS and LOC to be available for both runways. And as we all know, the GS for 28L/R have been out for over a month now due to the new displaced thresholds and the associated new GS antenna being installed.


When all is said and done (still scheduled to be Aug. 22nd) then the guys at Asiana will once again be happy campers. One push of APP, and the beloved 'LAND3' on the FMA will once again be displayed.

Last edited by B-HKD; 11th Jul 2013 at 20:36.
B-HKD is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:34
  #1767 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 64
Posts: 7,103
Received 295 Likes on 186 Posts
Teldorserious:

If you've read the entire thread, you'll note a rather raucous chorus of opinion that flying a visual approach on a VFR day is a standard required task and skill. It is somewhat surprising to see comments to the contrary, however.

If you read up on organizational culture, and the root of air mishaps -- there are plenty of links and points provided throughout this thread -- you'll find out that pilot error has, or can have, roots in training, practice, currency, and organizational habits.

If you read (a non pilot) Malcolm Gladwell's Outliers and his narrative of how Korean Airlines went to some effort (with help from a number of other airlines and airline related organizations) to identify organizational issues that contributed to their (at the time) poor safety record, you might understand why any number of posters here don't simply point at two pilots and declare: their fault, problem sorted.

Beyond that: pot stirring, perhaps?
Lonewolf_50 is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:46
  #1768 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: uk
Posts: 151
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency
There's no apologism on this forum, what there is is an attempt to understand the circumstances that led to what appears to be a huge deriliction of duty by the operating pilots. There's also a degree of sympathy from those of us who have dealt with SFO's novel way of controlling heavies. That's sympathy, but it's a long train ride away from apologism!

Here's a news flash for you buck, flying on a sunny day can turn out to be a very dangerous day out indeed. The weather during my last Mayday was just wonderful, wasn't much help at putting out a fire though. What you call our 'apologism' is what NASA publish as its team skills debriefing guide which we use to review our performance. Learning from accidents like this is what the industry has spent 20 years trying to ingrain in us all! Negligence is rarely a result of willfull disregard, aviation is littered with the graves of the good intentioned performing below the standards required on that given day. We keep learning and relearning or we step back into a past that I'm in no hurry to return to.

If you believe its as simple as jonny foreigner isn't as good as us yanks then I despair. If your hearing apologism, I suggest your not listening.
the heavy heavy is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:53
  #1769 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: In a Pineapple Under the Sea
Age: 61
Posts: 152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Boggles at the depth and pernicious level of airline pilot apologism there is on this forum.

So flying on sunny days is dangerous now? Auto throttle not working is an emergency event?
Thank you. 3 pilots - automation either failed or was used improperly - plane crashed while attempting a landing. Either way - isn't it the error of the pilot for allowing the speed to drop that low? If not - who's fault is it?

I don't care how many ways you slice it - the THREE pilots watched (or ignored) the aircraft's speed degrade below safe levels and tried to compensate when it was too late. It's not like the aircraft's automation reconfigured the aircraft and caused the accident . . .

WillFlyForCheese is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 20:59
  #1770 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: MA, USA
Age: 54
Posts: 75
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
"Every air traffic control frequency is under the control of the ATCO who is providing the service on that frequency. A pilot would virtually never speak directly to another pilot, although that is simply a matter of pressing the transmit button. Usually what happens is to speak through the ATCO i.e. "Tower, doesn't the 777 on finals look a little low?" This serves to bring everyone's attention to the situation and the Controller might well respond with a call to the 777 such as "Asiana 214, you look a little low, are you OK?"

I was wondering the same thing. Isn't ATC required whilst on an IFR flight plan to give you low altitude alerts (7110.65U 2-1-6)? "a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/initiate an alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude that, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain and/or obstructions."

Or does their obligation end just because they cleared you for a visual approach. When I was working on my rating I'd gotten nudged on practice approaches in VMC/VFR under the hood.
Yancey Slide is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:04
  #1771 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Up in the sky
Posts: 5
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
It is quite obvious to all professionals that this approach look pretty much like what is called an unstable approach, but was that the only cause?

An accident or even an incident is always the result of multiple things going wrong, sometimes even things that are not so obvious at the first glance.

We know the glideslope was off, that might have been a contributing factor, but it can be replaced by other things like fix distance / altitude checks, the simple rule 1NM - 300ft that all pro's should know applies.

The flight was vectored to a 17NM final and cleared for a visual approach after more than 10 hours flight time, a visual approach can be a demanding manouver, maybe another contributing factor?

Initially the aircraft was high and fast on the approach, descent rates from 1.600ft to 500ft was around 1.400 ft/min average, about double of what is normally required. Another contributing factor? Maybe.

The A/T was mentioned, it did not perform as expected in maintaining airspeed. A contributing factor? Maybe.

Anyhow, a pilot must be able to take over an aircraft from any state of automation to manual flying (that means manual flight with manual thrust without flight director) at any time when the automation does not perform as he wants it to do. Some discussions about which mode on the Boeing does this and that mode on the Airbus does that is just nutpicking and bores me to death, it really does not matter: If it does not do what I want it to do or expect it to do, I switch it off and do it manually myself. So what? So simple! The very basic competence of a good pilot. It is the pilot who controls where the aircraft goes to, not the aircraft that controls where the pilot goes to.

As the flight was a training flight, several questions arise to me:
  • How much training did the Captain under Supervision receive during the transition to the new type?
  • Airlines in Korea are known to hire contract pilots on all aircraft types, so who did pay for the new type rating? The trainee or the airline?
  • How much, and what kind of training did the Training Captain receive during his training to Instructor Pilot?
  • Was the training the pilots received sufficient? The training certainly met the minimum standards required by authorities, but is that enough?

Modern Jet Airplanes are very complex systems, I would even say they belong to the most complex systems, mankind is able to build. The are heavy, they are fast, they have a lot of interacting systems and computers build in.
The Operating Manuals are really thick books with hundreds of pages, some even way over thousand pages. Pilots are expected to know every single sentence and note of their Operating Manual, additionally to the aircraft manual, a pilot must know a whole bunch of other books and rules to perform his job well. But there is a difference between just memorizing a book and putting the knowledge to good use in an instance of a second while handling an aluminium tube of two hundred tons of weight through 3 dimensions of space and put it down on a 60m wide and 3400m long piece of concrete in one piece (or even less...).

There are minimum requirements defined by the authorities for a new type rating course, but are these minimums enough to feel comfortable as a pilot in command on an airliner? Take a four weeks ground course, click a few thousand pages of CBT (Computer Based Training) slides, have 10 sessions of each 4 hours simulator, maybe even at night time when every other brave soul lies at bed and sleeps, have a check ride and here you go, you are legal to operate the big aircraft as Commander or First Officer. Do you feel safe and comfortable now to operate your new aircraft in any condition, in any weather, in any technical condition, at any time?
Could minimum training might be a contributing factor as well? Maybe.

How about the company culture? Is a go around a mandatory report in the company or has the company so much trust on its skipper (who they trust a 250M$+ aluminium tube) to decide whether he likes to go around or not for a few hundred or thousand bucks? A Go Around is just 10 or 15 minutes more flight time, sometimes even less than circumnavigating a bad weather area or fly a little bit holding because the runway needs to be cleared of snow and ice. A Go Around seems to cost money, yes, it burns fuel and uses flight time, but if not done, it is much more expensive if the aircraft crashes and not only the fuel burns. A pilot makes this decision to produce safety, not to save money. If he would be there to save money, he would be called a banker, not a pilot. But converting safety to a monetary value is really difficult.

Another point of company culture is the hierarchy gradient between flightcrew members. Does the Captain loose face if the First Officer gives a speed call? Does the First Officer (or Second Officer) have the authority to call for a go around? Possibly even as an observer from the jump seat? What if you call for a Go Around just because you think "It does not feel right..."?
What will happen? Nothing? A report written followed by coffee without cookies with management?
Dolfin is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:04
  #1772 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Heavy Heavy, Amen to that. Deep down we all know this should never have happened, but those of us who have operated into SFO where parallel approaches are REQUIRED in order to get maximum use of BOTH northerly runways know that an approach into SFO can be hair raising at times. This article from Der Spiegel, lays it on a bit thick, but gives a flavour of operating a heavy into the Bay.

San Francisco: Crash 'Was Only a Matter of Time'

By Gerald Traufetter


REUTERS
The cause of the crash landing of a Boeing 777 in San Francisco is still unclear. But pilots say they had been worried about conditions at the West Coast airport for a while. An important flight control system had been out of service for weeks.

A lot of newsprint has already been devoted to speculating about the cause of the dramatic crash landing of an Asiana Airlines Boeing 777 at San Francisco International Airport on Saturday. But pilots that have flown into the California airport in recent weeks also have major questions about the accident that left two people dead and 182 injured.

A landing safety system has been out of service for weeks because of renovation work, including a component of the facility's instrument landing system that tracks an incoming airplane's glide path. Deborah Hersman, head of the United States National Transportation Safety Board, said that investigators would examine what role the absence of a glide slope system played in the accident. A statement from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Sunday said that the glide slope system, which pilots were informed would be turned off, is "not necessary for safe landing" on visual flight routes at this particular airport.
A German airline pilot who regularly lands at the airport and has asked to remain anonymous says he was not surprised by the accident, though. "A stabilized arrival in San Francisco has become practically impossible," the pilot said in an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE. "It was only a matter of time before something like this happened."

An 'Unstabilized Arrival'

No one can say with certainty what the cause of the accident was. But what is known so far about the circumstances of the crash do fit the profile of an "unstabilized arrival," the German pilot, a captain, told SPIEGEL ONLINE. The Boeing initially approached the runway at too high of an altitude and then began to decrease rapidly. The automatic landing system that is currently out of service would have warned the pilot earlier.

Before it hit the runway, the aircraft apparently crashed into a seawall that protects the beginning of the runway from the water of the San Francisco Bay. The airplane was catapulted back into the air and came down again hard, with the undercarriage slamming against the asphalt. The impact was so powerful that it ripped the tail of the plane clean off.

Without the tail fin, it is nearly impossible for a pilot to steer a plane in a straight line. Plus, several parts of the undercarriage had snapped off. The scattered debris and luggage are evidence of just how great the impact was. "Under the circumstances, one could say that it turned out much better than it could have," the captain told SPIEGEL ONLINE.

Chaotic Circumstances

Among his colleagues, the San Francisco International Airport has a particularly bad reputation. In addition to the electronic landing system being off, the pilots were often instructed by the air traffic controllers to approach the runway at an extremely steep rate of descent, he said. Presumably due to noise concerns, the aircraft were supposed to make their path of descent as short as possible, so that they would only be flying at low altitude for a brief period. "This rate of descent is often the maximum of what is allowed, and sometimes even higher," the captain said.

Adding to these stressors, the pilots must also land in quick succession. These chaotic circumstances are not without consequences. SPIEGEL ONLINE has learned that some three weeks ago, a Lufthansa Airbus had to abort a landing at the airport. Furthermore, Lufthansa statistics rank the San Francisco International Airport at the top of the list for aborted landings, which is why even before the Asiana crash landing, the German national carrier had implemented special safety instructions for ending flights there.

On Sunday evening, Hersman said the Asiana pilot had attempted to abort the landing about one and a half seconds before impact. The flight recorder shows that just seconds before that, there were no complications. Hersman has so far remained silent on what may have caused the accident, but commenters on several pilot forums suggest that it was indeed because the landing system was unavailable.

Even without technical deficiencies, pilots consider the airport to be a challenge because of the onsite conditions. Legendary pilot Chesley Sullenberger, who successfully crash-landed an Airbus in New York's Hudson River in 2009, has confirmed this in television interviews. The now-retired Sullenberger also said that descending over water makes optical assessment of altitude extremely difficult for pilots.

According to Asiana, the pilot of the Boeing 777 had little experience with that particular plane model, and it was his first time landing it in San Franciso. Though he'd completed some 10,000 flying hours over the course of his career, just 43 were in the cockpit of a Boeing 777, an airline spokeswoman said.

Last edited by nigegilb; 11th Jul 2013 at 21:09.
nigegilb is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:12
  #1773 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Somewhere Over America
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I was through KSFO Sunday 07/07/13 and the green laser light warning was up on the ATIS.
Halfnut is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:31
  #1774 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: SFO/KCH
Posts: 42
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by draglift
I spent many years flying 747s to Africa and the Caribbean and rarely saw an ILS. The more approaches you do without an ILS the better pilot you will be.
And this is the highly visible elephant in the room that the automation-loving posters just refuse to acknowledge. In essence, ATC offering visual approaches in safe conditions is, in the long-term, SAFER for everyone. Removing the option or requiring functional glide slopes, ILS, etc. everywhere is just reducing the problem to the lowest common denominator "solution." That's the knee-jerk "easy" way out but does nothing to raise the collective bar. This is only "safer" when dependence on automation and lack of pilot skills is the norm.

The true solution is not to increase automation, but instead to raise the collective bar through increased training and daily exposure to approaches which are not dependent on automation for success. It certain airlines cannot meet this requirement then they quite simply aren't safe to fly. Any other workaround such as requiring x, y, or z to be active at all times coddles unsafe pilots and pleases the bean counters at the expense of aggregate pilot skill.
clayne is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:40
  #1775 (permalink)  
BBK
 
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 468
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Clayne

So you are saying that a non precision approach is safer, in the long run, than a precision approach. Words fail me!
BBK is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:45
  #1776 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
ASI has been reduced to a small tape indication on the display. I can't believe that the PF would have allowed the airspeed to continue to decay if he knew what it was. So, why didn't he know?
Airspeed needs a more prominent display.
Being a glider/PPL FI I used to do jumpseat rides frequently (pre 911...). Of course I always monitored what the pilots are doing (once an FI, forever an FI...). I always scanned speed on the backup ASI, which was a "propper" mechanical one, not an electronic small tape. Matter of habit of course, but mayby also indicating a human factors issue. I still find it extremely hard to see any trend on a speed tape unless some new color is coming in, while on the old fashioned round dial I find it so easy. I also find it easier to see margins to the ends of the colored arcs if I can see the full arc. It makes it so much easier to put the reading in proportion. I don´t know how others stepping up to "serious" aircraft after thousands of hours on "toy planes" managed the new style ASI. Or do you simply leave ASI to the A/T ?
Volume is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:46
  #1777 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: SEA
Posts: 35
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I've flown into SFO many times and have most definitely been in a parallel landing; indeed, I remember asking about separation rules for this on PPRuNe a few years back, and someone has described a similar situation on this thread.
Just recently, actually as of Wednesday, May 15, 2013, 0600 PDT (1300Z), the FAA recently approved the WTMD system and procedures for SFO.

WTMD is the crosswind-enabled elimination of wake turbulence separation minima when Heavy/B757 aircraft depart the downwind runway and any aircraft follows departing the upwind runway.
This system will be fielded at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), followed by George Bush Intercontinental/Houston Airport (IAH), and Memphis International Airport (MEM) to demonstrate operational benefit and support operational experience for potential expansion of airports for WTMD operation.

INFO May 2013
UAVop is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 21:49
  #1778 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 2,584
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
imo there are considerable differences between flying a formal "procedural" visual circuit or the equally procedural visual circle-to-land that my company trains and radar positioning to a visual approach. It may seem a strange suggestion to non-pilots but I think other pilots will understand what I mean.

If you haven't been specifically trained to do this it may seem quite alien, simply because it isn't "linked" to flight regimes we are used to. I've certainly seen our exceptionally well trained (Eu) FOs quite unsettled by having to do this without instrument guidance when they're more than capable of doing the first two manoeuvres mentioned simply because they aren't used to it.

As the fast jet pilot said several pages back (sorry, name escapes me now) if you don't train and practice simple manoeuvres you're quite likely to get them wrong.

Add to this a clearly unsuitable approach profile for any airport outside a mountain range, a (to me) ludicrous request for 180 to 5 (as by our operating standards we'd risk inability to land from such an unstable approach in an aircraft of one third the weight - is this really Europeans being "over cautious"???) and finally RT so atrociously mangled and gabbled that imo this alone have the place shut down for retraining of ATC and its beginning to look like the Koreans are by no means alone in shouldering the responsibility for this accident. That anyone with English as a first language copes with that sort of gobbldegook is impressive, how anyone without it manages is nothing less than incredible.

I don't usually go in for US bashing, but several aspects of the environment these guys were flying in look more like Africa 20 years ago than anything I've ever seen or heard in 15,000hrs in Europe.

Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 11th Jul 2013 at 22:00.
Agaricus bisporus is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 22:03
  #1779 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2010
Location: europe
Age: 67
Posts: 645
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
BBK....read clayne's post again. He is NOT suggesting that visual approaches are the safest option, merely he is stating that the training bar should be raised, and that all pilots should be quite capable of carrying out a visual approach without sweating about it.
deefer dog is offline  
Old 11th Jul 2013, 22:18
  #1780 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: Pasadena
Posts: 633
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Words from United

If the crew of the United 747 waiting to depart did say "Asiana. Go around", I am most impressed.

If I remember correctly, that was the exact phraseology the Heathrow controller used to the (Qatari?) aircraft following the Hatton Cross 777 crash.

Perhaps the most direct way to try to get Asiana to pay attention to their impending accident.
awblain is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.